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Introduction 
 
Subject and Parameters of this Dissertation 
Rape in war has long been a reality. In 1992, after visiting refugee camps and 
women’s groups in and around Zagreb, a member of a team representing 
international aid agencies reported that representatives of churches and international 
agencies stated that women from conflicting parties were, ‘of course’ being raped by 
opposing combatants and she heard, many times, ‘that’s war’ with accompanying 
shrugs.1 It was a comment indicative of the chilling acceptance frequently exhibited 
to this reality of abuse in war. The report of the visit noted the two types of rape 
which refugee women and women’s groups had been highlighting in the conflict 
between Serbs and Bosnians: rape as a by-product of war and rape as a weapon of 
war.2 The response from some observers in the international organisation which led 
the team, was to dismiss the term, ‘rape as a weapon of war’, as merely provocative 
or as an attempt to be clever or strategically useful, in attracting attention to what 
they deemed ‘just’ a women’s issue.3 Such attitudes indicated that these workers in 
humanitarian organisations did not take seriously the reality that rape was and could 
be a weapon, deliberately planned and systematically implemented. Their comments 
seemed to indicate a failure to recognise that such rape was an issue for communities, 
women, men and children. 
The conflict in Rwanda in 1994 followed with more widespread use of rape. Then in 
1999 another report was presented to humanitarian organisations and to a cross-party 
group of women senators in the Australian Government; this report highlighted that 
rape was continuing on a mass scale in the conflict in Kosovo.4 The response, this 
time, from a senior executive in the Australian humanitarian agency which had 
                                                                
1 B Fitzpatrick, Rape of Women in War, World Council of Churches, Geneva, 1992, p. 21. 
2 Fitzpatrick, pp. 21-22. 
3 World Council of Churches, Geneva 1992. 
4 B Fitzpatrick, Kosovo – the Women and Children, World Vision Australia, Burwood, Victoria 1999. 
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funded the investigation was: ‘It is not a story – men are being killed’.5 Despite its 
prevalence in history and the work of feminist scholars such as those discussed in 
later chapters of this dissertation, rape in war had been largely ignored. Rather than 
seeing it as a violation of humanitarian law or as behaviour which was preventable, 
there had been a general acceptance of rape as an inevitable part of conflict. Such a 
restricted view had centuries of negative implication for women and communities 
and facilitated the ongoing use of rape in war. This persistent denial and 
mischaracterisation of war rape had: 
reinforced its acceptance as a natural, if regrettable, aspect of war rather than as a 
crime under humanitarian law. Implicit tolerance by military and political leaders 
signifies implicit permission (and) can lead to condoning it and thereby to an overt 
strategy that utilises rape as a weapon of war.6  
This long-standing refusal to confront the tactical use of rape in war finally, 
gradually, began to be overcome from the 1990s. 
This dissertation analyses discourse between judiciaries, states and international 
organisations since the 1990s, which indicates the development of normative 
rejection of what the dissertation terms and will define as ‘tactical rape’. It finds 
discourse which led to increased understanding and normative rejection of the 
broader concept of sexual violence in war. John Dryzek defined discourse as, ‘the 
sets of concepts, categories and ideas that provide ways to understand and act in the 
world, whether or not those who subscribe to them are aware of their existence’.7 The 
discourse will be analysed in the context of understanding the changing nature of 
war. It will consider emerging judicial decisions and applications of international 
                                                                
5 World Vision Australia. 
6 N Farwell, ‘War Rape: New Conceptualisations and Responses’, Affilia, Vol. 19, no. 4, Winter 2004, 
p. 389, retrieved 6 August 2008, <aff.sagepub.com>. 
7 JS Dryzek, Deliberative Global Politics; discourse and democracy in a divided world, Polity Press 
Cambridge, UK, 2006, p. vi. 
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humanitarian law and United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions which 
have contributed to a growing normative rejection of tactical rape and sexual 
violence in war. This is based on the definition of norms as ‘collective expectations 
about proper behaviour for a given identity’ as distinct from principled ideas which 
are defined as ‘beliefs about right and wrong held by individuals’.8 More detailed 
consideration of the development of collective expectations within and by 
communities will be examined in Chapter 1. 
This dissertation examines the question: what has been the nature and extent of 
commitment by the international community to reject tactical rape and sexual 
violence in war since the early 1990s? The focus is primarily at the international 
level where, it is argued, there has been considerable and, in some ways, steady 
development of normative and institutional rejection of tactical rape and sexual 
violence in conflict since the 1990s. Terms such as ‘reject’, ‘condemn’ and ‘prohibit’ 
are all relevant to describing responses. However, the term most used in this 
dissertation is ‘reject’, defined as refusing ‘to acquiesce in, submit to or adopt (a rule, 
command, practice, etc), to refuse credit to’, with some use of ‘condemn’ which is 
defined as holding ‘a judicial conviction; an expression of disapprobation’ or 
‘prohibit’, which is defined as ‘forbid’.9  The focus is at international level because it 
will be shown that, at this level, reactions to the use of tactical rape finally resulted in 
a broad rejection of sexual violence in war. Reference to the international community 
is reference to international institutions such as the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC), international Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) and to international 
civil society.  Recognition and understanding of tactical rape eventually led to the 
                                                                
8 RL Jepperson, A Wendt & PJ Katzenstein, ‘Norms, identity, and culture in national security’, in PJ 
Katzenstein (ed.), Culture and National Security, 1996, p. 54 cited in T Risse & K Sikkink, ‘The 
socialisation of international human rights norms into domestic practices’ p. 7 in The Power of Human 
Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, T Risse, S C Ropp & K Sikkink (eds), Cambridge 
University Press, 1999. 
9 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Volumes I and II, Oxford 
University Press, 1973. 
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realisation that sexual violence needed to be confronted if women, men, communities 
and states were to be secure. It also led to the realisation that if women were 
vulnerable to sexual violence in peace they would be even more vulnerable in 
wartime.  
In order to answer this question about the level of commitment to respond to tactical 
violence and sexual violence, there are other, related, questions to be answered. What 
contributions did the conflicts and ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) make to the international community’s eventual rejection of tactical rape? 
What degree of understanding and commitment to rejecting tactical rape and 
understanding the broader concept of sexual violence is reflected in United Nations 
Security Council resolutions in the two decades since the early 1990s? To what 
extent do the interests of human security and international stability intersect and how 
has realisation of this intersection contributed to a normative rejection of tactical rape 
and sexual violence? What is needed to demonstrate a serious international 
commitment to rejecting tactical rape and sexual violence? 
This dissertation argues that rejection of tactical rape and sexual violence is an issue 
of international security because this ongoing form of abuse is a threat to human 
security and to international peace and stability. It represents a failure of compliance 
with accepted international humanitarian and human rights law and it impedes 
international responses to humanitarian crises. International humanitarian law is the 
law which imposes duties on states and individuals to restrain the conduct of war in 
order to protect or limit harm to non-combatants and to those who are defenceless in 
the hands of the enemy.10        This dissertation argues that as tactical rape and sexual 
violence in war are understood in their totality as a strategic method of targeting 
                                                                
10 GIAD Draper, ‘Humanitarianism in the Modern Law of Armed Conflict’, International Relations, 
vol. viii no 4, 1985, p.240. 
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civilians in conflict, contravening accepted international humanitarian and human 
rights law, there is a consequent requirement to prevent such violations, to hold 
perpetrators accountable and to provide justice for survivors. It argues that 
accountability and justice must be evident during transitions from war to peace and 
in the long term. It argues that the provision of justice is essential to avoid re-
emergence of conflicts. As will be seen in later analysis of United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) resolutions, states have begun slowly to accept responsibility and 
respond accordingly. Because tactical rape and sexual violence can destabilise states 
and hinder peacemaking and peacekeeping, it is in states’ interest to respond and take 
action to confront such attacks. In 1999, the then Prime Minister of the United 
Kingdom, Tony Blair, outlined a new ‘Doctrine of International Community’ and 
stated as part of that doctrine, ‘we cannot turn our backs on conflicts and the 
violations of human rights in other countries if we still want to be secure’.11 As later 
chapters demonstrate, the political will to confront tactical rape and sexual violence 
in war has followed more from a gradual realisation of it as a threat to international 
peace and security than from a perception of rape in war as a women’s issue.  
This introduction first defines tactical rape and sexual violence. It then acknowledges 
the nature of the ‘new wars’ and conflicts of the 1990s, the contexts in which tactical 
rape and sexual violence have been widely used as a deliberate strategy. It identifies 
key events which have stimulated discourse and legal bases for the development of 
international progress from understanding tactical rape to the normative rejection of 
sexual violence as it includes and goes beyond tactical rape. It outlines the concept, 
debates and implications of tactical rape and sexual violence for security and it 
establishes the parameters of this dissertation.  
                                                                
11 A Blair, Doctrine of the International Community, address to the Chicago Economic Club, 22 April 
1999. 
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Tactical Rape and Sexual Violence in War 
In this dissertation, tactical rape is defined as rape which is used as a tactic by state 
or non-state actors to attack individuals, groups and communities deemed to be 
enemies in conflicts, which may be intra-state or inter-state. It targets civilians. It is a 
specific strategy to control, destabilise and even to destroy the social fabric of 
civilian communities. It can be a strategy to remove populations from one geographic 
area to another. It is a widespread, deliberate policy of attack, promoted or condoned 
by at least one party to a conflict and it may constitute a war crime, a crime against 
humanity and may be used as a weapon of genocide, of torture or of ethnic cleansing.  
This dissertation argues that tactical rape as a military strategy has immediate 
negative physical, emotional and communal impact on women and civilian 
populations (including men) during conflict. Because of how societies are 
constructed, there are also long-lasting negative economic, cultural and social 
impacts on women, civilian populations and communities. The cases and accounts in 
Chapters one, three and four, relating to the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in 
particular, illustrate these effects. There is also consideration of the role of societal 
values and attitudes, such as patriarchy, in fostering and increasing the effectiveness 
of tactical rape. It will be shown that tactical rape has been recognised as having an 
impact which hinders transitions from conflict to peace, hinders peacemaking, 
destabilises communities and states and can be a threat to international security. 
Tactical rape in war is a reality, a strategy which specifically and deliberately targets 
civilians, which is perniciously effective with immediate and long-term destructive 
impact. It is a real threat and the international community of states has increasingly 
recognised its responsibility and a self-interested motive to confront, to prevent, and 
to hold accountable those who perpetrate tactical rape and sexual violence in war. 
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It is imperative to recognise that tactical rape and sexual violence in war as defined 
in this dissertation are essentially military weapons, used to gain political ends. As 
with any rape, tactical rape is not primarily to do with sexuality. There are various 
types of rape in war: rape of individuals by individuals; rape by the rogue soldier or 
criminal who acts without any authorisation. These can be referred to as ‘by-
products’ of war and the concomitant breakdown of law and order. They are matters 
of concern and should not be easily dismissed. There can be rape offered as a reward 
for victorious forces. There can be rape offered as a ‘comfort’ to troops – an 
insidious term used in reference to women taken into sexual slavery by Japanese 
forces during World War 2. During the Russian army advance through Germany, two 
million women were raped with Stalin’s blessing on the grounds that ‘the boys are 
entitled to their fun’.12 There has been a long tradition of victors claiming the right to 
rape. Christine Chinkin, who has provided numerous insights to the issue of rape and 
sexual violence, stated in one paper that ‘women are attacked in conflicts across the 
globe by men of all colours, religions, nationalities and ideologies’ and pointed out 
that licence to rape has even been used as a term of employment for mercenary 
soldiers.13 These uses of rape must all be condemned as abuses of human rights. 
However, these types of rape in war are not the core subject of this dissertation. This 
dissertation focuses on tactical rape as used primarily against civilian women and 
girls, with acknowledgement that women combatants and men are, at times, also 
targeted and women may, at times, be complicit. There is no assumption that all men 
rape nor that all military men rape. The type of rape which is the focus here is 
tactical rape – not rape as a right or a reward for victory – but rape as a policy and a 
tactic to effect military or political victory. 
                                                                
12 G Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice, Allen Lane, 1999, p. 306. 
13 C Chinkin, ‘Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women in International Law (Symposium: The Yugoslav 
Crisis: New International Law Issues)’ European Journal of International Law 5 (1994): 326-41. 
p.328 
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There has been increasing discourse in UNSC resolutions and debates (analysed in 
later chapters), which reflects a global comprehension that the use of rape as a 
deliberate, multi-facetted tactic used in conflict is an issue which falls within the 
mandate and responsibility of the UNSC. Analysis of this discourse will show an 
emerging realisation that there is also a multi-facetted impact on states, recognising 
the reality that tactical rape is a threat to human security; a threat to security of 
women, a threat to security of populations and a threat to international security. 
There has also been recognition that confronting tactical rape as a deliberate strategy 
employed in varying ways by parties to conflicts must be comprehensive. Rape can 
be seen as a weapon of war or as a crime against humanity; as a weapon of torture or 
ethnic cleansing or as a weapon of genocide. However, this dissertation will examine 
how recognition of the comprehensive range of uses and impact of tactical rape has 
resulted in a more direct understanding by states of their responsibilities and 
recognition that it is in their own self-interest to ensure compliance with international 
humanitarian and human rights laws. As will be discussed later, some policies of 
some states have begun to reflect, in practice, the normative rejection which at 
present is still largely limited to the international arena. Focussing on the complex 
totality of tactical rape has resulted in comprehension of tactical rape as one 
particular strategy among many which constitute sexual violence, which has 
gradually led to a more comprehensive response to confronting sexual violence.  
This definition of tactical rape reflects the recognition of widespread, policy-directed 
use of rape as a deliberate tactic of attack. Since the 1990s, recognition of the full 
impact of tactical rape and its rejection has evolved into recognition and rejection of 
sexual violence in conflict situations. Sexual violence has been defined in a number 
of key documents by the international community and is a term which is both 
comprehensive and frequently used without specific definition, in overlapping and 
potentially confusing ways. Mahima Achuthan and Renee Black pointed out that 
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recognising three non-mutually exclusive categories for describing sexual crimes is 
useful: sexual violence; sexual exploitation and gender-based violence.14  
In the Statute of the International Criminal Court, rape appears in a comprehensive 
list of acts which are deemed sexual violence. When defining crimes against 
humanity the Statute lists, ‘Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable 
gravity’.15 This list is repeated when defining war crimes and is extended to include, 
‘any other form of sexual violence also constituting a serious violation of article 3 
common to the four Geneva Conventions’.16 The second term which is commonly 
used in discussion is ‘sexual exploitation and abuse’. There are two concepts inherent 
in this term. Sexual exploitation has been defined by the Secretary General of the 
United Nations as, ‘any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, 
differential power or trust for sexual purposes including but not limited to, profiting 
monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another’.17 Sexual 
abuse has been defined as ‘actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, 
whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions’.18 This terminology 
became particularly relevant in the formulation of United Nations Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 (2000) which is discussed more fully in Chapter 5 of this 
dissertation. It reflects the understanding that sexual violence may encompass a 
variety of forms of attack.  
Gender-based violence was defined in 1992 with reference to the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The 
                                                                
14 M Achuthan & R Black, United Nations Resolution 1820: A Preliminary Assessment of the  
 Challenges and Opportunities, International Women’s Tribune Centre, New York, September 2009, 
 p. 11. 
15 Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 7 para 1 (g). 
16 Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 7 para 2 (e). 
17 United Nations, ST/SGB/2003/13, Section 1. October 2003. 
18 United Nations, ST/SGB/2003/13, Section 1, October 2003. 
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monitoring committee of CEDAW referred to the Convention, which in Article 1 
defines gender-based violence as:  
violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects 
women disproportionately. It includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual 
harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty.19 
Gender-based violence includes violent acts such as rape, torture, mutilation, sexual 
slavery, forced impregnation and murder and threats of such acts.20  
In this dissertation there is reference to widespread or systematic abuse as an element 
of tactical rape and/or sexual violence in war. In 1996, widespread sexual violence 
was defined as sexual violence ‘committed on a large scale’ and directed against a 
‘multiplicity of victims’.21 In 2000, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) said that systematic violence referred to the ‘organised nature of 
acts of violence’ and not ‘random occurrences’.22 In 2008, the report of a conference 
held at Wilton Park, just prior to the passing of UNSCR 1820, said that widespread 
or systematic violence referred to violence during conflict perpetrated by armed 
groups ‘as a strategy of warfare for obtaining political and military ends’ and ‘is used 
to torture, terrorize, demoralize, injure, degrade, intimidate and punish affected 
populations’.23 Taken together, these definitions elicited the key elements of 
widespread and systematic sexual violence.  
                                                                
19 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 19 
(llth session, 1992), retrieved 6 March 2010, 
<www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm> . 
20 M Achuthan & R Black,  p. 11. 
21 International Law Commission. ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 
Forty-Eighth Session (1996)’, GAOR, 51st Session, Supp. No. 10, UN Doc A/51/10. 
22 ICTY Case No. IT-95-14-A Judgement (March 3, 2000). 
23 A-M Goertz & L Anderson, ‘Women Targeted or Affected by Armed Conflict: What Role for 
Military Peacekeepers? Conference Summary’, UNIFEM, New York 2008. 
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As will be seen in later chapters, relevant UNSC resolutions are now entitled and 
include reference to ‘women, peace and security’. This is a term which covers 
concerns for women in conflict situations and, since the 1990s, has increasingly 
referred to a recognition that tactical rape and sexual violence relate to human 
security and international security. Later chapters will focus on particularly relevant 
documents of the Security Council: debates and presidential statements as well as the 
text of specific resolutions. It will be seen that strong calls from the public and 
pressure from Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) to respond to widespread 
tactical rape, developed into strong calls to respond to the broader practice of sexual 
violence in war and eventually to a greater understanding of the links between 
women’s vulnerability in peace and in conflict and human and state security. 
The Changing Context and Implications for Use of Tactical Rape 
Consideration of rape in war began to change in the early 1990s with increased 
recognition of rape in war as a policy-based attack against civilians, requiring it to be 
considered ‘as a weapon, a targeted act of terror, rather than merely as a by-product 
of the violence surrounding war’.24 Understanding rape as a tactic in war is 
comprehensible when linked with recognising the changing nature of war in recent 
decades, as will be discussed in the next chapter.25 Mary Kaldor, in her insightful 
consideration, wrote of ‘new wars’ tending to avoid battles between armies and 
instead to aim at control of territory through ‘political, psychological and economic 
techniques of intimidation’.26 When referring to wars in the Balkans and Africa, she 
wrote that in these conflicts, ‘warring parties share the aim of sowing ‘fear and 
hatred’ …and ‘create a climate of insecurity and suspicion’.27 She also said, 
‘essentially, what were considered to be undesirable and illegitimate side-effects of 
                                                                
24 Farwell, p. 390. 
25 A fuller account of the changing nature of war is provided in Chapter 1. 
26 Kaldor, p. 8.  
27 Kaldor, p. 9. 
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old war have become central to the mode of fighting in the new wars’.28 Tactical rape 
is an ideal strategy to achieve the aims of these new wars. While Edward Newman 
claimed that Kaldor had overstated the differences between old and new wars, he 
also acknowledged that tactics such as widespread rape characterised current 
conflicts.29  
Later chapters on the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda will show that in these two 
conflicts, violence was directed against civilian populations. Tactics such as rape and 
sexual violence were prevalent because, as will be demonstrated, these are effective 
ways of targeting women and the communities of which they are part. As part of the 
civilian population, women and girls experience generalised violence. They may be 
killed, murdered, imprisoned or tortured. But, as a result of their gender, they 
experience additional, more specific violence. They may be raped, forced into 
prostitution, suffer forced impregnation, pressured by social and cultural attitudes 
into abortions and may suffer particular forms of humiliation, degradation, rejection 
and exclusion.  
This method of waging wars, by attacking civilians and communities rather than 
directly facing enemies in delineated battles between armies, is fertile ground for the 
use of rape as a deliberate tactic of war. Retired Major General Patrick Cammart, 
Former Division Commander of the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), said in a UNSC debate preceding 
resolution 1820, in 2008, that the climate of impunity in most post-conflict contexts 
allowed the many forms of violence, including sexual violence, to flourish.30 Further, 
he noted that the political will to end the vicious cycle of impunity did not exist and 
                                                                
28 Kaldor, p. 100. 
29 E Newman, ‘The ‘New Wars’ Debate: A Historical Perspective is Needed’, Security Dialogue, vol. 
35 no. 2, 2004, pp. 173-189. 
30 <www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9364.doc.htm>, 1 July 2008, retrieved 6 August 2010. 
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this remained a serious impediment for the prevention of sexual violence. He said, ‘it 
has probably become more dangerous to be a woman than a soldier in an armed 
conflict’.31 The use of this particular tactic of waging new wars is an issue for states 
and entire populations. It is not an issue restricted to concern for one sector of states 
and populations. 
Discourse Leading to Normative Rejection of Tactical Rape and Sexual Violence 
The growing awareness of tactical rape on the part of the media and NGOs 
eventually evolved into widespread rejection of any form of sexual violence. 
International law, particularly as case law emerged from the ICTY and ICTR, 
provided a basis to establish state obligation to prevent, prosecute, hold accountable 
and disallow impunity for perpetrators of tactical rape and sexual violence in war. It 
became possible to demonstrate where existing law could and should be applied and 
to confront arguments against its application. Existing obligations were 
demonstrated. These required understanding and applying sources of customary law, 
humanitarian law, human rights law and, importantly, judicial case law. Emerging 
case law from the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda will be shown to have provided a substantial body of definitions and 
interpretations of international law.  
It was in these judiciaries that significant normative progress occurred and this will 
be examined in this dissertation, while recognising that there are other ongoing 
sources of such case law.32 Writing in 2003, Kelly Askin noted, ‘ten years ago… 
there was debate as to whether rape was even a war crime. Since that time, the 
Tribunals have developed immensely the jurisprudence of war crimes, crimes against 
                                                                
31 <www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9364.doc.htm>, 1 July 2008, retrieved 6 August 2010.  
32 The rationale for focussing on these two Tribunals will be provided later in this chapter. 
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humanity and genocide’.33 The Tribunals dealt with events in different contexts – one 
in Africa, one in Europe – but both dealt with arenas where tactical rape was 
perpetrated. Their similarities and their differences helped to ensure a broad 
understanding of the issue. The extent and nature of the rapes in these two conflict 
arenas will be identified and judicial rulings and definitions will be analysed with 
consideration of the key existing instruments of international law and their 
contributions to the discourse rejecting tactical rape and sexual violence. 
Key UNSC resolutions also provide grounds for tracking and analysing the 
development of an international discourse rejecting tactical rape. These resolutions 
were, at least in part, stimulated by the findings of the Tribunals and built on the two 
sets of outcomes from those judiciaries. For this reason they are linked together in 
the development of an international recognition and response to sexual violence in 
conflict. The major relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council to be 
analysed include: UNSCR 1325 (2000); UNSCR 1820 (2008); UNSCR 1888 (2009) 
and UNSCR 1969 (2010). These are developments since the early 1990s and are the 
focus of consideration because they reflect the growing attention to rape in conflict, 
rape in its manifestations as contravention of international law. Tracking the progress 
on these resolutions demonstrates that normative rejection of rape in conflict appears 
to be accelerating at global level. This is also reflected in the development of the 
mandate and focus of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which will also be 
reviewed. However, further consideration will show that progress is still limited as 
far as institutionalisation at national levels. Each of these resolutions will be analysed 
to evaluate the extent to which each demonstrates some progress in understanding 
the complexity and urgency of having a widely accepted norm rejecting tactical rape. 
Debates by states around these resolutions will be analysed to evaluate the extent to 
                                                                
33 K Askin, ‘Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender-Related Crimes under International Law: 
Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles’, HeidOnline – 21, Berkeley Journal of International 
Law, 288-349, 2003, p. 346. 
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which recognition of the security implications of tactical rape was increasingly 
expressed and, increasingly, provided motivation for confronting tactical rape 
specifically and sexual violence more broadly. 
Tactical Rape and Sexual Violence as Threats to Human and International Security  
The gradual move to the Security Council rejecting tactical rape and eventually 
rejecting sexual violence can be linked to the increasing degree to which debates 
aligned tactical rape and sexual violence with security. It is necessary to recognise 
the links between threats to individuals, to human security and threats to international 
stability, peacekeeping and peacemaking. These threats endanger the security of 
states. Kaldor wrote of the complex relationship between processes of governance, 
legitimacy and forms of security, which she explained as ‘how organised violence is 
controlled’ and she contrasted this with the ‘old wars’ which were concerned with 
‘national security’ in the sense of protection of territory and protection from external 
threats.34 This brings to the fore the need to understand the interplay between the 
security of individuals, communities and states – states individually and as a global 
collective.  
The Commission on Human Security has urged increased recognition of human 
security as an overarching concept of security, which broadens the focus from the 
security of borders to the lives of people and communities inside and across those 
borders.35 The Commission also wrote, ‘all societies depend much more on the acts 
or omissions of others for the security of their people, even for their survival.’36 
Amitav Acharya wrote, ‘in an era of rapid globalisation, security must encompass a 
broader range of concerns and challenges than simply defending the state from 
                                                                
34 Kaldor, p. 140. 
35 Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now 2002-2003, retrieved 20 September 2010 
<ochaonline.un.org/humansecurity/CHS/finalreport/index.html>.  
36 Commission on Human Security, p. 12. 
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external military attack’.37 In the new wars of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 
security threats extended from the immediate, localised, internal territory to the 
international community whose laws of war and laws for the protection of the most 
basic of human rights were flouted, deliberately and extensively. These threats were 
eventually confronted with the international tribunals and some forms of direct 
intervention into the sovereignty of states.  
It was in the key UNSC resolutions passed between 2000 and 2011 which are the 
focus of this dissertation, that the UNSC recognised the need for action in response 
to violence against women. There were significant instances of states’ representatives 
in UNSC debates referring to rape in war and the well-being and security of states as 
linked. Secretary of State of the United States, Condoleezza Rice, chaired the debate 
on UNSCR 1820 in June 2008. She commented on the fact that there had long been 
dispute about whether sexual violence against women in conflict was an issue the 
Council was authorised to address and said, ‘we affirm that sexual violence 
profoundly affects not only the health and safety of women, but the economic and 
social stability of their nations’.38 In the same discussion, Deputy Secretary-General 
Asha-Rose Migiro also addressed the meeting, saying that sexual violence had not 
only grave physical and psychological health consequences for its victims, but also 
direct social consequences for communities and entire societies: ‘impunity for sexual 
violence committed during conflict perpetuates a tolerance of abuse against women 
and girls and leaves a damaging legacy by hindering national reconciliation’.39 The 
debates by states in Security Council, which will be analysed more fully in a later 
chapter, reflected an important step with states agreeing that rejection of tactical rape 
and sexual violence was, indeed, an issue for the Security Council and could no 
                                                                
37 A Acharya , ‘Human security’ in John Baylis & Steve Smith (eds), The Globalisation of World 
Politics, Fourth Edition, Oxford Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 492. 
38 <www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9364.doc.htm>, 1 July 2008, retrieved 6 August 2010. 
39 <www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9364.doc.htm>, 1 July 2008, retrieved 6 August 2010. 
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longer be side-lined or dismissed as a sectoral issue applying to women but not to 
states.  
In discussions around the passing of UNSCR 1888, in 2009, Secretary of State of the 
United States, Hillary Clinton, urged the UNSC to pursue the fight against sexual 
crimes even beyond the measures called for in the resolution, saying that sexual 
violence in conflict areas could not be separated from the broader security issues on 
the Council’s agenda.40 In that same discussion, Bedouma Alain Yoda, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of Burkina Faso, said sexual crimes created long-lasting enmity 
between peoples, making it hard to bring about peace and degrading the dignity of 
women reduced their crucial ability to contribute to peacemaking.41 Recognition and 
rejection of tactical rape and sexual violence was on the agenda of the Security 
Council. 
Establishing the Parameters and Methodology 
There are clear parameters established in this dissertation. It focuses on tactical, 
widespread rape and sexual violence in war. This is not, in any way, to establish a 
hierarchy of horror nor to underestimate the impact of individual rapes on 
individuals. Rape of any nature must be condemned. Impunity for violent, sexual 
abuse of vulnerable victims must end, whether it is the result of deliberate policy or 
not. This dissertation does not call for anything less. There is, sadly, usually rape of 
one sort or another on all sides of most conflicts. Women are disproportionately 
victims and often tactical rape and sexual violence are employed by at least one side. 
These are the situations which will be the focus of this dissertation, even while there 
is acknowledgement of the concerns of those feminist writers (considered in Chapter 
2) who call for attention to all forms of rape, who worry that by putting a focus on 
                                                                
40 <www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9753.doc.htm> retrieved 3 May 2010.  
41 <www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9753.doc.htm> retrieved 3 May 2010. 
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one form of rape, other forms are somehow diminished, or who worry that by 
focussing on international or state security, the suffering of women may somehow be 
diminished. Lene Hansen noted the fears that by making a distinction between 
individual and collective rapes, the needs of the individual who suffers rape may be 
diminished.42 This is understandable and a fear shared by many who would demand 
accountability for rapists. It is understandable because there is such a history of 
ignoring rape of women in war.  
This dissertation does, however, limit itself to consideration of tactical rape and 
sexual violence which is organised and officially promulgated. Furthermore, this 
dissertation specifically focuses on outcomes of international tribunals and courts, 
particularly the ICTY and ICTR. This is done recognising the limitations and 
inappropriateness of judicial systems to recognise the suffering of women 
participating in confrontational and antagonistic proceedings which may, justifiably, 
be deemed another level of violence against victims. Focussing on legal proceedings 
is done recognising the validity of those who condemn the suffering which women 
experience when testifying in such courts. The perspectives of scholars who express 
concerns regarding legal proceedings will be considered in more detail in Chapter 2, 
reviewing objections and concerns regarding the impact of tribunals on individual 
women as victims of tactical rape and sexual violence.  
This dissertation chooses to focus primarily on two conflicts when there are a 
plethora of similar arenas.43 The conflicts in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia were 
watershed cases in the development of consideration and action regarding tactical 
rape. These were conflicts where there was widespread recognition of the use of 
                                                                
42 L Hansen, ‘Gender, Nation, Rape: Bosnia and the Construction of Security’, International Feminist 
Journal of Politics, vol. 3 no.1, April 2001,  p. 63. 
43 G Gilbert in U Dolgopol and J Gardam, The Challenge of Conflict: International Law Responds 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, Boston, 2006 p. 440. 
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tactical rape and sexual violence in war. Cases were documented and witness 
accounts verified, despite difficulties in establishing exact numbers of rapes. Causes 
for this difficulty will be considered in Chapter 3 on the former Yugoslavia. Kaldor 
referred to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina as having become ‘the paradigm of the 
new type of warfare’ and ‘likely to turn out to be one of those defining events, in 
which entrenched political assumptions, strategic thinking and international 
arrangements are both challenged and reconstructed’.44 She highlighted the 
techniques of population displacement in new wars: systematic murder; ethnic 
cleansing; rendering an area uninhabitable – physically, psychologically, 
economically – and noted that a method of defilement is ‘through systematic rape 
and sexual abuse…or by other public and very visible acts of brutality’.45 Each 
technique can be explicitly applied to the conflicts in both the former Yugoslavia and 
in Rwanda.46 This will be further explored in later chapters where analysis 
demonstrates that in each of these conflict arenas, tactical rape was a deliberate 
policy and strategy of attacks on civilians and rape was widespread.  
While the work of scholars is referenced in this dissertation there is also a strong 
focus on primary sources such as case judgements from the two Tribunals, reports to 
the UNSC and specific resolutions. Many are recent and have not yet been the 
subject of extensive academic consideration. With some dearth of scholarly 
commentary, reports by NGOs – including some written by the author of this 
dissertation - are sometimes referenced, particularly where such reports were used to 
stimulate action by UN Special Rapporteurs, the European Community and legal 
advocates and investigators. As will be referenced in later chapters, such reports 
were part of pressure applied to have UN Special Rapporteurs extend the original 
areas of investigation and eventually include reference to rape in the former 
                                                                
44 Kaldor, p. 32. 
45 Kaldor, pp. 99-100. 
46 Kaldor, p. 99. 
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Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Organisational reports of meetings and encounters in and 
around Zagreb and Rwanda written by NGO representatives included summary 
accounts of stories and concerns expressed by refugee women and workers in camps 
in Zagreb, Benaco and Ngara; by individuals whose identities were not published for 
reasons of their own security. They included prisoners who had escaped across the 
border into Zagreb; representatives of organisations including UNHCR, 
documentation centres, women’s houses, women’s support and advocacy groups 
(such as ‘Mothers for Peace’, ‘Help for Children in Croatia’, ‘Women of Bosnia-
Herzegovina’, ‘Women of the Anti-War Campaign’); by humanitarian assistance 
agencies and by church representatives, both Christian and Muslim.47 There has been 
much input to relevant multi-lateral agencies and panels and many reports and many 
articles regarding these experiences written and submitted to international 
organisations and activist groups. The author of this dissertation has not included any 
interview material from her experiences and meetings with women and girls who 
suffered tactical rape and sexual violence in conflicts, other than those referenced in 
published reports. The author’s experiences did, however, lead to the desire to 
undertake and publish further research. Insights from recorded and public accounts 
of personal, professional experience, particularly regarding certain actions taken by 
international NGOs, may at times be referenced. This follows an established practice 
among authorities, analysts and scholars as well as advocates, of using informal 
narrative to inform as well as to stimulate responses from states, international 
agencies and judiciaries.   
Chapter Outline 
This dissertation is organised with chapters which focus on specific stages in the 
development of international commitment to confronting tactical rape and sexual 
                                                                
47 Fitzpatrick, Rape of Women in War and B Fitzpatrick, The Rwandan Regional Crisis, World 
Council of Churches, Geneva, 1994. 
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violence in conflict. Chapter 1 considers discourse contributing to the rejection of 
tactical rape and sexual violence in conflict. It provides a more detailed consideration 
of the changing nature of war, the impact of the use of rape in war and includes a 
brief overview of particular social relationships as an insight to understanding why 
and how the use of tactical rape and sexual violence is such a pernicious and 
damaging way of attacking communities. It considers how social relationships and 
attitudes can change. Chapter 2 provides a review of the legal concepts and critical 
commentary relevant to tactical rape and sexual violence. It analyses aspects of rape 
and international law, providing relevant legal definitions. It considers the United 
Nations Security Council and its resolutions. It also recognises the contributions and 
reservations of some feminist analysts regarding theorising on such a topic as rape in 
war and the limitations and inappropriateness of judicial systems in recognising the 
suffering of women participating in antagonistic proceedings.  
Chapters 3 and 4 respectively analyse the use of tactical rape and sexual violence in 
the conflicts of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s and the progress and 
limitations of the work of two key international judiciaries: the ICTY and ICTR. 
These Tribunals were intended to provide justice in the immediate aftermath of 
violence and became the most immediate forms of transitional justice available to 
survivors of the widespread tactical rape and sexual violence which characterised the 
two conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Their work will be considered 
in the context of the contribution to case law and legal definitions pertaining to 
tactical rape and/or, at least, aspects of tactical rape. The analysis will provide a 
review of case law and international agreements with emerging definitions, 
understanding tactical rape in war and understanding tactical rape as a crime against 
humanity and rape as a method of genocide.  
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In chapters 5 and 6, major UNSC resolutions which demonstrate and contribute to 
the development of international recognition of the security implications and 
rejection of tactical rape and sexual violence are analysed. These particular 
resolutions have been selected for their links to international attitudes and 
acknowledged responsibilities. Gaps and limitations in each of these key resolutions 
will be analysed. The developing role and work of the International Criminal Court 
will be reviewed as part of evaluating international progress in confronting and 
rejecting tactical rape and sexual violence. There have been other tribunals, other 
relevant conflicts and many other relevant UN documents. However, outcomes from 
the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the identified UNSC 
resolutions, particularly, moved the understanding of tactical rape into understanding 
sexual violence and brought these violations into international consideration in 
important and major ways. With all their flaws – and there are many – these 
moments in the development of the discourse have provided the building blocks for 
taking the discourse into the future and they warrant particular attention and analysis.  
The penultimate chapter, chapter 7, focuses on the situation in 2011 and analyses 
ongoing challenges. It includes a review of the ongoing use of tactical rape and 
sexual violence in war and the threat this poses to the increasingly interlinked 
concepts of women’s security, human security and state security. It deals with state 
level institutionalisation of the rejection of sexual violence in conflict, emphasising 
the need for security sector reform and effective transitional justice in the aftermath 
of widespread use of tactical rape and sexual violence if renewed conflicts are to be 
avoided.  
The conclusion will contend that despite limitations and ongoing challenges, 
progress towards commitment to action against tactical rape and sexual violence has 
been significant. There has been increased acceptance of the links between women’s 
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status in peace and in war. There has been acceptance that tactical rape and sexual 
violence in war represent violations of international humanitarian law and are threats 
to security. There have been significant moves towards institutionalisation of the 
need to confront tactical rape and sexual violence in war. There remain many 
problems such as the slow change in patriarchal attitudes, the slow change in 
women’s status and participation nationally. Sadly, it is likely that tactical rape and 
sexual violence will continue in national/local conflicts and, as will be seen, there 
appears to be growing use of tactical rape on men. What is needed is continued 
pressure from feminist analysts, from NGOs, from UN agencies, from the ICC and a 
global refusal to grant impunity as part of ‘deals for peace’. Reform of the security 
sector and ensuring effective transitional and long-term justice for victims of tactical 
rape and sexual violence in war will be imperative to confront the immediate and 
continuing effects on women, the children born of abuse and the communities 
attacked by these tactics. There will be a need for follow-up with indictments at the 
highest levels and there will need to be realistic funding for actions linked to the 
relevant UNSC resolutions.  
Conclusion 
This dissertation tracks the development of discourse around the progress towards an 
accepted normative rejection of tactical rape and sexual violence in war. It places 
tactical rape within the context of new wars and emerging international case law and 
tracks the development of understanding and rejecting tactical rape to the 
understanding and rejection of sexual violence. It analyses relevant UNSC 
resolutions since 2000 which have contributed to such normative rejection of tactical 
rape and sexual violence and argues the link between tactical rape, sexual violence 
and international security, a link which makes sexual violence an issue to be 
confronted for the security and well-being of women and for the security and well-
being of entire communities. The chapters which follow lead to judging the degree of 
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serious commitment exhibited by the international community in acting on its 
resolutions.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Discourse Contributing to Rejection of Tactical Rape and Sexual Violence 
For effective analysis of the extent to which there has been an increasing 
commitment by the international community to reject tactical rape and sexual 
violence in war since the early 1990s, it is necessary to be clear about the context in 
which this occurs. The time frame being considered in this dissertation is the period 
between 1990 and 2011. This has been a time of considerable development in global 
normative rejection of sexual violence in war and of what this dissertation has 
defined as tactical rape. It has been a period in which many wars and conflicts have 
occurred, with significant humanitarian implications. This dissertation has a focus on 
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda because events in these two arenas and in the ad 
hoc tribunals established to deal with those events will be shown to have been 
instrumental in developing international attitudes of rejection of tactical rape and 
sexual violence in war.  
This chapter first reviews the changing nature and style of war in the 20th and 21st 
centuries as a basis for putting these two specific conflicts and genocide into context. 
Secondly, the chapter reviews the use of tactical rape and sexual violence and its 
impact on collectives as well as individuals. As a third step, there is consideration 
and recognition of the basis for such impact: patriarchy as a framework of particular 
social relationships, values and hierarchies of communities. This includes the social 
constructions which contribute to the impact of tactical rape and sexual violence in 
war. There is recognition that patriarchy affects the way women value themselves 
and that it has a pervasive impact on whole communities. Finally, there is a brief 
examination of how development of normative change can and could happen and 
how social attitudes and values develop so that this understanding can be applied to 
the development of the global discourse which has led to international rejection of 
tactical rape and sexual violence in war. 
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The Changing Nature of War 
As noted in the introduction to this dissertation, understanding rape as a tactic in war 
is made easier when linked with recognising the changing nature of war in recent 
decades. Herfried Munkler described the process by which, historically, war 
gradually became a state controlled enterprise, for reasons related to economic costs 
and the type of complex weaponry being employed.1 He averred that as war became 
expensive and required increasingly complex management states took control of 
them and actual conflicts and hostilities became shorter with each state engaged in 
the war wanting to bring about a rapid end to fighting because shorter conflicts 
incurred less cost. As he said, ‘war of this kind was a war of soldiers against soldiers 
and the civilian population was largely spared from violence and destruction’.2 These 
are not the sort of wars fought in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s. 
Munkler described how as super-powers developed it became increasingly difficult 
for smaller groups to engage in the traditional battles of armies against armies. 
Guerrilla warfare came to the fore as the method utilised by groups who did not have 
the means to wage traditional wars. These groups could afford to take longer to 
achieve their goals and used methods which did not require complex technology and 
weaponry. A key factor in the changes was that attacks on civilians increased as, ‘the 
country’s civilian population … falls prey to those who, with the help of their armed 
henchmen, exercise control over them’.3 While Munkler did highlight the increased 
role of children as soldiers, notably, he failed to highlight the place of women as 
particular targets in civilian populations. Yet much of what he says in general can 
explain the particular use of rape as a tactic in new wars. The relevance to the 
                                                                
1 H Munkler, ‘The Wars of the 21st Century’, International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 85, no. 849, 
March 2003. 
2 Munkler, p. 15. 
3 Munkler, p. 16. 
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conflicts of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s will become apparent in 
Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation. 
Civilian populations are largely comprised of women and rape is a means of 
attacking women. Munkler noted that one of the crucial factors in the emergence of 
new styles of warfare is ‘the fact that they have become cheap to wage’.4 This 
certainly applies to the use of rape and sexual violence as tactics. They require no 
special equipment, no special training and no ongoing maintenance or supply of 
those capable of employing such tactics for an identified goal. If civilian targets are 
now taking the place of military objectives then it becomes urgent that there be 
clarity of rules of engagement regarding attacks on non-combatants, including 
women.5 Analysis of the outcomes of proceedings at the ICTR and ICTY in later 
chapters will demonstrate how international humanitarian law can and should be 
applied to this particular tactic increasingly common in conflicts. 
When considering the strength of the impact of allowing rape as a tactic of war it 
must be recognised that the tolerance of rape as a weapon of war has been an 
ongoing factor in conflicts throughout history. Christoph Schiessl referenced a pro-
Serb organisation which denied the reports of rape by saying they had investigated 
and found there were no reliable reports of ‘more than average war-time rape’.6 He 
highlighted the development during the twentieth century of the focus on targeting 
civilians. Mary Kaldor noted the relevant statistics: at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, 85-90 per cent of conflict related casualties were military; in World War II, 
approximately half the casualties were civilian; by the late 1990s approximately 80 
                                                                
4 Munkler, p. 17. 
5 Munkler, p. 18. 
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per cent of casualties are civilians.7 Kaldor reiterated the changing rate of civilian to 
military deaths since World War II and current conflicts and added data indicating 
that the numbers of internally displaced people have risen from approximately 
40,000 per conflict in 1969 to 857,000 per conflict in 1992.8  
Kaldor referred to the ‘new wars’ of the 20th century and stressed the change from 
military to civilian targets, describing the aim of the new warfare as being ‘to control 
the population by getting rid of everyone of a different identity (and indeed of a 
different opinion)’.9 She stated that the new warfare tends to avoid battle and to 
control territory through political control of the population: 
hence the strategic goal of these wars is population expulsion through various means 
such as mass killings, forcible resettlement, as well as a range of political, 
psychological and economic techniques of intimidation.10 
It is not difficult to see that tactical rape and sexual violence are strategies which fit 
Kaldor’s description of how such new wars are being fought. Tactical rape is an 
attack on civilian rather than military targets. It has psychological as well as physical 
effects. It can be a form of killing and destroying whole generations of a population, 
as will be seen when there is later consideration of the impact of tactical rape in 
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.  
As a tactic of war, rape is particularly violent and it is a rational tactic. Katrina Lee-
Koo has provided a clear and comprehensive explanation of the impact of rape: 
                                                                
7 M Kaldor, New and Old Wars, Organised Violence in a Global Era, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 
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10 Kaldor, p. 8. 
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Rape attacks women’s physical and emotional sense of security while 
simultaneously launching an assault, through women’s bodies, upon the genealogy 
of security as constructed by the body politic.11  
Lee-Koo has recognised that the use of tactical rape is a rational strategy, a 
sanctioned and systematic means of achieving political objectives. She has 
highlighted that such use of rape can be based on state-sanctioned representations of 
non-combatant women which reflect rather than confront traditional 
conceptualisation of women’s realities and this will be further considered in Chapters 
4 and 5 dealing with United Nations responses and resolutions.12 Lee-Koo’s concerns 
reflected those of many feminist analysts and advocates and eventually resulted in 
actions which will be considered in detail in these later chapters of this dissertation. 
The focus of this dissertation is the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 
two conflicts which will be seen to have been different wars but with certain 
common elements. Carl von Clausewitz recognised that while war is ‘a true 
chameleon’, forever changing and adapting its appearance to the varying socio-
political conditions under which it is waged, it is always distinguished by ‘the 
intrinsic violence of its components, the creativity of its strategists and the rationality 
of the political decision-makers’.13 Political objectives are those which ‘have at their 
heart control, compliance of civilians and even genocide’.14 Tactical rape bears all 
the hallmarks of modern warfare, and the links between military objectives and 
social attitudes such as those evident in patriarchal societies will be considered later 
in this chapter. Rape is a tactic which has immediate and long-term impact on the 
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12 Lee-Koo, p.525. 
13 C von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, 19th edition, Werner Hahlweg, Bonn, 1980, pp. 212ff, quoted in 
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societies of victims in ways which will be detailed in later chapters of this 
dissertation. If, too, war is ‘an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to 
fulfil our will’, then, again, rape and any form of sexual violence are effective and 
destructive acts of violence.15 Tactical rape and sexual violence are aspects of new 
wars which cannot be ignored. They are gendered forms of tactics aimed at attacking 
individual women and entire communities. 
The Impact of Rape in War 
Tactical rape and sexual violence in war have negative and long lasting impacts on 
individuals and on their societies and communities. While this dissertation focuses 
on what it has defined as tactical rape, it recognises that there is an extensive and 
diverse field of study regarding rape. To understand the impact and effectiveness of 
tactical rape this dissertation generally accepts that rape is a socially learned form of 
aggression. Lee Ellis referred to three theories of rape, including the Social Learning 
Theory of Rape, in which he posits that rape is a form of interpersonal aggression 
arising from learned and observed behaviour.16 While there are numerous other 
theories, this dissertation will generally accept a focus on the sociological theory in 
that it is a political and socio-economic approach and a construction of societies 
affected in the two specific arenas of conflict selected for focus. Making the decision 
to exclude the full debate on the nature of rape itself is not taken lightly. It is 
acknowledged that without fully understanding the real nature of rape it becomes 
difficult, if not almost impossible, to achieve appropriate responses to it. But this 
dissertation has a focus on tactical rape and it is the sociological approach which best 
helps comprehend the impact of this form of attack on women and communities. 
Tactical rape is an attack which achieves high and widespread impact because, as 
                                                                
15 C von Clauswitz, On War Pelican Books, London 1968, p.1. 
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will be discussed in this chapter, it relies on social relationships and values, 
particularly the constructed values inherent in patriarchy. 
Claudia Card, writing in 1996, reminded readers that rape as a weapon of war was 
not new but the attention it was receiving and the extent of its relative publicity was 
indeed new.17 When considering the nature and impact of rape she stated:  
One set of fundamental functions of rape, civilian or martial, is to display, 
communicate and produce or maintain dominance which is enjoyed for its own sake 
and used for such ulterior ends as exploitation, expulsion, dispersion and murder.18  
This description acknowledged that sexual gratification could have some role in the 
perpetration of rape – while this may not be a primary motivation for tactical rape, it 
does facilitate its application. 
Considering the diverse types of rape, Cynthia Enloe referred to ‘the militarization of 
rape’.19 When focussing on consideration of militarised rape, she referred to three 
types of rape in war: recreational rape as the alleged outcome of not supplying male 
soldiers with ‘adequately accessible’ militarised prostitutes; national security rape as 
an instrument for bolstering a nervous state; systematic, mass rape, as an instrument 
of open warfare.20 Each of these types of rape is recognised as occurring in many 
conflict zones. Each type of rape requires attention, prevention and bringing to 
account those who perpetrate them. It is, however, the impact of the third type, 
systematic, mass rape which is the focus of this dissertation.  
                                                                
17 C Card, ‘Rape as a weapon of war’, Special issue: Women and Violence, Indiana University Press, 
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Before looking at the underlying reasons for such impact, it is useful to consider 
commentaries and analyses of the ways in which these crimes have been observed 
affecting direct victims and others in the conflict and genocide of the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. By the end of the twentieth century, scholars were 
reviewing the emerging law on rape from early customary international law through 
the post World War Two era and to the late twentieth century responses to Rwanda 
and Bosnia.21 Rape had long been an element of war. This did not change in the 
twentieth century. Despite many efforts by women to have rape recognised as more 
than some unfortunate but inevitable by-product of war, it was not until international 
global attention was drawn to the conflicts and genocide in the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda that attitudes began to change. The events in those two conflicts, 
relevant judicial rulings and legal decisions and related discourse at the United 
Nations Security Council, which contributed to global rejection of tactical rape and 
sexual violence in war since the 1990s are detailed more fully in later chapters.  
Reviewing the impact of rape in war, and the reasons why rape is an effective tactic, 
will highlight the underlying social attitudes and values regarding women in many 
communities. But, first, it is essential to consider the use and impact of tactical rape. 
Tactical rape and sexual violence in war must be recognised as affecting individuals 
and their communities and societies. The ICTY Trial Chamber, for example, quoted 
testimony from a medical worker:  
The very act of rape, in my opinion – I spoke to these people, I observed their 
reactions – it had a terrible effect on them. They could, perhaps, explain it to 
themselves when somebody steals something from them or even beatings or even 
some killings. Somehow they sort of accepted it in some way, but when the rapes 
started they lost all hope. Until then they had hope that this war could pass, that 
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everything would quiet down. When the rapes started, everybody lost hope, 
everybody in the camp, men and women. There was such fear, horrible.22 
This statement reflects an understanding of rape as a tactic of war. People who are 
raped and people who know that others in their group are being raped are all affected 
so that they are disempowered and resistance is attacked while physical and 
emotional damage are caused. The impact on individuals and on the communities of 
those direct victims must be recognised and the underlying causes of such impact can 
then be considered. 
In her paper questioning the effectiveness of the ICTR in dealing with Rwanda’s rape 
victims, Binaifer Nowrojee quoted statements to the ICTR by Major Brent 
Beardsley, a professional soldier and a Canadian member of the UN peacekeeping 
force: 
One, when they killed women it appeared that the blows that had killed them were 
aimed at sexual organs, either breasts or vagina; they had been deliberately swiped 
or slashed in those areas. And, secondly, there was a great deal of what we came to 
believe was rape, where the women’s bodies or clothes would be ripped off their 
bodies, they would be lying back in a back position, their legs spread, especially in 
the case of very young girls. I’m talking girls as young as six, seven years of age, 
their vaginas would be split and swollen from obviously gang rape, and then they 
would be killed in that position. So they were lying in a position they had been 
raped; that’s the position they were in. 
Rape was one of the hardest things to deal with in Rwanda on our part. It deeply 
affected every one of us. We had a habit at night of coming back to the headquarters 
and, after activities had slowed down for the night, before we went to bed, sitting 
                                                                
22 ICTY Trial Chamber, Prosecutor vs. Tadic (IT-94-1) para. 175. 
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around talking about what happened that day, drink coffee, have a chat, and amongst 
all of us the hardest thing that we had to deal with was not so much the bodies of 
people, the murder of people – I know that can sound bad, but that wasn’t as bad to 
us as the rape and especially the systematic rape and gang rape of children. 
Massacres kill the body. Rape kills the soul. And there was a lot of rape.23 
This is a powerful description of the use of rape in war and the impact it has on 
survivors as well as victims. His description highlighted the particular violence 
suffered by women and children and the physical evidence of links to gender in the 
ways they were killed. His comment that rape kills the soul links with the underlying 
collective attitudes to rape that will be considered later in this chapter and is 
indicative of the reality that tactical rape and sexual violence have long lasting and 
wide spread negative effects. 
Various accounts of the use of rape in conflict and in genocide contribute to 
understanding the impact of such crimes. The International Committee for the Red 
Cross and Red Crescent has written that rape is at times used as a method of 
extracting information and as punishment for actual or alleged actions.24 Human 
Rights Watch supports this observation of rape as a punishment with accounts of 
Serbian police and military forces raping women as a punishment for their husbands 
or family members being members of the Kosovo Liberation Army and there were 
also the reports of public rapes which have an additional impact beyond the suffering 
of individual women.25 They attack the fabric of their communities and can destroy 
hopes of any long-lasting recovery even when the rapes and conflict stop. As will be 
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detailed later in this chapter, the attack extends beyond the individual and beyond the 
immediate pain and suffering of the victim. 
Bulert Diken and Carsten Bagge Laustsen contributed to understanding the reality of 
tactical rape and sexual violence, basing observations and analysis on events in 
Bosnia Herzegovina, particularly noting that family members were at times forced to 
rape each other or to witness the rape of family members.26 After such rapes, victims 
and perpetrators would have severe difficulty in facing each other. For some men 
raping was seen as form of rite of initiation – being forced into a brotherhood of 
guilt.27 This is far from an opportunistic attitude to rape by rogue individuals making 
the most of a breakdown of law and order. This is a deliberate attack on the 
community as well as individual women. In their article on rape and sexual violence, 
Diken and Laustsen noted that as well as the immediate degradation, pain and terror, 
rape survivors frequently experience long-term physical injury and psychological 
trauma. They highlighted risks of sexually transmitted diseases and pregnancy and 
noted the intense cultural pressures which could come into play, especially when 
faced with either seeking an abortion in a context where health provision was likely 
to be disrupted, when there may be cultural opposition to abortion – but there may 
also be pressure against keeping a child conceived by rape.28 
Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin helped further understanding of the 
nature and extent of harm done by rape in war when they noted the variety of ways in 
which rape in war impacts on women and their communities:  
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As well as the immediate degradation, pain and terror, rape survivors frequently 
experience long-term physical injury and psychological trauma. Fear and shock are 
also experienced by women who were not themselves subjected to attack.29 
It is essential to understand that fear and shock are experienced both by the victims 
and by those in their collective group before going on to consider the reasons for this 
wider experience. Charlesworth and Chinkin recognised a number of allied impacts 
on women raped in war, including the risk of sexually transmitted disease and 
pregnancy, with the possibility of facing childbirth or seeking an abortion ‘at a time 
of great dislocation, with reduced health care and intense social and cultural 
pressures, sometimes against abortion and sometimes against keeping a child 
conceived by rape’.30 Physical damage may last long after an attack and can have 
serious health implications for childbirth, at the very time when health services are 
less available.  
When women are forced to flee conflict zones, they are vulnerable to a variety of 
forms of rape and sexual violence. Charlesworth and Chinkin referred to attacks ‘in 
refugee camps, in foreign countries or as displaced persons in their own countries’ 
and to demands for sex amounting to rape when such demands are exploiting 
economic need of women and are made as requisites for provision of food and 
necessities for survival.31 The definitions of rape in war developed in the ICTY and 
ICTR began to come to terms with rape which was not specifically the result of 
physical force and violent attack but still was the result of coercion. These definitions 
will be discussed further in later chapters when analysing the variety of forms of rape 
which could be deemed to be tactical. Charlesworth and Chinkin were voicing the 
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concerns about rape necessitating violent force and which neglected the variety of 
ways in which force could be applied. These concerns were gradually confronted by 
the international community. The analysis of Charlesworth and Chinkin was relevant 
and powerful as an expression of feminist recognition of the full reality of women’s 
vulnerability in conflict. 
Charlesworth and Chinkin also referred to the reality that war-related rape can 
continue to occur after a conflict. They noted, ‘a rape epidemic was reported in 
Kuwait after ‘liberation’ at levels worse than during the Iraqi occupation’ where the 
attitude of men perpetrating the rapes was that the women targeted ‘deserved’ their 
treatment for ‘supporting’ the Iraqis.32 They further noted the failure of the 
government to take action against these crimes ‘especially where rapes were 
committed by men in uniform’.33 These were not specifically tactical rape but do 
demonstrate that tactical rape can leave a legacy of using rape for a variety of reasons 
and a variety of expressions of power relations. The final chapters of this dissertation 
will include a focus on the economic and security impacts of tactical rape and sexual 
violence in war on states and on their neighbours. 
Rape – always an expression of power relationships – can in the context of conflict 
be an expression of power over a collective as well as over an individual. A report 
relating to the former Yugoslavia, in 1992, noted that there was mounting evidence 
of systematic rape’, with survivors speaking of what they called ‘rape on the front 
line’ and ‘third-party rape’ which were reported as rapes carried out publicly by 
Serbian soldiers to demoralise family members and opposition forces compelled to 
witness them.34 This report was based on accounts given by women and workers in a 
refugee camp. The stories were accepted as sufficiently convincing for legal and 
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formal investigations to take them into account and the writer of the report was 
requested to brief a European Council (EC) investigative team which traveled to 
Zagreb immediately after the report’s distribution.35  
The report of the EC mission substantiated the earlier report noting in its findings, 
‘the delegation frequently heard – including from several individual witnesses and 
sources – that a repeated feature of Serbian attacks on Moslems towns and villages 
was the use of rape, often in public’.36 This public rape was perceived as having 
impact on the victim - and on her community. The ICTR and ICTY, by recording 
accounts of survivors and responses by medical and military observers, have taken 
comprehension of tactical rape and sexual violence into discussions about which 
international laws cover such violations. As will be seen in Chapters 3 and 4, the 
ICTR and ICTY contributed to recognition of the applicability of existing 
international law, particularly for individuals who suffered tactical rape and sexual 
violence. But tactical rape and sexual violence also impact on communities and the 
collective impact of tactical rape must be traced back to collective social 
relationships. 
Social Relationships Which Make Tactical Rape and Sexual Violence Effective 
The vulnerability of women and communities to tactical rape and sexual violence in 
war is linked with attitudes and community values that must be recognised. This is a 
vulnerability which has the potential to extend the range of impact beyond the 
immediate tragic damage done to individuals in any physical attack. Importantly, it is 
a vulnerability which could be lessened by clear recognition of the interaction of 
conflict with social attitudes and norms – and by subsequently attempting to change 
those attitudes and norms. Tactical rape and sexual violence in war have immediate 
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and long-lasting, wide spread physical, cultural and emotional effects on individuals 
and on collectives. Understanding these effects is facilitated by understanding the 
collective values and sense of identity. Understanding the learned values and 
attitudes which render women and their communities vulnerable to tactical rape and 
sexual violence can also provide a basis for confronting that vulnerability. This is the 
greater understanding referenced by Lee-Koo as the need to ‘un/recover the 
experiences of women’.37 This is a significant need. 
If, as Munkler claimed, ‘the defence of cultural identity could also become a 
recurring reason for going to war’ then attacks on cultural identity can be an effective 
and strategic way to wage war.38 The definitions of culture are varied but this 
dissertation accepts that, ‘culture constitutes one’s political self’.39 Attitudes to 
women are part of cultural identity. Patriarchy is an element of cultural identity 
which affects both men and women. Testimonies of witnesses from cases heard by 
the international tribunals (especially those at the ICTR) demonstrate how attacks on 
women were used as attacks on communities, men and women. Patriarchy certainly 
is an aspect of cultural identity which renders whole communities vulnerable to the 
destructive force of tactical rape and sexual violence in war. One definition has been 
provided by Adrienne Rich:  
Patriarchy is the power of the fathers: a familial-social, ideological, political system 
in which men – by force, direct pressure or through ritual, tradition, law and 
language, customs, etiquette, education and the division of labour determine what 
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part women shall or shall not play and in which the female is everywhere subsumed 
under the male.40 
The definition does articulate many of the features of patriarchal societies even 
though these may be interpreted differently between cultures. 
Nancy Farwell has provided valuable insights to understanding the links between 
often demonstrated patriarchal attitudes and militarisation of rape.41 She noted the 
protectionist values inherent in patriarchal relationships which promote the view that 
women are property of men and as such are to be defended.42 In a patriarchal society, 
a female may be ‘viewed as a vessel for a male seed’ and this can provide ‘a 
construct that is central to the use of rape in ethnic cleansing’.43 She wrote that in 
patriarchal societies women are perceived as protecting the honour of the community 
through marriage and cultural practices that maintain a pure lineage and pure ethnic-
cultural heritage.44 This can help explain how ‘rape and sexual violence during ethnic 
conflict become strategies for infiltrating or destroying those boundaries and 
attacking the honour of the community and the purity of the lineage’.45 
Understanding these often present elements of patriarchy helps understanding of the 
collective as well as the individual damage done by tactical rape and sexual violence 
in war. The individual victim suffers direct physical and emotional pain – and she 
also suffers from additional pain resulting from the perceptions of her community. 
The community suffers from a perceived attack on the holder of its values and its 
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lineage, an attack on a member whom the community has perceived as being one for 
whom it has a responsibility to protect.  
While patriarchal attitudes have damaging impacts on women and girls in restricting 
their access to many of the rights they should share in communities, patriarchy 
should be seen, also, as an issue damaging to communities as a whole. Restricting the 
freedom and rights of women makes communities vulnerable to attacks such as 
tactical rape and sexual violence in war. In Rwanda, before the genocide, women 
were traditionally deemed to be dependents of men. A 1996 report on the status of 
women in Rwandan society said:  
Throughout their lives, women are expected to be managed and protected by their 
fathers, their husbands and their male children. Traditionally, the role of the 
Rwandan woman in society centred on her position as wife and mother.46  
Such an attitude puts women in a position where they are valued as belongings rather 
than as individuals – and women’s value is determined by the degree to which they 
are valued by males. Such an attitude, while giving males the power to determine the 
value of women, also places pressure on males to protect ‘their’ women. Any 
demonstration of their failure to do so can contribute to social disintegration. It can 
intensify defeat of the ‘owner’ as it is clear he is unable to protect ‘his’ property. 
Tactical rape and sexual violence in war are effective methods of attacking a 
community for these reasons. 
Earlier, in 1992, the United Nations Committee monitoring the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), made these 
comments regarding the causes of gender-based violence: 
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traditional attitudes by which women are regarded as subordinate to men or as 
having stereotyped roles perpetuate widespread practices involving violence or 
coercion, such as family violence and abuse, forced marriage, dowry deaths, acid 
attacks and female circumcision. Such prejudices and practices may justify gender-
based violence as a form of protection or control of women.47  
This recognition of the overall societal attitude to women is applicable to sexual 
violence in war and all forms of gender-based violence. Patriarchy is a pervasive 
element and as will be seen in later analysis of events in the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda and UNSC responses, it is the case that women’s vulnerability to violence in 
peacetime results in even greater vulnerability in war. The combination of patriarchal 
attitudes and women’s gender is a potent factor in the effectiveness of tactical rape 
and sexual violence in war. 
Jill Steans has contributed to realisation of the need to confront gender when she 
devoted a chapter in her monograph Gender and International Relations to 
understanding ‘how gender is central to the processes involved in constructing the 
boundaries of the nation-states, specifically war’.48 She considered the relationship 
between military participation and citizenship concluding with the implications of 
the relationship between women and ‘the state, the military- and state-sanctioned 
violence’.49 When considering patriarchy, Steans focussed on the conventional 
distinctions made between protectors and those protected in social and political 
relationships, with women always seen as those needing protection. Steans helped 
illuminate the importance of understanding the implications of this socially 
constructed and legally reflected status of women in many communities. She said, 
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‘the distinction between the “protectors” and “protected” disguises the particular 
ways women suffer in wars’ listing the disruption to lives, the ongoing suffering of 
women in wars that have ‘no neat beginnings and endings’, the need for women to be 
carers and the high numbers of women in refugee populations where they are 
vulnerable to a range of violence including sexual violence.50 She quoted J.H. Stiehm 
who had noted that ‘protectors usually control those whom they protect’51 and Jan 
Pettman, ‘the protector/protected relationship makes women vulnerable to other 
men’s/states’ violence’.52 Steans believed that it was patriarchal attitudes which 
underlie and exacerbate women’s vulnerability in wartime, particularly vulnerability 
to rape.  
Steans also highlighted that ‘rape in warfare does not occur as an isolated incident’ 
but, as she claimed feminists had long argued, attitudes to rape ‘should be viewed as 
an accepted part of the code that governs the fighting of wars rather than as an 
individual act of wrong’.53 She noted that domestic violence springs from the same 
patriarchal attitude and concluded, ‘war, violence and women’s oppression all grow 
from the same root’.54 The notion of women as only victims, as having little capacity 
to protect themselves and participate in peacemaking and peacekeeping has been 
soundly debated as will be seen in later chapters regarding United Nations Security 
Council resolutions but Steans does helpfully explain the societal underpinnings of 
societies in which tactical rape and sexual violence are effective forms of attack.  
The link between rape in war and patriarchy was also highlighted by Christine 
Chinkin, who explained that the potency of rape as a weapon is often due to the fact 
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that for men the rape of their women encapsulates the totality of their defeat as they 
are demonstrably unable to protect ‘their’ women.55 Hilary Charlesworth and 
Christine Chinkin quoted B. Reardon, noting that ‘sexually manifested violence’ is 
‘connected to ideas of male soldiers’ privileges, to the power of the military’s line of 
command as well as by class and ethnic differences among women’.56 They also 
quoted R. Seifert referring to the link between rape and the idea of women as 
property – a link which means that ‘to rape a woman is to humiliate her 
community’.57 Patriarchy is a context to be understood for its implications regarding 
tactical rape and sexual violence in conflict. 
It is essential to stress that the use of rape in war is closely linked with women’s 
position in societies and communities. Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin 
have also written, ‘Sexually manifested violence in armed conflict is an aspect of the 
subordinate position of women globally’.58 Writing in 1998, they noted that such 
violence against women had not received due attention and that: 
the entirely unacceptable situation in international law is that the fundamental norms 
which all states must observe include systematic racial discrimination but not 
discrimination against women or even widespread gender-based violence. Women 
have had to mount a campaign to have violence against women, in all its forms, 
recognised as an international legal wrong.59 
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They are among the feminist analysts of rape in war who have highlighted the links 
between rape in war and underlying gender relationships often most clearly 
determined in recognition of patriarchy.  
Importantly, too, Charlesworth and Chinkin recognised the community impact of 
rape in war. They quoted the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human 
Rights, who said that rape was used in the former Yugoslavia, to humiliate, shame, 
degrade, and terrify an entire ethnic group.60 This is a reflection of the reality that 
communities see women as belonging to the group, as requiring protection and as 
holders of what Farwell called ‘the purity of the lineage’.61 It is an essential part of 
the use of rape in war that it attacks individual victims and it attacks their societies 
and communities, who see their own ability to protect and preserve their identity. 
Social constructions regarding the perceived damage by rape to a woman’s value 
come into play and often it is in times of great social upheaval and disruption that 
women are faced with no options that will satisfy prevailing social standards. 
Abortion may be judged as wrong but impregnated women may perceive that there 
will be nothing gained by either the woman or the child by keeping a child of a 
perceived enemy. The lack of control of the woman against attack does not 
counterbalance the fact that she is carrying an unwanted child. 
There is a complex and damaging effect on individual women and on women as part 
of a group. The group impact of rape has also been described by Binaifer Nowrojee:  
The humiliation, pain and terror inflicted by the rapist are meant to degrade not just 
the individual woman but also to strip the humanity from the larger group of which 
she is a part. The rape of one person is translated into an assault upon the community 
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through the emphasis placed in every culture on women’s sexual virtue: the shame 
of the rape humiliates the family and all those associated with the survivor.62  
This can be seen as a result of patriarchal attitudes – attitudes which lead to 
damaging impacts on whole communities and males as well as females. In 
patriarchal societies where women are perceived as belonging to men, then raping 
someone perceived to be a man’s woman sends a clear message about victory in 
relative power relations. This in no way diminishes the suffering of individual 
women victims of tactical rape and sexual violence. It explains how their suffering is 
intensified in a community which is culturally patriarchal. As accounts from women 
in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia will demonstrate, the physical attacks and 
violations of women are exacerbated by their feelings of shame and their perception 
of themselves as being less valuable as well as of being less valued. Tactical rape has 
a long-term communal– as well as an immediate individual – capacity to damage.  
The work of so many of these feminist analysts highlights the need to confront both 
cause and effect of tactical rape and sexual violence in war. In addressing the root 
causes and the impact of rape in the former Yugoslavia, particularly Bosnia 
Herzegovina, Lynda Boose posited that the way rape is socially constructed makes it 
‘primarily’ a violation defiling male members of families and communities and 
concluded, ‘the more patriarchal the culture, the more vulnerable it becomes, all the 
more likely are the women to become targets for enemy rape’.63 It does need to be 
noted that while rape may be a violation of males, it is questionable that it is 
‘primarily’ a violation of those males in any society. This would seem to be a value 
judgement with which many women victims might disagree. However, Boose did 
refer to the numbers and the identity of the women raped and linked these with 
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ongoing relations between Serbs and Turks.64 She recognised the courage of the 
women who survived and who went on to testify, at great personal cost in many 
cases. She observed that even the word rape could not encompass the trauma of the 
events for many of those women for whom sexual violation would have been one of 
a series of abuses: seeing their family members killed, being tortured, and being 
humiliated publicly. It is important to consider these aspects of rape in war to 
understand that the use of rape and sexual violence in war is closely linked with 
gendered constructs in societies. The impact on societies contributes to such 
violations being effective in achieving destruction and damage of those societies. 
Other feminist analysts have contributed to understanding the pernicious 
effectiveness of tactical rape and sexual violence in war. In 2006, Diana Milillo 
specifically referred to rape as a tactic of war and she also made the link with the 
impact of rape and patriarchal societies, noting that rape devastates both individuals 
and their societies and her conviction that: 
the systematic nature of rape as a tactic of war exists against a backdrop of rigid 
cultural norm of gender and women’s sexuality, social dominance and power within 
conflicting groups and a soldier’s identity as a man and as a member of a particular 
military group.65  
She convincingly challenged the notion that all men have a drive to use their 
genitalia as a weapon – pointing out that not all men rape and in fact not even most 
men rape.66 Milillo quoted H. Tajfel and J.C. Turner who believed that individual 
men have a desire for a positive social identity and will do what is needed to enhance 
the status of the group perceived as the ‘in-group’ and/or to discriminate against the 
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‘out group’.67 Milillo’s linking of the concepts of tactics and rape in war was 
indicative of an advance in understanding of the causes and motivations for the use 
of tactical rape and sexual violence in war. 
Again, the work of Lee-Koo had contributed when she highlighted the ‘extreme 
insecurity’ of women in war and the failure of mainstream approaches to 
international relations theory to identify this extreme insecurity of individual women 
and their experiences in inter-state war.68 She criticised the realist and neo-realist 
traditions of international relations theory as a discourse which renders women 
unseen and unheard in international relations, trapping them in gendered and 
subordinate roles. She also recognised that there had been some positive 
developments: international recognition of the socially constructed and gendered 
reality identifying vested interests in the subordination of women; acknowledgement 
of the multiple subjectivities of women which helps to dispel the ‘essential women’ 
myth.69 This was a valuable insight, expanding on the broad approach to women’s 
vulnerability in conflict reflected in UNSCR 1325 in 2000, a resolution which will be 
analysed in detail in Chapter 5 and which recognised the causes of – and therefore 
the ways towards confronting - tactical rape and sexual violence in war.70  
It is important to recognise that patriarchy is not restricted in its impact to the 
attitudes of men in communities. As members of patriarchal societies, women, 
themselves, may share their society’s value of them. A report from the Rwandan 
Government in 1995 reflected that society’s value of women: 
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the ideal image of a woman is still generally viewed through the perspective of her 
maternal role. The woman must be fertile, hard-working and reserved. She must 
learn the art of silence and reserve.71 
As members of the Rwandan society, women could share this view. It is not difficult 
to understand, therefore, why many women would be reluctant to speak of their 
experiences of being raped. Silence and reserve were honoured. Those who were 
physically damaged and no longer likely to be able to bear children were likely to 
fear being rejected as no longer fertile and valuable. The report, Shattered Lives said: 
In Rwanda, as elsewhere in the world, rape and other gender-based violations carry a 
severe social stigma. The physical and psychological injuries suffered by Rwandan 
rape survivors are aggravated by a sense of isolation and ostracisation. Rwandan 
women who have been raped or have suffered sexual abuse generally do not dare 
reveal their experiences publicly, fearing that they will be rejected by their family 
and wider community, and that they will never be able to reintegrate or marry.72 
This statement would likely hold true for women in many other patriarchal societies. 
The silence of women who have survived rape of any form has been a long-standing 
issue and the experiences which will be outlined in the chapter regarding testifying, 
particularly at the ICTR, will highlight many reasons for such silence.  
Testimonies from victims in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia are particularly 
illustrative of the impact of tactical rape on women – impact which goes beyond the 
agonising physical suffering they experienced and which reflect the constructed 
sense of self as a member of a society. One woman, ‘Goretti’, was raped for days by 
various groups and had her legs held open while the sharpened end of the stick of a 
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hoe was pushed into her.73 After this she found some temporary refuge before being 
raped again. In the telling of these horrific events she said that after the last rapes: 
I was left alone and naked. I decided to try and escape. I couldn’t walk properly and 
so was on all fours. When people passed me, I sat down and stopped walking so they 
wouldn’t know I had been raped because I was ashamed.74 
The fact that the victim felt shame was an addition to her plight that goes beyond the 
terrible physical attack and reflects the constructed value of herself that had been 
imposed upon her. The same sense of imposed degradation and heartbreaking sorrow 
was reflected when she said, ‘you can’t ever forget. Until I die, I’ll always be sad’.75 
Sadly, there have been many stories of such dire suffering.  
Another victim, ‘Josepha’, said, ‘rape is a crime worse than death’.76 ‘Jeanne’, who 
was abducted and kept in sexual slavery as a ‘wife’ said, ‘rape is a crime worse than 
others. There’s no death worse than that’.77 ‘Nadia’, who was eleven when militia 
attacked her house, who was still severely traumatised two years after seeing them 
hack her brothers to pieces in front of her, was then taken and raped at least five 
times. She said:  
He threatened to kill me with his machete. He would keep the machete near the bed 
while he raped me. I have never told anyone before what happened to me. I am 
ashamed and scared that people will laugh at me.78 
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Shame such as this is socially constructed and imposed. Medical practitioners have 
reported rape victims being reluctant to seek medical treatment because of the fear of 
being judged because ‘society is looking at you’ and they feel such shame.79  
The effect of tactical rape was not some unfortunate by-product of rape. One 
interviewee said, ‘many women begged to be killed during the genocide’ and she 
continued, ‘they were refused and told, you will die of sadness’.80 The rapes were 
often accompanied by severe torture and mutilation, particularly of sexual organs, 
which emphasised degradation and violation:  
Sexual mutilations included the pouring of boiling water into the vagina; the opening 
of the womb; to cut out an unborn child before killing the mother; cutting off 
breasts; slashing the pelvis area; and the mutilation of vaginas.81 
Such actions are more than torture. As well as savage personal physical attacks, they 
are a destructive image of attack on future generations and are considered to be a 
direct demeaning of the value of women. This is a potent attack in societies where 
women are valued as holding the purity of lineage. 
The impact of tactical rape is often even greater when rapes in war result in 
pregnancies and children. This is heightened when there is the added belief in 
strongly patriarchal societies that children ‘belong’ to their fathers. During the visit 
of an international team to refugee camps in and around Zagreb in 1992, a woman in 
Zagreb said, ‘one part of me – deep inside – believes that my children belong to their 
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father’.82 She explained the struggle which the community of the women raped 
would have in accepting the children of those rapes as part of the mothers’ 
communities. In wars with strategies to attack the civilians of opposing groups in a 
conflict, rape is frighteningly effective. Nowrojee explained the rights of men in 
Rwanda, noting that in Rwanda, customary law accords men the role of head of the 
family.83 They inherit property, name children and transmit the family name. Before 
the genocide, when ethnicity was registered, it was the father’s ethnicity which was 
transmitted. If the husband dies, children can be taken from the wife by the 
husband’s family as the children ‘belong’ to the husband and his family.84 This has 
serious implications for inheritance laws and recognition of children – they are the 
children of their fathers even when the result of rape.  
A further impact of tactical rape may be that a woman’s ability to bear children could 
be affected. When a woman is physically damaged to the point of not being able to 
be sexually active or to have children, she, as well as the community, may judge her 
as devalued, not worthy of being a marriage partner. An international team 
interviewing refugees and workers in camps in Zagreb in 1992, was told that there 
had been calls within the Muslim community to accept women who had been raped 
as ‘heroes’ and ‘to maintain marriage as a continuing option’.85 The motivation 
behind the call was seen as intended to be supportive and to ameliorate community 
judgement of raped women as being of less value. However, as women workers at 
the time said to one another and to the team, there would be many women who 
would not welcome any sexual relationship after their attacks and so would be caught 
between the choice of entering into an unwelcome marriage or being seen as less 
than a natural woman, with a less secure place in their society.  
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Attacks on women are attacks on future generations of their collectives. In Rwanda, 
‘Maria’, an eighteen year old Hutu student ‘does not like to see or be near men’.86 
Her story is tragic. She saw her grandparents, two aunts and her brother killed before 
being gang raped and having her vagina slashed with knives by militia who shouted, 
‘We are going to kill you so you will want death’.87 What may seem at first as a 
nonsensical statement actually can be seen to reflect a different form of killing for a 
woman, a form of attacking so that a quick death would be welcome. When she 
eventually reached medical help reconstructive surgery was performed but she will 
never be sexually active or bear children and she is carrying the HIV/AIDS virus. 
She said, ‘They have ruined my future. I am not the only one. What they did to me 
they did to many others. But what can I do?’88 In a society which values a woman for 
bearing children, ‘Maria’ sees herself deemed valueless. Such is the destructive 
impact of rape when patriarchy is prevalent.  
It is essential to understanding the effectiveness and danger of tactical rape that 
constructed attitudes and community values be recognised as potential areas of 
vulnerability. This vulnerability extends the range of impact beyond the immediate 
tragic damage done to individuals in any physical attack. This is a vulnerability 
which could be lessened by changes in social attitudes and norms. Priorities and 
programmes developing from UNSC resolutions and institutionalised allocations of 
resources to confront women’s vulnerability in peace time will be detailed more fully 
in later chapters. These resolutions have recognised that by working to reduce 
women’s economic, social and political vulnerability in peace time, their 
vulnerability – and that of their communities – in conflict will be confronted. 
Societal attitudes such as those evident in patriarchal communities which are 
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constructed can be changed. It is important to understand how such change can be 
effected. 
Changing Societal Attitudes 
Key stimuli for changing existing attitudes and relationships may come from 
international or trans-national sources. Non-governmental organisations can be key 
agents, working within a context of global and national civil society. The Prosecutor 
of the International Criminal Court, noted: ‘global civil society, as a network of 
domestic and transnational non-governmental organisations is able to shape the 
values and the priorities of the international community’.89 Commenting on the role 
of civil society in affecting normative attitudes, he said, ‘when domestic and trans-
national NGOs work together in consensus with a common message, new 
international norms are established and justice can more easily be recognised’.90 This 
was certainly the case in drawing attention to the widespread use of rape in both the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s. Many NGOs and multilateral agencies 
had, for many years, highlighted situations of tragic sexual abuse and rape in 
conflicts. In the early 1990s, they seemed finally to attract due attention to 
widespread tactical rape and sexual violence in the particular conflict areas of the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. They were, of course, supported by individuals and 
organisational leaders within and beyond country borders, civil society groups within 
country and regional structures. The roles played by many of these entities will be 
demonstrated in later chapters.  
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink have proposed that ‘new ideas often emerge 
in response to dramatic policy shocks, failures or crises’.91 The events in both the 
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former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s shocked the international humanitarian 
and human rights organisations. But, perhaps more significantly in terms of 
developing policies and responses, the events shocked state members at various UN 
bodies. In 1993, ECOSOC expressed outrage at rape being used as a weapon of 
war,92 and in 1994 the UN General Assembly expressed alarm at ‘the continuing use 
of rape as a weapon of war’.93 Both these resolutions recognised rape as an 
instrument of ethnic cleansing and noted that the abhorrent policy of ethnic cleansing 
was a form of genocide. In 1995, the General Assembly noted that it reaffirmed ‘that 
rape in the conduct of armed conflict constitutes a war crime and that under certain 
circumstances it constitutes a crime against humanity and an act of genocide’.94 It 
called upon states to ‘take all measures for the protection of women and children 
from such acts and to strengthen mechanisms to investigate and punish’ those 
responsible.95 It took some time before there was any real attempt to spell out just 
what these statements implied, but they demonstrated that the shock of continuing 
events – and continuing media attention – did stimulate responses and contributed to 
the development of the international normative rejection of tactical rape. UN 
attitudes and interpretations regarding tactical rape and sexual violence in war began 
to change.  
Tactical rape and sexual violence came to be perceived by UN agencies as pressing 
political problems. Pressure for response to the reports of widespread rape came from 
sustained attention and publicity from public media and NGOs and, eventually, from 
the UN’s own rapporteurs. It became difficult for states to ignore the use of rape in 
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the two specific conflicts. The events in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were 
being perceived as pressing by the public media which publicised reports such as 
those of the European Community and NGOs which will be detailed in Chapters 3 
and 4. The consequent pressure on the international community, particularly the UN, 
to respond could be perceived as leading to the resolutions noted above, from the 
General Assembly and Economic and Social Council of the United Nations 
(ECOSOC) in particular. More action would be demanded of the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) as will be seen in chapters 5 and 6 of this dissertation. It 
will be seen, too, that at a certain stage, states themselves began demanding more 
than statements of rejection and called for resolutions which made explicit the action 
needed to confront tactical rape and sexual violence in war.96  
An idea’s degree of persuasion may also originate in the perceived legitimacy of the 
advocate as well as in the extent of international support it is perceived to be 
receiving. Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink recognised the role 
of ‘trans-national advocacy networks’, agreeing with other analysts that these are 
networks of ‘those relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are 
bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of 
information and services’.97 Risse, Ropp and Sikkink acknowledged the essential role 
of international NGOs and foundations which are loosely connected to human rights 
organisations (international and domestic) and the role of international institutions 
such as United Nations bodies and related treaties drafted and ratified under the 
auspices of UN and regional institutions.98 In the consideration and analysis of key 
steps such as UNSC resolutions, it will be shown that such trans-national advocacy 
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networks have been instrumental in sustaining discourse to bring attention and 
responses to tactical rape and sexual violence in war.  
The work of Risse, Ropp and Sikkink has been helpful in positing processes by 
which states are socialised and norms become entrenched in domestic policy and 
practice, moving beyond rhetoric when ideas and norms become habitualised and 
internalised.99 Attitudes need to become part of the rule of law in states as well as at 
international level. Shirley V. Scott has commented that the principle of the rule of 
law ‘serves as a normative basis for law: it establishes what the law should do, even 
though it does not always do so’.100 The National Action Plans required of states by 
UNSCR 1325, which will be analysed in detail in Chapter 5, demonstrate how 
rejection of tactical rape and sexual violence in war can be translated from global 
rhetoric into state institutions, policy and practice. They also demonstrate how 
attitudes can become part of the rule of law. 
Risse, Ropp and Sikkink highlighted that normative change influences political 
change through a socialisation process. They asserted that ‘norms become relevant 
and causally consequential during the process by which actors define and refine their 
collective identities and interests’.101 The framework they provide for understanding 
the socialisation of states and for tracking progress in the acceptance of norms is 
useful when determining the extent to which events and discourse reflect states’ real 
likelihood of changing to respond to the new international rejection of tactical rape 
and sexual violence in war. While Risse, Ropp and Sikkink focus on human rights 
norms, the models they provide for understanding socialisation processes transfer 
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easily to consideration of normative rejection of tactical rape and sexual violence in 
war.  
The three types of socialisation processes necessary for enduring change which 
Risse, Ropp and Sikkink have identified are, first, the processes of adaptation and 
strategic bargaining; second, the processes of moral consciousness-raising, 
‘shaming’, argumentation, dialogue and persuasion; and third, the processes of 
institutionalisation and habitualisation.102 These stages may overlap or occur in 
parallel time. States may, firstly, endorse a norm for strategic motives in a desire to 
win approval from other states – and possibly, political and economic benefits in so 
doing. Risse, Ropp and Sikkink note that to ‘endorse a norm not only expresses a 
belief, but also creates an impetus for behaviour consistent with the belief’.103 So, 
whatever the motive, there can be moves to the second stage, accompanying or 
eventual moral consciousness raising. This can have positive results as norms, which 
may have been adopted or at least given rhetorical support by some leaders, may 
eventually become internalised as leaders, used to hearing the rhetoric, come to 
believe and accept what has become collective expectations. Consequently, ‘the goal 
of socialisation is for the actors to internalise norms, so that external pressure is no 
longer needed to ensure compliance’.104 When international actors and organisations 
such as those at the UNSC and United Nations Assembly began to reject certain 
behaviours – even when those statements might initially have seemed to be mere 
rhetoric – it is possible that eventually change occurred in normative attitudes. This 
progress will be examined further in later chapters of this dissertation. As will be 
demonstrated in the later analysis, UNSC 1325 articulated broad ranging 
understanding of the fact that women’s vulnerability in peace was directly linked to 
the degree to which they are vulnerable in conflict. Confronting tactical rape and 
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sexual violence in war was seen to require confronting negative gendered realities of 
women in many patriarchal communities.  
The third stage, the degree to which societal and political change is truly effected, is 
reflected in the degree to which it can be seen reflected in national policy and 
institutions. No significant change can be deemed to have taken place if apparent 
acceptance of an attitude or value is not reflected by ratification of relevant 
international conventions and optional protocols; is not reflected in constitutions and 
domestic law; does not provide some mechanisms for citizens to call for redress of 
abuses; if states do not comply without complaint of ‘interference in internal 
affairs’.105 This is why analysis of National Action Plans in Chapter 5 is a useful 
indicator of the real degree of change which has filtered into states’ domestic policy 
and practice. However, it must be noted that reliance on states to institutionalise 
norms such as rejection of tactical rape and sexual violence is in itself problematic, 
as many feminist scholars have highlighted that there is an inherent legitimising of ‘a 
model of (male) dominance and (female) subservience within states as 
immutable’.106 International agencies and organisations must provide an 
institutionalised focus for implementing change if it is to be taken seriously. 
International donors and development agencies must, also be aware of the need to 
support new and apparently more just policies and practices in states – such as 
change for a greater degree of gender equality. Funders’ support for such change can 
be a factor in the reflection of international norms in sustainable national practice and 
policy.  
As consideration focuses on Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia in later chapters, it 
will become apparent that outcomes of these differing contexts have impacted on the 
degree to which international attitudes to tactical rape and sexual violence in war 
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eventually changed as well as the emergence of developing international discourse 
regarding rejection of these abuses. UNSC resolutions analysed later also indicate a 
growing awareness at global level of the diverse areas of gender inequality and 
injustice which are linked with women’s particular vulnerability to tactical rape and 
sexual violence in war. J.T. Checkel stated that not only do different states react 
differently to the same international norms, but the mechanisms by which norms are 
internalised within states also differ.107 This has been demonstrated in international 
responses to tactical rape and sexual violence in war. Change happens slowly in 
social, community attitudes and responses to events and is often eventually 
encapsulated in the development of new social and community attitudes and values. 
But, the rejection of tactical rape and sexual violence in war has been gaining 
strength since the early 1990s, in ways and for reasons which will be considered and 
analysed to ascertain the degree of progress in changing attitudes and standards of 
states. Key developments such as the working of the two international tribunals and 
the UNSC are relevant because international law and international organisations are 
the primary vehicles for stating community norms and for collective legitimation.108  
As the process of raising moral consciousness occurs and is shared, then allied 
processes of argumentation and a variety of forms of dialogue and persuasion can 
come into play. The notion of shaming agents or entities, which do not comply with 
these articulated and accepted standards may be utilised and is often effective in 
applying pressure for compliance. This was the case regarding the widespread use of 
rape in the 1992 conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda as media and NGOs 
made events so public that there was a sense that the international community had to 
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respond and make clear their condemnation of such acts. As the expectations of 
collective behaviour are integrated into the operations and expectations of 
institutions they are simultaneously strengthened. The two tribunals, ICTY and 
ICTR, were key institutions contributing to expectations regarding tactical rape, 
sexual violence and international law. By making judgements and legal clarifications 
these two tribunals institutionalised internationally acceptable standards and 
demonstrated that tactical rape and sexual violence were contraventions of 
acceptable attitudes. Engaging in moral discourse can help clarification and 
implications of expressed standards or modes of behaviour and contribute to eventual 
conviction that these standards are justified. Adaptation of behaviour can follow. 
However, it is also possible that, ‘actors might actually agree on the moral validity of 
the norm, but disagree whether certain behaviour is covered by it’.109 It would appear, 
from the ongoing discourse at the UNSC, to be analysed in a later chapter, that there 
are actors who genuinely reject tactical rape and sexual violence in war.  
While Risse, Ropp and Sikkink do not refer to it, there can also be instances of 
misappropriation of moral attitudes – using them as excuses for behaviour that would 
otherwise be condemned. The excuse of countering terrorism or extremism may be 
invoked to provide a cover for any behaviour against groups or governments, which 
are perceived to be oppositional. Risse, Ropp and Sikkink have acknowledged that 
persuasion itself can be conflictual and often involves, ‘not just reasoning with 
opponents, but also pressures, arm-twisting and sanctions’.110 Later chapters 
analysing the practical actions taken – or not taken – by states in response to UNSC 
resolutions will demonstrate that progress on developing acceptance of a normative 
rejection of tactical rape is in early and varied stages of institutionalisation and 
socialisation.  
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There is a long way to go before rejection of tactical rape and sexual violence in war 
is fully institutionalised by states, until it is ‘incorporated into standard operating 
procedures of domestic institutions’ and ‘actors follow the norm because it is the 
normal thing to do’.111 There is, too, a long way to go before the gendered attitudes to 
women’s participation in and ability to contribute effectively to political and social 
life of their communities is fully recognised. However, another and strong motivation 
for states to institutionalise rejection of tactical rape and sexual violence in war can 
be the belief that it is in a state’s own interest to conform to international norms for 
economic or political reasons. As will be discussed in a later chapter, states may also 
conform because there is awareness that accepting the norm will affect their own 
security.  
The institutionalisation of a response to tactical rape and sexual violence in conflict 
is also influenced by existing humanitarian norms and institutions. These are 
articulated in treaties and conventions, with definitions which have been included, 
considered clarified and expanded in judicial case law and statutes. An important 
step in discourse leading to rejection of tactical rape and sexual violence in war is 
changing and challenging existing law to have it respond to a feminist analysis. 
Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin and Shelley Wright, in 1991, focussed on 
developing an international feminist perspective, outlined the male organisational 
and normative structure of the international legal system and applied feminist 
analyses to various legal principles.112 This required ‘looking behind the abstract 
entities of states to the actual impact of rules on women within states’.113 They 
concluded that modern international law is both andro-centric and Euro-centred in its 
origins and includes legal institutions which are essentially patriarchal and which are 
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based on questionable assumptions that law is objective, gender neutral and 
universally applicable. It is the recognition that the centrality of the state in 
international law reflects its patriarchal forms, which has particular bearing on the 
approach to rejection of tactical rape and sexual violence in war. Understanding and 
challenging the patriarchal base which applies in many situations must be a 
foundation for an emerging change of attitude and to non-acceptance of tactical rape 
and sexual violence in war.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the changing nature of war in order to provide a context 
for the two arenas of conflict which will be the primary focus of further 
consideration. It has considered the impact of tactical rape and sexual violence in war 
on women and on their communities. It has considered the discourse between 
feminist analysts and NGOs and the voices of women testifying in ad hoc courts. 
This discourse provides insight to the impact of tactical rape and sexual violence in 
war and into social relationships and attitudes which contribute to tactical rape and 
sexual violence in war being effective. The chapter has briefly considered the ways 
social attitudes can change as international discourse influences state policy and 
practice by applying rhetorical normative rejection of behaviours such as tactical 
rape and sexual violence in war. The next chapters will consider legal and analytical 
contributions and highlight some of the constraints and reservations of commentators 
and feminist analysts. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Legal Concepts and Critical Commentary Relating to Tactical Rape and Sexual 
Violence in War 
As awareness and accompanying media and NGO outrage at tactical rape and sexual 
violence in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda grew in the 1990s, so too did the 
pressure to respond. The ICTY and ICTR reviewed international humanitarian law 
and applied it in new ways in cases against those accused of these crimes. There had 
long been feminist commentators and analysts who condemned the use of rape and 
sexual violence in war, but they were relatively few in number among political 
commentators and until this period the issue had been usually considered a sectoral 
one, an issue affecting women and girls rather than states. The international attitude 
to humanitarianism began to change slowly. As will be seen in the later chapters 
regarding the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the voices of NGOs and feminist 
analysts were heard more clearly. International humanitarian law was found to apply 
more broadly than previously acknowledged. Eventually, even the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) began to consider that tactical rape and sexual violence in 
war might be within its mandate – and within its limits of responsibilities. 
Eventually, too, the sanctity of sovereignty would be challenged by the notion of a 
Responsibility to Protect.  
This chapter briefly reviews the legal and critical context in which discourse around 
recognition and rejection of tactical rape and sexual violence in war began to 
develop. It begins with an examination of the place of rape in international law. The 
second step is to review feminist critical analysis in the discourse around tactical rape 
and sexual violence in war in order to evaluate progress in rejecting these abuses and 
to identify issues in the related emerging discourse. The third step is to clarify 
relevant legal definitions. Fourthly, this chapter will review the role of the UNSC in 
order to ensure that detailed analysis of its resolutions later in this dissertation can be 
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evaluated. The fifth step is to review and acknowledge the reservations of some 
feminist writers regarding theorising on such a topic as rape in war – and to argue 
that despite the legitimacy of their concerns, it remains useful to focus on tactical 
rape and sexual violence in war. Finally, it recognises the concerns of those who 
decry the limitations and inappropriateness of judicial systems in recognising the 
suffering of women participating in antagonistic proceedings. While agreeing the 
legitimacy of these concerns, this dissertation is based on a conviction that imperfect 
and incremental progress is preferable to waiting for ideal and immediate change. 
Rape and International Law 
A number of analysts have reviewed the place of rape in international law. In many 
cases this has been a matter of noting the omission of mention of rape or the lack of 
understanding the nature of rape – particularly tactical rape. There is some, albeit 
limited, recognition of rape even when it is not specifically mentioned in 
international law. It is in the areas of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and 
Human Rights Law that there is most often reference to rape, especially rape in war. 
This dissertation bases its understanding of international law on the work of Shirley 
V. Scott who defined international law as:  
a system of rules, principles and concepts that governs relations among states and, 
increasingly, international organisations, individuals and other actors in world 
politics.1 
Scott highlighted the need to ‘appreciate that international law, although an integral 
part of politics is also to a large extent, autonomous’.2 She claimed that as there is no 
international legislature, it is the case that rules, concepts and principles come from a 
variety of sources. These include treaties, which are ‘agreements between states, 
                                                                
1 SV Scott, International Law in World Politics, Lynne Reinner Publishers, Colorado, 2004, p. 1. 
2 Scott, p. 2. 
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between states and international organisations or between international 
organisations’.3 Treaties may be bilateral between two parties such as an 
international organisation and a specific state or between two states regarding 
extradition or control of prosecution over actions of armed forces. They may be 
multilateral between three or more states such as those within a geographic region or 
between a larger number of states aiming at a global participation. The UN Charter 
requires members to register all treaties with the UN Secretariat. 4 The other source 
of international law is customary international law, which Scott pointed out, was 
once the most important source of international law: ‘Custom is created by what 
states do, where that action is carried out with a view to the rules and principles of 
international law.’5 Whatever the source of international law, its enforcement is 
problematic.  
Scott noted that international law operates ‘in a state-based system that is anarchical’ 
made up of ‘sovereign equals’ so enforcing compliance must rely on retortion, 
‘unfriendly but legal acts’, countermeasures, ‘acts that would be illegal except that 
they are carried out in response to an illegal act by the other party’ or by rewarding 
compliance with assistance.6 There are some limited judiciaries established to 
enforce compliance. But it is in the Statute of the International Court of Justice, as 
Scott noted, that the sources of international law have been formally articulated and 
these include treaties (international conventions); international custom; ‘general 
principles of law recognised by civilised nations’ and ‘judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations’.7 The term 
‘civilised nations’ is now understood as ‘states’ and ‘general principles’ is 
understood to refer to:  
                                                                
3 Scott, p. 3. 
4 Scott, pp. 4,5. 
5 Scott, p. 6. 
6 Scott, p. 10. 
7 Article 38 (1) Statute of the International Court of Justice quoted in Scott, p. 11. 
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general principles of law common to a representative majority of domestic legal 
orders which includes ‘the main forms of civilisation and the principle legal systems 
of the world.8  
The definition of states is set out in the Montevideo Convention of 1933: 
A State must have a permanent population, a defined territory and a government 
capable of maintaining effective control over its territory and of conducting 
international relations with other States.9 
This definition becomes particularly relevant as analysis of UNSC actions emerges 
later in this dissertation. It will also become apparent that states are not always 
willing or ready to maintain effective control over its territory. Judicial decisions 
refer to judgements of tribunals and courts and writings of distinguished international 
lawyers which can be utilised to inform judgements.10 The ICTY and ICTR are the 
specific judiciaries which are the focus of this dissertation and the rulings of these 
tribunals are analysed to understand and evaluate their actual and potential 
contribution to rejection of tactical rape and sexual violence in war. Each of these 
tribunals was mandated by the UNSC to operate within the limits of existing law – 
and it was by doing this that rulings demanded recognition of the fact that tactical 
rape and sexual violence in war did violate existing standards and agreements. As 
will be detailed in later chapters, they established that no new law was needed 
because tactical rape and sexual violence in war were deemed to be violations of 
existing international law.  
                                                                
8 H Mosler, ‘General Principles of Law’, in Encyclopaedia of Public International Law 2 (1995): pp. 
511-527, 516-517, and others quoted in Scott, p. 12. 
9 S V. Scott, AJ Billingsley & C Michaelson, International Law and the Use of Force: A Documentary 
and Reference Guide, Praeger Security International ABC-CLIO, Oxford, 2010, p.14. 
10 Scott, p. 12. 
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One area of international law most applicable to tactical rape is international 
humanitarian law (jus in bello) the laws by which war should be fought and which 
have been codified in numerous legal instruments since the nineteenth century. Scott, 
however, pointed out that such rules of conducting war had been set out in much 
earlier times such as in the wars between the Egyptians and the Sumerians in the 
second millennium BC and rules prohibiting the use of poisoned arrows by Hindus 
set out in the ancient Laws of Manu.11 Scott provided a detailed context for modern 
humanitarian law and noted that currently, modern humanitarian law has two 
streams: that pertaining to limitations or prohibitions of specific means and methods 
of warfare (the Hague laws) and that regarding the protection of civilians and those 
no longer fighting (the Geneva laws).12 It is this second set of laws which is the 
primary focus of this consideration of the legal context for rejecting tactical rape and 
sexual violence. As later analysis will show, there are grounds for dealing with 
tactical rape under the Geneva laws – known as the Geneva Conventions and their 
additional protocols.13 It is Convention IV, concerning the protection of civilians, 
which will be shown to apply most clearly to tactical rape and sexual violence in war 
as these are attacks on civilians.  
It has been acknowledged by Scott, among others, that the distinction between the 
two streams had become less clear since the 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions which address both issues.14 The 1977 additional protocols are the 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Arms Conflicts and Protocol Additional to the 
                                                                
11 Roberts & Guelff, Documents on the Laws of War, p. 29, quoted in Scott, p. 245. 
12 Scott, pp. 245-246. 
13 Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field (75 UNTS 31); Geneva Convention II for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked members of Armed Forces at Sea; Geneva Convention III 
Concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War; Geneva Convention IV Concerning the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War. 
14 Scott, p. 246. 
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Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts. While there is still a degree of invisibility of 
women in the Geneva law, article 76(i) of the first additional protocol does at least 
stipulate that ‘women shall be the object of special respect and shall be protected 
against rape, forced prostitution and any other forms of indecent assault’. Protocol 2 
cleared the way as the first piece of international law to acknowledge the need for 
protection of people in non-international conflicts – an important and relevant 
development when considering events in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. As will 
be seen, the ICTY and ICTR were able to build on these protocols and apply 
interpretations of the other major treaty in international humanitarian law, the 
Convention on the Protection and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the 
Genocide Convention). This Convention will be a focus in the chapter on the ICTR. 
As well as the Genocide Convention and the four Geneva Conventions with 
Additional Protocol II, which are referenced in the statutes of the ICTY, ICTR and 
the International Criminal Court (ICC), there are some key international agreements 
which are relevant to tactical rape and sexual violence in war. These include (inter 
alia): the United Nations Convention on Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women and Optional Protocol (1979); the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 
the Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women. 
It is essential to understand the developments in international humanitarian law in 
recent decades if one is to analyse its relatively recent application to tactical rape and 
sexual violence in war. Dietrich Schindler outlined two contradictory aspects of the 
recent development of international humanitarian law: enormous progress in 
attaining almost universal recognition and the gross violations of that law in 
inhumane and cruel acts committed in armed conflicts in the same period.15 He 
referred to the ‘remarkable normative development of international humanitarian law 
                                                                
15 D Schindler, ‘Significance of the Geneva Conventions for the Contemporary World’, International 
Review of the Red Cross, vol. 81 no. 836, December 1999, pp. 715-28. 
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since 1949’ and reviewed the phases of this development.16 He then claimed that 
there are five major developments which international humanitarian law has 
experienced since the end of the Cold War. The first was a realisation by the UNSC 
‘that large scale violations of human rights and international humanitarian law and 
the ensuing magnitude of human suffering can constitute a threat to international 
peace’.17 Schindler referred to specific resolutions which included mention of 
situations in the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia) and Rwanda, where the UNSC 
determined that violations of international humanitarian law constitute a threat to 
international peace and security.18  
The second development Schindler identified was that the distinction between 
international and non-international conflicts lost much of its significance in IHL.19 As 
later analysis will indicate, this development was certainly applicable when 
confronting the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The third 
development was the growing importance of customary law in judicial decision 
making. The fourth was the increasing influence of human rights law on international 
humanitarian law. The fifth development was seen to be located in a judgement of 
the International Court of Justice which ruled that the principles of international 
humanitarian law, ‘belong to the most fundamental norms of international law, 
norms which form part of what could be called the unwritten constitution of the 
international community.’20 As the rejection of tactical rape and sexual violence was 
discussed in international forums, the role of tribunals in demonstrating through case 
decisions was crucial and for this reason the work of the ICTR and ICTY are a focus 
of this dissertation. Such focus, however, also reinforces Schindler’s 
                                                                
16 Schindler, p. 716. 
17 Schindler, p. 720. 
18 UNSCR 929 (1994) on Rwanda; UNSCR 770 on Bosnia and Herzogovina (1992); UNSCR 808 
(1993); UNSCR 827 on Yugoslavia (1993); UNSCR 955 on Rwanda (1994). 
19 Schindler, p. 721. 
20 Schindler, p. 723. 
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acknowledgement of the massive lack of compliance and there is acknowledgment 
too of the increased levels of violent conflicts in the years since the conflicts in the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  
Critical Analysis Contributing to the Discourse Regarding Tactical Rape and Sexual 
Violence in War 
The changes in development of international law are positive but there have been 
many reservations expressed. As referenced in Chapter 1, Hilary Charlesworth and 
Christine Chinkin have written extensively on women and international law, 
examining the boundaries of this law from a feminist perspective.21 They have placed 
any progress for women in the application of existing international law in the context 
that such law is formulated to exclude appreciation of women’s concerns. It is a 
gendered legal context. Their analysis provided an understanding of the gendered 
attitudes inherent in law which supposedly applied to both men and women but 
which, in reality, ignored or failed to recognise the differing needs of the two 
genders. They have defined international law as ‘a mechanism for distributing power 
and resources in the international and national communities.’22 Their approach and 
rationale for feminist analysis was based on the recognition that international law is 
highly gendered, with limited reference to and inclusion of women. They quoted the 
feminist philosopher, Elizabeth Grosz, when commenting on the ‘international’ in 
international law, recognising it as a ‘veiled representation and projection of a 
masculine which takes itself as the unquestioned norm’.23  
Charlesworth and Chinkin approached their feminist analysis from the conviction 
that such analysis has two major roles: ‘one is deconstruction of the explicit and 
                                                                
21 Charlesworth and Chinkin, p. 252.  
22 Charlesworth and Chinkin, p. 1. 
23 E Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal Feminism, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1994, p. 103, 
quoted in Charlesworth and Chinkin, p. 60. 
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implicit values of the international legal system, challenging their claim to 
objectivity and rationality because of the limited base on which they are built’.24 This 
conviction could lead to elemental revision of all international law. The second role 
is to reconstruct, the explicit and implicit values, which ‘requires rebuilding the basic 
concepts of international law in a way that they do not support or reinforce the 
domination of women by men’.25 A number of factors contribute to understanding 
how the formulation and application of international law has impeded justice for 
women victims of tactical rape. A key factor is the need to understand that 
international law is severely gendered. There are important benefits to be gained 
from analysis such as that provided by Charlesworth and Chinkin and from 
considering the lack of awareness of gender issues displayed in international law. 
This will be apparent in later chapters where such law is analysed in the work of the 
ICTY and ICTR. However, while it remains questionable that the goal of 
reconstructing international law to incorporate a gendered perspective has been 
achieved, there will be demonstrated at least some progress in applying international 
law more inclusively so that women have been able to access more justice from the 
existing law.  
Under article 27, the fourth Geneva Convention says that states parties must protect 
women ‘against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced 
prostitution or any form of indecent assault’. Charlesworth and Chinkin recognised 
that this does not explicitly prohibit the offences but calls for protection of women 
and that by designating rape as a crime against ‘honour’ rather than one of violence, 
the protection presents women as male and family property.26 Protocol I continues to 
portray women as needing special respect and protection and Protocol II identifies 
rape in non-international conflicts as an outrage upon personal dignity not a violent 
                                                                
24 Charlesworth and Chinkin, p. 60. 
25 Charlesworth and Chinkin, p. 61. 
26 Charlesworth and Chinkin, p. 314. 
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attack on personal integrity.27 Charlesworth and Chinkin’s analysis highlighted that 
‘grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions are made subject to universal jurisdiction 
exercisable in national courts’ and are ‘regarded as the most significant violations of 
international humanitarian law’.28 It is telling that, as they point out, ‘rape, enforced 
prostitution and sexual assault are not explicitly designated grave breaches’.29 It is 
possible, of course, to use the wording of Protocol I, which lists grave breaches as 
‘degrading practices involving outrages on personal dignity based on racial 
discrimination’ for prosecuting cases of tactical rape and sexual violence in war. 
Non-grave breaches can be deemed war crimes. But, as Charlesworth and Chinkin 
highlighted, this is a less than satisfactory formulation in international law.30 Even in 
common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions it is not made explicit that sexual 
assault and violence are covered by listed prohibitions. In chapters 3 and 4, the work 
of the ICTY and the ICTR in interpreting and applying what international 
humanitarian laws could be applied to tactical rape will be shown to have, at least, 
gone some way to redressing these deficiencies.  
Charlesworth and Chinkin have also considered the gendered aspects of human rights 
law, the other main form of international law which is applicable to tactical rape and 
sexual violence in war. They have noted that human rights law ‘challenges the 
traditional state-centred scope of international law, giving individuals and groups, 
otherwise with very restricted access to the international legal system, the possibility 
of making international legal claims.’31 An important international instrument 
relevant to tactical rape and sexual violence in war is the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.32 This includes a requirement that states do not engage in acts such as 
                                                                
27 Charlesworth and Chinkin, p. 315..  
28 Charlesworth and Chinkin, p. 315. 
29 Charlesworth and Chinkin, p. 315. 
30 Charlesworth and Chinkin, p. 316. 
31 Charlesworth and Chinkin, p. 201. 
32 GA Res. 217A(111), 10 December 1948. 
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torture, arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty and security. The outcomes of the ICTR 
and ICTY established that this prohibition applies to tactical rape and sexual violence 
in war.  
However, as Charlesworth and Chinkin pointed out, ‘mainstream human rights 
institutions have tended to ignore the application of human rights norms to women’ 
and they referred to the study in 1993 of the work of the UN Commission on Human 
Rights’ Special Rapporteur on Torture, which found that ‘he rarely considered the 
application of norms of international human rights law or international humanitarian 
law to women’.33 This same report found that in the Special Rapporteur’s work, ‘well 
documented cases of torture and ill-treatment of women went un-investigated or 
were treated in a desultory fashion’.34 It was indicative of attitudes to tactical rape 
and sexual violence in war that the Special Rapporteur’s condemnation of rapes in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina focussed on the harm resulting to ethnic communities and failed 
to acknowledge the harm inflicted on women as individuals because of their sex and 
gender.35 The particular shortcomings of the work of this Special Rapporteur will be 
dealt with in more detail in the later chapter on the former Yugoslavia. 
In a similar case, Charlesworth and Chinkin pointed out that the UN’s fact finding in 
Rwanda did not detect ‘systematic sexual violence against women until nine months 
after the genocide when women began to give birth in unprecedented numbers’ – an 
instance exemplifying the reality that ‘methods of investigating and documenting 
human rights abuses can often obscure or even conceal abuses against women.’36 The 
                                                                
33 International Human Rights Law Group, Token Gestures: Women’s Human Rights and UN 
Reporting 1. The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Washington DC, 1993, at 5-6 quoted in 
Charlesworth and Chinkin, p. 218. 
34 International Human Rights Law Group, pp. 10-11, 14-15. 
35 International Human Rights Law Group, pp. 7-8 
36 A Gallagher, ‘Ending the marginalisation: strategies for incorporating women into the United 
Nations Human Rights system’, 19, Human Rights Quarterly (1997) 283 at 292 quoted in 
Charlesworth and Chinkin, p. 219. 
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chapter on Rwanda will demonstrate that the failure to report formally on the 
widespread use of tactical rape and sexual violence was almost incomprehensible 
given the awareness of NGOs, media and peacekeepers across the war-torn country. 
Tactical rape and sexual abuse in the conflict were apparent to even the most casual 
observer, but were not accorded attention in many early reports. So, while human 
rights law could be invoked to confront tactical rape and sexual violence in war, it 
was as difficult an exercise as applying international humanitarian law.  
Together with other feminist analysts, Judith Gardam has provided insight to 
understanding the broader context of justice for women. Writing in 1998, Gardam 
considered the impact of the growing focus on women’s human rights, particularly in 
relation to the criminalisation and punishment of sexual violence against women in 
armed conflicts.37 Her opening statement referred to the general development in the 
last fifty years of the principles that comprise human rights law having had a major 
impact on international humanitarian law and indeed on international law generally.38 
Her insightful analysis, which followed, highlighted that the impact could be seen 
‘primarily in developments regarding the criminalization and punishment of sexual 
violence against women in armed conflict’.39 Gardam tracked the progress through 
the actions of human rights activists and organisations and considered the 
achievements and difficulties in the ICTR and ICTY and concluded that the scrutiny 
by human rights groups of sexual violence against women in armed conflicts had 
translated into ‘a new perception that such acts must be addressed by mainstream 
bodies dealing with enforcement of international humanitarian law’.40 This is a 
reiteration of the dual need to ensure equality of women’s human rights and the need 
to ensure the same application to war crimes and crimes against humanity when 
                                                                
37 J Gardam, ‘Women, Human Rights and International Law’, International Review of the Red Cross, 
no. 324, 1998, pp. 421-32. 
38 Gardam, 1998 p. 421. 
39 Gardam, 1998 p. 422. 
40 Gardam, 1998 p. 431. 
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perpetrated against women as when perpetrated against anyone else in armed 
conflict.  
Gardam examined the work by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
and she noted that the ICRC had ‘given increasing recognition to the fact that the 
situation of women in armed conflicts poses distinctive challenges for humanitarian 
law.’41 She referred specifically to a resolution of the ICRC, adopted by consensus in 
1995, which dealt separately with sexual violence against women.42 This resolution 
condemned the practice of sexual violence against women in armed conflict, 
reaffirmed that rape in the conduct of hostilities was a war crime and highlighted the 
importance of enforcing the relevant provisions and the need to train those involved 
in such processes.43 This was certainly some progress, but Gardam was forced to 
conclude that despite progress in paying attention to women’s human rights and the 
allied impact on international humanitarian law, this had not led to ‘a general 
acknowledgement that women’s human rights warrant a special place in 
humanitarian law’.44 With no specific formulation of women’s rights in international 
law, this left the option of using mainstream humanitarian law, elaborated where 
possible by reference to human rights law, to enforce justice for victims of tactical 
rape and sexual violence. 
Writing in 2001 with Michelle J. Jarvis, Gardam highlighted the need to view the use 
of sexual violence in war in the broader context of generalised discrimination: 
                                                                
41 Gardam, 1998 p. 432. 
42 Resolution 2(B), of the 26th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, 1995. 
43 Gardam, 1998 p. 432. 
44 Gardam, 1998 p. 432.  
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violence against women is perhaps one of the clearest examples of how 
discrimination against women that exists in all societies during peace-time is 
exacerbated during periods of armed conflict.45 
As will be seen in later chapters, this realisation was also reflected in UNSC 
resolutions, in the 2000s, which did take a more holistic view in confronting sexual 
violence against women in war. However, Gardam and Jarvis were right to highlight 
that discrimination against women in society is reflected in international 
humanitarian law and that the ‘unequal status of women also exacerbates what 
appear initially to be neutral factors experienced by both men and women’.46 Their 
commentary provided a basis for deeper understanding of the linkage between 
gender discrimination and violence against women in war. 
Related to women’s place in their societies is the nature of the formulation and 
understanding of human rights. Georgina Ashworth, writing on human rights in 
global politics, charted responses by women’s human rights movements to ‘the built-
in selectivity’ of the human rights regime.47 This charting, too, helped understand 
that existing human rights law required a new way of interpreting and applying it to 
women’s needs and concerns. The responses she charted included NGO activism and 
the formulation of sections for inclusion in the Declaration and Programme for 
Action for adoption at the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights (1993). The 
objectives of those activists included demonstrating how recognition of women’s 
human rights had been suppressed and this was echoed in later international 
conference participation.48 Ashworth concluded that women’s groups themselves had 
                                                                
45 J Gardam & MJ Jarvis, Women, Armed Conflict and International Law, Kluwer Law International,  
The Netherlands, 2001, p.25. 
46 Gardam & Jarvis, 2001 p.134. 
47 G Ashworth, ‘The Silencing of Women’ in T Dunne & N Wheeler, Human Rights in Global 
Politics, Cambridge University Press, UK,1999.  
48 Ashworth, p. 265. 
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begun to use the ‘mainstream’ human rights systems more effectively and that ‘while 
not abandoning the Women’s Convention, they aspire to see the equality promises in 
the major conventions become real for themselves and their sisters.’49 This approach 
of using existing, mainstream international law, especially international humanitarian 
law and human rights law, and insisting it be applied to issues such as tactical rape 
and sexual violence in war, has been the basis for much of the work of the ICTY and 
ICTR. As will be seen in later chapters of this dissertation, the Tribunal statutes set 
existing law as parameters – an approach which appeared to be a pragmatically 
effective strategy.  
While the ICTY and ICTR were mandated to work within existing international law, 
there was growing recognition that this existing legal framework would require new 
approaches to interpretation and application to ensure justice for women – 
approaches which the two courts did, at least in part, undertake. A paper by Jane 
Connors, Chief of the Women’s Rights Unit of the UN’s Division for the 
Advancement of Women, listed a number of the international conferences at which 
the issue of gendered discrimination of women’s access to their human rights had 
been confronted.50 These included the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights in 
June 1993. Connors said the international community had openly acknowledged that 
the body of international law and mechanisms established to promote and protect 
human rights had not properly taken into account the concerns of over half the 
world’s population and states formally recognised the human rights of women as ‘an 
inalienable, integral and indivisible part of human rights’.51 This had been an 
important step.  
                                                                
49 Ashworth, p. 271.  
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Gender Equality and the Judiciary, Commonwealth Secretariat, UK, 1999, p. 37.  
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Connors also noted progress with the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
Against Women (December 1993) and the Beijing Declaration and Platform for 
Action (September 1995). However, she continued to identify limitations of the 
existing human rights system: human rights were conceptualised and defined without 
significant participation of women’s groups; many issues including (inter alia) 
systematic violence had not been defined as human rights issues or made the subject 
of legally binding norms; international human rights law effectively excluded many 
actions by non-state actors and in the private sphere; discrimination against women 
was justified by governments on the basis of culture, religion and ethnicity.52 
Connors named the Committee on Torture as having done less than other treaty 
bodies to reflect the importance of gender consideration.53 This overview of work 
being done to ensure protection for women’s human rights highlighted the reality 
that much more needed to be done when applying human rights law to victims of 
tactical rape and sexual violence in war, on the grounds of human rights violation.  
Other analysts debated concerns about the distinctions made between public and 
private spheres when dealing with tactical rape and sexual violence in war. This is a 
distinction which had to be recognised as impacting on where, when and how 
international law was interpreted and applied. When Karen Knop introduced her 
book on gender and human rights she referred to feminist debates over the 
public/private distinctions made in interpreting international law.54 Karen Engle, for 
example, mapped ‘onto public international law the public/private distinction that 
demarcates bodily autonomy as private, and this distinction carries different 
implications for legal intervention’.55 Knop made the point that feminist legal 
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55 K Engle, ‘After the Collapse of the Public/Private Distinction: Strategising Women’s Rights’ in DG 
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analysis had shown that women are more vulnerable in the private sphere but the 
public/private distinction had been applied, possibly for reasons of convenience, to 
prevent relevant law from remedying the situation. She pointed out that this had been 
the issue adapted to critiques of international law and noted that this distinction, 
intended as a critique of international law had been questioned for possibly being 
more ‘mystifying than useful’ by Patricia Viseur-Sellers.56 The distinction between 
private and public spheres was referred to as a notional division that sees ‘legal 
regulation as appropriate to the public sphere and ordinarily inappropriate to the 
private sphere, where the line between public and private is most often drawn either 
between the state and civil society or within civil society so as to mark off the 
domestic space of family life as private’.57 Sellers had focussed on individuals’ 
liability for collective violence with particular attention to work of the ICTY 
reviewed in the context of the public/private distinction.  
Sellers emphasised that international law regulated armed conflict such as crimes 
against humanity yet when these crimes were committed against women, they had 
been deemed to be in the private sphere and not really the subject of international 
humanitarian law. She referred to what she called a self-evident point:  
All international humanitarian law, or in modern terminology, the laws of armed 
conflict, is public not private law. To accentuate the obvious, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide reside only in the very public domain that obligates 
state action and, more recently, galvanized the international community to establish 
the ad hoc Tribunals and the ICC.58  
Sellers had been clear that whether war crimes were perpetrated against men or 
women, they were in the public domain and demanded response. This was as 
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applicable to tactical rape and sexual violence as a war crime as it was applicable to 
any other war crime. Again, this analysis quite rightly highlighted that application of 
existing law to ensuring justice for women had been wanting. Given this situation, 
the work of the ICTY and ICTR, when considered further in Chapters 3 and 4 
particularly, will be seen to have been progressive.  
Julie Mertus also clarified some of the legal frameworks which could be seen to 
pertain to tactical rape and sexual violence in war.59 She reviewed the work of Hugo 
Grotius in De Jure Belli (1623-1624) and his conclusion that the rights of combatants 
and non-combatants alike should be protected. She noted, too, that ‘Eighteenth-
century Enlightenment thinkers further refined the rights of non-combatants and the 
limitations placed on warfare’ and ‘rape was not viewed as strategy to further war 
aims nor was it regarded as necessary to winning a war.’60 As Mertus highlighted, 
even by the nineteenth century, when states were beginning to look at sexual 
violence in codes of conduct for armed forces, rape in peace or in war was still seen 
as a crime against a man, ‘an assault on male property’ and even when rape was seen 
as a theft of chastity and virtue, the crime was against the man or the family ‘who 
was entitled to the woman’s chastity and virtue, not against the woman herself as an 
independent individual’.61 After World War I there was some effort to document 
violence against women in armed conflict. There was the ‘existence of international 
customary law prohibiting rape during armed conflict’ but ‘political will to prosecute 
and punish violators of such rules’ did not exist.62 It was not until the trials at 
Nuremberg and Tokyo that some attention (albeit limited) was paid to rape. This 
minimal attention did have value for the prosecution of rape as a war crime in that it 
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paved the way for the prosecution of rape before the international criminal tribunals 
of Yugoslavia and Rwanda some fifty years later.63 
Mertus identified where prohibition against wartime rape could be found in many 
international instruments as well as in customary international law.64 This approach 
supported the notion that existing law, when appropriately interpreted and applied 
could provide a framework for justice for victims of tactical rape and sexual violence 
in war. Mertus noted that rape is listed as a simple breach of obligation under Article 
27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention which calls for women to be ‘especially 
protected against any attack on their honour, in particular rape’ but could be 
understood to constitute a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions if classified as 
inhuman treatment or great suffering or serious injury to body or health.65 Mertus 
highlighted that this is important because it is only grave breaches which fall under 
universal jurisdiction, meaning that they can be tried by any court irrespective of 
where the offence occurs. Rape can also fall under common Article 3 of all Geneva 
Conventions and the two 1977 Protocols Additional to Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
These protocols ‘offer greater protection as they apply to all women in the territory 
of the conflict, regardless of whether their states are parties to the convention’.66 
These international laws could provide protection to victims of tactical rape and 
sexual violence in war, but it required political will to prosecute and bring to account 
perpetrators of violations of such rules.  
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in an Aide Memoir in 1992 
had deemed rape to fall under the provisions of both the Articles referenced in 
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Mertus.67 With the commentary of the ICRC on Protocol II to the Geneva 
Conventions, which reaffirmed and supplemented Common Article 3, it became 
clear that it was necessary to strengthen the protection of women who may also be 
the victims of rape.68 This approach and attention to reading existing law from the 
perspective of understanding the reality of rape in war and recognition that terms of 
existing law could be legitimately applied was a sign of progress towards due 
attention being paid to tactical rape and sexual violence in war. It was becoming 
apparent that existing law encapsulated the rules for confronting tactical rape and 
sexual violence in war, including wars fought in new ways.  
As was noted in the introduction to this dissertation, Mary Kaldor provided a 
framework for understanding the new ways in which wars were fought in the 
twentieth century. This framework is particularly relevant to understanding the 
conflict and genocide in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and to recognising the 
degree to which existing law applied to victims of tactical rape and sexual violence 
in war. She described the new wars as, ‘in a sense, a mixture of war, crime and 
human rights violations’ so it is understandable that tactical rape, a strategy of these 
new wars, required reference to a range of law.69 Kaldor stated that ‘all types of 
warfare are characterised by rules; the very fact that warfare is a socially sanctioned 
activity, that it has to be organised and justified, requires rules’.70 She said, ‘there 
developed rules about what constituted legitimate warfare which were later codified 
in the laws of war’.71 These codified laws constitute international humanitarian law 
and much of the work of the ICTY and ICTR which will be analysed later in this 
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dissertation comes within the ambit of interpreting and applying that law to tactical 
rape and sexual violence in those conflicts. Kaldor noted that after the Second World 
War, human rights norms were added to what was known as international 
humanitarian law and the difference, ‘between humanitarian and human rights law 
has to do largely with whether violation of the law takes place in war or peacetime’.72 
However, as will be seen, the ICTY and ICTR did not accept that actions which 
would be illegal in war should escape accountability because the definition of war 
and peace had become blurred in the new type of warfare. 
The ICTY and ICTR were operating in a context of greater understanding of the 
changing nature of war. Chris Brown provided a re-examination of war and the states 
system in 2002, helping to clarify that the context in which tactical rape and sexual 
violence could be utilised had changed as he identified changes in the way war is 
fought in the 21st century, including a move away from decisive battles and the 
differences between women’s place in the public and private spheres.73 It is notable, 
however, that he omitted any real focus on the attacks on civilians, which is where 
attacks on women become apparent, although he did offer insights into human rights 
law and norms. Human rights laws frequently represent norms purportedly held by 
many states.74 Brown considered the term ‘settled norms’ used earlier by Mervyn 
Frost and stated: ‘a norm is ‘settled’ if states endorse it even when their behaviour is 
apparently in contradiction to it’.75 A developing norm, such as one rejecting tactical 
rape and sexual violence in war, would take time to be considered ‘settled’.  
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As the work of the ICTY and ICTR continued, there was further commentary 
recognising the nature of the context of failure to apply existing law to achieve 
justice for women. In 2003 Kelly Askin highlighted how limited has been the 
attention paid by international law and allied judicial proceedings to rape in war.76 
She noted that in the Hague Conventions, there is one single article which prohibits 
sexual violence as violation of ‘family honour’; at the Nuremberg Trials, there were 
723 pages of reports but rape was not even in the index; at the Tokyo Trial, with five 
supplementary indexes to twenty-two volumes, rape is mentioned only four times 
under ‘atrocities’; in the four Geneva Conventions, of the 429 sentences, only one 
mentions prohibition of rape although there are a few others which could be 
interpreted as including rape; the 1974 Declaration on Protection of Women and 
Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict includes no mention of rape; in the 1977 
two Additional Protocols to Geneva Conventions only one sentence explicitly 
prohibits sexual violence’.77 
Also helping to understand the application and interpretation of existing international 
law in ICTY and ICTR trials involving tactical rape and sexual violence, Askin 
summarised and highlighted key findings with implications for other cases and future 
accountability of perpetrators.78 She provided an overview of the progress and the 
obstacles facing advocates for prosecuting perpetrators of rape in war. She provided 
comprehensive background and analysis, noting that while there had been progress 
this had to be measured against a prior dearth of attention and focus. These analyses 
by Askin will be referenced extensively in later chapters dealing with outcomes of 
the ICTY and ICTR, because they focus not only on the limitations of applying 
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existing law but also on the progress – however limited – in confronting tactical rape 
and sexual violence in war with existing law. They also figure in analysis because 
many aspects of rape and international law were defined and clarified in the rulings 
of these two tribunals and in other relevant documents as the international 
community made links between tactical rape and sexual violence in war and existing 
international law.  
Legal definitions relevant to tactical rape and sexual violence in war 
A UN legal study on rape and sexual assault summarised some key issues for states 
and international relations when dealing with rape.79 It said, ‘a single act suffices to 
constitute a war crime’.80 It follows that individual rapes can be war crimes and 
therefore action can be taken against a perpetrator. This study also said, ‘crimes 
against humanity can be committed by anybody and come with universal 
jurisdiction’.81 State involvement must be proved, ‘at least in terms of tolerance’ and 
acts must be part of a widespread or systematic attack based on national, political, 
ethnic or religious grounds.82 So, individual rapes can be recognised and 
accountability required – when part of a tactical strategy. Geoffrey Robertson 
clarified what he deemed an important distinction, ‘an act which is wicked in itself, 
becomes especially wicked (that is a crime against humanity) when deployed 
systematically and for political ends’.83 This is an important distinction and helps 
understand the difference between rape as a ‘by-product’ of war and rape as a tactic 
of war.  
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The work of the ICTY and ICTR contributed to definitions now generally accepted 
in international law and reflected specifically in the Rome Treaty, which was the 
base for the International Criminal Court.84 The International Criminal Court (ICC) is 
an independent, permanent court established by the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court – adopted in 1998 and entered into force in 2002 after ratification of 
sixty states. The ICC is mandated to act as a court of last resort and will not act if a 
case is investigated or prosecuted by a national judicial system unless the national 
proceedings were not genuine. It tries only ‘those accused of the gravest crimes’.85 
The definition of a crime against humanity to be used by the ICC drew on work done 
by the ICTY, acknowledging the need to consider the existence of ‘widespread or 
systematic attack on civilian populations and the mental state of the individual 
defendant’.86 The ICC is mandated to discourage acts of criminality, not acts of war. 
As this court may try cases where it is believed the national proceedings were not 
genuine and may have been held to shield an accused, it will have a role beyond the 
time frame of ad hoc tribunals. If states without political will to prosecute particular 
crimes try to avoid international scrutiny and accountability, the ICC is mandated to 
take action.  
Key definitions from the ICC Statute, built on established international law as well as 
on the work of the ICTY and ICTR, and provide an ongoing basis for applying 
international law. Article 6 of the ICC Statute refers to the definition and 
requirements of acts of genocide, set out in the text of the 1948 Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the ‘Genocide Convention’.87 
This Convention provides the foundational elements to be considered when 
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determining whether or not actions constitute genocide. These include defining and 
identifying the perpetrators, the targeted victims, the nature of the acts, the intent 
behind those acts and the responsibility to prosecute. This definition will be 
particularly relevant when considering tactical rape and sexual violence in Rwanda. 
Article 6 of the ICC Statute defines genocide as any of the following acts committed 
with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious 
group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm 
to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures 
intended to prevent births within the group; forcibly transferring children of the 
group to another group. The ICTR made a first and key ruling regarding tactical rape 
and genocide and this is the focus in Chapter 4 where there is detailed analysis of the 
elements of events in Rwanda which were able to be interpreted as genocide. 
The ICC Statute Article 7 defined a crime against humanity as any of a 
comprehensive list of acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against a civilian population with knowledge of the attack. These included 
(inter alia):  
rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation, 
or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; persecution against any 
identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, 
religious; gender or other grounds that are universally recognised as impermissible 
under international law.88 
The comprehensive list ensures a mandate to deal with a diverse range of acts under 
the general rubric of tactical rape and sexual violence in war. The specific note that 
                                                                
88 Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 7 para. 1. 
 89 
 
such acts are ‘impermissible under international law’ sets such acts within the 
existing, established parameters of international law.  
Article 8 of the ICC Statute gives the ICC jurisdiction over war crimes ‘when 
committed as part of a plan or policy’ or when acts are committed on a large scale. It 
defines war crimes as: ‘grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of August 12 
1949’ and lists a number of specific acts which include (inter alia): wilful killing; 
torture or inhuman treatment; wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to 
body or health. 89 A second category of war crimes are acts which constitute ‘serious 
violation of laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict’ and such 
acts include (inter alia): intentionally attacking civilian populations or individuals not 
taking direct part in hostilities; committing outrages on personal dignity in particular 
humiliating or degrading treatment; committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy or any other form of sexual violence constituting a 
breach of the Geneva Conventions.90 In the case of an armed conflict not of 
international character, the Statute includes as war crimes violations of Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and violations of laws and customs applicable 
in armed conflicts not of international nature.91 The conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda were clearly covered by this Statute and later chapters 
regarding the judgements and work of the ICTR and ICTY will show that they were 
influential in establishing the applicability of these definitions – especially regarding 
international vs. non-international conflicts – and in defining rape, sexual slavery, 
torture and other aspects of tactical rape. All of these have informed other 
commentaries and considerations of elements of the three main categories of crimes 
relevant to consideration of tactical rape and sexual violence in war: crimes against 
humanity; war crimes and genocide. 
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There is often confusion regarding the two terms ‘genocide and ‘ethnic cleansing’. 
Genocide is defined according to the Genocide Convention. It is a legal term based 
on agreed international law. It is essential to establish the key elements of genocide 
as determined by the international convention.92  The primary source regarding rape 
as a weapon of genocide must be the Genocide Convention. Raphael Lemkin may 
not have been fully satisfied with the final text but this Convention which resulted 
largely due to his efforts, does have widespread application.93 Lemkin was appalled 
that the banner of ‘state sovereignty’ could shield men ‘who tried to wipe out an 
entire minority’ and argued that ‘sovereignty cannot be conceived as the right to kill 
millions of innocent people’.94 Eventually, he achieved international agreement to 
what is the Convention, which has been ratified and widely accepted by states as 
setting a standard for international behaviour. The definition and requirements for 
definition of acts of genocide, set out in the text, provide the foundational elements 
to be considered when defining actions as constituting genocide. Article 2 defines 
genocide as ‘any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole 
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such: (a) killing members 
of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) 
deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring its physical 
destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births 
within the group; (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
There is no legal requirement for conflict to be occurring for events to be deemed 
genocide. 
Helen Fein believed that Lemkin viewed (c), (d) and (e) as steps towards (a) in most 
cases of genocide and she noted that besides mass killing, genocide also may include 
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murder through starvation and poisoning of air, water or food and the involuntary 
transfer of children.95 Rape is a notable omission from her list considering that 
tactical rape and sexual violence can contribute to mass killing and can also be 
shown to be a strategy resulting in serious bodily or mental harm, deliberately 
inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction and to 
impose measures intended to prevent births within the group if the intent is to destroy 
the group. 
In contrast to genocide, ethnic cleansing is a political concept rather than a legally 
defined term. It is a concept which became particularly relevant in the conflicts in 
both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s. According to Martin Griffiths 
and Terry O’Callaghan, ethnic cleansing was a term coined during the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia, although it has been applied in many other contexts since its original 
application.96 It refers to situations or stratagems by which ethnic minorities are 
driven from a land or an area so that ‘a majority group can assemble a more unified, 
more contiguous, and larger territory for its nation-state’.97 It is important to note the 
significant difference. Ethnic cleansing seeks to ‘cleanse or purify’, the territory of 
an ethnic group ‘by use of terror, rape and murder to convince the inhabitants to 
leave’.98 In contrast, genocide seeks to destroy the group. 
In 1993, the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) expressed 
outrage at rape being used as a weapon of war.99 In 1994, the United Nations General 
Assembly resolution 1994/205 expressed alarm at ‘the continuing use of rape as a 
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weapon of war’.100 Both these resolutions also recognised the use of rape as an 
instrument of ethnic cleansing and noted that the abhorrent policy of ethnic cleansing 
was a form of genocide. However, this was not a legal definition. Ethnic cleansing 
had been defined by the UN Commission of Experts as, ‘rendering an area ethnically 
homogeneous by using force, or intimidation to remove from a given area persons 
from another ethnic or religious group’.101 Analysis of the two arenas of conflict in 
later chapters demonstrates that ethnic cleansing was a strategy employed and part of 
this strategy included tactical rape as a method of ‘cleansing’ a territory of unwanted 
groups. As will be seen, rape was eventually judged to have been a means of 
genocide in Rwanda. However, it must be clear that the term ethnic cleansing is a 
general expression of a strategy, while genocide is a legal term with consequent legal 
implications. There is a need to establish the distinction between ethnic cleansing and 
genocide because the two terms are sometimes used as if they are interchangeable.  
The United Nations Security Council and Its Resolutions 
In the absence of a global parliament or government, any change in political attitudes 
and expectations of states by states usually finds its roots in debates and deliberations 
at the United Nations. Hedley Bull’s definition of the concept of international society 
is that it exists:  
when a group of states, conscious of certain common values, form a society in the 
sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their 
relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.102  
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This international society finds its expression in the United Nations where rules and 
values are debated and shared and become international law. Michael Barnett and 
Martha Finnemore have pointed out that ‘rules, norms and principles that define what 
counts as legitimate international order’ are not fixed in stone but are subject to 
debate.103 They note, too, that most important debates often happen in the UN and are 
‘most intense when there is ‘shift, shock or challenge in world politics that 
potentially destabilises the existing standards’.104 Debates on tactical rape and sexual 
violence would appear to fit into such a description as world media and NGOs 
decried events in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s.  
The United Nations Security Council bears ‘primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security’.105 The Council is certainly the most 
powerful UN organ. Security Council decisions can be binding on all member states 
when adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter.106 During the Cold War, from 1946 
to 1986, the Council passed 593 resolutions but between 1987 and 2005, 1010 
resolutions were passed.107 There has not always been full implementation of these 
resolutions and there is ongoing concern about the range and number of resolutions 
passed. This will emerge in later chapters focussed on specific resolutions. Indicative 
of the potency and power of the Security Council, the ICTR and ICTY were 
established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It was the powers conferred on the 
Security Council by Chapter VII which allowed for the tribunals’ establishment and 
for the tribunals to claim primacy over domestic courts and demand ‘legally 
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cognizable cooperation’ from UN member states.108 These were the powers of the 
Security Council to remove threats to international peace and security.109 
However, the Security Council faced new conditions for action as the twentieth 
century drew to a close. It had to operate in a context of globalisation or ‘increased-
connectivity’ of states and organisations and it faced new expectations of 
humanitarianism and a new understanding of sovereignty. The sovereignty of states 
came increasingly, to include ‘a modicum of respect for human rights’.110 As the 
important debates on rules, norms and principles mentioned by Barnett and 
Finnemore result in resolutions, there is pressure on member states to implement and 
respect agreed standards of behaviour and responsibilities. The Charter refers to the 
UN being based on sovereign equality of all member states.111 But, there is increasing 
recognition that in reality not all member states are equal and that it is, in fact, 
possible for some states to fail. So, while borders remain crucial, sovereignty seems 
considerably less sacrosanct today than in 1945.112  
This lessening of the inviolability of sovereignty has, in part, resulted from the 
promulgation of the concept of Responsibility to Protect. In the early 1990s there 
was a shift in attitudes to humanitarian intervention. In 2001, the report of The 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) moved 
emphasis from the traditional right of states to non-interference in their affairs within 
their own borders and emphasised the responsibility of states and the international 
community to protect citizens within those borders.113 There has been ongoing debate 
around this concept, generally seen as illustrating the power of ‘a strong normative 
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concept in responding to massive atrocities’.114 Although the responsibility to protect 
has developed from a sense of hoping it would end mass atrocities, ‘once and for all’, 
Hilary Charlesworth argued that the responsibility to protect had ‘developed without 
adequate attention to the lives of women.’115 While she noted the ambivalent attitudes 
of feminist scholars to international law – sometimes invoking it and ‘sometimes 
worrying that invoking it may legitimate oppressive state structures’ – she concluded 
that the responsibility to protect should be framed ‘as one strand of a complex 
response that draws inspiration and ideas from everyone affected by violence’ and 
was valuable.116 It is a concept that is influencing the function of the UNSC and as 
such worth noting when analysing the context in which normative rejection of 
tactical rape and sexual violence in war began to emerge. 
Reservations about Theorising Rape and Judicial Processes 
Other approaches and analyses regarding tactical rape and sexual violence in war 
have raised concerns among feminist scholars and commentators.. The very fact of 
theorising about rape in war, of developing principles and frameworks around such 
pernicious practice can be – and has been – questioned. There is disagreement about 
the relevance of feminist theory to women raped in war. There is disagreement 
regarding the extent to which such theorising actually creates tensions, as most of the 
theorising is perceived to be culturally driven by feminists whose situations differ 
markedly from that of women who have been subjected to tactical rape and sexual 
violence in war. This debate between feminist writers and commentators highlights 
differences in attitudes to considering women as victims or women as having some 
agency in their own right and in their own ways of responding. Positively, this 
discourse keeps the issue in the public and academic consciousness. It is important to 
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recognise concerns regarding responses to the need for justice for women before a 
detailed examination of how and what progress has been made at global level in 
rejecting tactical rape and sexual violence in war.  
Beverley Allen, writing in the journal Signs, noted that, after spending time in 
Croatia during the war and in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the war, with ‘people who 
had been affected by the war, including those affected by genocidal rape’, she had 
found that ‘the relevance of contemporary theory grew pretty distant’ and she had 
‘stopped reading feminist theory pretty much altogether’.117 She wrote of her 
disappointment at the cognitive dissonance between the Balkans and American 
academia and that her response had been to turn to reliance on her experience and 
observations – admitting to more anecdotes and ever less theory, even while noting 
that such anecdotes bear all the defects and limitations of experience. In this article, 
she wondered that so few academics had direct experience in the Balkans, when so 
much of what was being studied – ethnicity, gender, nationalism – had become 
matters of life and death there.118 This is an understandable reaction to experiencing 
at close range the stories and accounts of women who have been exposed to real 
suffering. But, as is seen below, it is not necessarily a point of view shared by others.  
Janice Haarken wrote of ‘the seductions of theory’ and maintained that some of the 
explorations of theories of rape have inherent flaws, in particular she asserted that to 
explore the ambiguities at the borders of the politics of rape does not inevitably lead 
back to victim blaming but it does pose a risk of such blaming.119 She believed there 
was a need to insist on an approach to politics of sexual violence that encompassed 
the full range of complexity of women’s experience and the subjective and objective 
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barriers to women’s emancipation from patriarchal dominance. Haarken noted that 
one of the issues that bridges rape politics and feminist cultural theory centred on 
‘how we understand the gap between experience and representation’ and she 
continued, ‘it is important to recognise that there is an inevitable disjuncture between 
rape as a metaphor and rape as a concrete act of violence.’120 This would seem, at 
least in part, to have supported Allen’s call which, in effect, was to remember that 
rape in war affects real people in real ways and cannot always be dealt with without 
some subjective, emotional response. 
Carine Mardorossian took both Allen and Haarken to task. She rejected the 
‘theory/experience opposition’ which she believed Haarken was propounding and 
insisted that Allen was failing to see that academic theories could be useful, failing to 
use a theoretical framework to make sense of her experience.121 Responding to 
Allen’s use of anecdote and narrative, Mardorossian claimed that Allen wrote about 
victims of ‘genocidal rape’ and assembled their stories while Mardorossian, herself, 
addressed the ethical and theoretical questions that arise when feminists document, 
explain, or work to alleviate the suffering of rape victims. She claimed that she 
addressed the process through which academic feminists write about victims, make 
sense of their subjectivity and import their stories so as to interpret them.122 This 
exchange of views is indicative of the diverse approaches to considering tactical rape 
and sexual violence in war. For this dissertation, however, as noted in the 
introduction, there has been a decision to incorporate stories, testimonies and 
anecdotes which have been documented and consider them within theoretical 
frameworks which are deemed to help illuminate or understand the impact of those 
stories. This dissertation is based on a conviction that theoretical understanding 
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cannot and should not be divorced from experiential understanding. Nor should the 
human, personal dimension of an issue be excluded in consideration and analysis. 
The one can illuminate the other, with theory and analytical frameworks making 
sense of what is often the chaos of war and experience ensuring that humanity is not 
lost in objective considerations. 
Also writing in 2005, Karen Engle reviewed the progress in criminalising wartime 
rape.123 This highlighted a further aspect requiring caution when proceeding to bring 
about recognition and rejection of tactical rape and sexual violence in war. Engle 
recalled the two ‘camps’, as she termed them, engaged in feminist theory and 
strategising in the early 1990s: one camp consisted of those who focussed on the 
rapes being genocidal and in some respects different from what was referenced as 
‘everyday rape’ or even ‘everyday wartime rape’; the other ‘camp’ believed that as 
rape in war had long been a reality even in large numbers it was nothing new and the 
focus should not be genocide but rapes. She acknowledged that, with time, the debate 
seemed to fade as feminists joined forces to achieve what was certainly progress in 
the ICTY – as will be seen in a later chapter of this dissertation. However, she 
maintained that the ICTY’s achievements were not as path-breaking, nor as 
progressive as doctrinal recognition might suggest, and that pushing the limits of the 
ICTY might even be counterproductive.  
Limitations and Inappropriateness of Judicial Systems in Recognising the Suffering 
of Women 
A particular debate relevant to this dissertation is the debate around whether or not 
judicial proceedings such as those of the tribunals are appropriate responses to 
tactical rape and sexual violence in war. Julia Hall commented, ‘I think the reticence 
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[of international courts to try cases of rape] is a combination of classic gender 
discrimination that manifests itself in the attitude that crimes of sexual violence 
against women are so-called lesser crimes’.124 She called for courts to deal with cases 
of rape, particularly rape in war. But, her calls, which are typical of many NGOs and 
women’s advocates such as this author, have been to some degree challenged by 
other feminist writers who highlight the additional suffering and pain which can be 
experienced by women in judicial proceedings which do not reflect understanding of 
the true nature and impact of rape. Such suffering and pain cannot be denied but 
demands recognition and caution. This dissertation relies on analysis of judicial 
proceedings and it is imperative to acknowledge that while such proceedings will be 
shown to have had significant benefits in the development of normative rejection of 
tactical rape and sexual violence, those benefits will have been at considerable cost 
for the women who testified.  
Binaifer Nowrojee highlighted experiences of women victim’s suffering in judicial 
processes, exemplified in a case before the ICTR where a woman had been victim of 
multiple rapes and was being cross-examined: 
As lawyer Mwanyumba ineptly and insensitively questioned the witness at length 
about the rapes, the judges burst out laughing twice at the lawyer while witness TA 
described in detail the lead up to the rape. Witness TA had undergone a day and a 
half of questioning by the prosecutor, before being put through a week of cross-
examination by the counsel of the six defendants. One of the more offensive 
questions put by defence lawyer, Mwanyumba, included reference to the fact that the 
witness had not taken a bath, and the implication that she could not have been raped 
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because she smelled. The three judges [named] never apologised to the rape victim 
on the stand, nor were they reprimanded in any way for their behaviour.125 
If trial judges do not protect victims and ensure due process in judicial proceedings 
there is indeed potential for insensitive, unjustifiable and antagonistic strategies to be 
used in the name of formal investigation.  
In a case before the ICTY, defence counsel called for a woman judge, Florence 
Mumba, to be disqualified for apparent bias.126 This judge had previously been a 
Zambian representative on the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women 
and it was implied she was therefore predisposed to promote a feminist outlook. The 
court eventually deemed that being opposed to rape and believing those who 
perpetrate rape should be held accountable, did not render the judge biased. In 
another case, before the ICTY, the testimony of one witness was initially disallowed 
because she had undergone counselling for her trauma and her testimony was 
therefore claimed to be unreliable. Her evidence was finally judged to be admissible. 
This ruling did eventually clarify that there were no grounds for excluding a witness 
because of her suffering extreme trauma.127 However, the very fact of such a call 
being made would indicate the defence saw some potential to exclude a witness 
account of a traumatic event – because she was traumatised. This would seem a long 
way from justice or even logic. The very fact of calls such as these demonstrated the 
degree of opposition that women encounter and lack of understanding of the issues 
encountered by women in legal proceedings 
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Julie Mertus, in ‘Shouting from the Bottom of the Well’, highlighted the limitations 
and disadvantages of women, victims of rape, being involved in international 
courts.128 She based her case around the experiences of women involved in the trials 
of the three men indicted in the ICTY Foca case.129 Many people who have seen the 
impact of criminal court hearings of rape crimes will agree with Mertus’ analysis that 
the adversarial process can result in a further violation of victims. She said, quite 
convincingly, that testifying itself does not provide for any healthy catharsis for 
victims – regardless of the fact that many may have expected it to do so. While there 
is sympathy for Mertus’ opinion, there is a danger that a desire for an ideal situation 
may endanger even the slow and tiny progress being made in confronting the 
impunity of those who rape in war. Many aspects of domestic, national criminal law 
demonstrate that by bringing criminals to account, very little is done to atone to 
victims. Yet, without such legal prosecution, the degree of impunity might continue 
or increase. The ideal would be to ensure processes and practices which recognise 
the pain of victims, their right to protection and understanding – while at the same 
time ensuring protection of the rights of the accused. Too often, it seems, the rights 
of the accused take precedence over the rights of the accuser. Certainly, as this 
dissertation concludes, the concerns regarding the additional suffering experienced 
by women testifying are well founded.  
Other analysts have highlighted that bringing women to testify is not always 
motivated by a desire to accord the victims justice. Dorothy Thomas and Regan 
Ralph have provided many examples of rape being ‘mischaracterised and dismissed 
by military and political leaders’.130 Importantly, they highlight a need for awareness 
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when acting to bring accountability for perpetrators of tactical rape and sexual 
violence in war. They highlighted that rape has been – and is still in many penal 
codes – seen as a crime against the honour of males rather than an attack on the 
victim herself. They wrote of the long-standing impunity of those who rape in war, 
despite the act of rape being universally condemned and asserted that the attitudes 
towards women that prompt rape [in war] in the first place and that fuel its 
mischaracterisation as a personal matter are reinforced and even shared by those in a 
position to prohibit and punish the abuse. Thomas and Ralph, too, highlighted that 
many women suffer a further violation when crimes against them are made public 
and denounced but when this is done for political purposes rather than to prevent 
abuse or to see justice done. The danger of misappropriation of women’s suffering is 
always a possibility. 
Women victims experience additional suffering by courts and also from having their 
suffering ignored. Cynthia Enloe wrote of the invisibility of many rape victims in 
war, saying that ‘the women who suffer rape in wartime usually remain faceless.’131 
Enloe asserted that even trying to increase the visibility of particular rapes by 
soldiers is a political act and she highlighted two traps. For the first, Enloe referred to 
Atina Grossman for an explanation of the trap of assuming that increasing the 
visibility of rape ‘is a simple undertaking to reveal ‘the truth’ about militarized rape, 
even brutal war-time rapes or mass-scale rapes’.132 Grossman had written about the 
widespread rapes of German women, mostly by Soviet troops in 1945-46, explaining 
that the telling of a rape experience is affected by many factors beyond the specific 
physical attack: 
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Women’s rape stories were framed in incredibly complicated ways, shaped by their 
audience and the motives behind their telling. Their experiences were ordered and 
given meaning within a complex grid of multiple images and discourses.133  
For courts to recognise this complexity and still acknowledge the justice of hearing 
women’s stories and gleaning the truth within them is no easy task. It is a task which 
must be undertaken sensitively and honestly. Enloe, in her book, Maneuvers, which 
considered the politics of militarising women’s lives, devoted a particular chapter to 
looking at the political implications which may be linked to situations when soldiers 
rape.134 Enloe’s overall concern in this chapter was the militarising of rape and the 
diverse nature of militarised rape. In her introductory chapter she defined 
militarisation as, ‘a step-by-step process by which a person or thing gradually comes 
to be controlled by the military or comes to depend for its well-being on militaristic 
ideas’.135 In this case she was talking of the militarisation of the act of rape. She 
referred to conflict arenas including Bosnia and Rwanda. She noted there was 
sometimes a need for organising by women for women to uncover soldiers’ 
systematic political uses of rape.136  
Enloe noted a second trap likely to be encountered in making war-time rape visible 
when she wrote that exposing militarised rape did not automatically serve the cause 
of demilitarising women’s lives.137 The example she provided was that of a woman 
outside the military who has been raped by someone else’s soldiers and who could be 
remilitarised if her ordeal were made visible chiefly for the purpose of mobilising her 
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male compatriots to take up arms to avenge her – and their – allegedly lost honour.138 
By bringing cases of tactical rape and sexual violence in war to the international 
tribunals, it is acknowledged that there could be exploitation of women’s suffering 
for reasons other than justice for those victims.  
Charlesworth and Chinkin, having noted the effects of patriarchy and manipulation 
of ideas of women as property to be protected by males, quoted Gibson as having 
written that ‘the vulnerability of women to sexual attack is appropriated by 
government, military and the media’ for the purpose of justifying international 
responses to situations of conflict – in the case of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait for 
example, projecting ‘the construct of the virile, white male defender of women and 
children’.139 This is a recognition of the varied understanding of tactical rape and 
sexual violence in war and the ways they receive attention or are portrayed by 
governments and media. This can present a dilemma for activists and NGOs. Tactical 
rape and sexual violence in war may be highlighted for short-term, political gains 
and may, frequently, then be allowed to fade from public attention, eliciting little or 
no response to the specific needs of women and the underlying reasons why tactical 
rape and sexual violence are effective.  
Yet, despite these justifiable reservations, there persists a reasonable argument, 
shared by this author, that by bringing perpetrators to account, even in less than 
perfect court processes, there may be a preventative impact on potential offenders. 
Making tactical rape and sexual violence visible may be sometimes counter-
productive in advancing justice for women and may be exploited for political 
reasons. But, again, this dissertation is based on the conviction that ongoing secrecy 
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and failure to raise awareness of tactical rape and sexual violence in war must be 
countered. By publicising events and indicting those who commit rape in war, some 
greater security – albeit extremely limited – is achieved for women, individually and 
collectively. During meetings in refugee camps for Kosovar women in 1999, it was 
noted that women refugees in Kosovo were ‘unusually’ prepared to report rape 
because the expectation would have been of reticence based on rape often being 
‘seen as such a big shame, a mark for their whole lives’.140 Some reasons were put 
forward in a conversation with a lawyer engaged in taking formal statements from 
victims. One was, ‘sadly when many women have been raped, it may be easier for 
each one to cope and to speak about her experiences’.141 It should be noted that at the 
time of this conflict there had been widespread reporting and condemnation of the 
use of tactical rape in Bosnia-Herzogovina. It is possible that the Kosovar women 
knew of what had happened to others in Bosnia-Herzogovina from media reports: 
they felt they would be believed and not made to suffer for being victims. They may 
also have thought there was a chance of perpetrators being held accountable. The 
lawyer continued that the women were, ‘first interviewed at border points but they 
really WANT to give evidence again’.142 International efforts towards formal, 
international rejection of tactical rape and sexual violence in war were, at the time of 
the Kosovo outbreak, 1999, in their infancy. Formal recognition and rejection was 
beginning to be considered and had been accorded a degree of credibility even at that 
stage.  
Closely allied with concerns for the additional suffering experienced by women 
victims of tactical rape and sexual violence in war were concerns regarding the 
suffering incurred when well-meaning activists ‘interview’ women. There are times 
when it is a natural part of interaction for women to tell their stories but as Cynthia 
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Enloe highlighted, unnecessary additional pain can be inflicted, quoting one case 
when a woman had been questioned by twelve interviewers.143 Shana Swiss and Joan 
E. Giller referred to the damage which could be inflicted by well-meaning attempts 
at recording experiences: 
The very process of human rights documentation may conflict with the needs of the 
individual survivor. Recounting the details of a traumatic experience may trigger an 
intense reliving of the event and, along with it, feelings of extreme vulnerability, 
humiliation and despair.144 
The retelling of tactical rape can have significant repercussions. It may endanger the 
teller socially. It may have emotional and psychological impact. Part of the insidious 
effect of tactical rape and sexual violence in war is the damage they do to any 
cultural notions of chastity and social value. However much those outside a society 
may decry such values they are often imbedded in the psychology of women as much 
as in the psychology of the men in their societies. This author heard many stories 
from women in refugee camps, but names and identifications were always protected. 
These details were the purview of authorised and formally authenticated 
documentation. Many interviews on these visits were with workers in camps rather 
than actual victims. Any retelling must be approached with sensitivity and the 
antagonistic style of most judiciaries needs to be understood and, where possible, 
changed.  
By 2005 there was awareness of a further dimension of prosecuting perpetrators of 
rape in war, raising questions as to whether victims should be considered due 
compensation beyond the punishment of perpetrators.. Rosalind Dixon reviewed 
developments in prosecution of rape in international law and noted the emerging 
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imperative for recognition of victims as well as the imperative for a more ordered 
international community.145 She posited that prosecution alone would not provide for 
due and just recognition of victims and proposed that another system of 
compensation might be needed as the concept of ‘justice’ moved beyond the existing 
ICTY and Rome Statutes. This is a justifiable proposition given the recognition in 
much domestic law now that compensation is due to victims of many crimes but this 
aspect of justice will not be considered further in this dissertation.  
Focus on specific judiciaries, such as the tribunals, must acknowledge the limitations 
of such processes. Certainly, there have been limitations to the achievements of both 
the ICTY and the ICTR and there have been some disgraceful incidents in both of 
these courts, which will be recognised in later chapters while also demonstrating that 
these judicial proceedings have been milestones in the developing attitude to tactical 
rape and sexual violence in war. The motivations for prosecuting tactical rape and 
sexual violence and highlighting their impact have at last received attention in 
international judiciaries. While long practised, historically, these forms of attack 
have always been on the margins or dependent on interpretation in international law. 
At least, recently, victims have been awarded their days in court.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has established that rape and sexual violence in war are referenced in 
international law, with specific definitions relevant to understanding the outcomes 
and work of the ICTY, ICTR and the UNSC. The chapter has also reviewed the 
critical analyses which have contributed to the discourse leading to the rejection of 
tactical rape and sexual violence in war. There are analysts who have highlighted 
serious reservations about a focus on judicial proceedings because of the 
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inappropriateness and insensitivity of many of these proceedings. This dissertation 
recognises the legitimacy of some of these reservations, but does track what are 
incremental and less than perfect moves in development to assess and analyse 
progress towards normative rejection of tactical rape and sexual violence in war. 
There is a conviction that these proceedings have contributed greatly to international 
rejection of tactical rape and sexual violence in war. Chapters 3 and 4 will consider 
the work of the ICTY and the ICTR to determine how they have contributed to 
recognition of the applicability of existing international law to crimes such as tactical 
rape and sexual violence in war.  
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Chapter 3 
 
International Law, Tactical Rape and Sexual Violence in the former Yugoslavia 
This chapter considers the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the work of the 
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). It contends that here are initial signs here of an 
increasing commitment by the international community to reject tactical rape and 
sexual violence in war. This was an important conflict for the ways in which it 
demonstrated a style of warfare where civilians were targeted, where international 
intervention happened within a context of new understandings of the limits on 
sovereignty, where a tribunal which was deliberately an ad hoc entity extended 
judgements regarding tactical rape and sexual violence as contraventions of 
established international law. It became ‘the paradigm case, from which different 
lessons are drawn, the example which is used to argue out different general positions, 
and, at the same time, a laboratory in which different ways of managing the new 
wars are experimented’.1 The judgements of the ICTY provided a base for 
recognising that tactical rape and sexual violence were issues of security for women, 
for communities and for states. The security implications will be analysed more fully 
in later chapters of this dissertation. 
This chapter, first, provides analysis and reference to understanding the nature of this 
conflict. Secondly, it reviews some key aspects of focussing international attention 
on the nature and extent of the use of tactical rape and sexual violence in conflict. In 
doing so, it reviews the developing discourse around normative rejection of tactical 
rape and sexual violence in war. There is attention to the work of NGOs who were, 
as this dissertation argues, influential in eventual action at international level. 
Thirdly, it analyses the establishment of the ICTY. Fourthly, it analyses the ways in 
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which the emerging judgements and definitions contributed to building a basis of 
international law for rejecting tactical rape and sexual violence as war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. Finally, it references the emergence of other relevant 
judiciaries which contributed to bringing at least some degree of accountability for 
perpetrators of tactical rape and sexual violence in conflict. 
The Conflict  
The conflict in the former Yugoslavia between 1992 and 1995 was extremely 
complex but an understanding of the complexity and the root causes is essential to 
understanding the degree of antipathy and the resulting war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, into which conflict the use of tactical rape and sexual violence was 
introduced.2 The conflict concerned three main ethnic groups: Bosniaks (Bosnian 
Muslims), Croats and Serbs. In 1991, after the fall of communism, the first multi-
party elections were held, despite the fact that it was clear that all three groups had 
different goals. Muslim nationalists wanted a centralised independent Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Serb nationalists wanted a Belgrade-dominated Yugoslavia. Croats 
wanted an independent Croatian state. Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic, took 
military action against Croatia and Slovenia after they declared independence. Media 
reports began detailing severe human rights abuses including mass, targeted rape and 
pressure for action was mounted by many NGOs. Largely as a result of this pressure, 
in January 1992 the UN established a protection force, UNPROFOR, to act as a 
peacekeeping force in Croatia. 
In March 1992, Bosnia declared independence. War broke out and the Serb Republic 
was proclaimed. Ethnic cleansing began and in April 1992 a report by the Secretary 
General to the UN Assembly and Security Council in noted, ‘Ethnic cleansing is the 
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direct cause of the vast majority of human rights violations which have occurred in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina since the present human rights emergency began in March 
and April 1992’.3 In early August 1992, media reports were widely published about 
the Omarska Prison Camp in Northern Bosnia, in which reputable reporters from the 
Guardian and Newsweek newspapers told of horror treatments, including torture and 
rape.4 The August 1992 Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of 
Former Yugoslavia presented to the UN, was followed by a series of UN resolutions 
which included the protection of humanitarian convoys and establishing ‘safe 
havens’.5 Few of these were effectively implemented.  
The conflict in the former Yugoslavia exemplified the development of ‘new wars’. 
This was not a war in which armies just confronted and battled other armies. The 
findings of the ICTY, to be detailed later, show that while this was not essentially a 
battle across international state borders it was indeed a conflict in which accepted 
international humanitarian and human rights law were applicable and contravened. 
The battle was for control of territory but the methods and strategies focussed on 
control of civilian populations. Achievement of the goal depended on ‘getting rid of 
all possible opponents’, creating ‘an unfavourable environment for all those people it 
cannot control’ and on ‘continuing fear and insecurity and on perpetuation of hatred 
of the other’.6 Different groups in the disputed areas were, before the conflict, living 
together in shared communities. A report to the UN in 1992 stated that some 
observers believed that attacking forces were ‘determined to ‘kill’ the city [Sarajevo] 
and the tradition of tolerance and ethnic harmony that it represents’.7 Mary Kaldor 
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identified specific techniques for gaining territorial control: systematic murder; 
ethnic cleansing; rendering an area uninhabitable – physically and economically: 
defilement through systematic rape and sexual abuse.8 Kaldor, in effect, provided a 
summary of the strategies employed in the conflict in the country. The full nature and 
impact of all the strategies – particularly tactical rape and sexual violence – 
employed in this conflict took time to be recognised and understood. But, this 
conflict was something of a water-shed in that such strategies were even noted and 
condemned rather than accepted as unfortunate but ultimately inevitable in war. 
Many human rights and humanitarian NGOs were already active in the Balkans 
region. In particular there were groups organised to address women’s rights and 
concerns. ‘Women in Black’, an internationally linked group of activists, worked to 
call attention to the patriarchal nature of nationalism and war and protested against 
the killing of civilians and ethnic cleansing.9 In October 1992, UNSCR 780 
established a Commission of Experts to analyse and examine events relating to 
‘violations of humanitarian law, including grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions’.10  
Awareness of Rape as Part of the Conflict 
In November 1992, an informal request was made by a worker at UNHCR to a 
Geneva-based international peak body of church-related humanitarian agencies. 
Information was shared about rumours and reports of extensive rape being used 
against women and the request was for a team to check out these reports. In 
December 1992, a team of women went to the former Yugoslavia with the aim of 
verifying reports, which were already the subject of many calls for action from the 
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public media.11 The team met with refugee women and workers in camps in Zagreb, 
ex-prisoners who had escaped across the border into Zagreb, UNHCR, 
representatives of organisations including documentation centres, women’s houses, 
women’s support and advocacy groups (such as ‘Mothers for Peace’, ‘Help for 
Children in Croatia’, Women of Bosnia-Herzegovina’, ‘Women of the Anti-War 
Campaign’), humanitarian assistance agencies and church representatives – both 
Christian and Muslim.  
This team found that there were grounds for a formal international investigation of 
the use of rape in the conflict and that ‘as part of the overall humanitarian response to 
physical and emotional needs it is a matter of urgency that adequate and appropriate 
attention be given to the psychological needs of women raped in war’.12 The team 
reported its conviction that there was evidence of the rape of women by all sides in 
the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina – including rape as a by-product of the conflict.13 
However, it also reported on rape that was systematic and this type of rape was more 
than opportunistic or random:  
The team is convinced that there is clear evidence of the use of systematic, mass 
rape as an increasingly sophisticated weapon of war being used, in this instance, by 
members of the Serbian forces. Survivors speak of ‘rape on the front line’ and ‘third 
party rape’. These are rapes carried out publicly by Serbian soldiers to demoralise 
family members and opposition forces compelled to witness them.14 
This was a description of the use of rape for strategic, tactical purposes, linked with 
the campaign of ethnic cleansing. It specified the nature of such rape as systematic 
and widespread and as being used by one party to the conflict against civilians. In 
                                                                
11 Fitzpatrick, Rape of Women in War. 
12 Fitzpatrick, Rape of Women in War, p. 24.  
13 Fitzpatrick, Rape of Women in War,  p. 21. 
14 Fitzpatrick, Rape of Women in War, p. 21. 
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essence, it referred to the strategic use of rape before there was any public 
recognition of the concept of tactical rape.  
The team also recorded women’s groups dismay and anger regarding the lack of 
attention being paid to the crimes reported and concluded:  
Women’s groups are angered by what they see as prevarication and refusal to accept 
the accounts of women’s suffering. The ‘second-layer’ of victimisation of survivors 
by insistence upon legalistic interrogation is being resisted. The team believes that 
there is sufficient conviction of the truth of reports of mass, systematic rape to, now, 
place the onus of ‘proof’ on the international community which claims to condemn 
it.15  
The concerns of feminist analysts and commentators such as those referenced in the 
previous chapters were apparent and reinforced. There was a dearth of serious 
attention to the reports of tactical rape and sexual violence, despite widespread media 
and NGO calls of condemnation. 
This report, Rape of Women in War, was written immediately after the team returned 
to Geneva and was widely shared among UN agencies, NGOs and women’s 
advocates.16 There were numerous press announcements and media conferences and 
a request to brief Dame Anna Warburton who was about to lead a European 
Community Delegation on one of the first formal investigations. The report from this 
delegation, ‘European Council: an Investigative Mission’ in January 1993, accepted 
the possibility of speaking ‘in terms of many thousands. Estimates vary widely, 
ranging from 10,000 to as many as 60,000. The most reasoned estimates suggested to 
                                                                
15 Fitzpatrick, Rape of Women in War, p. 22. 
16 The report of this team investigation was later hand delivered to Slobodan Milosevic by a 
delegation of the European Council of Churches and that same delegation eventually submitted a copy 
to The Hague when Milosevic was on trial. 
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the Mission place the number of victims at around 20,000’.17 These numbers and the 
limited mandate of the Mission (to investigate only treatment of Muslim women) 
were later criticised by Norma von Ragenfeld-Feldman but her criticisms and 
reservations regarding possibly inflated numbers were offset by the acknowledged 
reluctance of many women to report rapes.18 The outcome of this and other 
subsequent investigations later confirmed that throughout these conflicts, rape was 
widespread and systematic.  
It should be noted that media attention to the use of rape was maintained for 
extended periods rather than the more usual, single and often sensationalised story. 
Exactly why there was such sustained media attention has not been definitively 
established. One could posit that it was largely driven by the observation that the 
victims in the former Yugoslavia were European as compared with those victims in 
other conflicts such as in Africa and Asia. There was, too, the fact that the conflicts 
and genocide in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda followed closely on one another. 
The genocide in Rwanda followed the inauguration of Nelson Mandela in South 
Africa and the media had focussed on Africa as a continent at that time with some 
hope for positive development. Then the genocide in Rwanda exploded much of that 
hope. The complexity of events in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, especially in 
the former Yugoslavia, may have meant that to focus on one aspect of the extensive 
violence was easier. Distribution of reports such as those mentioned above by the 
World Council of Churches and the European Council exerted effective pressure and 
kept stories alive. Perhaps, too, the very extent and horror of the violations made it 
difficult for media management to determine a short shelf life for the stories. 
Certainly, the sensational nature of the issue of rape and killing may have helped to 
                                                                
17 A Warburton, European Council Investigative Mission into the Treatment of Muslim Women in the 
Former Yugoslavia: Report to the European Council Foreign Ministers, 28-1-1993, para. 14. 
18 N von Ragenfeld-Feldman, The Victimization of Women: Rape and the Reporting of Rape in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992-1993, presented at Fifth Annual Interdisciplinary German Studies 
Conference, 15-16 March 1997. 
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sustain public pressure and consequent pressure on states and the UN to 
acknowledge what was happening. Certainly, too, events reported in the two arenas 
interacted to exert pressure to recognise the widespread incidence of rape and to link 
it with genocide and ethnic cleansing.  
In the final months of 1992, another group of women connected to ecumenical 
churches visited Belgrade. Their report called for international support and solidarity 
with women in Serbia, such as Women in Black, who demonstrated weekly against 
the suffering of women in the whole of the former Yugoslavia.19 This visiting group 
reported on meetings with senior churchmen who, with some exceptions, denied that 
the widespread rapes being reported could occur on the Serbian side and insisted that 
media reports were merely propaganda. Despite these protestations, on December 16, 
1992, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) issued a 
statement noting that the agency was ‘shocked at reports, over the past several weeks 
of human rights abuses directed against women in former Yugoslavia’ and 
continued: 
In over 40 years of working with women fleeing conflict and persecution UNHCR 
has documented many cases of rape. In addition to causing personal physical and 
mental suffering, rape may be perceived to bring dishonour to the woman and result 
in marginalisation of both her and her family. Its systematic use can result in the 
destruction of the social fabric of the persecuted group.20  
This was a specific recognition of the use of rape in the conflict and recognition of 
the impact on communities as well as individual women. It was a development from 
                                                                
19 E Raiser, Women Build Bridges to the former Yugoslavia, World Council of Churches, 1992, quoted 
in Fitzpatrick, Rape of Women in War, Appendix 1, p. 2. 
20 UNHCR Situation of Women in Ex-Yugoslavia, 16/12/92, quoted in Fitzpatrick, Rape of Women in 
War, Appendix III. 
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rape being couched only in terms of ‘dishonour’ as consistent with the Geneva 
Convention terminology. 
In January 1993, the Special Rapporteur made his third visit to investigate human 
rights abuses and he reported back to the UN in February 1993.21 In this report he 
referred to ‘an alarming number of allegations’ regarding the use of rape as a weapon 
of ethnic cleansing.22 He also noted the reports of missions by the European 
Community, the World Council of Churches, Amnesty International, Helsinki Watch 
and two French physicians.23 ‘Gravely concerned’ by these reports he had sent a team 
of experts to investigate the allegations, January 12-23 1993 and included the expert 
team’s findings in his own report.24 These findings included that rape had been used 
on a large scale predominantly by Serb forces against Muslim women and girls, rape 
had been used as an instrument of ethnic cleansing and furthermore it was noted that 
those in positions of power had made no attempt to stop the rapes.25  
By 1993 tensions had increased and alliances and conflicts had become increasingly 
complicated: conflict between Muslims and Croats; Muslims and Serbs allied against 
Croats in Herzegovina; rival Muslim forces fought each other in north-west Bosnia; 
Croats and Serbs allied against Muslims in central Bosnia. The UN established ‘safe 
havens’ in Sarajevo, Goradze and Srebrenica as populations were caught and torn by 
the conflicts. The UN Commission of Experts reported back in 1993 that there had 
been grave breaches and violations of international law including rape.26 The 
Commission also recommended the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal and May 25, 
                                                                
21 Report to the Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/1993/50 10 February 1993. 
22 E/CN.4/1993/50 para. 82. 
23 E/CN.4/1993/50 para 86. 
24 E/CN.4/1993/50 para. 83. 
25 E/CN.4/1993/50 para. 84. 
26 Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, 1993. 
 118 
 
1993 saw the agreement of the Security Council to establish the ad hoc International 
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY). 27  
In December 1994, the report of the UN’s Commission of Experts recorded claims 
that in the former Yugoslavia, there were approximately 1,100 reported cases of rape 
and sexual assault: about 800 victims had been named or were known to the 
submitting source; about 1,800 victims had been specifically referred to but not 
named or identified sufficiently by the reporting witness; witness reports through 
approximations referred to a possible further 10,000 victims.28 The report of the 
Commission of Experts outlined some reasons for survivors of rape being reluctant 
or unable to report offences against them.29 They included fear of reprisals for 
themselves and family members and shame and fear of ostracism. As time passed, 
many women just wanted to get on with their lives. Many women did not have a 
place to report the assaults or rapes and refugees had an increasing scepticism about 
the response of the international community.  
Importantly, Cherif M. Bassiouni, author of this report, identified several different 
categories of rape, which included some committed as the result of individual or 
small group conduct ‘without evidence of command direction or an overall policy’ 
and he urged a distinction between ‘opportunistic’ crimes and the use of rape and 
sexual assault as a method of ‘ethnic cleansing’.30 The two types of rape, which can 
be related to ethnic cleansing are identified as either those which are instances of a 
                                                                
27 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, UN 
Document S/25704 at 36, Annex (1993) and S/25704/Add.1 (1993), adopted by the Security Council 
on 25 May 1993, UN Document S/RES/827 (1993). 
28 CM Bassiouni, Rape and sexual assault – Final Report of the United Nations Commission of 
Experts established pursuant to security council resolution 780 (1992) Annex IX United Nations 
Security Council 28-12-1994, S/1994/674/Add.2 (Vol. V), 28 December 1994, Section A.  
29 Bassiouni, Annex IX 28-12-1994 Section A (a) – (f). 
30 Bassiouni, Section C para. 1. 
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policy of commission or cases which point to a policy of omission.31 This report to 
the United Nations Security Council also identified recurring characteristics of rapes 
and sexual assaults and concluded that the patterns suggested that ‘a systematic rape 
and sexual assault policy exists’.32 While admitting that, at that time, this was yet to 
be proved, he noted that some level of organisation would have been needed to 
account for the large number of rapes which occurred – particularly in places of 
detention. When considering the correlation between media attention and the decline 
in the number of rapes and assaults, he suggested, too, ‘that the purposes for which 
the alleged rape and sexual assault was carried out had been served by the publicity’ 
and that this, in turn, ‘would indicate that commanders could control the alleged 
perpetrators, leading to the conclusion that there was an overriding policy advocating 
the use of rape and sexual assault as a method of ethnic cleansing’.33 
Bassiouni noted there was the evidence of deliberate impregnation of women raped, 
which could be seen as an indicator of intent to destroy a group, necessary when 
assessing whether or not events constituted genocide. When describing the patterns 
of rape and sexual assault, he reported that ‘perpetrators tell female victims that they 
will bear children of the perpetrator’s ethnicity, that the perpetrators were ordered to 
rape and sexually assault them’ and ‘perpetrators tell victims that they must become 
pregnant and hold them in custody until it is too late to get an abortion’.34 The social 
impact of bearing children who are deemed to be children of an enemy, children 
outside the group of the mother, is psychologically as well as physically damaging. It 
can have economic impact as the women who bear these children may be ostracised 
and denied economic support, inheritance may be contested or denied and 
                                                                
31 Bassiouni, Conclusion para. 3.  
32 Bassiouni, Conclusion. para. 2. 
33 Bassiouni, Section D, Annex IX,  pp. 8, 9. 
34 Bassiouni, Annex IX Section C. 
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communities may reject the children themselves – all these impacts can have long-
term negative effects. 
Bassiouni’s report was substantiated by other sources including the journalist, Peter 
Maas, who detailed many individual incidents.35 The report by Human Rights Watch, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina A Closed Dark Place: Past and Present Human Rights 
Abuses in Foca also documented many accounts.36 This report focused on events in 
Foca, a town of about 40,000, after the Serb takeover in April 1992, when local 
authorities established a ‘Crisis Committee’ to coordinate the Serb military and 
police in their campaign of ‘ethnic cleansing’: detaining, arresting, expelling, raping, 
torturing, and murdering the non-Serb population. Foca became known as the site of 
‘rape camps’ where non-Serb women were detained and abused.37 Young Muslim 
women and girls were among Foca’s principal victims: they were raped on a daily 
basis and enslaved in a context of other crimes such as murder, torture, and the 
destruction of civilian property and religious sites. Many Muslim women, some as 
young as twelve years of age, were detained in various locations in the town, and 
forced to have sex with the accused and with dozens of other persons. The 
perpetrators were members of the Republika Srpska army and police, along with 
soldiers from Montenegro (mainly from the Niksic area) and individuals (Dragoljub 
Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic) were indicted and charged. The 
crimes took place in 1992 and the first half of 1993; the indictment was issued in 
1996, and the trial began in March 2000.38 One witness told the court how Radomir 
Kovac, termed the ‘owner’ of four women, had forced them to dance naked on a 
                                                                
35 P Maas, Love Thy Neighbour: A Story of War, Papermac, London 1996  pp. 51-52, 12-13, 5-7, 53-
54. 
36 Human Rights Watch, Bosnia and Herzegovina. A Closed Dark Place: Past and Present Human 
Rights Abuses in Foca, vol.10 no.6 (D). 
37 Human Rights Watch summary of the report, <www.hrw.org/en/news/2004/10/14/foca-confronts-
its-past, retrieved 1/6/2009>. 
38 Human Rights Watch, retrieved 1 June 2009, < www.hrw.org/en/news/2004/10/14/foca-confronts-
its-past>. 
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table, had told them they would be executed at the nearby river and then took them 
there. They were subsequently held as sex slaves. Another witness told how her 
mother and brothers had been killed and she had been raped by about fifty men. 
When asked by the prosecutor about how she felt after the gang rape she had 
described, she responded, ‘I felt dead’.39 After raping one witness, Zoran Vukovic 
had told her that he could have hurt her much more, but would not since she was 
about the same age as his daughter.40 
The rapes documented in the report on Foca by Human Rights Watch indicated a 
systematic approach. The growing awareness of this systematic approach, an element 
of rape being used as a tactic in conflict, was emphasised in UN statements in 1993 
and 1994: ECOSOC referred to ‘the systematic practice of rape’ being used in the 
ethnic cleansing.41 The UN General Assembly noted conviction that ‘this heinous 
practice constitutes a deliberate weapon of war in fulfilling the policy of ethnic 
cleansing’.42 In 1995, Srebrenica was overrun by Bosnian Serbs under General Ratko 
Mladic. Thousands of men and boys were massacred despite the presence of Dutch 
UN troops. The failure of the international community in the form of these Dutch 
troops to intervene when they were supposed to be protecting the residents, and the 
failure to send threatened air strikes, would later be a factor in strengthening 
acceptance of the policy of Responsibility to Protect which is perceived to override 
the concept of sovereignty. This contributed to the UNSC’s strengthened 
preparedness to support international legal processes to protect victims of tactical 
rape and sexual violence.  
                                                                
39 <www.hrw.org/en/news/2004/10/14/foca-confronts-its-past>. 
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41 United Nations ECOSOC Resolution1993/8. 
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In February 2001, in an historic court ruling, Bosnian Serbs were convicted by the 
ICTY for rape, torture and enslavement, in the case against Kunarac et al.43 This was 
the first conviction of a crime against humanity by the Tribunal and will be 
considered in more detail with other legal judgments and their implications in 
international law later in this chapter. In August 2001, the ICTY convicted Radislav 
Krstic of genocide and in 2004 in a ruling dismissing his appeal the Tribunal stated 
clearly that ‘the crime of genocide was committed at Srebrenica, July 1995’.44 The 
appeal hearings, considering the requirements and definitions of the Genocide 
Convention had confirmed an intent to destroy and that the intent had been 
destruction ‘in part’ of a group. The court noted the Genocide Convention’s 
requirement that ‘in part’ be a substantial part and that the hearings had taken this 
seriously because ‘the gravity of genocide is reflected in the stringent requirements 
which must be satisfied’ and the need to ‘guard against a danger that convictions for 
this crime will be imposed lightly’.45 These convictions did not refer to tactical rape 
or sexual violence but did establish that genocide had been a feature of the conflict. 
[In the next chapter on the ICTR, there will be a focus on genocide, tactical rape and 
sexual violence.]  
The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).  
The establishment of the ICTY was an important step in providing a relevant 
institution and basis for the emerging norm rejecting tactical rape. Faced with a 
situation which was stimulating strong international cries for action and 
condemnation including calls from NGOs, public media and its own UN agencies 
such as UNHCR and the Human Rights Commission, the UN Security Council was 
                                                                
43 Prosecutor v Kunarac, Judgement, IT-96-23-T 22 Feb. 2001. 
44 ICTY IT-98-33-A para. 39. 
45 ICTY IT-98-33-A para. 37. 
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under pressure to take direct action. While the issue of sovereignty is never far away 
when the international society acts against or within a particular state, the 
international society, as recognised in the form of the UNSC, was unable to continue 
ignoring the contravention of its common humanitarian values and rules in the 
former Yugoslavia. However, any solution needed to take into account recognition of 
the opposition to any action perceived to override the sovereignty of individual 
States. The Security Council had adopted a number of resolutions regarding the 
former Yugoslavia before establishing the ICTY. Resolution 764 (13 July 1992) 
reaffirmed obligations to respect international humanitarian law and set down the 
principle of individual responsibility for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. 
Resolution 771 (1 August 1992) applied Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations demanding all states desist from all breaches of international law. Most 
importantly, resolution 827 (27 May 1993) approved the Statute of the ICTY, under 
the Charter of the UN.  
The ICTY was established with ‘the power to prosecute persons responsible for 
serious human rights violations of international humanitarian law committed in the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991’.46 The Statute covered powers to 
prosecute grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, violations of the laws 
or customs of war, genocide and crimes against humanity. It outlined areas of 
responsibility regarding superior command, planning, instigating, ordering or 
committing violations and territorial and temporal jurisdiction. A head of state does 
not have impunity from prosecution – this became important in the indictment of 
Slobodan Milosevic. The decision to establish such a court was based on Chapter VII 
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of the UN Charter and ‘constituted a response to the threat to international peace and 
security posed by those crimes’.47  
Juan Jose Quintana pointed out that normally establishing such a tribunal would be a 
lengthy and complex process but by acting under the application of Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter, it had ‘the major advantage that all States would be under a binding 
obligation to take whatever action is required to apply the decision of the Security 
Council, since it was a measure approved under Chapter VII’.48 Quintana listed the 
distinctive features of the ICTY: it is an independent organ not subject to any kind of 
authority or control by the Security Council; it is a temporary organ, the existence or 
maintenance of which depends on the restoration of peace and international security 
in the former Yugoslavia; it is an ad hoc jurisdictional mechanism not directly related 
to the establishment of an international criminal jurisdiction of a permanent nature; it 
must confine itself to applying existing rules of international humanitarian law and 
not develop or create new rules.49 Provided it operated under its mandate, rulings and 
judgements of the ICTY would be difficult to ignore.  
Establishment of the ICTY represented a judicial response to the reports of serious 
violations of human rights. In many cases the international community seeks to find 
a way of responding to such violations by means other than forcible intervention. 
The use of force is always more difficult to justify than humanitarian or, in the case 
of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1900s, judicial intervention. There was 
still a desire to avoid establishing a permanent body, because this could be seen to be 
intervening in internal concerns, so it is important to understand the implications of 
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establishing the ICTY as an ad hoc judiciary, with the features noted above by 
Quintana. 
Andrea Birdsall provided a useful analysis of the implications of the establishment of 
the ICTY as an ad hoc solution, outlining problems and progress. She argued, 
convincingly, that the establishment of the ICTY, ‘constituted an important 
precedent for multi-lateral action towards institutionalising respect for the rule of law 
and principles of individual justice’ and concluded that ‘this suggests that these 
norms are being taken increasingly seriously and are being given priority over other 
fundamental principles of order such as sovereignty and non-intervention’.50 The 
institutionalising of attitudes and values became an increasingly important element in 
the development of rejection of tactical rape and sexual violence in war and the 
establishment of the ICTY was a step towards such institutionalisation. Birdsall 
described the ICTY as constituting ‘external intervention by a number of states into 
the internal affairs of another sovereign state in order to enforce human rights laws 
and to protect principles of justice’ and her definition of justice as ‘enforcement of 
international human rights laws and norms aimed at holding perpetrators accountable 
and ending the culture of impunity’ is consistent with the role to be played by the 
ICTY in furthering the acceptance and response to the norm rejecting tactical rape.51 
There was little doubt that the ICTY would be judging behaviours and events in a 
sovereign state. There was, too, little doubt that by giving the ICTY its mandate, the 
international society was prepared to hold accountable those who contravened 
existing international laws.  
Birdsall perceived the establishment of the ICTY as demonstrating that human rights 
norms were in train to cascade from the first phase of institutionalisation of new 
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norms into international law.52 While this may well have been the case, rejection of 
the use of rape as a tactic for policy attack on a civilian population was still not 
integrated into the recognised spectrum of human rights violations. It was as the 
ICTY progressed that tactical rape and sexual violence in war achieved recognition 
as crimes against humanity, as war crimes and as gross violations of human rights. 
However, the fact that human rights norms had already been established in 
international law and included universal jurisdiction provisions which placed states 
under obligation to enforce them was significant in providing international society 
with grounds to take action. Birdsall noted that such universal jurisdiction provisions 
were significant because they recognised that ‘some human rights are seen as 
fundamental to all states and have the potential to take precedence over other 
principles’.53 As the ICTY developed it was made clear that protection of civilian 
populations from tactical rape and sexual violence in war should be included as one 
of these fundamental human rights and not be dismissed as merely an inevitable by-
product of conflicts.  
The decision to establish the ICTY as an ad hoc judiciary was founded in politics and 
state concerns regarding sovereignty. The ICTY Statute established the court under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter and as such was a response to threats to peace and 
security. States were using the rhetoric of established human rights norms as 
justification for a tribunal which would, in effect, override the sovereignty of another 
state. The Security Council was careful to make sure that the ICTY was not a 
permanent fixture in international judiciaries. It was ad hoc and mandated to a 
specific conflict at a specific time. The ICTY was limited in its time frame, its 
geographic range and acceptable as ‘an exceptional step needed to deal with 
exceptional situations’.54 Importantly, the ICTY was established ‘for the purpose of 
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upholding universally agreed principles firmly established in international law’.55 
The ICTY, therefore, was justified on the grounds that it was not intended to 
establish new norms or precedents, but only to investigate and prosecute within the 
framework of established norms and standards.  
However, as the ICTY proceeded, it provided new insights into a developing norm 
such as rejection of tactical rape and sexual violence in war by judging that these 
practices fell within the definitions and mandates of already accepted international 
humanitarian and human rights law. As analysis of its decisions shows, the ICTY did 
extend and develop recognition, scope and definition of accepted norms – and tested 
tactical rape and sexual violence in war against those accepted norms and standards, 
finding that there was a legal basis for rejecting tactical rape and sexual violence in 
war. It accepted arguments that, under certain circumstances, these abuses fell within 
the parameters of the ICTY’s own Statute and perpetrators could be and were 
indicted and charged for rape and sexual violence as well as other acts seen as grave 
breaches and violations of accepted international law.  
Not surprisingly, even as an ad hoc tribunal, the ICTY was opposed by leadership in 
affected areas of the former Yugoslavia. The right to establish the ICTY was 
interpreted as overstepping sovereignty of an independent state and the Tribunal’s 
authority later challenged. However, the Security Council proceeded and such 
appeals were dismissed in cases such as those against Dusko Tadic.56 The ICTY 
Appeals Chamber dismissed appeals from Tadic relating to the Tribunal’s authority 
and the challenges to the Security Council’s authority to establish such a court: 
The Chamber concluded that the Tribunal was properly established by the Security 
Council. In reaching this conclusion, the Chamber determined that it could assess the 
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lawfulness of Security Council actions when necessary to satisfy itself that it has the 
authority to proceed in a case. Upon conducting this kind of assessment, the 
Chamber found that the Security Council’s decision to establish the Tribunal was a 
legitimate measure aimed at the restoration of peace and security authorised under 
the United Nations Charter, and that the Tribunal had been duly established 
according to the rule of law.57 
The Appeals Chamber similarly dismissed Tadic’s challenge to the Tribunal’s 
assertion of primacy over national courts, concluding that, contrary to Tadic’s 
submissions, the Tribunal’s primacy did not constitute an improper intrusion on state 
sovereignty. The Chamber noted that such actions were authorised under Article 2.7 
of the United Nations Charter and emphasised that state sovereignty must give way 
in the face of offences that ‘do not affect the interests of one State alone but shock 
the conscience of mankind’.58 The Appeals Chamber also dismissed Tadic’s 
objection to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, rejecting his assertion that the Tribunal 
lacked jurisdiction because the Bosnian conflict was a civil war. As will be seen later 
in this chapter, this particular objection was countered and case law established 
regarding intra- and inter-national conflicts. Taking responsibility for bringing to 
account perpetrators of crimes against established international humanitarian law was 
an important step in eventually holding accountable those who perpetrated crimes 
relating to tactical rape and sexual violence in conflict.  
Birdsall qualified the impact of the ICTY, asserting that it should only be seen as a 
step in the life-cycle of a developing norm and that ‘further developments need to 
take place in international politics and law to achieve a more universal, less 
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discriminatory enforcement of existing norms’.59 Certainly, further development was 
needed and the work of the ICTY enabled that further development. Birdsall did 
refer to the work of Victor Peskin who recognised the long-term normative impact of 
ad hoc courts in establishing precedents for the further extension of international 
law.60 It is arguable, therefore, that the ICTY, while not establishing new norms, did 
indeed extend the understanding and reaction to tactical rape and sexual violence in 
war within the application of existing norms and international law – and it did 
establish important new case law regarding the existing international law.  
Building a Basis in International Law for Rejecting Tactical Rape and Sexual 
Violence in War  
The development of normative rejection of tactical rape and sexual violence in war 
was encouraged by the specific case law which emerged from the ICTY and ICTR. 
The ICTY contributed significantly to the legal basis of treating tactical rape and 
sexual violence as contraventions of accepted international law. Importantly, it 
established that these abuses were contraventions of international humanitarian law 
as well as human rights law. When considering, in the previous chapter, how change 
occurs in societal values and attitudes, one factor highlighted was that an idea’s 
degree of persuasion may originate in the perceived legitimacy of the advocate or in 
the extent of international support it is perceived to be receiving. The ICTY’s 
legitimacy came from Chapter VII of the UN Charter and from the widespread 
support it received from the Security Council and member states. It should also be 
noted that the work of the ICTR and the ICTY often proceeded in parallel, either 
with one judiciary developing a particular aspect first or by building on the work of 
the other tribunal. This will become clear in the analysis of the ICTR which follows 
in the next chapter.  
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The ICTY has listed what it sees as its core achievements.61 These include (inter 
alia): expanding on the legal elements of the crime of grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions by further defining the test of overall control, identifying the existence 
of an international armed conflict and an extended and exact definition of protected 
persons under the Conventions; narrowing the differences between laws or customs 
of war applicable to conflicts; identifying a general prohibition of torture in 
international law which cannot be derogated from by a treaty or by internal law. 
Other achievements listed include making significant advances in international 
humanitarian law pertaining to the legal treatment and punishment of sexual violence 
in war and identification and application of the concept of command responsibility.62 
The significant advances in international humanitarian law pertaining to the legal 
treatment and punishment of sexual violence in war are directly relevant to the 
normative rejection of tactical rape. Other achievements frequently link to or support 
case findings and new international case law which extend international rejection and 
strengthen the judicial base for the norm. The outcomes and rulings related to cases 
of the ICTY include major development and progress in establishing international 
legal bases for defining and prosecuting tactical rape and sexual violence in war. 
This was an important step in providing legitimacy for changed attitudes and 
eventual rejection of the abuses.  
The ICTY findings in the case against Tadic contributed to general jurisprudence 
relating to crimes against humanity. It deemed that a single act could qualify as a 
crime against humanity as long as there was a link with a widespread or systematic 
attack against a civilian population and although a ‘policy’ to commit crimes against 
humanity must exist, it need not be the policy of a state but could be instigated or 
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directed by a non-state organisation or group. Rochus J.P. Pronk and Brian D. 
Tittemore provided an overview of these significant developments from the Tadic 
case.63 The ICTY deemed that commission of crimes against humanity came under 
customary international law for which there is individual criminal responsibility. It 
identified key elements that were required under Article 5 of the ICTY Statute, to 
judge an act as a crime against humanity. Article 5 lists specific acts which may be 
classified as crimes against humanity. Pronk and Tittemore highlighted that the 
ICTY judged that acts needed to be committed ‘during’, as opposed to ‘in’, an armed 
conflict, and be linked temporally and geographically to that conflict. The ICTY 
Appeals Chamber, in its previous jurisdiction appeal decision in the Tadic case, had 
held this linking was not required as a matter of customary international law but was 
nevertheless expressly required under the ICTY Statute. A further requirement was 
that a systematic widespread attack on a civilian population was occurring at the time 
of the commission of the acts. Finally, it had to be established that the accused knew 
or had reason to know that by his acts or omission that he was participating in the 
attack on the population.  
Certain aspects of the Statute of the ICTY have particular relevance to the 
prosecution of perpetrators of tactical rape and sexual violence in war. One such is 
the clarification of who is deemed a protected person when applying international 
law. The Statute of the ICTY included powers under Article 2 to prosecute persons 
under the laws as set out in the Geneva Conventions. Under Additional Protocol 1 to 
those Conventions, it had been firmly established that civilians should never be 
specifically targeted in war.64 This cleared the way for the ICTY to deal with rape of 
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civilians as part of a policy of tactical use of rape. However, the Fourth Geneva 
Convention says that protected persons are ‘those in the hands of a party to the 
conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals’.65 This might have 
excluded victims of the same nationality as their abusers but that definition of 
protected persons was interpreted widely by the ICTY to include victims for whom 
‘factors such as religion or ethnicity may be more determinative of where an 
individual’s alliance lies than formal nationality’.66 This provided protection to such 
people as Bosnian Muslims victimised by Bosnian Serbs. The ruling by the ICTY set 
a judicial precedent for avoiding legal loopholes to enable impunity for perpetrators 
of tactical rape and sexual violence. 
Veronica Arbreu provided some additional useful analysis when she noted that 
Article 2 of the ICTY Statute referred to persons protected under the provisions of 
the Geneva Conventions.67 The ICTY was established under the UN Charter which is 
committed to promoting respect for human rights and for fundamental freedom for 
all people without distinction such as their sex.68 It follows that the ICTY, as an 
entity of the UN, must recognise the same rights for men and women and must 
provide for equal protection. Included in the Statute were the acts for prosecution by 
the ICTY: torture or inhuman treatment; wilfully causing great suffering or serious 
injury to body or health and unlawful confinement of a civilian. These are all aspects 
of crimes which can be applicable to understanding the impact and conduct of 
tactical rape and link with the advances in legal treatment and punishment of sexual 
violence in war. The ICTY determined that civilians in the former Yugoslavia had 
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the right to protection from crimes by forces not of their ethnic group.69 This clarified 
legal grounds for prosecuting perpetrators of tactical rape and sexual violence. 
A further important development from the ICTY was the clarification of the 
relevance of distinctions between international and internal conflicts. Theodor Meron 
provided useful commentary on the role played by the jurisprudence of the ICTY in 
enabling the application of international humanitarian law to internal conflicts when 
he asserted that there was no moral justification and no truly persuasive legal reasons 
for treating perpetrators of atrocities in internal conflicts more leniently than those 
engaged in international wars.70 Article 5 of the ICTY Statute enabled prosecution of 
crimes against humanity, listing acts and conditions under which they might be 
constituted ‘crimes against humanity’. This had to be included in the Statute as there 
was no international treaty which specifically defined ‘crimes against humanity’. 
Article 5 is important in that it recognises that such acts can be committed as part of 
either international or internal conflicts and forces perpetrating these acts do not have 
to be state-controlled but can include ‘illegitimate forces that take de facto control 
over defined territory, including militias, terrorist groups and organisations’.71 
It was in the ICTY Appeals Chamber Decision on Jurisdiction that armed conflict 
was defined as conflict existing, ‘whenever there is a resort to armed force between 
States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organised 
armed groups or between such groups within a State’.72 In this same ruling, it was 
judged that such conflict was deemed to exist until such time as a peaceful settlement 
was reached, whether or not actual combat was taking place. This was an important 
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ruling in that it meant that International Humanitarian Law should apply to conflicts 
within states even if there were protests or concerns about intervention into the realm 
of a particular state’s sovereignty. This meant that tactical rape and sexual violence 
could be prosecuted if perpetrated as part of an internal conflict.  
The ICTY also noted that human rights law and humanitarian law pertain during 
conflicts whether international or internal, stating that both human rights law and 
humanitarian law, ‘take as their starting point the concern for human dignity, which 
forms the basis of a list of fundamental minimum standards of humanity’.73 Askin 
noted that the Geneva Conventions, Common Article 2 and the Martens Clause of 
the early Hague Conventions, assert that ‘fundamental human rights do not cease to 
be applicable during armed conflict’.74 By recognising that international 
humanitarian law and human rights law apply in conflicts – and those conflicts may 
be international or internal – the application and relevance of other international 
instruments such as the declarations and covenants which formulate required 
protection of human rights, civil and political rights, protection of women and 
children and prohibit torture and discrimination were all clarified.75 The rights to 
protection and justice contained in these instruments can be seen to have attained the 
status of jus cogens meaning that these are rights considered so fundamental that 
states are not permitted to contract out of them.76 It is to this status that the rejection 
of tactical rape and sexual violence in war must aspire.  
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Tactical Rape as Strategy and Policy 
Article 5 of the Statute of the ICTY enabled prosecution as crimes against humanity, 
if a series of criminal acts – including rape – were committed as part of a widespread 
or systematic attack against a civilian population. The concept of tactical rape as 
defined earlier in this dissertation included that rape be part of a strategy and policy 
of attacking civilians, be widespread or systematic. Kelly Askin, reviewing cases 
heard by the international tribunals noted that ‘evidence indicates that rape crimes 
are increasingly committed systematically and strategically, such that sexual violence 
forms a central and fundamental part of the attack against an opposing group’.77 She 
concluded, too, that the laws of warfare have prohibited rape of combatants and non-
combatants for centuries, but noted that increasingly, ‘this prohibition extends to 
other forms of sexual violence, including sexual slavery, forced impregnation, forced 
maternity, forced abortion, forced sterilisation, forced marriage, forced nudity, sexual 
molestation, sexual mutilation, sexual humiliation and sex trafficking.’78 Tactical 
rape in the former Yugoslavia was the abuse which sparked outrage and 
condemnation, but the other acts which constitute sexual violence also often 
accompanied it. The practice of tactical rape and sexual violence were indeed 
widespread. This contention was supported in the ICTY Judgement in the case 
Prosecution v Kvocka.79 There was general acceptance that widespread attacks such 
as tactical rape and sexual violence in any conflict are subject to international 
humanitarian law. At the ICTY, a crime against humanity was defined as: ‘a single 
act by a perpetrator taken within a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian 
population entails individual responsibility and an individual perpetrator need not 
commit numerous offences to be held liable’.80 Deciding that offences have been 
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committed in a ‘systematic or organised’ fashion can be guided by examining the 
nature of the crimes which may have been perpetrated as a result of either a state 
policy or the policy of non-state forces including terrorist groups or organisations.81  
The ICTY ruled in the case against Kunarac, one of four accused who were 
convicted of various crimes dealing with rape and sexual slavery: ‘It is sufficient to 
show that the act took place in the context of an accumulation of acts of violence, 
which, individually, may vary greatly in nature and gravity’.82 Each individual act of 
rape may be deemed to be an act of tactical rape when it is part of an overall, 
systematic attack which is widespread and strategically motivated. When judging 
Vukovic, one of those accused with Kunarac, the court dismissed his defence that his 
actions were beyond the court’s jurisdiction because even if he had raped it was not 
out of hatred. The court ruled, ‘all that matters in this context is his awareness of an 
attack against the Muslim civilian population of which his victim was a member and, 
for the purpose of torture, that he intended to discriminate between the group of 
which he is a member and the group of the victim’.83 This clarified the essential 
condition for tactical rape and sexual violence being deemed war crimes – the fact 
that such acts were committed as part of a strategic or policy-driven plan to gain 
political or military ascendency over another group or to ethnically cleanse a 
territory. The court also ruled that a plan or policy may be indicative of the 
systematic nature of the crime and thus be ‘evidentially relevant’ but it is not 
essential to produce such a plan or policy for an attack to be deemed ‘systematic’.84  
This pre-condition of being widespread or systematic also applied when ruling on 
tactical rape and sexual violence as crimes against humanity. The Statute of the 
                                                                
81 Charlesworth and  Chinkin,  p. 322. 
82 Prosecutor v Kunarac, Judgement, IT-96-23-T para. 419. 
83 Prosecutor v Kunarac, para. 816. 
84 Askin, ‘Prosecuting Wartime Rape’ p. 315. 
 137 
 
ICTY listed a number of acts under Article 5, Crimes Against Humanity, as this had 
not been elsewhere formally agreed despite the term being widely used since the 
Nuremburg Trials. Askin said that while definitions differed, ‘in essence, a crime 
against humanity consists of an inhumane act (typically a series of inhumane acts 
such as murder, rape, and torture) committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack directed against a civilian population’.85 It is important therefore that there be 
clear understanding of what is meant by ‘widespread’ or ‘systematic’. An article in 
the Slovenian newspaper, Delo, was quoted by Mary Kaldor, as it claimed that the 
Yugoslav National Army had a plan for mass rapes as a weapon of psychological 
warfare: ‘Analysis of the Muslims’ behaviour showed their morale, desire for battle 
and will could be crushed most easily by raping women, especially minors and even 
children’.86 The existence of a plan contributed to establishing that the rapes were 
widespread and systematic. Cases tried before the ICTY established that tactical rape 
and sexual violence were, indeed, widespread. In the ICTY case against Tadic where 
the indictment included alleging a ‘campaign of terror which included killings, 
torture, sexual assaults and other physical and psychological abuse’, the Trial 
Chamber noted that treatment received by some named witnesses was not unique: ‘A 
policy to terrorize … is evident’.87 The work of the ICTY, therefore, in ruling about 
elements of systematic attacks contributed substantively to establishing legal grounds 
for understanding tactical rape and sexual violence as violations of established 
humanitarian law.  
In the ICTY case against Furundzija, there was development in the understanding of 
rape in international law.88 In this case, Anto Furundzija was found guilty of aiding 
and abetting outrages on personal dignity including rape. He had been a local 
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commander of a group within the Croatian Defence Council, known as ‘the Jokers’ 
and in mid-May 1993 had been interrogating a witness. Another accused had been 
rubbing a knife on the woman’s inner thigh and threatening to cut her. Later, she was 
raped in the mouth, anus and vagina while other members of the group milled around 
watching and laughing. She was deemed to have suffered severe physical and mental 
harm and public humiliation.89 The Trial Chamber identified the ‘objective elements’ 
of rape in international law as the sexual penetration, however slight, of the vagina or 
anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the 
perpetrator; or penetration of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator. 
The definition also included rape when such penetration was perpetrated by coercion 
or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person.90  
This definition of objective elements, particularly the elaboration of the possible 
nature of coercion and force, was important in moving from the requirement of proof 
of non-consent and the judgement noted that ‘any form of captivity vitiates 
consent’.91 This represented a serious attempt to define and understand the reality of 
rape. The Trial Chamber emphasised that while force, threat of force or coercion are 
relevant, these factors are not exhaustive and the emphasis must be placed on 
violations of sexual autonomy.92 Sexual autonomy was ruled to be violated ‘wherever 
the person subjected to the act has not freely agreed to it or is otherwise not a 
voluntary participant’ and factors such as force, threat or taking advantage of a 
vulnerable person provide evidence as to whether consent is voluntary.93 Under Rule 
96 regarding procedures and evidence, the Trial Chamber also ruled that no 
corroboration of the victim’s testimony was required and prior sexual conduct of the 
victim was not admissible in evidence. This was a realistic obviation of legal 
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approaches which might attempt to undermine the testimony of survivors of tactical 
rape or sexual violence in war.  
There were numerous incidences of rulings which provided a realistic understanding 
of tactical rape and allied sexual attacks. In the Kvocka case the Trial Chamber 
pointed out that ‘sexual violence covers a broad range of acts and includes such 
crimes as rape, molestation, sexual slavery, sexual mutilation, forced marriage, 
forced abortion, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and forced sterilization’.94 In 
the Celebici case the Trial Chamber stressed that rape ‘causes severe pain and 
suffering, both physical and psychological. The psychological suffering of persons 
upon whom rape is inflicted may be exacerbated by the social and cultural conditions 
and can be particularly acute and long lasting’.95 This Celebici case focused on four 
accused: with Zejnil Delalic eventually acquitted and Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic 
and Landzo convicted and sentenced to terms ranging from seven to twenty-five 
years. The indictment alleged that in 1992, forces consisting of Bosnian Muslims and 
Bosnian Croats took control of those villages containing predominantly Bosnian 
Serbs within and around the Konjic municipality in central Bosnia. Those persons 
detained during these operations were held in the Celebici prison-camp, where 
detainees were killed, tortured, sexually assaulted, beaten and otherwise subjected to 
cruel and inhuman treatment by the four accused.  
This was a case with significant findings and judgements. It was the first judgement 
involving multiple defendants. It provided legal classification of the conflict in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, deeming it to be an international conflict because of the 
involvement of the federal republic of Yugoslavia and its forces. It provided the first 
elucidation of the concept of command responsibility by an international judicial 
body since the cases decided in the wake of the Second World War, including 
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responsibility of civilians holding posts of authority. This was also the first 
conviction of an accused person for rape as torture by the ICTY. Rape as torture was 
charged as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions and a violation of the laws and 
customs of war and according to the Trial Chamber ‘there can be no question that 
acts of rape may constitute torture under customary law’.96 
In the case against Kunarac, the Trial Chamber noted, ‘rape is one of the worst 
sufferings a human being can inflict on another’ and took into account that the 
accused had frequently told his victims ‘that they would give birth to Serb babies’.97 
The Trial Chamber also emphasised that suffering need not be long-lasting, stating it 
was not ‘open to regard the fact that a victim has recovered or is overcoming the 
effects of such an offence as indicating it did not constitute an outrage on personal 
dignity’.98 These were important acknowledgements of the immediate and long term 
impacts of rape. They demonstrated an increased and more thoughtful degree of 
commitment to confronting and bringing to account the perpetrators of tactical rape 
and sexual violence in war, with an increased sensitivity to the real impact of these 
abuses on victims. 
Kelly Askin reviewed the judgement on Tadic and the events at Omarska camp 
where ‘both male and female prisoners were subjected to severe mistreatment, which 
included beatings, sexual assaults, torture and executions’.99 Askin noted it was 
‘particularly significant that the trial chamber cited [this] testimony concerning 
sexual violence and reproduced testimony attesting to the enormous pain and 
suffering endured by women and girls and the community at large.’100 There was 
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recognition of the widespread negative impact of tactical rape on a group and, 
importantly, it was recognition that such negative impact extended from the 
individuals directly attacked to their communities.  
In situations of conflict there may be debate regarding where responsibility lies for 
criminal acts: with those who actually perpetrate those acts, those who allow or 
condone them or those who may authorise and plan them. Edoardo Greppi wrote:  
the rules of humanitarian law concerning international crimes and responsibility 
have not always appeared sufficiently clear. One of the thorniest problems is that 
relating to the legal nature of international crimes committed by individuals and 
considered as serious violations of the rules of humanitarian law.101 
Commenting further Greppi continued that the basic problem regarding the 
classification of offences seemed to be that the borderline between war crimes and 
crimes against humanity appears blurred.102 The ICTY achieved some clarity in these 
aspects of international law. Greppi wrote about the distinction which grew after 
1946 and noted that ‘beyond any doubt’ crimes against humanity had become part of 
international law and judgements of the ICTY ‘affirmed it openly’.103 He focussed on 
the ‘humanity’ aspect of the distinctions between the two forms of crimes because 
‘the principle of humanity is at the core of international humanitarian law’ and ‘the 
principle of individual responsibility has clearly been established by humanitarian 
law’.104  
Aspects of humanitarian law, particularly regarding responsibility, required attention. 
Timothy McCormack pointed out regarding humanitarian law, that ‘acceptance of 
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the body of rules and principles regulating the conduct of armed conflict can be 
perceived as condoning the resort to force’ but ‘when it comes to the prosecution of 
war crimes and other atrocities committed in armed conflict, the existence of legal 
principles is crucial’.105 An article by Frits Kalshoven and Liesbeth Zegveld, written 
in 2001, outlined the variety of responses made by the UN Security Council to gross 
violations of human rights law and humanitarian law, then noted that the goal of 
humanitarian law is ‘to preserve humanity in the face of the reality of war’ and 
linked this with the opinion that Security Council decisions to establish the ICTY and 
ICTR had been based on the notion of individual responsibility.106 In establishing a 
base of jurisprudence regarding tactical rape, it was, therefore, imperative that issues 
of responsibility were clarified if the degree of impunity were ever to be reduced. 
Patricia Viseur-Sellers focussed on the outcomes of ICTY sexual assault cases 
regarding common purpose and joint responsibility, providing a detailed analysis of 
cases and the legal steps involved in reaching relevant decisions.107 From her position 
as legal advisor for Gender-related Crimes in the Office of the Prosecutor for the 
ICTY, she noted, ‘war, systematic attacks against civilians or the eruption of 
genocide entail collective criminal conduct’.108 She explained that the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber ‘ruled that no one who participates in a serious violation of humanitarian 
law escapes the Tribunal’s jurisdiction’.109 This was an important approach, avoiding 
loopholes for perpetrators. Sellers described the two broad forms of individual 
liability: direct criminal responsibility and indirect or superior responsibility. Direct 
responsibility implicates any accused who has planned, instigated, committed, 
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ordered or aided or abetted the execution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Statute (of the ICTY). Indirect criminal responsibility attributes liability to a person 
in a position of superior authority, whether military, political, business or any 
hierarchical status, for acts directly committed by his or her subordinates.110 
Sellers described the approach by which a judgement was made by the Trial 
Chambers and Appeals Chamber regarding criminal liability, not directly expressed 
in Article 7(1), the relevant article of the ICTY Statute: ‘Co-perpetration or joint 
criminal enterprise is a form of direct liability based upon a perpetrator undertaking 
to participate in criminal conduct with a plurality of actors’.111 This clarification 
considerably extends the range of liability of participation and responsibility of 
perpetrators of tactical rape and sexual violence. Sellers wrote in 2004 that she would 
‘not presume to predict, only speculate upon the munificent effect the common 
purpose or joint criminal enterprise doctrine might have on the development of 
sexual assault jurisprudence’.112 However, this author shares the hope that it will 
indeed prove to be of benefit in a wide-ranging application for justice for victims of 
tactical rape and sexual violence.  
A number of other rulings contributed to the jurisprudence regarding responsibility. 
The case against four men who were involved in acts of sexual violence at the 
Celebici camp, mentioned earlier, referred to violence against men and women.113 
The accused were a de facto commander at the camp; a second person with alleged 
authority over the camp; a worker and a guard. The court judged that even when they 
did not commit the specific acts of sexual violence, the accused were responsible on 
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the basis of ‘their de facto as well as their de jure positions as superiors’.114 This 
judgement was supported by the ICTY Appeals Chamber and deemed that superior 
responsibility for crimes committed by subordinates could be incurred for war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide:  
Superior responsibility may be used to hold military and civilian leaders accountable 
for crimes of sexual violence committed by subordinates that the superior 
negligently failed to prevent or punish’.115  
This was an important step forward because, as Kelly Askin noted, it set a precedent 
which could be used, ‘to hold superiors criminally liable for failing to adequately 
train, monitor, supervise, control and punish subordinates who commit rape crimes’ 
and there could be no illusions that women and girls were not at high risk of sexual 
violence during war, mass violence and occupation.116 This represented progress in 
accountability of those who were responsible for permitting or even encouraging 
widespread and systematic rape. Responsibility can now be placed on those who are 
judged to be in control of troops.  
In the judgements in the Omarska case, there was also a closely-allied ruling about 
joint responsibility of people who were reasonably deemed to know about or support 
crimes. The accused included Kvocka who was convicted of having had sufficient 
influence to prevent or halt some of the abuses but rarely made use of that 
influence’.117 The Trial Chamber of the ICTY ruled that it was not reasonable for 
those who worked at the camp not to have known that abuses were being inflicted. 
As well as possibly witnessing the rapes and abuses, those who worked at the camp 
would have known because: 
                                                                
114 Celebici, Trial Chamber Judgement, para. 354. 
115 Askin, ’Prosecuting Wartime Rape’, 2003, p. 326. 
116 Askin, ‘Prosecuting Wartime Rape’,  p. 327. 
117 Omarska,Keraterm and Trnopolje Camps, (IT-98-30/1), ICTY Press Release, retrieved 3 December 
2008, <www.icty.org/x/cases/kvocka/cis/en/cis_kvocka_al_en.pdf>. 
 145 
 
evidence of abuses could be seen in the bloodied, bruised and injured bodies … 
heaps of dead bodies, lying in piles … cramped conditions and bloodstained walls 
… and evidence of abuse could be heard from the screams of pain and suffering … 
evidence could be smelled from deteriorating corpses, the urine and faeces …118  
It was accepted that knowledge alone was not sufficient grounds for conviction but 
the accused must have participated at some level – such as aiding acts of abuse or 
performing acts which advanced the goals of what was a criminal enterprise. Mlado 
Radic was a professional policeman who had power over guards but was convicted 
for using that power selectively, ‘while ignoring the vast majority of crimes 
committed during his shift’.119 However, he was also convicted of rape, participation 
in sexual intimidation, harassment and assaults as well as acts of sexual violence 
characterised as torture taking into account ‘the vulnerability of the victims, the pain 
deliberately inflicted and the state of anxiety in which women detainees were kept at 
Omarska.’120 This again broadened the range of people responsible for contravention 
of International Humanitarian Law – and may well deter participation in such 
violations even if no more direct action to prevent is taken or possible.  
The indictment of Slobodan Milosevic, despite his death before any concluding 
ruling of the Tribunal, also demonstrated that heads of sovereign states could be 
brought to account. Milosevic was President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
from 15/7/1997 until 6/10/2000. He was arrested 1/4/2001 and transferred to the 
ICTY 29/6/2001 where he was charged with crimes including cruel and inhumane 
treatment which included the sexual assault of women in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
the sexual assault of Kosovar Albanians by forces under his command. He died 
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11/3/2006 before the case against him concluded.121 While the complexity and 
number of charges against him probably led to the drawn-out proceedings and the 
ICTY’s dealings with the man himself in the proceedings, his arrest and charges 
signalled that command responsibility would be applied at the highest levels of 
government.  
In its report to the UN Security Council and General Assembly in 2007, the ICTY 
highlighted its focus on ‘senior level individuals accused of the most serious crimes’ 
and noted that the failure at that time to arrest Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic 
remained ‘of grave concern with respect to the proper administration of justice’.122 
Since then, in July, 2008, Karadzic has been arrested and is in The Hague. Both 
Karadzic and Mladic were charged with having superior authority and that ‘by their 
acts and omissions and in concert with others, committed a crime against humanity’ 
for acts which included them being ‘criminally responsible for (inter alia) rape and 
sexual assault’.123 Holding heads of states and senior leaders accountable is the 
logical outcome of recognising superior responsibility and does, at least, send a 
message to those who use tactical rape and sexual violence as strategies in conflicts 
that they may not have impunity.  
From the Celebici case important judgements emerged which referred to rape as 
torture. In a key ruling, the Trial and Appeals Chambers of the ICTY interpreted 
Article 3 of its Statute, which refers to violations of laws of war or customs of war, 
‘to include the crimes of torture and ‘outrages upon personal dignity’, which includes 
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acts such as rape, within its purview’.124 In this particular case, the elements of 
torture for the purposes of the war crimes provisions of the ICTY Statute were held 
to be the elements of torture contained in the Convention Against Torture.125 This 
includes acts: which inflict severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental; 
which are committed intentionally for obtaining information or confessions from the 
victim or a third person; committed as punishment, intimidation or coercion for any 
reason based on discrimination of any kind; committed by or as a result of 
instigation, consent or acquiescence of an official or person acting in an official 
capacity. The Trial Chamber ruled that when rape or any form of sexual violence 
satisfies these elements, it may constitute torture.126 In this case it was judged that the 
accused: 
used sexual violence as an instrument of torture and subordination, since he 
committed the rapes with an aim of ‘intimidate[ing] not only the victim but also 
other inmates, by creating an atmosphere of fear and powerlessness’.127  
It is important that the threat of rape was recognised as a strategy for intimidation – 
not just the act of rape itself. Here again, the rulings established a legal base for 
maintaining that rape is a contravention of accepted law and as such, it is a ruling 
which also strengthens attitudes rejecting the use of tactical rape as a strategy in 
conflicts.  
In the case against Furundzija, there was recognition that involvement in torture may 
include a varying range of action – from ordering, to organising, to provision of 
opportunity, to processing results of information which may be obtained. All these 
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actions carry responsibility.128 This case also established that being forced to watch 
the rape of a woman he knew constituted torture of a male victim.129 The rulings 
stated that there was also a generally accepted prohibition of torture which has 
reached the status of jus cogens under international law and that ‘acts constituting 
sexual terrorism amount to torture’.130  
It was the Kunarac case in 2001 in which the ICTY gave its first judgement of rape 
as a crime against humanity and as sexual slavery.131 The accused in this case were 
convicted for crimes committed in the detention centres in Foca in 1992. The ICTY 
Statute Article 5 which referred to crimes against humanity did not specifically refer 
to sexual slavery but did list rape and enslavement as two acts ‘justiciable as crimes 
against humanity’ so ‘the crime of holding women and girls for sexual servitude was 
charged and prosecuted’.132 The Foca municipality was a particularly horrific centre 
of rape of women and girls, where from and in a range of holding places, ‘forces 
systematically raped, gang raped and publicly raped’ many women and young girls, 
with some being taken out, raped and returned and some being held in specific 
locations for ‘sexual access whenever captors demanded it’.133 
The Trial Chamber of the ICTY, in this case, referred to the definition of slavery in 
international law, including in the Slavery Convention, as ‘the status or condition of 
a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are 
exercised’ and found that indicia of slavery included (inter alia) absence of consent 
or free will, exploitation, forced labour or service, sex, prostitution and control of 
sexuality.134 The judgement ‘forcefully concluded that neither physical restraint nor 
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detention is a required element of slavery’ and ‘implicitly accepted that fear of 
retribution if they escaped and were recaptured as a reason that women were 
psychologically prevented from escaping’.135 However, as Askin noted, while the 
judgement took care to emphasise that control over a person’s sexual autonomy, or 
obliging a person to provide sexual services may be indicative of enslavement, 
regrettably, the term sexual slavery was never used in the judgement.136 
Despite this lack, the ruling was historic for linking rape and slavery and was 
welcomed by many advocates. The ruling provoked this response from Regan Ralph 
of Human Rights Watch: ‘This decision is historic because it puts those who rape 
and sexually enslave women on notice that they will not get away with these heinous 
crimes’.137. Many advocates including this writer shared Ralph’s sense of 
encouragement that there had been, at least, some recognition of these crimes and 
some accountability demanded. 
Judicial progress 
By June 2010, the ICTY had indicted more than 160 persons. Proceedings against 
123 had been completed and a further 40 cases were still open. These included 
Radovan Karadzic, who was the Bosnian-Serb President at the time of the conflict. 
He was indicted for genocide and crimes against humanity related to events at 
Srebrenica.138 The other accused, Ratko Mladic, also indicted for genocide and 
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crimes against humanity, was finally arrested in May 2011. He too was charged with 
genocide and with persecution, in which charges were included sexual violence.139 
In 2002, the International Criminal Court entered into force, established by the Rome 
Statute and adopted in 1998.140 This court is not directly linked with the former 
Yugoslavia but is noted here as its mandate built on work by the ICTY such as that 
mentioned in the previous chapter of the ICC Statute defining a crime against 
humanity by drawing on work done by the ICTY, referencing the widespread or 
systematic attack on civilian populations and the mental state of the individual 
defendant.141 In January 2003, the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia 
(OHR) and the ICTY recommended the creation of a specialised chamber to try war 
crimes cases within the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In August of that 
same year, the UN Security Council passed a resolution which called on donors to 
support the creation of such a specialised chamber.142 This War Crimes Chamber was 
created and began operations in 2005. In its World Report 2006, Human Rights 
Watch (HRW) noted that in 2006 the Bosnian War Chamber had been hearing 
eighteen cases while district courts in Republika Srpska continued to try cases, 
‘albeit at a slow pace’.143 This report noted that the efforts of cantonal and district 
courts were hindered by lack of support from the public, under-resourcing and 
witness cooperation issues, but the non-availability of suspects remained the biggest 
impediment to accountability’.144 By 12 February 2007, Human Rights Watch 
reported there were nine ongoing trials; there had been nine verdicts and three of 
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those had been confirmed on appeal; there had been five cases involving nine 
accused transferred to the War Crimes Chamber from the ICTY.145  
The other judiciary to note is the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which, in 2006, 
began hearings in genocide cases brought by Bosnia-Herzegovina against Serbia and 
Montenegro. In 2007, the ICJ ruled that events at Srebrenica did constitute genocide 
but cleared Serbia of direct responsibility. It is, however, the work of the ICTY 
which has most direct bearing on tactical rape and sexual violence. Its establishment 
as well as the case law it produced have contributed to the early signs of rejection of 
these practices in war. The ICTY continues hearing cases – notably regarding rape in 
specific indictments and rape as a weapon of war and a crime against humanity.  
Conclusion 
The ICTY did effectively contribute to the understanding of how conflicts were 
waged in the late twentieth century by examining the strategies and tactics employed 
by combatants in the former Yugoslavia. It contributed to the legal basis for 
normative rejection of tactical rape and sexual violence in war by the international 
community by advancing valuable judgments and interpretations about International 
Humanitarian Law. Essential elements of legal requirements for acts to be judged as 
war crimes and crimes against humanity were clarified in the context of this conflict. 
The ICTY demonstrated that tactical rape and sexual violence were contraventions of 
existing International Humanitarian Law and that perpetrators should therefore be 
brought to account. Analysis of the work of the ICTY indicates that there was 
increased commitment to rejecting tactical rape and sexual violence in war as 
definitions were expanded and degrees and locus of responsibility were identified. 
All this was done within the mandate of interpretation and application of existing law 
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and norms. The work of the ICTY and the ICTR were similar in many ways – but 
differences arose from the nature of the conflicts with which they dealt and the 
different emphases arising from cases they heard. The ICTR will be considered and 
its contributions to discourse and legal bases for rejection of tactical rape and sexual 
violence in war as acts of genocide will be analysed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Genocide, Tactical Rape and Sexual Violence in Rwanda 
This chapter focuses on the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. This was again a situation 
which included widespread and systematic tactical rape and sexual violence. It was 
another situation where the UNSC established an ad hoc tribunal from which 
significant case law and legal definitions emerged. This case law and definitions 
have contributed to the commitment of the international community to the 
development of a discourse rejecting tactical rape and sexual violence in war. The 
question considered in this and the previous chapter is, ‘What contributions did the 
conflict and genocide and ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and for Rwanda make to the development of a norm rejecting tactical 
rape and sexual violence?’  
As with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the judicial statements and rulings 
of the ICTY, the Rwandan genocide and the ICTR resulted in progress in 
understanding the nature and use of rape and sexual violence in war. It was another 
example of a ‘new war’ where the use of tactical rape and sexual violence, received 
attention from public media and the international community to a degree not 
previously common. Again, civilians were targeted as the genocide erupted within 
national borders. Again, intent to destroy a group was evident. Again, international 
intervention happened within a context of new understandings of the limits on 
sovereignty. The ICTR was also a tribunal which was deliberately an ad hoc entity, 
limited to extend judgements on existing international humanitarian norms and laws 
and when it considered tactical rape and sexual violence, it had to do so as a 
contravention of established IHL. There were – still are – many areas in which the 
ICTR failed to perform well and failed victims of tactical rape and sexual violence. 
However, it produced what could be argued to be the most significant case in 
international law regarding rape and genocide, despite many reservations and a sad 
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lack of substantive progress since that case. While the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia and the genocide in Rwanda occurred in a close time frame and a similar 
context of approaches to humanitarianism and the international community reacted in 
both arenas with ad hoc tribunals, Rwanda and the ICTR exemplified a different 
form of conflict, a different culture, a different form of using tactical rape and sexual 
violence – this time in an African state. 
The focus of this chapter is on understanding the elements which resulted in events 
in Rwanda being deemed to be genocide and the contribution of the ICTR to 
understanding the links between tactical rape, sexual violence and genocide. There is 
no requirement that conflict be occurring for genocide to occur but events in Rwanda 
– which could be deemed to have been in a post-conflict state – certainly resulted in 
genocide.  This chapter will, first, review the key events of the Rwanda genocide. It 
will, secondly, analyse the nature of the genocide in Rwanda. Thirdly, it will analyse 
how the hatred of the Tutsi – in particular Tutsi women – was constructed. Fourthly, 
it will examine the formation of the ICTR and the emerging case law with reference 
to tactical rape and sexual violence as genocidal. The outcomes of the ICTR and its 
judgements regarding tactical rape and sexual violence will be analysed, with a 
particular focus on how this contributed to building a base of international law for 
recognising the link between tactical rape and sexual violence and genocide. Finally, 
there is recognition of the limitations of the work of the ICTR, despite its progress in 
effectively linking tactical rape, sexual violence and genocide.  
Key Events in the Rwandan Conflict 
The events in Rwanda were not a spontaneous genocide. It was one phase in a long-
running series of historical and political events and key events need to be registered. 
From the fourteenth century, the population of Rwanda had been a mix of majority 
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Hutu, minority Tutsi and a very small number of Twa.1 Germany colonised Rwanda 
from 1897-1916.2 Belgium occupied it in 1916 and in 1919 Belgium was given, by 
the League of Nations, a mandate to rule Rwanda and did this through Tutsi kings.3 
In 1959, one of several outbreaks of violence against the Tutsi caused approximately 
130,000 Tutsi eventually to flee to the Belgian Congo, Burundi, Tanganyika and 
Uganda.4 Rwanda was declared a republic in 1962, with a Hutu president.5 Violence 
continued and by 1964, it is ‘likely’ that the correct estimate of Tutsis who had been 
forced to flee Rwanda was around 600,000 to 700,000 refugees.6 In 1973, Juvenal 
Habyarimana, another Hutu, took over as president in a military coup and he was 
formally elected in 1987.7  
There was ongoing tension and conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi in the realms of 
the military and political leadership, particularly as, after independence, the economy 
of Rwanda weakened and eventually the Hutu president, Juvenal Habyarimana lost 
popularity.8 Many Tutsi refugees in Uganda formed the Rwandan Popular Front 
(RFP) with some dissident, moderate Hutus, and planned to overthrow Habyarimana 
and regain the right to return to Rwanda. In 1990, a rebel army, mostly Tutsi, 
invaded from Uganda but power remained with Habyarimana and the Hutu and 
Habyarimana exploited this threat, hoping to bring dissident Hutus back on side with 
him and his government.9 Tutsis inside Rwanda were accused of collaborating to 
overthrow the government and of being a threat to Rwanda generally.10 After 
                                                                
1 G Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, Columbia University Press, New York, 1995, 
p. 5 and P Clark, The Gacaca Courts, Post Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice 
Without Lawyers, Cambridge University Press, 2010 Introduction pp 12-19  
2 Prunier  p. 25. 
3 Prunier  pp. 25-26. 
4 Prunier  pp. 50-51.  
5 Prunier  p.54. 
6 Prunier  p.63. 
7 Prunier  p. 75. 
8 Prunier  pp. 84-90. 
9 Prunier  pp. 90-92. 
10 Prunier  pp. 90-92. 
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extended periods of violence, in August 1993, Habyarimana signed a peace accord in 
Arusha with the RPF – but it had little effect except perhaps to be seen as 
Habyarimana falling into partnership with moderate Hutus as well as the threatening 
RPF.11 Habyarimana’s plane was shot down in April 1994 and he and the Burundian 
president travelling with him were killed.12  
There were accusations on both sides that the Hutu leadership had ordered the 
assassination.13 Whatever the case, the shooting signalled the eruption of genocide 
and in the next three months an estimated 800,000 were killed – nearly three quarters 
of the Tutsi population.14 Eventually, the RPF launched a major offensive and Hutu 
militias fled to neighbouring countries, taking with them around two million Hutu 
refugees who joined the flow of Tutsis and moderate Hutus and the Twa who were 
also targeted in the events which became defined as genocide and which showed 
clear signs of being well-planned and prepared.15 The United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) reported ‘the largest and fastest exodus 
UNHCR has ever seen’.16 The writer of this dissertation was in the refugee camps in 
Tanzania following the massive exodus from Rwanda in May 1994 and agrees with 
Gerard Prunier that these camps were filled with refugees who were a mix of 
surviving Tutsis and Hutus together with Hutus who had been involved in the 
massacres.17 It was a volatile mix. A description of the camp inhabitants noted on 
May 19, 1994 that the refugees included ‘women who have been raped’ as this was 
evident to most workers.18 It is notable, however, that the History of the Rwandan 
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Crisis published by Gerard Prunier has no mention of rape in the otherwise 
extremely detailed accounts of events.  
It needs to be noted that while many NGOs and observers had, early in the conflict, 
called the events in Rwanda ‘genocide’, it was some time before it was formally 
acknowledged as such by the international community and sovereign states. In 1994, 
the UN Special Rapporteur when considering whether or not the acts constituted 
genocide accepted there was clear and unambiguous intention to destroy a group in 
whole or in part, referring to the incitements put out by the media (particularly radio 
RTLM) and reproduced in leaflets.19 He added that even without such evidence the 
intention could be deduced on the basis of a variety of concordant indications 
including preparations for the acts with distribution of firearms and training of 
militias, the number of Tutsis killed and the policy of destruction of the Tutsis.20 
Attacks and slaughter began within hours of Habiyirama’s plane being shot down 
and were carried out by the Presidential Guard and militias.21 It has been estimated 
that country-wide the militias numbered about 50,000 members.22 Many civilians 
also participated: some were threatened, some received incentives such as money or 
food or the right to claim the land of slaughtered Tutsis.23 The main organisers were 
‘a small tight group belonging to the regime’s political, military and economic 
elite’.24 The Special Rapporteur recorded that radio had urged attacks and recruits 
were sent rapidly all over the country to incite and carry out many of the killings, 
noting that Radio Rwanda which broadcast during the events sent messages 
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throughout the country: ‘by 5 May, the cleansing of the Tutsi must be complete’ and 
‘the grave is only half full, who will help us fill it?’25  
The fact of widespread rape as part of the genocide was evident. A Canadian 
peacekeeper testified at the ICTY: ‘It seemed that everywhere we went, from the 
period of 19th April [1994] until the time we left, there was rape everywhere near 
these killing sites’.26 He was one of the professional soldiers who expressed shock at 
what they had seen of the widespread rape. When Phillip Gorovitch, a prize-winning 
journalist and author, visited a church where many Tutsis were slaughtered in mid-
April 1994 he saw bodies in varying stages of decomposition and observed: 
A woman in a cloth wrap printed with flowers lay near the door. Her fleshless hip-
bones were high and her legs slightly spread, and a child’s skeleton extended 
between them.27  
A soldier from the Rwandese Patriotic Front, a Tutsi, told Gorovitch that the dead in 
this room were mostly women who had been raped before being murdered.28 These 
were just some of the indications that widespread rape had accompanied killing and 
documentation and evidence at the ICTR, considered later, indicated that rape had 
also been systematic and a direct strategy and tactic in the events aimed at destroying 
the Tutsi. In January 1996, Rene Degni-Segui, UN Special Rapporteur, reported: 
‘rape was the rule and its absence the exception’.29 The UN Special Rapporteur 
reported difficulties in having exact figures of rape victims because of social stigma 
and cultural values but also because they did not take into account any accurate 
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estimation of ‘rapes which took place in refugee camps’.30 Prevailing belief of the aid 
workers and medical and relief personnel, as early as May 1994, was that any Tutsi 
‘female’ (this term was often used to include both women and little girls of any age) 
who had managed to cross the border to safety had ‘probably been raped – and 
maybe more than once’.31  
The UN Special Rapporteur when considering that not only Tutsis were targeted 
referenced a document issued by the General Staff of the Rwandese Army which 
distinguished between the Tutsi as the main enemy but also referred to ‘supporters’ 
described as ‘any person who gives any support to the main enemy’.32 Accounts of 
women who survived tactical rape such as those in earlier chapters of this 
dissertation indicate that Hutu women married to Tutsi or Tutsi women married to 
Hutus were not spared. The reasons for this are further indication of the patriarchal 
belief that women bore children who belonged to the father or father’s group. Hutu 
women were to be ‘equally punished for having married Tutsis and having Tutsi 
children’.33 
The use of rape was widespread and systematic. The UN Special Rapporteur noted 
that women ‘may even be regarded as the main victims of the massacres, with good 
reason, since they were raped and massacred and subjected to other brutalities’.34 
Human Rights Watch published an extensive documentation of events in Rwanda 
and claimed that ‘at least half a million people perished’ in the thirteen weeks after 
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April 6 1994.35 Throughout the 771 pages of this documentation there are constant 
references to rape of women although there is no attempt to quantify it. In the 
publication, Shattered Lives, Binaifer Nowrojee said, ‘Rwandan women were 
subjected to sexual violence on a massive scale’ and she continued: 
Although the exact number of women raped will never be known, testimonies from 
survivors confirm that rape was extremely widespread and that thousands of women 
were individually raped, gang-raped, raped with objects such as sharpened sticks or 
gun barrels, held in sexual slavery (either collectively or through forced ‘marriage’) 
or sexually mutilated.36  
There were also large numbers of pregnancies from the rapes. Remembering that this 
was a society where children are considered to be of the fathers’ groups there were 
severe problems for these children and their mothers. Nowrojee mentions terms such 
as ‘children of hate’, ‘unwanted children’, ‘children of bad memories’ and references 
the estimates as being conservatively between 2,000 and 5,000.37 She noted reports 
of children being abandoned and of infanticide.38  
The UN Special Rapporteur supported these figures as low estimates and noted ‘that 
it may never be known exactly how many women were raped’.39 Adding to the 
shame perceived by victims and communities, which resulted from social values, 
there were many cases of forced incest and children probably born of these attacks. 
Many women suffered such damage to sexual organs that they were unable to bear 
children – the Special Rapporteur noting this was the case for many ‘little girls who 
were raped’.40 The patriarchal attitudes of valuing women only as property of men, as 
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child-bearers and carers and sexual partners all contributed to the sense of shame and 
loss of any self-esteem indicated in those accounts. The tactical rapes and sexual 
violence in Rwanda were forms of imposing measures intended to prevent births 
within the group. 
While this empirical evidence abounded as early as May 1994, it is indicative of the 
attitude towards tactical rape that the UN investigators who visited Rwanda from 9-
20 June 1994, from 29-31 July 1994, from 14-25 October 1994, 27 March to 3 April 
and 25-28 May 1995 did not dedicate any particular attention to rapes except for 
including rape among problems and a brief reference to ‘taking women as hostages 
and victims of rape’.41 It was not until the report of visits made in August-September 
1995 that special attention was drawn to the systematic rapes.42 By July, 1994 the 
RPF had captured the Rwandan capital, Kigali. The government collapsed and the 
RPF announced a ceasefire. With the RPF victory, an estimated two million Hutus 
fled across borders, mostly into Zaire. This meant that in the same refugee camps 
there were both survivors and perpetrators of the genocide. Women who had 
survived rape were in the same camps as those who had raped them. The issue of 
protection for women refugees was extreme in this situation.  
There was evidence indicating intent to destroy a particular group and of great bodily 
and mental harm (from tactical rape as well as other attacks). There was evidence of 
tactical rape imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group and 
evidence that with the prevailing patriarchal attitudes that would mean children of 
rapes would not be children of the targeted group but deemed to be children of the 
attackers. Still the international community resisted naming events as genocide – 
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which could have brought with it a responsibility to intervene. UN troops had 
withdrawn after ten soldiers were killed and UN attempts at ceasefires failed.43 
International response was limited to humanitarian aid to those who managed to 
escape across borders. It was not until after July 19, 1994 when a new multi-ethnic 
government was formed, that the UNSC established the ad hoc International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) which eventually judged that genocide had 
occurred and that the use of tactical rape and sexual violence had been part of the 
genocide in Rwanda.  
Understanding the Nature of the Genocide in Rwanda 
The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 did not require high technology or large budgets. 
Pangas made for tilling agricultural plots became weapons for killing. Youth groups 
and ordinary citizens were troops. Civilians and militia attacked civilians. The entire 
Hutu population was expected to attack the entire Tutsi population. Reports indicated 
that the extremists’ aim was for the entire Hutu populace to participate in the killings. 
Having involved everyone in the massacres, the blood of genocide would stain 
everybody and there could be no going back.44 Widespread participation by the 
populace was evident. A Kigali lawyer and survivor said, ‘everyone was called to 
hunt the enemy’.45 The speaker went on to explain what he believed was the process 
for ensuring everyone participated: 
But let’s say someone is reluctant. Say that guy comes with a stick. They tell him, 
‘No, get a masu [weapon]’. So, ok he does and he runs along with all the rest but he 
doesn’t kill. They say, ‘Hey, he might denounce us later. He must kill. Everyone 
must help to kill at least one person. So this person who is not a killer is made to do 
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it. And the next day it’s become a game to him. You don’t need to keep pushing 
him.46 
This is as likely as any explanation of the motivation of some who participated but 
motives will have differed. In a country with a long history of conflict between 
differing groups, participants will have had differing motivations – some political, 
some economic. This was genocide with origins in previous events and was a tragic 
continuation of those events. But there is some need to understand how such a large 
number of people could be engaged in such acts. The same lawyer said: 
In Rwandan history, everyone obeys authority. People revere power and there isn’t 
enough education. You take a poor, ignorant population and give them arms and say, 
‘It’s yours. Kill.’ They’ll obey….And in Rwanda, an order can be given very 
quietly.47 
It became clear that orders had been given and orders had been obeyed and that 
included orders regarding the rape and humiliation of women. Gerard Prunier 
pointed out that when identifying the ‘organisers’ of the events in Rwanda, ‘doubts 
are relatively limited’ and until the late stage ‘the killers were controlled and directed 
in their task by civil servants in the central government’ who, in turn, received orders 
from the capital, Kigali.48 This is supported by a record dated May 6, 1994 in which 
prefectural authorities decided to write to burgomasters about the need to stop rapes 
with violence.49 Clearly, there were authorities who were in a position to control the 
mass behaviour. 
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Regardless of diverse motivations for participation, this was not an impulsive 
conflict. It made use of available resources such as the tools found in most 
households as well as what appeared, to the writer of this dissertation, to be old 
Kalashnikovs. Small groups were armed but the vast majority of the attackers used 
whatever was available as weapons, from household farming implements to tactical 
rape. This genocide was planned and was early recognised as being planned. It was 
not an impulsive, spur of the moment reaction to events. In a report from the World 
Council of Churches’ team which was in refugee camps and spent time with many 
refugees, it was noted: 
Some mention should, I think, be made here of the fact that (a) the killings had been 
carefully planned beforehand (b) gangs had been provided with weapons (c) the 
signal to start the massacres was broadcast in pre-arranged code over the 
government controlled Radio Mille Collines, saying, ‘It is time to gather in the 
harvest’ and later, ‘the baskets are only half-full: they should be filled to the brim’.50 
Using local radio, the most prevalent form of communication in Rwanda as in most 
African countries, this war maximised available resources rather than developing 
specific, expensive alternatives.  
However, the use of simple agricultural tools and public radio did not mitigate the 
horrific nature of events: 
Although the killing was low-tech – performed largely by machete – it was carried 
out at a dazzling speed: of an original population of about seven and a half million, 
at least eight hundred thousand people were killed in just a hundred days. Rwandans 
often speak of a million deaths and they may be right. The dead of Rwanda 
accumulated at nearly three times the rate of Jewish dead during the holocaust. It 
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was the most efficient mass killing since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki.51 
In this context, tactical rape and sexual violence as weapons came into their own. 
The use of these forms of attack was driven by pre-established, constructed hatreds 
and fear, which will be elaborated later in this chapter. They were attacks which 
could kill and could inflict lasting damage to bodies, to spirits and to groups. Social 
attitudes such as patriarchy and the relationships between Hutu and Tutu (discussed 
further below) meant tactical rape and sexual violence impacted on community 
identities, on social relationships and economic options. Widespread HIV/AIDS 
added an additional physical menace. HIV/AIDS was already rife in Rwanda and the 
widespread rape of women and girls is deemed to have dramatically increased the 
rate of infection.52 The Rapport National of 1995 said that while it was difficult to 
ascertain exact numbers, the question of HIV/AIDS infection was aggravated 
considerably between April and July 1994.53 In such a situation of prevalent 
HIV/AIDS, rape of women resulted in infecting victims either consciously or not 
adding to the genocidal impact by contributing to the destruction of the group. 
The reality of massive participation in the massacres was clear to observers because 
‘great and sustained destruction’ does not occur aimlessly but ‘must be conceived as 
the means of achieving a new order’ and ‘even if killers do not enjoy killing, they 
must want their victims dead’ and ‘they have to want it so badly that they consider it 
a necessity.’54 This contributes to an analysis that such destruction – and the tactical 
rape and sexual violence which were part of it – were deliberate, planned and 
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systematic. The outcomes of the ICTR provided further insight and more detailed 
and authoritative documentation and evidence.  
An international NGO worker in the refugee camp at Benaco, Tanzania, reported that 
many people believed that what they did was in revenge for what happened to them 
some years ago, while others were avenging what those ‘avengers’ had just done.55 
The antagonism between Hutu and Tutsi and the particular antagonism of Hutu to 
Tutsi women was a social phenomenon which had been developed over previous 
years. This was a conflict constructed on the deliberate generation of hatred and fear. 
It involved – but went beyond – the inherent vulnerability of women and their 
communities when there is an accepted patriarchal basis of community relationships. 
Understanding the Constructed Hatred of Tutsi as a Group – Particularly Tutsi 
Women 
In many ways the hatred between Hutu and Tutsi was constructed – and an additional 
layer of hatred targeting Tutsi women was overlaid on these constructions. It is too 
easy to blame either long-standing conflict between Hutu and Tutsi or to blame the 
European colonisers for the events in Rwanda in 1994. The reality of the cause is a 
more complex combination of factors. Rwandan writers such as Anastase Shyake 
have written strongly of an integrated pre-colonial population of Rwandan – but with 
two clear identity groups, the Tutsi and Hutu (with a much smaller group of Twa).56 
The two groups shared language and cultural values. Rather than merely accepting 
the fact of colonisation as the sole cause of antipathy, Catherine Newbury referred to 
‘corporate perception of identity’ and used this term to explain the group 
identification of people as objects for fear or hatred where Tutsi were not to be 
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considered individuals but rather as a total group, having one, corporate identity 
which was opposed to the Hutu as a group:  
The generalisation of blame was dramatically evident in the genocide against Tutsi 
in Rwanda in 1994 when hardliners in the Hutu-dominated government labelled all 
Tutsi in the country as enemies of the state. The genocide was calculated to 
exterminate them.57 
By generalising that all Tutsi were responsible for all problems in Rwanda, whether 
those problems were economic or political, it was only a step to believing that 
defence of the state required exterminating all Tutsi. As Binaifer Nowrojee noted, the 
propaganda of the time indicated that Tutsi were foreign conquerors, who had 
refused to accept their loss of power and were bent on reasserting their control over 
Hutu.58 Newbury also noted that in 1997, this corporate view of ethnicity, which 
targeted all Tutsi during the genocide, was also used later to label all Hutu refugees 
as genocidaires (people who helped perpetrate genocide) and this view seemed to be 
part of a political programme of vengeance directed against Hutu.59  
The reasons behind such corporate views of ethnicity are to be found in historical 
events, which include colonisation, but which also include economic and power 
contests. The variation in formulation of the diverse rationales is largely determined 
by factional/ethnic interests. The UN Special Rapporteur believed that the pre-
colonisation society was similar to a feudal system with three different kingdoms 
(Hutu, Tutsi and Twa) under one king. He described the economic division with 
Tutsi having cattle and economic dominance, linked with the royalty and Hutu being 
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farmers and noted there was mobility between groups.60 The Twa, the hunters, 
suffered discrimination and violence to a massive degree although it often seems 
they are ignored in consideration and analysis of the history and the conflict itself. 
First the German then the Belgian colonisers exacerbated these divisions, with the 
Belgians first depending on the Tutsi for indirect rule and later turning on them when 
the Tutsi demanded independence.61 The history of Rwanda is full of indications that 
the situation was extremely volatile. From early in the 20th century, tensions grew. 
The Belgian colonisers who arrived in 1916, when divisions already existed between 
Hutu and Tutsi, treated the Tutsi as a superior group, strengthening Tutsi economic 
power and privilege. Not surprisingly, this caused ongoing resentment and tension 
between Tutsi and Hutu and the 1959 riots resulted in the deaths of thousands of 
Tutsis and in many Tutsi fleeing to Tanzania, Burundi and Uganda.  
After 1962, when Belgium withdrew from Rwanda and the Hutus took their place as 
political leaders, Tutsis were seen as scapegoats for any crisis or problem in the 
country. With independence came stronger delineation between the groups as Hutu 
governments discriminated against Tutsi in a reversal of dominance.62 Degni-Segui 
described the situation as having political causes with ethnic overtones and the 
political power being strongly linked with economic power in a country which was 
essentially poor and over-populated.63 The Hutu government applied quotas in 
schools, public service, excluded Tutsis from the army, the police and information 
services and the population had identity cards naming their group.64 By doing this, 
successive regimes and systems, for their own political ends, ‘gradually conditioned 
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the population to psychological and social acceptance of ethnic discrimination’.65 
This set a context for the events which followed in 1994.  
Sustaining this perception of division and difference rested on schools and largely on 
public media. The effective use of media helps further to understand this conflict in 
Rwanda as an example of what Kaldor called the ‘new wars’ described earlier in this 
dissertation. In Rwanda, public radio was the primary communications vehicle both 
in preparations for and in the perpetration of the events of 1994. Kaldor noted the 
high impact of such communication media:  
The electronic media has an authority that newspapers cannot match: in parts of 
Africa, radio is ‘magic’ [and] ‘the use of ‘hate’ radio to incite people to genocide in 
Rwanda’ [provided] ‘a mechanism for speeding up the pace of political 
mobilization’.66  
This was reiterated by the UN Special Rapporteur who noted, ‘false rumours and 
tracts designed to inflame ethnic hatred and encourage violence are constantly 
circulating in Rwanda’ with the Tutsi portrayed as serious threats to the Hutu.67 He 
also referred to the ‘long-standing campaign’ and the existence of ‘Hutu ten 
commandments’ which ‘advocate an ideology of apartheid’.68 Tutsi women were 
frequently both admired for their beauty and feared for their ability to seduce and 
harm Hutu men.69  
Public media was used to establish and construct the social relationships which 
would be the context for the genocide. It also increased the vulnerability of women 
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and the collective impact on communities and groups of tactical rape and sexual 
violence because the media propaganda which preceded the massacres often 
focussed on Tutsi women. ‘Tutsi women were always viewed as enemies of the 
state’, said one Tutsi woman. She continued:  
No military man could marry Tutsi women or they would have to leave the military. 
…Tutsi women were considered beautiful which bred hate against them. …It led to 
a hate that I can’t describe…I was told I couldn’t work in certain places because as a 
Tutsi woman I would poison the others.70  
Stereotypes portrayed Tutsi women as arrogant, despising Hutu men and more 
sinister portrayals depicted them as weapons for use by Tutsi men against the Hutu. 
Of the ten ‘Hutu Commandments’ four dealt specifically with Tutsi women. These 
included warning Hutu women to be vigilant against Tutsi women’s wiles used to 
attract Hutu husbands, brothers and sons and warning Hutu men against Tutsi women 
advising that any who married, befriended or employed a Tutsi woman would be 
considered a traitor because the Tutsi ‘will not hesitate to transform their sisters, 
wives and mothers into pistols’ to conquer Rwanda.71 The extremist and virulently 
propagandist newspaper, Kangura, ran articles accusing Tutsi women of taking Hutu 
jobs, of despising Hutu men and of using their sexual prowess to seduce UN 
peacekeepers.72 So, women targeted in the genocide suffered from an interlinked 
culture which operated on multiple levels. Women were targets when they were 
Tutsi.73 Women were targets when they were considered the property of Tutsi men.74 
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Women were targets when they could have Tutsi children, which meant children of 
Tutsi men.75  
This perception and acceptance of the Tutsi as a group and of Tutsi women as a 
particularly hated group was key to directing violence against them and in 
understanding why the term ‘genocide’ was eventually applied to events. Most 
women raped during the attacks and later interviewed by Nowrojee described how 
their rapists mentioned their ethnicity before or during the rape.76 Comments 
included: ‘we want to see how sweet Tutsi women are’; ‘you Tutsi women think you 
are too good for us’; ‘if there were peace you would never accept me’, ‘you Tutsi 
girls are too proud’. All of these remarks indicated a sense that Tutsi women were 
deemed special because they were Tutsi and could be interpreted as setting the stage 
for their degradation.77 Accounts of events show that the use of tactical rape and 
sexual violence was a deliberate strategy used by the Hutu.  
The ICTR, Tactical Rape, Sexual Violence in War and Genocide in Rwanda 
On July 1, 1994 the UNSC established a Commission of Experts to investigate 
reports coming out of Rwanda.78 This Commission began work in August 1994 and 
provided its first report to the UNSC on October 1, 1994.79 This first report referred 
to ‘concerted, planned, systematic and methodical’ massacres ‘motivated out of 
ethnic hatred’.80 It reported media propaganda campaigns inciting hatred and killing 
of Tutsi.81 It referred to events within Rwanda as ‘genocidal massacres’.82 It believed 
there had been breaches of norms of international law, norms prohibiting crimes 
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against humanity and norms prohibiting genocide.83 The second report was submitted 
on 9 December, 1994.84 The introductory summary stated there was overwhelming 
evidence of acts of genocide, crimes against humanity and serious violations of 
international humanitarian law by both sides, but committed by Hutu with intent to 
destroy Tutsi, and referred the matters for investigation by the newly-established 
ICTR.85 It is notable that even so many months after NGOs, humanitarian workers, 
medical workers and refugees were aware of the prevalence of widespread rape there 
was no mention of these in either report.  
The ICTR has been the subject of considerable negative commentary but it did 
eventually rule on rape and genocide and on the implications of media mounting 
campaigns which contributed to the mass hatred of Tutsi women. The Statute of the 
ICTR refers to The International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens 
responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of 
neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘The International Tribunal for Rwanda’). . There was an acceptance 
that genocide was a reasonable conclusion and an expectation it would be 
investigated. Still, there was no mention of tactical rape or sexual violence. 
It was not until the case was being heard against Jean Paul Akayesu, a Rwandan 
citizen who was bourgomestre of Taba commune, Prefecture of Gitarama of Rwanda, 
that charges included rape as genocide.86 But this was almost accidental. There had 
been pressure from a range of groups for formal investigation of rapes because, 
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despite the apathy of formal bodies, the accounts of tactical rape were widespread. 
The original indictments had no mention of rape and it was not until witnesses 
recounted events that the indictments were amended. One observer at the trial of 
Akeyesu said:  
Had it not been for the [witnesses] who linked Akayesu to the Taba rapes, the 
interest in the case shown by the court’s one female judge, pressure from human 
rights and women’s groups and prosecutors skilled at winning over their witnesses 
the former mayor might never have been tried for Taba’s rape crimes.87 
Akayesu had been indicted for genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of 
Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions relating to his role as an authority at 
Taba where numerous atrocities were committed with his knowledge and as 
established under his supervision. But while murder, lines of responsibility and 
incitement were included, there had been no charges relating to rape.  
The ICTR did, finally, rule that genocide had been committed. Having investigated 
events with reference to the Genocide Convention it concluded that, ‘genocide was, 
indeed, committed in Rwanda in 1994 against the Tutsi as a group’.88 The nature of 
the genocide was described as ‘organized and planned’ and was ‘executed essentially 
by civilians including the armed militia and even ordinary citizens, and above all, 
that the majority of the Tutsi victims were non-combatants, including thousands of 
women and children, even foetuses’.89 This ruling had the force of a legal judgement. 
Part of the justification for the ruling was the established reference to planned 
incitement to hatred, even beyond the role played by the media. It was noted that 
Léon Mugesera, a lecturer at the National University of Rwanda, had published two 
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pamphlets accusing the Tutsi of planning genocide of the Hutu. In November 1992 
he had called for the extermination of the Tutsi and the assassination of Hutu 
opposed to the President. He exhorted his listeners to avoid the error of earlier 
massacres during which some Tutsi, particularly children, were spared.90 The intent 
to destroy the group was established, with some clear reference to patriarchal 
attitudes. 
There were some specific witness accounts which supported the allegations that Tutsi 
women were targeted and which also demonstrated the strong belief that children 
belonged to the group of the father: 
Other testimonies heard, especially that of Major-General Dallaire, also show that 
there was an intention to wipe out the Tutsi group in its entirety, since even newborn 
babies were not spared. Even pregnant women, including those of Hutu origin, were 
killed on the grounds that the foetuses in their wombs were fathered by Tutsi men, 
for in a patrilineal society like Rwanda, the child belongs to the father’s group of 
origin.91 
One witness testified regarding the rape of Tutsi women married to Hutu men. She 
described encountering on the road a man and woman who had been killed. She said 
the woman, whom she knew to be a Tutsi married to a Hutu, was ‘not exactly dead’ 
and still in agony.92 She described the Interahamwe forcing a piece of wood into the 
woman’s sexual organs while she was still breathing, before she died. She said, 
however, that she believed that in most cases Tutsi women married to Hutu men 
‘were left alone because it was said that these women deliver Hutu children’.93 She 
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said that there were Hutu men who married Tutsi women to save them, but that these 
women were sought, taken away forcibly and killed.94 
It was in statements from particular witnesses at the ICTR hearing that the court was 
shocked to hear the link made between acts being judged for being genocide and rape 
of Tutsi women.95 On 17 June, 1997, the indictment of Akayesu was amended to 
include allegations of sexual violence and additional charges against the Accused 
under Article 3(g), Article 3(i) and Article 4(2)(e) of the ICTR Statute. The 
prosecution stated that the evidence of witnesses had prompted them ‘to renew their 
investigation of sexual violence in connection with events which took place in Taba 
at the bureau communal’ and that there had not previously been sufficient evidence 
to link Akayesu to acts of sexual violence, acknowledging that factors to explain this 
lack of evidence ‘might include the shame that accompanies acts of sexual violence 
as well as insensitivity in the investigation of sexual violence’.96 The use of ‘might’ 
would seem to be some indicator of an understated reality.  
Later criticisms of the ICTR have constantly noted the insensitivity of investigators 
and, at times of the judges – as noted in Chapter 2 of this dissertation.97 The lack of 
interest was borne out by the fact that even when a witness volunteered the story of 
her six year-old daughter being raped by three men as part of her testimony about 
Akayesu and counts of murder, the prosecutor failed to pursue the point. Three 
judges intervened. One was a woman from South Africa who recalled, ‘I couldn’t 
understand what prosecution was doing’.98 The statement included in the case 
decision sought to answer questions regarding the pressure from NGOs which it 
considered indicative of public opinion and which resulted in an amendment to the 
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original indictment and concluded that ‘the investigation and presentation of 
evidence relating to sexual violence is in the interest of justice’.99 While there were 
concerns regarding the conduct of this case it was a watershed for recognising the 
links between tactical rape and genocide.  
It did achieve a number of important steps forward. One was that it defined rape 
under international law as a crime against humanity, noting that, ‘the Chamber must 
define rape, as there is no commonly accepted definition of this term in international 
law’.100 It defined rape:  
…as a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under 
circumstances which are coercive. Sexual violence, which includes rape, is 
considered to be any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under 
circumstances which are coercive. This act must be committed: a) as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack; (b) on a civilian population; (c) on certain 
catalogued discriminatory grounds, namely: national, ethnic, political, racial, or 
religious grounds.101 
In its concluding rulings the Tribunal added to this definition that sexual violence is 
not limited to physical invasion of the human body and may include acts which do 
not involve penetration or even physical contact.102 The Tribunal went on to note that 
coercive circumstances need not be evidenced by a show of physical force:  
threats, intimidation, extortion and other forms of duress which prey on fear or 
desperation may constitute coercion, and coercion may be inherent in certain 
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circumstances, such as armed conflict or the military presence of Interahamwe 
among refugee Tutsi women at the bureau communal.103 
The statement included recognition that sexual violence fell within the scope of 
‘other inhumane acts’, set forth in Article 3(i) of the Tribunal’s Statute, ‘outrages 
upon personal dignity,’ set forth in Article 4(e) of the Statute, and ‘serious bodily or 
mental harm’, set forth in Article 2(2)(b) of the Statute.104 This was a particularly 
important development in the understanding of rape as it included the notion of 
coercion which can be understood in many forms. Victim testimony, which was 
included in trial proceedings, established the use of tactical rape and sexual violence 
as severe attacks targeting Tutsi women and girls. They are distressing to read 
because of the reality of suffering inherent in them but they established the 
widespread nature and violence of the rapes. It was an achievement that at last there 
was an international court documenting and considering the true extent of damage 
done by tactical rape.  
Witness JJ testified that the Interahamwe took young girls and women from their site 
of refuge near the Bureau Communal into a forest in the area and raped them.105 
Witness JJ testified that this happened to her – that she was stripped of her clothing 
and raped in front of other people. At the request of the Prosecutor and with great 
embarrassment, she explicitly specified that the rapist, a young man armed with an 
axe and a long knife, penetrated her vagina with his penis. She stated that on this 
occasion she was raped twice.106 This account from the trial proceedings highlights 
the trauma experienced by many women when asked to recount sexual attacks. It is 
understandable that many women were reluctant to testify. Elizabeth Neuffer wrote 
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that it was not surprising that Rwandan women would not talk about being raped 
when ‘investigators, mostly white males, roared into villages in their white UN jeeps 
and treated survivors with condescension as if they were stupid rather than 
traumatised’.107 This sort of response indicates the lack of understanding and of 
trained personnel to deal with survivors of tactical rape and sexual violence. 
It was this ‘Witness JJ’ whose testimony had galvanised action to have rape charges 
included in the indictment of Akayesu.108 Her testimony included accounts of 
experiences which had continued after the attacks described above. She testified that 
when they arrived at the Bureau Communal the women were hoping the authorities 
would defend them but she was surprised to the contrary. In her testimony she 
recalled lying in the cultural centre, having been raped repeatedly by Interahamwe, 
and hearing the cries of young girls around her, girls as young as twelve or thirteen 
years old. On the way to the cultural centre the first time she was raped there, 
Witness JJ said that she and the others were taken past the accused who was looking 
at them. The second time she was taken to the cultural centre to be raped, Witness JJ 
recalled seeing the accused standing at the entrance of the cultural centre and hearing 
him say loudly to the Interahamwe, ‘never ask me again what a Tutsi woman tastes 
like’ and ‘tomorrow they will be killed’.109  
It was these statements indicating that Akayesu was focussed on Tutsi women, knew 
they were specific targets and was cooperating in the attacks on them which were 
said to have been keys in his eventual conviction. One of the judges, who was openly 
critical of the trial proceedings, asked the witness, twice, if investigators had asked 
her for the names of the men who had raped her.110 They had not done so. Neuffer 
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wrote that the witness had only mentioned the rapes to the prosecutor the day before 
and he had realised that the refugees at the Bureau Communal were all women ‘and 
that they were part of a plan for their rape’.111 This late awareness was indicative of 
the limited range of examination in preparation for cases and the lack of direct 
questioning of those testifying. Witness JJ had continued and after describing the 
accused and the statement he made regarding the taste of Tutsi women, she said he 
was ‘talking as if someone were encouraging a player’ and suggested that he was the 
one ‘supervising’ the acts of rape.112 She said most of the girls and women were 
subsequently killed, either brought to the river and killed there, or after having 
returned to their houses, or killed at the Bureau Communal and in a further account 
she told of her experience of finding her sister before she died, having been raped 
and cut with a machete.113 After the testimony, investigators went to Taba and, 
finally, investigated the rape attacks. 
The evidence was emerging that Akayesu was complicit in acts which targeted the 
Tutsi. Another witness testified that she had gone to him and asked for an attestation 
to help her keep her children alive.114 She said he replied that it was not he who had 
made them be born Tutsi and that ‘when rats are killed you don’t spare rats that are 
still in the form of fetus’.115 She had been pregnant and miscarried after being beaten 
by police and Interahamwe. Of her nine children, only two survived the events of this 
period.116 Akayesu’s statements regarding the ‘taste’ of Tutsi women and the 
apparent desire to destroy children as well as women were reflected in other 
accounts. A case indicating the intent to destroy even the children was that of a 
particularly savage attack on a woman called Alexia by Interahamwe. They threw her 
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to the ground and climbed on top of her saying ‘now, let’s see what the vagina of a 
Tutsi woman feels like’.117 According to Witness PP, Alexia gave the Interahamwe, 
named Pierre, her Bible before he raped her and told him, ‘take this Bible because 
it’s our memory, because you do not know what you’re doing’.118 Then one person 
held her neck, others took her by the shoulders and others held her thighs apart as 
numerous Interahamwe continued to rape her. According to the testimony, Alexia 
was pregnant. When she became weak she was turned over and lying on her 
stomach, she went into premature delivery during the rapes.119  
The evidence of witnesses constantly emphasised the desire on the part of attackers 
to humiliate as well as physically wound them. Another Tutsi woman, the younger 
sister of JJ, described being raped along with another sister by two men in the 
courtyard of their home, just after it was destroyed by their Hutu neighbours and her 
brother and father had been killed.120 She said one of the men told her that the girls 
had been spared so that they could be raped and when her mother begged the men, 
who were armed with bludgeons and machetes, to kill her daughters rather than rape 
them in front of her, the man replied that the ‘principle was to make them suffer’.121 
The girls were then raped and on examination the witness said that the man who 
raped her penetrated her vagina with his penis, saying he did it in an ‘atrocious’ 
manner, mocking and taunting them. She said her sister was raped by the other man 
at the same time, near her, so that they could each see what was happening to the 
other. Afterwards, she said she begged for death.122 These accounts support the 
contention that the rapes were more than sexual attacks by forces out of control – 
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they were intended to impart lasting humiliation and inflict serious bodily and mental 
harm. 
Building on work at the ICTY, the Akayesu decision also recognised the difficulties 
for rape victims to provide corroborating evidence. It concluded that Rule 96(i) of 
the Rules of the court alone specifically dealt with the issue of corroboration of 
testimony required by the Chamber and ruled that the provisions of this Rule, which 
applied only to cases of testimony by victims of sexual assault, stipulated that no 
corroboration shall be required. The ICTR quoted the ICTY ruling in the Tadic 
judgment and determined that this ‘sub-rule accords to the testimony of a victim of 
sexual assault the same presumption of reliability as the testimony of victims of other 
crimes, something which had long been denied to victims of sexual assault in 
common law [which] certainly does not [...] justify any inference that in cases of 
crimes other than sexual assault, corroboration is required. The proper inference is, in 
fact, directly to the contrary’.123 This was an important step in facilitating justice for 
women victims of tactical rape and in reinforcing the decision made by the ICTY 
which strengthened the force of such approaches. While corroboration of crimes may 
be required in some cases, it is unreasonable in many instances to require such 
corroboration from victims of tactical rape and sexual violence.  
The final rulings in this case established case law which provides support for a 
developing norm and understanding of tactical rape. While Akayesu was not found to 
have committed rapes himself, the ICTR found beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
accused had reason to know and in fact knew that sexual violence was taking place 
on or near the premises of the bureau communal, and that women were being taken 
away from the bureau communal and sexually violated. There was no evidence that 
the accused took any measures to prevent acts of sexual violence or to punish the 
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perpetrators of sexual violence.124 He was found guilty of having ‘specifically 
ordered, instigated, aided and abetted … acts of sexual violence’.125 It was ruled he 
did this: 
by allowing them to take place on or near the premises of the bureau communal and 
by facilitating the commission of such sexual violence through his words of 
encouragement in other acts of sexual violence which, by virtue of his authority, sent 
a clear signal of official tolerance for sexual violence, without which these acts 
would not have taken place.126  
This ruling, as in similar ones by the ICTY, established responsibility by virtue of 
authority which could have prevented or stopped tactical rape.  
However, the step which made specific progress in establishing that tactical rape and 
sexual violence could be used as genocide came when the court ruled: 
with regard, particularly, to the acts described in paragraphs 12(A) and 12(B) of the 
Indictment, that is, rape and sexual violence, the Chamber wishes to underscore the 
fact that in its opinion, they constitute genocide in the same way as any other act as 
long as they were committed with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
particular group, targeted as such. Indeed, rape and sexual violence certainly 
constitute infliction of serious bodily and mental harm on the victims [FN181] and 
are even, according to the Chamber, one of the worst ways to inflict harm on the 
victim as he or she suffers both bodily and mental harm.127  
Even with the many reservations about the operation of the ICTR, this was a 
watershed case for victims of tactical rape and sexual violence. It clearly linked these 
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attacks with genocide, an act condemned by the international community and the 
naming of which should bring responsibility for states to act to protect victims. The 
ruling stated explicitly that these rapes: 
resulted in physical and psychological destruction of Tutsi women, their families and 
their communities. Sexual violence was an integral part of the process of destruction, 
specifically targeting Tutsi women and specifically contributing to their destruction 
and to the destruction of the Tutsi group as a whole.128 
It stated that sexual violence was a step in the process of destruction of the Tutsi 
group – destruction of the spirit, of the will to live, and of life itself.129 This is a 
ruling which can be used by many other victims of tactical rape and greatly expanded 
the legal basis for action and for international rejection of rape being used as a means 
of genocide.  
The ruling applied to the suffering of Tutsi women finally recognised in an 
international tribunal the impact of tactical rape and sexual violence when it formally 
acknowledged that: 
the acts of rape and sexual violence, as other acts of serious bodily and mental harm 
committed against the Tutsi, reflected the determination to make Tutsi women suffer 
and to mutilate them even before killing them, the intent being to destroy the Tutsi 
group while inflicting acute suffering on its members in the process.130 
Certainly, this was an important step in developing case law and bases for 
international rejection of tactical rape. The case may have been flawed in its process 
and in the way it demonstrated a lack of commitment to bringing to account those 
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who perpetrate tactical rape and sexual violence, but it did result in progress towards 
full comprehension of such crimes.  
Limited Progress Despite Recognition of Tactical Rape, Sexual Violence in War and 
Genocide in Rwanda 
Despite the progress made by establishing a legal case for rape and sexual violence 
as elements of genocide there remained much to do before there was truly any 
commitment to the developing norm rejecting tactical rape. Given the late inclusion 
of charges relating to rape and sexual violence, the ruling in the Akayesu case could 
be deemed to have been more a matter of luck than of any real commitment to 
bringing justice to victims. There have been no additional rulings specifically linking 
tactical rape and sexual violence with genocide. There have been few rulings from 
the ICTR on rape at all. By the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, the ICTR 
had handed down 21 sentences with 18 convictions and 3 acquittals and only ten 
percent of those contained any rape convictions, with no rape charges even brought 
in 70 percent of those adjudicated cases.131 This was despite widespread recognition 
of the extent and nature of tactical rape and sexual violence in the genocide.  
There continues to be resounding criticism of the style of investigations into rape 
cases where they do take place. Binaifer Nowrojee has written of a lack of provision 
of optimal care for those testifying, of a lack of information and follow-up for 
women who do testify and inadequate attempts to provide witnesses with anonymity 
and care, so they often return home to threats and reprisals.132 There is a stated sense 
that ‘as groundbreaking as the Akayesu judgement is, it increasingly stands as an 
exception, an anomaly’.133 Rwandan women who are rape survivors have expressed, 
‘almost without exception’ their sense that the ICTR has failed them as far as the law 
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is concerned because they want the legal record to show ‘the horrific sexual 
violence’ they experienced.134 The ICTR has failed them as far as justice is concerned 
because they want respect and care in legal processes, they want to be kept informed 
and they want protection from ‘reprisal, exposure and stigma’.135  
The Cyangugu case was a cause of considerable controversy and outrage on the part 
of women’s groups and trial attorneys.136 Samuel Imanishimwe (former military 
garrison commander), Emmanuel Bagambiki (former prefect) and André Ntagerura 
(former Minister of Transportation) were all three accused of genocide, complicity in 
genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, crimes against humanity 
and violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, for crimes 
committed in the Cyangugu region. None of them was accused of committing or 
inciting to commit crimes of sexual violence. The trial began on 18 September, 2000. 
Ntagerura and Bagambiki were acquitted. Women’s groups were outraged that they 
had not been permitted to have additional evidence which linked the two to sexual 
violence and rape admitted into proceedings. A trial attorney was quoted, ‘we had 
collected strong evidence. The women of Cyangugu were begging us to tell their 
story’.137 The evidence concerned particularly the convicted man, Imanishimwe, who 
had raped women himself and ‘had killed a woman by inserting a pistol into her 
vagina and shooting her to death’.138 It is quoted as a case where rape charges could 
have been brought but never were ‘even though the prosecutor had evidence’.139 
Unlike the Akayesu case, the prosecutor was not prepared to amend the initial 
charges to include rape. This is indicative of processes where investigations are not 
implemented with an awareness of a need for appropriately considering whether or 
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not rape has occurred – and given the widespread use of rape this would seem to be a 
reasonable possibility. 
The other reservations regarding progress building on the Akayesu case come from 
reservations about the Genocide Convention itself. The Genocide Convention, while 
widely ratified and established as setting a norm for international respect, still has 
critics: some are pragmatic about enforceability or lack of enforceability and others 
critical of the extent of behaviour covered by the text. George Andreopolous raised 
the issues around prosecution referring to Fein’s observation that the most 
fundamental problem with the Convention is ‘its unenforceability, as the perpetrator 
of the genocide, the state, is responsible for its prosecution’.140 This issue of state 
sovereignty is at the heart of dealing with genocide. States are wary of applying the 
title ‘genocide’ to events. Naming genocide brings with it responsibilities which 
many states are often reluctant to take. It was months before the UNSC reacted with 
investigations into events in Rwanda. It was months after events that UN reports 
even recognised that widespread rape had occurred.  
Another critic is Peter Stoett who outlined difficulties in enforcing prosecution given 
the scale of genocidal acts and questioned whether the United Nations could ever 
play an effective and impartial role.141 If there are difficulties in prosecuting 
genocidal killings, then there will be even more reticence and enumerated obstacles 
to prosecuting genocidal rape because of traditional and prevailing dismissals of 
sexual crimes which has been practice for so long. Samantha Power highlighted the 
US responses to genocide and these certainly provide grounds for fearing that there 
are many ways of states avoiding responsibilities, even when there is little doubt of 
those responsibilities under international law and the Genocide Convention in 
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particular. She wrote that despite graphic media coverage, US policy-makers, 
journalists and citizens, ‘assume rational actors will not inflict gratuitous violence’.142 
She believed that they, ‘trust in good-faith negotiations and traditional diplomacy’ 
and then, once killings start, they ‘assume civilians who keep their heads down will 
be left alone’, at which point, ‘they urge ceasefires and donate humanitarian aid’.143 
One clear strategy to avoid the recognition of any state’s responsibility to intervene 
in events is avoidance of naming those events, ‘genocide’. As Power opined, the 
state, will, ‘render the blood-shed two-sided and inevitable, not genocidal’ and by 
avoiding use of the word, genocide, the state can, ‘in good conscience, favor 
stopping genocide in the abstract, while, simultaneously, opposing American 
involvement in the moment’.144 Sadly, such perceptions would seem all too credible 
and strengthen the views of those writers who claim the Convention is 
unenforceable.  
Richard Falk noted that the international community had shown little real capacity to 
‘address the supreme moral challenge of genocidal behaviour’.145 He referred to a 
directive within the Clinton Administration instructing officials to avoid calling 
events in Rwanda genocide ‘because that would arouse public pressures to take some 
action’.146 He listed numerous reasons and complicating causes of why the 
prevention of genocide is not a simple matter: ‘the passion of ethnic politics’ having 
been unleashed and resistance to intervention, with memories of colonisation being 
invoked.147 But, overall he saw a lack of real commitment by governments to 
intervene as the primary cause of non-action. His solutions lay in preventive modes, 
which included education and the inclusion of tolerance as an integral element in the 
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teaching of democratic theory and practice, stating clearly his belief that ‘reactive 
modes of response to genocide are likely to be ineffectual’ and even reactive 
responses to genocide are unlikely unless, ‘it provokes a major response that reflects 
security priorities of strong neighbouring states …or regional or global actors’.148 
This link to security is a thread which will be considered in more detail in later 
chapters of this dissertation, but the limitations on real progress by having tactical 
rape recognised as genocide are clear. 
Lisa Sharlach, however, said that crimes of genocide under international law ‘are a 
more grave matter than widespread crimes against women on the basis of sex’.149 Her 
concern was with the Convention text and content. She argued that the current 
Genocide Convention does not explicitly state that sexual violence is a crime of 
genocide and it should be expanded to include mass rape, regardless of whether the 
victims are raped on the basis of racial/ethnic, national or religious identity. In an 
ideal world this may be the next step in the development of effective security for 
women – it would likely strengthen the legal grounds for rejecting tactical rape. 
Meantime, pragmatists have little option but to use the current terms and 
jurisprudence from the ICTR to at least increase the pressure on states to intervene 
when women are being raped collectively. Sharlach also said, ‘the seeming 
disinterest around the globe in prosecution of rape as genocide may mean that in 
future ethnic conflicts men believe that they have license to rape’.150 This might mean 
that it could be counter-productive for tactical rape to be deemed genocidal – and yet 
still fail to bring perpetrators to account. It emphasises the need, while work 
continues to strengthen the wording of international law and new legal precedents are 
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being set, to pressure states to intervene when other states are culpable in not 
providing security for its women.  
If, as Power intimated, there is a general reluctance to respond to genocide, then it is 
possible that this reluctance could be increased if there were any doubt regarding 
definitions of genocide, in particular when it meant recognising tactical rape and 
sexual violence as genocide. It is acknowledged that this could mean that calling for 
action by states on the grounds that tactical rape and sexual violence are weapons of 
perpetrating genocide, may well be counter-productive. It is acknowledged that it is 
possible that states could prevaricate around definitions. However, this thesis argues 
that it is only by really understanding all the implications and potential use of tactical 
rape that progress towards appropriate state engagement in prevention, protection 
and accountability will be achieved. The Convention remains the best hope for 
dealing with genocide and with tactical rape and sexual violence as methods of 
perpetrating genocide.  
Conclusion 
In the conflict in Rwanda civilians were targeted. It was a conflict which was judged 
to be a genocide. It demonstrated how social attitudes such as patriarchy and 
constructed hatreds made the use of tactical rape and sexual violence chillingly 
effective as part of genocide. The judgements of the ICTR did enable progress in the 
comprehension of tactical rape and sexual violence as contraventions of international 
law. It is a judiciary whose processes have provided little justice for many women 
survivors and whose processes have reflected many prevailing attitudes to tactical 
rape and sexual violence. It has been a far from perfect judiciary, but it has made 
some valuable contributions to international legal precedence. With all its defects the 
ICTR did go a long way to demonstrate and provide judicial support for bringing to 
account those who use tactical rape to perpetrate a genocide. Ensuring political will 
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to do so is, of course, another matter. In the next chapters there will be analysis of 
how the UN Security Council and the international community reacted to the work of 
the ICTR and the ICTY and how recognition that the impact of tactical rape and 
sexual violence can go beyond the borders of any single state and threaten 
international stability developed.  
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Chapter 5 
 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325  
For all their limitations, the two ad hoc international criminal tribunals (ICTY and 
ICTR) contributed considerable case law which clarified and established legal bases 
for rejecting tactical rape. Notably, the international community, particularly the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), began to evince interest in tactical rape 
from the early 1990s in ways which had not been demonstrated earlier. The key 
question to be answered in this dissertation is: to what extent has there been an 
increasing commitment by the international community to reject tactical rape since 
the early 1990s? The primary focus is at the international level where, it is argued, 
there has been considerable and, in some ways, rapid development since the 1990s. 
The establishment of the two criminal tribunals exemplified at least to some degree 
that tactical rape was an issue – and an issue which needed international legal 
attention. The question then to be considered in this and the next chapter is: what 
degree of commitment to rejecting tactical rape is reflected in United Nations 
Security Council resolutions since the early 1990s? The development of policy and 
practice regarding sexual violence in war at the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
will form part of the answer to this question and will be considered in chapter 6. 
This chapter will first consider briefly the context of changing attitudes towards 
humanitarianism in which the international community in the UNSC began a long 
overdue consideration of tactical rape. Secondly this chapter will look at 
developments leading to UNSCR 13251. The third chapter will analyse UNSCR 
1325, passed in 2000. which was a ground-breaking resolution in many ways. This 
resolution warrants close scrutiny because it was hailed as reflecting a systematic and 
broad-ranging approach to dealing with women’s vulnerability in conflict situations. 
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It recognised that if women are vulnerable and suffer discrimination and denial of 
rights during peacetime, they will be even more vulnerable during conflict. It 
signalled the move from outrage at tactical rape to a broader rejection of sexual 
violence in war. It also signalled the beginning of a serious debate as to whether the 
use of sexual violence in war (including tactical rape) was a concern for the UNSC 
and it was the foundation of the ongoing debate which led to UNSC 
acknowledgement that confronting these violations was a responsibility of that 
international body. This acknowledgement of responsibility was more fully 
expressed in the later resolutions which will be the focus of the next chapter, but 
UNSCR 1325 was an important step in the development of an international norm 
rejecting tactical rape. For all its problems especially regarding implementation and 
the lack of accountability measures inherent in UNSCR 1325, the issue at its core is 
now clearly on the UNSC agenda: ‘Women, peace and security has emerged as an 
issue that can no longer be overlooked either by the United Nations or its member 
states. Accordingly, it is regarded as a new norm in the making’.2 Finally, the chapter 
will provide a brief analysis of various National Action Plans which have been 
formulated and adopted as the extension into national level of states’ commitments to 
this particular resolution. This analysis will indicate the degree of action and 
response which followed UNSCR 1325 because this provides an indicator of national 
application of international discourse with respect to tactical rape and sexual violence 
in war.  
Changing Attitudes in the 1990s  
The 1990s saw an era of changing attitudes to humanitarianism and this contributed 
to international response to tactical rape as well as to other forms of human suffering 
and need. Torunn L. Tryggstad noted several key factors about change by the end of 
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the 1990s in ‘how the security concept and legitimate intervention in intra-state 
might be defined’.3 She noted the debate about the need to broaden the security 
concept to human security; the ways in which the nature of conflict had shifted to 
intra-state conflicts; to the way civilian populations were increasingly seen as the 
targets and means of attack, with ‘an exponential growth in the use of sexualised 
violence as a weapon of war’.4 Michael Barnett and Thomas Weiss focussed on 
questions raised for and from humanitarian agencies about the nature, motivations 
and effects of humanitarianism.5 They noted that agencies were engaged in identity-
defining questions regarding what humanitarianism aspired to accomplish and 
concluded that the answer must include establishing the rule of law and respect for 
human rights.6 The impact of public media in raising awareness and consequent 
demands that action be taken in the face of ‘conscience-shocking suffering’ 
contributed to states recognising the need for action.7 The motivation of states is not 
always disinterested. They are influenced by their own interests and their concerns 
regarding security which will be further discussed in Chapter 7. However, as Barnett 
and Weiss pointed out, international laws, norms and principles are also important 
and pressure to respect these was reinforced by real-time media coverage and graphic 
images of suffering of people as individuals and not just disembodied numbers. The 
1990s was a decade of dramatic communications showing situations which outraged 
and mobilised calls for action. Barnett and Weiss commented that the crises of the 
turbulent 1990s helped catalyse new movements that were intent on protecting and 
rescuing those in danger.8 As journalists, NGOs and humanitarian agencies reported 
and detailed atrocities in conflicts such as those in Rwanda and the former 
Yugoslavia, there was mounting public condemnation and consequent unwillingness 
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to settle for expressions of dismay without any accompanying action by states or the 
UN.  
The member states of the UN were aware of calls to respond. In the late 1980s and 
into the 1990s there was a realisation that pressure for change could come from 
publics which rejected bureaucratic or governmental apathy. Humanitarian crises 
became personalised and humanised, with faces attached to statistics and analysis. 
By late 1988, telling the stories of individuals and highlighting the human tragedies 
of victims of conflicts became a strategy of investigators such as this writer working 
for humanitarian agencies, who presented stories of individuals in conflict situations 
and humanitarian need to UN agencies, international NGOs and peak aid agencies. 
Telling such stories highlighted the impact of tactical rape and resulted in pressure on 
states to respond to known incidences of mass suffering and to the flouting of 
accepted norms regulating behaviour of states and within states. The pressure 
reached to the United Nations as links were made between rape and international 
law. In 1993, ECOSOC expressed outrage at rape being used as a weapon of war.9 In 
1994 the UN General Assembly expressed alarm at ‘the continuing use of rape as a 
weapon of war’.10 Both these resolutions recognised rape as an instrument of ethnic 
cleansing and noted that the abhorrent policy of ethnic cleansing can be a form of 
genocide.  
This was a time when the distinction between ethnic cleansing, the term used to refer 
to events and practices in the former Yugoslavia, and genocide was not always fully 
clarified. In 1995, the General Assembly reaffirmed ‘that rape in the conduct of 
armed conflict constitutes a war crime and that under certain circumstances it 
                                                                
9 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Rape and abuse of women in the areas of armed 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia, Commission on Human Rights resolution 1993/8.  
10 United Nations General Assembly, Rape and abuse of women in the areas of armed conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia’ General Assembly resolution 1994/205. 
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constitutes a crime against humanity and an act of genocide’.11 It called upon states 
to ‘take all measures for the protection of women and children from such acts and to 
strengthen mechanisms to investigate and punish’ those responsible.12 With media 
and NGO attention to the widespread use of tactical rape in Rwanda and in the 
former Yugoslavia and the engagement of bodies such as ECOSOC and the General 
Assembly as well as reports coming from the Special Rapporteurs regarding tactical 
rape such as those considered in previous chapters of this dissertation, pressure was 
mounting for international engagement and eventually the UNSC responded. 
Towards UNSCR 1325 
The awareness of events in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda meant that the 1990s 
were a time of increased recognition of tactical rape and the need to prevent this form 
of abuse, to protect women in conflict situations, to prosecute perpetrators and to 
ensure that acceptable normative expectations of states precluded what was 
increasingly recognised as a particular war crime and crime against humanity. 
LaShawn Jefferson wrote that it was necessary to understand the backdrop against 
which such gender-based violence occurs, because it is ‘a continuation – and a 
significant worsening – of the various discriminatory and violent ways that women 
are treated in times of peace’.13 Jefferson identified what she called several critical 
factors which make sexual violence in conflict resistant to eradication: women’s 
‘subordinate and unequal status in peacetime renders them predictably at risk’ in 
wartime; ‘increasing international exposure and public outrage’ have failed to result 
in any serious accountability; inadequate post-conflict attention to the needs of 
sexual violence survivors ‘reflects official disregard’ and suggests a ‘lack of 
                                                                
11 United Nations General Assembly, Committee 3, Rape and Abuse of Women in the Areas of Armed 
Conflict in the former Yugoslavia, 99th plenary meeting, 22 December 1995. 
12 United Nations General Assembly, Committee 3, Rape and Abuse of Women in the Areas of Armed 
Conflict in the former Yugoslavia, 99th plenary meeting, 22 December 1995. 
13 LR Jefferson, In War as in Peace: Sexual Violence and Women’s Status, January 2004, Human 
Rights Watch, p. 3.  
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commitment to facilitating survivors’ reintegration’ to their communities.14 This 
understanding of the complexity of causes and therefore potential strategies to 
prevent, mitigate, prosecute perpetrators and respond to survivors’ needs set the 
scene for UNSCR 1325.  
Jefferson highlighted areas such as ‘both law and practice’ where women are 
subordinate and lack the rights of male counterparts.15 She noted, too, the social 
attitudes frequently exhibited even by the judiciary which blame victims of rape and 
judge according to previous sexual experience, so that virgins are considered more 
favourably than other women and the reality that in some cultures a failure to achieve 
a conviction can mean additional suffering, discrimination and even imprisonment 
for the woman making the charges. Jefferson wrote, ‘many men are accustomed to 
enforcing gender norms and stereotypes through physical violence’.16 She argued, 
‘such violence is often culturally, sometimes, legally sanctioned’.17 Changing the 
legal status and achieving legal rights for women can be steps towards changing the 
degree of protection that women are afforded by some communities.  
Patriarchy and a sense of male ‘ownership’ of women contributes to women’s 
vulnerability in that during conflict women can be viewed as rewards or as a source 
of labour by combatants. The many cases considered earlier from Rwanda of forced 
‘marriages’ can be the outcome when such views are held. It is this same patriarchal 
attitude which renders women so vulnerable to attack when male combatants set out 
to find ways to attack each other. As Jefferson said, ‘the patterns of social dominance 
and deeply engrained gender-specific roles get violently expressed in wartime’.18 It is 
reasonable, therefore, to see changes in attitudes, social relationships and women’s 
                                                                
14 Jefferson, p. 1. 
15 Jefferson, p. 2. 
16 Jefferson, p. 3. 
17 Jefferson, p. 3. 
18 Jefferson, p. 6. 
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access to rights as strategies to prevent or at least minimise tactical rape and sexual 
violence in war.  
Part of this realisation of the relevance of women’s situations pre-conflict and post-
conflict as well as during conflict began to gather momentum during the 1990s. 
Jefferson spoke of training combatants as one essential step.19 Education regarding 
rights, international human rights law and International Humanitarian Law may 
contribute to lessening vulnerability of women in conflict. Bringing perpetrators to 
account, monitoring behaviour of combatants, documenting violations of national 
and international law – all these can alter attitudes and behaviours. In Kosovar 
refugee camps in 1999, when it was noted that women were more ready to talk about 
their experiences of rape than the women of Bosnia had been only a few years 
earlier, a young lawyer taking depositions said that he believed it was because the 
Kosovars had heard that the Bosnian women were being taken seriously and were 
less afraid of being ignored or suffering discrimination.20 Sadly, for many of these 
brave women, their faith was misplaced, but for some it was vindicated as 
perpetrators were charged and the international community generally was brought to 
a better understanding of what was their reality.  
There was, also, at least some effort by humanitarian agencies to recognise the needs 
of survivors of tactical rape in the post-conflict stages and recognition that the 
reintegration of these survivors would require economic self-sufficiency and support 
in recovery from physical and psychological trauma. Many humanitarian agencies 
including major ones such as those connected to the World Council of Churches, 
World Vision, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent all had at least some 
programmes which focussed on the needs of women victims in the conflicts in both 
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. But, these were often narrowly focussed and it 
                                                                
19 Jefferson, p. 6. 
20 Fitzpatrick, Kosovo, pp.14-15. 
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was not until UNSCR 1325 that there was a more holistic approach to dealing with 
tactical rape.  
Laura Shepherd provided an analysis of the lead-up to UNSCR 1325 in the UN and 
the role played by women’s advocacy groups.21 From NGOs there was mounting 
pressure for action and the UN had taken a series of steps towards recognition of 
women’s issues. These had their beginnings as far back as 1975 in the UN 
International Year of Women, and continued in the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, in the Declaration on the Elimination 
of Violence Against Women and ‘the ever strengthening linkages between feminist 
theorists/activists and the UN system’.22 Each of these steps at the international level 
moved forward the understanding of women’s realities and needs. At the Vienna 
Conference on Human Rights in 1993, women’s advocates and activists began to call 
for the recognition of women’s rights as human rights. They were critical of 
traditional human rights frameworks for tending to exclude the experiences of 
women and to fail to recognise the realities of women’s experiences and lives in war 
and in peace. There were also the UN World Conferences on Women including the 
1995 Beijing Conference which produced an influential Beijing Platform of Action 
(BPFA). Shepherd refers to descriptions of the document, noting that the BPFA set 
comprehensive benchmarks and a vision for improving women’s lives and that it was 
at Beijing, with 188 states as signatories to the Platform for Action, that the impact of 
armed conflict on women was noted as a specific emerging issue requiring 
                                                                
21 L Shepherd, ‘Power and Authority in the Production of United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1325’, International Studies Quarterly 2008, 52, pp. 383-404. 
22 Shepherd, p. 387. 
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attention.23 Some feminist analysts have commented that these World Conferences 
‘played a crucial role – one that would pave the way for UNSC 1325’.24 
The key group of NGOs involved in preparing the way for UNSCR 1325 was 
represented by the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security (NGO-
WG). This group lobbied members of the UNSC and applied pressure for action on 
behalf of women in conflict and is largely credited with major contribution to 
achieving UNSCR 1325. Shepherd noted that it was this Working Group, ‘through 
its continued political presence’, which was, ‘able to transform decades of theorising 
and activism into concrete achievements in the issue area of women, peace and 
security’.25 The linking of women, peace and security was a foundational step 
towards understanding the interaction between tactical rape and security – an 
understanding which would be developed further in the next decade and will be 
considered in the next chapter of this dissertation. During the 1990s interaction 
between the UN and NGOs had increased, with UN agencies seeking advice and 
information and entering into a range of joint activities.26  
Concurrent with this NGO action, the UN itself was taking steps towards 
acknowledging it had a role to play in dealing with tactical rape. Importantly, it was 
in this process towards passing UNSCR 1325 that the UNSC began to consider new 
concepts of security – a change in attitude which would eventually lead to even 
stronger focus on tactical rape in the next decade. The UNSC Presidential Statement 
of February 1999 had condemned the fact that there was an increasing toll of civilian 
casualties in conflicts, that women were the majority of those increased casualties 
                                                                
23 Shepherd, p. 387. 
24 C Binder, K Lukas & R Schweiger, (2008) ‘Empty Words or Real Achievement? The Impact of 
Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women in Armed Conflicts’, Radical History Review, vol. 101 
pp 22-41. 
25 Shepherd, p. 391. 
26 Shepherd, p. 392. 
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and that increasingly women were the targets of combatants and armed elements. 
The statement made reference to the need for a ‘comprehensive and coordinated 
approach by Member States and international organisations’ to address the problem 
of protecting civilians in situations of conflict.27 The Secretary General had been 
requested to submit a detailed report and consequently presented his Report to the 
Security Council on Protection of Civilians. This report was presented in September 
1999 and began with acknowledging the Geneva Conventions and ‘legal norms from 
which there can be no derogation’.28 It reiterated that civilians were 
disproportionately represented among the victims of armed conflict – with women 
and children disproportionately represented in those civilian numbers and 
deliberately targeted and subjected to gender- based violence including rape. There 
was reference to both the ICTR and ICTY as demonstrating UNSC concern for these 
issues. The Secretary General called for action by states to ratify and respect existing 
legal instruments, called for special protection of women and children and asked 
Member States to be prepared to take action against those guilty of widespread 
violations.29 
Two UNSC resolutions, 1265 (1999) and 1296 (2000), addressed the protection of 
civilians in armed conflict and ‘functioned to suggest that the UN Security Council 
recognises the protection of civilians as an issue that falls under its remit’.30 This was 
an important step towards accepting responsibility for confronting tactical rape. 
Although it was not until later (considered in the next chapter of this dissertation) 
that all members of the UNSC finally accepted that tactical rape and sexual violence 
in war were a direct concern of the UNSC, this acknowledgement of responsibility 
for protecting civilians created a context for a resolution such as UNSCR 1325 which 
                                                                
27 UN Document S/PRST/1999/6. 
28 UN Document S/1999/957. 
29 UN Document S/1999/957. 
30 Shepherd, p. 393. 
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focussed on the protection of a section of that civilian group – the women and girls. 
In March 2000, the UNSC issued a statement in which, members of the Security 
Council recognised ‘that peace is inextricably linked with equality between men and 
women’, and which referenced ‘violence against women’ and identified obligations 
of the ‘international community’ to ‘refrain from human rights abuses in conflict 
situations’ and called for those responsible to be prosecuted.31  
With obligations of the member states of the UNSC recognised, it remained to 
formulate a strategic approach to meeting those obligations. In June 2000, Mary 
Robinson, High Commissioner for Human Rights, presented a report on Systematic 
Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices during Armed Conflict.32 This set 
the scene for the international approach to confronting tactical rape. Robinson wrote 
of rape and sexual violence being used as a weapon of war and said that in order to 
end the cycle of violence, action was needed on a broad range of fronts. She wrote: 
Without the full equality and participation of women, the empowerment of women, 
the emancipation of women’s image, allowing women to develop confidence and 
respect for themselves, and enabling them to realise their full potential and 
acknowledging the full value of the contribution they make to the well-being, 
security and progress of society, any measure taken to prevent the systematic rape of 
women during armed conflicts, in fact any form of gender-based violence, will fail.33 
This was a recognition of the complexity of the issues around tactical rape and 
indicated that any strategic approach aiming at preventing tactical rape would need to 
encompass steps to reduce women’s vulnerability in peace as well as in conflict and 
would need to recognise women both as potential victims and as capable of positive 
                                                                
31 UNSC 2000b, Peace Inextricably Linked with Equality Between Men and Women Says Security 
Council in International Women’s Day Statement, Press Release SC/6816. 
32 UN Document E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/20 (Mary Robinson). 
33 UN Document E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/20, para. 8. 
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contributors to situations of improved peace and security. It was a statement which 
was to be reflected in the overall direction of UNSC 1325. 
In the open debate prior to passing UNSCR 1325, many UNSC representatives made 
the links between tactical rape and the need for involvement of women in 
peacekeeping.34 The starting point was the awareness of the impact of conflict on 
women. The Netherlands’ representative called for actions to prevent gender- based 
violence, to support prosecution of those responsible, to increase awareness that rape, 
sexual slavery, enforced prostitution and pregnancy and sterilisation were war crimes 
when committed in conflict situations and could be crimes against humanity under 
certain circumstances. He demanded an end to impunity for offenders.35 As the open 
debate concluded, many member states’ representatives called for women to be more 
included in high-level positions in both peacemaking and peacekeeping and for 
gender training for peacekeeping forces, decision-makers and negotiators. The 
connection was made between general inequality, poverty and women’s vulnerability 
to sexual attack and rape in conflict situations.36  
Finally, on 31 October, 2000, a milestone was reached in states’ recognition of the 
need to respond to violence against women in war and conflict situations. UNSCR 
1325 was passed unanimously and welcomed as an important advance for women in 
conflict situations.37 The resolution in itself was certainly progressive and was hailed 
as ‘a vital and innovative political framework’ for dealing with issues, such as 
tactical rape, in the pre-conflict and post-conflict phases as well as during conflict.38 
Agencies such as Human Rights Watch were among those who recognised the 
advance represented by UNSC 1325 stating that: 
                                                                
34 UN Document Press Release SC/6937 24/10/2000. 
35 UN Document PressRrelease SC/6937 24/10/2000. 
36 UNSC Press Release Document SC/6939 25/10/2000.  
37 UNSCR1325 on Women, Peace and Security, 31 October 2000, Resolution (S/RES/1325). 
38 Shepherd, p. 383.  
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the resolution is historic not only in that it constituted the first time the Council 
systematically addressed the manner in which conflict affects women and girls 
differently from men and boys, but also because it acknowledges the crucial link 
between peace, women’s participation in decision-making, and the recognition of 
women’s life experiences throughout the conflict cycle.39  
It was, indeed, in its systematic and comprehensive approach that UNSCR 1325 
demonstrated a commitment to broad-ranging strategies to confront tactical rape and 
sexual violence in war. It went beyond condemnation and rhetorical outrage to real 
actions in a way that had not been demonstrated in previous international resolutions 
of the Security Council. Writing in 2009, Aisling Swaine commented that UNSCR 
1325 had ‘moved international discourse and debate on women’s role in international 
security forward in the last decade in that it has redefined the position of women in 
the context of security’.40 It was an important step in progress towards recognising 
and responding to tactical rape and sexual violence by recognising the link between 
women’s vulnerability in peace time and vulnerability in war.  
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) 
Because UNSCR 1325 was such a major development in states’ commitment to 
dealing with tactical rape, it deserves close consideration. The resolution was 
recognised as an important step in confronting gender-specific aspects of women in 
war and: 
the first Security Council resolution to focus specifically on women’s experience of 
armed conflict. SC Res. 1325 aims to empower women at all levels of decision 
making in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peace building, in addition to 
                                                                
39 Human Rights Watch, retrieved 14 May 2008, <www.hrw.org>. 
40 A Swaine, ‘Assessing the Potential of national Action Plans to Advance Implementation of United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1325’, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, vol. 12, 
2009, pp. 405. 
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reducing gender-based violence. Rather than marginalizing women’s experiences, it 
appears to bring gender specific concerns within mainstream peace and security 
policy considerations.41  
While there is a perceived intent to mainstream gender specific concerns, it is notable 
that such mainstreaming is only directly mentioned in relation to peacekeeping 
missions.42 The resolution acknowledged that a broad ranging approach would be 
required to confront sexual violence in war. It included the customary preamble and 
then operative paragraphs. Each section demonstrated the development of attitudes 
and strategic approaches. It is worth noting that the resolution opened with 
‘recalling’ numerous other resolutions: UNSCR 1261 (1999); UNSCR 1265 (1999); 
UNSCR 1296 (2000); UNSCR 1314 (2000). It clearly built on UNSCR 1296 which 
condemned all violence against civilians, particularly women, children and other 
vulnerable groups43. It also ‘recalled’ commitments of the Beijing Declaration and 
Platform for Action (A/52/231) and the outcome document of the 23rd Special 
Session of the UN General Assembly, ‘Women 2000: gender, equality, development 
and peace’ (A/S-23/10/Rev.1). In the body of the resolution it also ‘recalls’ UNSCR 
1208 (1998). This is an indication of how incrementally progress is made on an issue 
such as women’s security, with many apparently small steps towards recognition of 
the gravity of an issue and consequent decisions to take some action. 
The preamble of the resolution expressed concern that women and children are the 
majority of those ‘adversely affected’ in conflicts and recognised that they are the 
targets of combatants and armed elements.44 The text of the preamble included a 
                                                                
41 A Barrow, ‘United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820: constructing gender in 
armed conflict and international humanitarian law’, International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 92 no. 
877, March 2010, p. 229. 
42 Barrow referring to clause 5, p. 229. 
43 UNSCR 1296 Doc. S/RES/1296 (2000). 
44 S/RES/1325/2000 para. 4. 
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number of specific references to established principles or agreements. These included 
references to the targeting of women and children, the role women could play in 
peace and security, the relevance of existing human rights and international 
humanitarian law and the need to mainstream gender perspectives across a wide 
range of related peacekeeping operations. It is important to note these references as 
part of understanding the development which UNSC represented.45 Rather than 
assuming a by-product of conflict is that women and children are accidentally likely 
to be caught in the crossfire, there is recognition that civilians are increasingly being 
specifically targeted by armed groups. It is recognised that this is a route to 
escalation of violence and has long-term effects on possibilities for peace. This was – 
and remains – a vital recognition about the nature of conflicts and the deliberate 
targeting of women and children among civilian populations. It recognised that new 
wars are not fought solely between armies or militias. Armed elements deliberately 
target civilians – contrary to established international law.  
This language of referring to women and children as one entity has, however, raised 
concerns among some feminist analysts. Nadine Puechguirbal offered a review of 
many of these concerns.46 She concluded that the linking of women with children 
resulted in – and reflected - a negative attitude to women as being victims and having 
little or no agency in their own lives.47 She deplored the ongoing association with 
children noting that if women were seen ‘as actors within the family and community, 
rather than just given the status of victim, they would have more leverage in 
recovering from armed conflicts’.48 She claimed that because of the ongoing 
portrayal of women as vulnerable victims, ‘women’s experiences of local issues in 
                                                                
45 S/RES/1325/2000. 
46 N Puechguirbal, ‘Discourses on Gender, Patriarchy and Resolution 1325: A Textual Analysis of UN 
Documents,’ International Peacekeeping, 2010. 
47 Puechguirbal, p. 173. 
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the sphere of security remain an untapped resource’.49 UNSCR 1325 could be 
accused of being couched in terms of women’s vulnerability – but, at least, it offered 
some sign posts to the link between vulnerability in peace with vulnerability in 
conflict and, as will be seen regarding later resolutions, there were efforts to 
recognise women’s agency in peacemaking and peacekeeping. From feminist 
analysts of UNSCR 1325 came, ‘genuinely radical understanding’ of patriarchy as 
the ‘principal cause both of the outbreak of violent societal conflicts and the 
international community’s frequent failures in providing long term resolutions to 
those conflicts’.50 The issue ‘women, peace and security’ could be weakened if 
women were always as identified as being in need of protection and not capable of 
contributing to key elements in peacemaking and peacekeeping. 
It is no surprise then that the preamble stated that by passing UNSCR 1325, the 
UNSC was reaffirming also the need to implement fully international humanitarian 
and human rights law that protects the rights of women and girls during and after 
conflicts. Women and girls are to be protected by existing human rights laws and 
international humanitarian law, particularly the Geneva Conventions and Additional 
Protocols – all existing norms governing behaviour of governments and their armed 
forces and which apply equally to armed opposition groups and any other parties to a 
conflict. This echoes the approach of the two international tribunals  applying 
existing international humanitarian and human rights law to the experiences of 
women and children in conflict.  
Significantly, the preamble acknowledged that protection of women required a 
broader understanding of the reality of women’s situations in many communities. It 
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recognised that such understanding had to apply and develop across a range of 
aspects of women’s lives. General understanding of social, cultural, economic and 
political realities of women was essential. Protecting women required action beyond 
direct responses to conflict situations. The preamble prefaced its direct 
recommendations by ‘recognizing the urgent need to mainstream a gender 
perspective into peacekeeping operations,’ and the use of ‘urgent’ was important as it 
reflected a degree of seriousness about this aspect of strategies which were to 
follow.51 Taking the issue beyond direct conflict contexts to consider women’s roles 
in peace and reconciliation was a major step.  
The preamble also reaffirmed ‘the important role of women in the prevention and 
resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding’.52 This was a recognition that women’s 
lives and contributions were of importance for women themselves and for their 
communities, a recognition beyond women being viewed narrowly as victims when 
conflict broke out. There was acknowledgement of women’s potential for 
contribution, equal participation and ‘full involvement in all efforts for the 
maintenance and promotion of peace and security’.53 Logically, then the preamble 
called for action to increase women’s role in decision-making with regard to conflict 
prevention and resolution. This paragraph of the preamble was a reflection of the 
growing understanding of women as more than victims. It formally acknowledged 
that women have contributions to make in prevention and in recovery processes and 
was a basis for recognition that if women were to be enabled to play an equal part in 
security and maintaining peace, they must be empowered politically and 
economically. The understanding that confronting violence against women in 
conflict requires confronting inequality and subordination of women generally in 
their communities was growing.  
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Dealing with such inequalities can also result in benefit to women and girls – and to 
their communities and to the international community. The preamble recognised the 
necessity of understanding the impact of armed conflict on women and girls. 
Notably, it recognised that the provision of effective institutional arrangements to 
guarantee women’s protection and full participation in the peace process ‘can 
significantly contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and 
security’. Related to this aim was the need ‘to consolidate data on the impact of 
armed conflict on women and girls’. The need to be informed, to understand 
accurately the reality of the impact of conflict on women and girls is underscored 
here as a crucial element in ensuring effective protection and response to specific 
needs. Attention is drawn to the paucity of data available and the absence of any 
systematic processes for documentation, collation and analysis of information to 
inform responses to the impact of conflict on women. Similarly, there is a need for 
reliable information regarding women’s potential and actual role in relation to 
peacebuilding, especially when women and women’s groups are frequently engaged 
in support responses both post and during conflicts at local, national and regional 
levels. The UNSC also noted its own responsibilities towards protection of women 
and girls. Referring back to the statement of the UNSC president to the press on 
March 8, earlier in the year, the preamble reiterated reference to its own mandate 
with regards to authorising peacekeeping operations, placing emphasis on the 
importance of training peacekeepers so that women and children are protected and 
their special needs are identified and addressed.54  
Having set out in the preamble the bases on which it was proceeding, UNSCR 1325 
then moved to the specifics of its resolution. The operative paragraphs of the 
resolution reflect the steps to be taken and, as in any resolution, the language 
signalled differing levels of commitment or differing levels of application. In some 
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steps states were ‘urged’ to action. In other steps states were ‘encouraged’. The 
Secretary General was ‘required’ to undertake certain steps. Just as the preamble had 
indicated the UNSC’s own responsibilities, so too did the operative paragraphs.  
Some concerns regarding the slow progress in implementation of the resolution have 
been linked back to the language of the resolution. UNSCR 1325 was adopted under 
Chapter VI which means that although it was adopted unanimously it is non-coercive 
and not binding on states. It does however, ‘carry a normative imperative that is 
intended to influence behaviour (in the short and long term) at both international and 
national levels’.55 Resolutions adopted under Chapter VII are deemed coercive, 
binding on states and invoked when a breach of the peace or a threat to international 
peace and security is perceived. Because it was not adopted under Security Council 
Chapter VII mandate, the language is deemed to be ‘soft’ in comparison to ‘hard’ 
language in other resolutions.56 For example, SCR 1373 on Counter Terrorism uses 
terminology such as, ‘decides’ ‘declares’ ‘directs’ while SCR 1325 uses terms such 
as ‘express’ ‘emphasises’ ‘requests’.57 It has been argued that ‘because the language 
appears weak it fails to be taken seriously by the military’.58 However, Torunn L. 
Tryggestad has commented that since the advent of UNSCR 1325, ‘women, peace 
and security has appeared as a normative issue that is increasingly difficult for states 
to shun’ noting that women’s issues were traditionally relegated to soft policy and 
thus not something to which the Security Council was required to pay attention.59 She 
concluded that despite reservations and criticisms of the resolution, it was ‘a 
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remarkable development’.60 A closer analysis of the resolution highlights failings and 
strengths.  
The first four operative paragraphs urged and encouraged member states and the UN 
secretariat under the Secretary General to work for increased participation of women 
at all decision-making levels. Member states were urged to do so ‘in national, 
regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, 
management, and resolution of conflict’.61 The Secretary General was encouraged to 
implement a plan formulated in 1994 which had called for ‘an increase in the 
participation of women at decision-making levels in conflict resolution and peace 
processes’.62 In the first two operative paragraphs, both member states and the UN 
itself were called to take action. Operative paragraphs three and four similarly 
focused on participation of women and inclusion in decision-making positions. 
While this focus on women’s participation in decision-making was admirable, the 
need to reiterate the call did highlight that much needed to be done to make this a 
reality.  
There followed a paragraph relating to peacekeeping operations. The wording is 
tentative at best. The UNSC ‘expresses its willingness to incorporate a gender 
perspective into peacekeeping operations and urges the Secretary-General to ensure 
that, where appropriate, field operations include a gender component’.63 The phrase 
‘where appropriate’ is one with implications that there will be a judgment but no 
clear parameters or conditionality set out as a basis for such judgment. A 
‘willingness to incorporate’ does not appear to carry any requirement for specific 
action. It is a passive statement. However, this paragraph needed to be read in the 
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context of the Secretary General having provided a report (October 2000) on 
resource requirements for implementation of the report of the Panel on United 
Nations Peace Operations in 2000 and this request for resources had noted that 
attention needed to be given to gender perspectives in all phases of the peace support 
operations, beginning with needs assessment missions through post-conflict 
peacebuilding.64  
This report of the Secretary General had included attention to gender in analyses, 
policy and strategy development and planning of peace support operations, as well as 
training programmes and instruments developed to support effective implementation 
of those operations. The report had listed political analysis, military operations, 
civilian police activities, electoral assistance, human rights support, humanitarian 
assistance, assistance for refugees and displaced persons, development and 
reconstruction activities and public information, noting the importance of training of 
troops and civilian police on gender issues as well as gender balance in interim 
bodies and development of capacity within interim governing bodies. The report 
highlighted the importance of paying attention to gender perspectives ‘from the very 
outset of peacebuilding and peacekeeping missions, including through incorporation 
in the initial mandates’ and importantly it recommended that all reports of any 
individual mission to the Security Council ‘should include explicit routine reporting 
on progress in integrating gender perspectives as well as information on the number 
and levels of women involved in all aspects of the mission’.65  
Paragraph five was a commitment to follow through on these identified needs and 
represents agreement that such a gender perspective should be incorporated into 
peacekeeping missions – with an important implied recognition that this needed to be 
noted in budgetary allocations. Operative paragraph six recognised the need for 
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 212 
 
‘specialized training for all peacekeeping personnel on the protection, special needs 
and human rights of women and children in conflict situations’.66 It was imperative 
that member states accept responsibility for their own peacekeeping forces as a way 
to demonstrate commitment and shared responsibility of all states and agencies. This 
was followed by Paragraphs 7 and 8 which ‘request[ed]’ provision of training in 
many aspects of gender sensitivity and ‘urge[d]’ financial allocations and 
commitments to enable such training. The outline of financial allocations indicated a 
seriousness to commit to action. 
This degree of seriousness is continued in operative paragraph eight where ‘all 
actors’ are called upon to adopt ‘a gender perspective’ when ‘negotiating and 
implementing peace agreements.’67 Rather than a generalised call, the resolution 
notes specific aspects requiring attention. It highlights the special needs of women 
and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and 
post-conflict reconstruction. It calls for measures that support local women’s peace 
initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women 
in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements. It also calls for 
measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and 
girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police 
and the judiciary. This indicates an emphasis on involving local women and valuing 
local and national processes, with a requirement for involving women in peace 
agreements. Proposed action included agreements on power-sharing arrangements; 
economic reconstruction; demobilisation and reintegration of soldiers; legislation on 
human rights; access to land, education and health; the status of displaced people and 
the empowerment of civil society. All require attention to gender, regardless of who 
is doing the negotiating or implementing. By addressing reintegration, the Security 
Council was recognising that refugee women and women who are Internally 
                                                                
66 UNSCR 1325 Operative para. 6. 
67 UNSCR 1325 Operative para. 9. 
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Displaced Persons, as well as female demobilised soldiers returning to their homes, 
require particular care and attention. For all these women return must be voluntary 
and any facilitated return must consider issues of security. Later paragraphs dealt 
with the need to respond effectively to identified special needs of women in refugee 
camps and as ex-combatants with dependents.68  
Operative paragraph nine, by mentioning the International criminal Court (ICC), 
‘could be used to lobby for a referral of the Security Council to the ICC when states 
fail to address cases of massive sexual violence’.69 Operative paragraph eleven, 
UNSCR 1325 called upon all parties to armed conflict to respect fully international 
law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls as civilians. This was 
a key point as it reaffirms the applicability of existing norms to women in conflict. 
The paragraph goes on to list some of the major – and non-derogable – international 
normative agreements, which most, if not all, member states have acknowledged. 
While it may seem odd that a specific statement was needed to ensure that women 
were included as civilians and international law applied to women, it was, in reality, 
an important step. It built on the work and judgements of the international tribunals 
and made clear that while women had specific needs they were covered by the same 
international law as any civilians. This led logically to the next paragraph which 
dealt with impunity and accountability. It emphasised ‘the responsibility of all States 
to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes including those relating to sexual violence against 
women and girls.’70 Crimes such as sexual violence (which would include tactical 
rape) were to be confronted. Impunity for such crimes was to end. This was a natural 
development from the recognition that such crimes were not to be considered 
inevitable by-products of conflict, something to be deplored but accepted as part of 
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conflict. It was a specific recognition that these were acts which contravened 
international law and for which perpetrators were to be brought to justice. The 
paragraph continued to ‘stress’ the need to exclude these crimes, ‘where feasible’, 
from amnesty provisions. This call to put an end to impunity was welcomed but the 
inclusion of the words, ‘where feasible’ to exclude sexual and other violence against 
women from amnesty agreements were disappointing as they indicated a sense that 
exceptions could be made. The work of ICTY and ICTR had demonstrated the 
difficulties in bringing perpetrators to justice. Such difficulty, however, should not 
preclude the principle of refusing amnesty. There are many instances where 
implementation of international humanitarian law and human rights law may prove 
difficult. The implications of respecting the Genocide Convention may present 
serious challenges to those responsible to respond to violations and may result in 
states hesitant to name acts as genocidal. These difficulties are recognised. They 
cannot be allowed to render it acceptable to grant amnesty to those who commit the 
violations.  
However, overall, UNSC 1325 demonstrated an understanding of the impact of 
armed conflict on women and the need for effective institutional arrangements to 
guarantee their protection and full participation. It recognised that such 
understanding and arrangements could significantly contribute to maintenance and 
promotion of international peace and security. It emphasised the need to respect 
existing law and called for a gender perspective in peacemaking and peace 
agreements, rejecting impunity for perpetrators of violence against women and 
children and urging, ‘where feasible’, that amnesty for such offences be avoided. 
This was an important step in the development of normative rejection of tactical 
rape. It is notable, however, that C. Binder, K. Lukas and R. Schweiger, writing in 
2008, commented: ‘surprisingly, few academic papers and legal documents reference 
Resolution 1325’ and they went on to highlight that ‘the most comprehensive UN 
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paper on post-conflict justice, the UN secretary general’s report on transitional 
justice and the rule of law in conflict and post-conflict societies does not mention the 
resolution’.71 As will be seen in the next chapters, there have been some significant 
moves at the UN to support implementation of UNSCR 1325 and subsequent 
resolutions, but the real test of commitment came with states’ actions to put in place 
the requirements of the resolution, to formulate their National Action Plans. 
National Action Plans as Measures of Commitment to UNSCR 1325  
UNSCR 1325 addressed the impact of war and conflict on women and called for 
women's participation in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and sustainable 
peace- building. The resolution, however, did not include any clear mechanisms for 
monitoring implementation and ensuring accountability and states were asked to 
formulate National Action Plans (NAPs). National Action Plans represented a 
relatively new approach to ‘the challenge’ of implementation and ‘are regarded as a 
practical means through which states can demonstrate the steps they are taking to 
meet their obligations under the resolution.72 UNSCR 1325 called for member states 
to take a range of specific steps, which would require specific policy and practice. 
The resolution, being adopted unanimously, carried with it a responsibility that 
member states adapt and incorporate the elements of the strategy it contained into 
national policy and procedures with a focus on named general areas of concern 
regarding women, peace and security. States were to act to develop participation of 
women in decision-making and peace processes with a consequent increased number 
of women in institutions and UN field operations. States were to consult with women 
and ensure the inclusion of women in peace processes. Elements in states’ 
implementation of UNSCR 1325 would require including women in decision-making 
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and peace processes, protecting women from sexual violence in war and ensuring 
gender perspectives in training and peacekeeping.  
Implementation of UNSCR 1325 would mean gender mainstreaming in UN reporting 
systems and programme implementation. The aim was for states to mainstream 
gender aspects of policy and practice. All these were aspects to be incorporated into 
states’ action plans. Mainstreaming a gender perspective was defined by the 
Economic and Social Council as a process of assessing the implications for women 
and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all 
areas and at all levels.73  The forum agreed mainstreaming was a strategy for making 
women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the 
design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all 
political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men would benefit 
equally and inequality is not perpetuated.      However, it was argued that if 
mainstreaming were the goal, then a separate policy document or action plan would 
negate such mainstreaming which would require adaptation or amendment of 
existing policy and practice.74 This was countered by a fear that gender aspects would 
be lost or ignored without specific plans and while some states such as Fiji 
incorporated gender aspects into existing policy approaches, many states began 
formulating national action plans.75 In Israel, a law has been passed making it 
mandatory to include women in government peace negotiations, effectively 
incorporating UNSCR 1325 into national law.76 
In Presidential Statements S/PRST/2004/40 and S/PRST/2005/52, the Security 
Council called on member states to implement UNSCR 1325, including through the 
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75 Swaine, p. 411. 
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development of national action plans (NAPs) or other national level strategies. The 
creation of an action plan provides an opportunity to initiate strategic actions, 
identify priorities and resources, and determine responsibilities and time frames at a 
national level.77 Henry F. Carey having said that norms comprise the rules and goals 
of governing which constitute a regime type, referred to UNSCR 1325 as the epitome 
of a new regime.78 This resolution represented a stated commitment to a new regime 
for protecting women from sexual violence in conflict. However, Carey noted too, 
that UN member states ‘are able to support the new regime in principle, even if 
practice will not change automatically’.79 As he noted, universal human rights and 
humanitarian law institutions already prohibited sexual violence against women and 
sought to protect their human rights.80 This had not resulted in preventing or even 
seriously prohibiting sexual violence. By creating national action plans to implement 
and institutionalise the responsibilities accepted by agreement to UNSCR 1325, 
states could demonstrate a commitment beyond rhetoric.  
A National Action Plan is where a state articulates practical measures to implement 
agreements made at international level. The National Action Plans are the national 
extension of the international agreements inherent in UNSCR 1325. It was the 
awareness of the use of tactical rape and sexual violence in war and the work of the 
international tribunals which stimulated the international sense that women must be 
protected in war – and in, particular protected from tactical rape and sexual violence. 
UNSCR was passed unanimously by all member states of the UNSC. All states 
accepted an implied responsibility to honour and enact steps to implement the 
resolution. As noted above, allocation of resources is an indication of seriousness to 
commit to any actions. So, too, is the adoption of national policy and associated 
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practice a measure of commitment. The UN – INSTRAW recommended guide for 
NAPs refers to a number of components and provides a guide to evaluating existing 
NAPs.81 It refers to the following elements: an introduction indicating process, peace 
and security issues for women; a rationale with reference to 1325, importance of 
women, peace and security and relations to the state; long and short-term objectives; 
specific initiatives linked to objectives, with key performance indicators, deadlines, 
resources; time frames for the plan as a whole and for specific initiatives; monitoring 
and evaluation systems and an allocated budget.82 
Analysis of how multi-lateral agencies and states approached this responsibility with 
regard to UNSCR 1325 and the processes and plans they did or did not follow sheds 
some light on the degree of real commitment to the task of confronting tactical rape 
and ensuring adherence to the developed norm rejecting tactical rape. While it will 
be useful to focus on action at the UN after UNSCR 1325, the NAPs provide an 
insight to states’ commitment. The responses of various states – those which have 
responded – are varied in the quality of demonstrated commitment exhibited in their 
National Action Plans (NAPs). Aspects of some plans indicate states taking seriously 
the implications of UNSCR 1325. Some plans are useful as models demonstrating 
pitfalls and omissions. Some exemplify attitudes that are unhelpful to the purposes 
stated in UNSCR 1325. The process of developing a plan is a key reflection of how 
women are recognised and included and it should be a process of ‘awareness raising 
and capacity-building in order to overcome gaps and challenges to the full 
implementation of resolution 1325’.83  
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Analysing Some Action Plans as Measures of Commitment 
As an indicator of the slow pace of implementation of UNSCR 1325, it should be 
noted that the UN took five years to formulate an organisation wide action plan.84 
Although it has since been revised the plan was initially seen as ‘a compendium of 
activities’ rather than a forward looking ‘action –oriented document’ to challenge 
stakeholders to change their ways of doing business and address gaps in 
implementation.85 It took time and further resolutions, which will be discussed in the 
next chapter, before satisfactory institutional changes and definite operational time 
frames and loci of responsibility were really developed. Writing in 2008, Binder, 
Lukas and Scheiger noted that ‘a review of recommendations of UN human rights 
committees (committee on CEDAW, on the Rights of the Child, on the Convention 
on Civil and Political Rights, on the Convention on Torture) shows that not a single 
committee referenced 1325’.86 Work on implementing and applying UNSCR 1325 
was slow to gain momentum.  
As of 30 June 2009, women in the UN Secretariat constituted: 38.3% (2,894 out of 
7,565) of all staff in the professional and higher categories with appointments of one 
year or more; 27.3% (180 out of 660) of all staff at the D-1 level and above; 39.3% 
(2,713 out of 6,903) of all staff at the P level. Gender balance had only been achieved 
at the P-1 (50%) and P-2 levels (51.5%) and during the 11-year period June 1998-
June 2009 in the UN Secretariat , the overall growth of women in appointments of 
one year or more was 3.7%, an increase from 34.6% (1,441 out of 4,164) in 1998 to 
38.3% (2,894 out of 7,565) in 2009.87 With her concerns noted earlier regarding the 
language linking women and children and emphasis on women’s vulnerability, 
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Peurchguirbal concluded, ‘the relations of inequality and the imbalance of power 
between women and men in the UN remain uncontested, despite the existence of 
resolution 1325’.88 The UN itself should have been leading the early implementation 
of UNSCR 1325 but it was slow to react. 
There were a number of steps taken by the European Union: the European Parliament 
and Council of Europe have formulated documents encouraging implementation of 
UNSCR as have NATO and the OSCE and some UN member states formed ‘The 
Group of Friends of 1325’.89 In 2008, this group comprised 31 member states and 
was coordinated by Canada.90 In European countries where NAPs have been 
formulated it has usually been ministries responsible for foreign affairs – 
development cooperation, defence and justice – which have taken the lead while in 
Africa it seems to have been ministries responsible for gender equality.91 Uganda, for 
example has included an analysis of the gendered aspects of conflict.92 Consideration 
and analysis of these plans needs to remember that the aim of UNSCR 1325 was to 
have gender specific issues mainstreamed into states’ policies and practices. Hilary 
Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin have commented on the dissonance between 
equality and representation that may still arise when women are accorded 
participation in decision making bodies or when equality is measured by numbers of 
women participating because ‘this account of equality ignores the presence of 
underlying structures and power relations that contribute to the oppression of 
women’.93 Others have noted that UNSCR 1325 does not address root causes or 
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structural problems such as women’s access to economic or financial resources and 
education.94  
However, by April 2012, the number of countries which had formulated NAPs in 
response to UNSCR 1325 as well as to UNSCR 1820 and other resolutions to be 
discussed in the next chapter had grown to thirty-six.95 When reviewing UNSCR 
1325 in particular, it is useful to consider some NAPs which were developed in direct 
response to that specific resolution. Three early NAPs provide interesting examples 
of similarities and variations in process and content - those of the Netherlands, of 
Iceland and of Finland - while the first and then later plans of the UK show a process 
of development. 
In many ways, although it has some notable flaws, the Netherlands Plan set a 
standard for others to follow.96 The process of developing the Netherlands Action 
Plan reflected a growing sense of the importance of networks which are ‘increasingly 
central in publicising trans-national social issues and consolidating change’.97 It 
facilitated exchanges across national regions according to legal, cultural, social and 
economic (including labour) interests for women, peace and security, utilising NGO 
networks at local levels in countries to gain information and to facilitate reporting of 
concerns which may otherwise have had no way of being shared or communicated. It 
includes serious consideration of women before, during and after conflicts as victims, 
combatants and pillars of development and it defines key concepts such as gender 
mainstreaming and discrimination against women to ensure clarity of focus and 
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understanding. It sets a focus on periods of time before and after conflict and deals 
chiefly with physical safety and legal security of men and women. Monitoring and 
evaluation responsibilities are allocated with focus on all partners working at national 
and international levels and reporting progress.  
The Netherlands Plan sets out to be as clear as possible as it is intended to inform the 
efforts of those across the country who signed it, stating explicitly what is expected 
of them.98 This is in contrast to some other plans which are ‘chiefly government 
documents’ and which offer cursory reference to many key concepts and do not 
demonstrate any attempts to incorporate learning or reflection.99 This Netherlands 
Plan referred to reconstruction after conflict, providing an explanation that this is 
interwoven with prevention which remains a major objective of the Netherlands’ 
Foreign Policy and core business of some NGOs. Prevention was, in turn, linked 
with development cooperation. Despite its recognition that security is a 
socioeconomic concept there was a decision not to include the socioeconomic 
aspects of security because ‘security and development influence each other so 
directly one may ask where one stops and the other begins’.100 The Plan 
acknowledged past achievements and difficulties – such as failure to recruit 
sufficiently in the ranks of police and military and it acknowledged that bi-lateral and 
multi-lateral activities must reinforce one another while empowering those most 
affected.101 
This NAP set out to ‘unite people and organisations active in the fields of 
development (including humanitarian aid), diplomacy and social action in a joint 
effort for conflict prevention and resolution, peace negotiations and 
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reconstruction’.102 For each specific action, there was identified an area of focus, a 
goal and activities and those responsible for implementation were named. In some 
cases, the availability of resources was confirmed – or noted for allocation or 
sourcing. When referencing the international legal framework, the Netherlands Plan 
asserted the importance of human rights and the Government’s endorsement of the 
concept of the ‘responsibility to protect’ and noted the ever-growing discrepancy 
between international standards and reality.103 For this reason, it established there 
must be steps relating to both the design of legal systems and law enforcement. There 
must be national as well as international laws which protect women’s rights and 
combat impunity. Actions included aligning national legislation with international 
human rights agreements and calling countries to account for violations and 
protecting women’s rights in unofficial legal systems.  
International women’s networks were to be used to give women an effective voice – 
demonstrating the usefulness of cooperation with NGOs, especially those with 
international connections. Importantly, the Netherlands Plan included guarding 
against the misuse of women’s rights for agendas other than gender justice – a 
warning reflecting the reality of states ‘using’ such rights for political ends. 
Throughout the Plan, the goal was to institutionalise women’s equal participation. It 
recognised the differing situations of women who may have been combatants. 
Gender perspectives were to be advocated in all international organisations and 
within any new structure of the UN.104 The need to reform security sectors after 
conflict was emphasised and there was a commitment to see the role of women 
embedded in peace missions and in UN, NATO and EU operational guidelines, as 
well as promoting the inclusion of UNSCR 1325 in mandates, resolutions and terms 
of reference. Peacekeepers would be required to maintain codes of conduct and 
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foreign partners would be called to account for conduct on missions. Training on the 
roles and capabilities of women would be provided. There would be local gender 
focal points to whom reports could be made and gender specialists in short missions. 
The Plan also recognised that some international missions would oppose 
accountability when there were troops from countries which either condoned or 
promoted impunity for their own troops. This was an acknowledgement that in the 
international arena there can be glib commitments without any accompanying 
commitment.  
There is a sense of real commitment in this Netherlands Action Plan although there 
are some areas where it could be strengthened. It included ‘promoting’ training 
among professionals in the justice sector and for personnel on peace missions and 
while ‘promotion’ is useful, such training should be mandatory in most cases.105 It 
‘condemned’ impunity but only ‘encourage[d]’ prosecutions.106 It talked of 
monitoring the security and safety of women during court proceedings and 
supporting them with psycho-social counselling – this was an implied but not explicit 
acceptance of responsibility to follow up where women’s safety and security are 
found to be under threat. It put emphasis on intensifying research into women, peace 
and security but did not go further than examining whether funding could be 
increased. However, the style of this NAP had much to offer, even with the 
omissions and concerns mentioned. Throughout, it did allocate responsibilities and 
set clear time frames. It recognised what was known about women, peace and 
security and it recognised that further research was needed. Importantly, it 
recognised that women have multiple realities and a variety of skills and need to be 
empowered to effect changes for themselves while being supported with adequate 
resources and advocacy. It reflected a serious commitment to implement the intent of 
UNSCR 1325 as a broad-ranging strategy which could confront the reality of tactical 
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rape, confront women’s vulnerability in conflict that is often rooted in their 
vulnerability in peace and exacerbated in conflict.  
The NAP of Iceland was released early 2008 and followed a broad consultative 
process similar in nature to that of the Netherlands.107 It included little analysis of 
women’s issues and needs but involved in the plan’s formulation were civil society, 
Nordic partners, and academic institutions. The Iceland Plan stated it was built on 
‘the main pillars of Iceland’s foreign policy: respect for human rights; increased 
development cooperation and peaceful resolution of conflict. Special emphasis was 
put on women’s access to the negotiating table’.108 Despite the consultative process, 
in most specific activities it is the Icelandic Government named as responsible for 
implementation and there was no mention of the expertise or contextual contribution 
which could be brought by NGOs. 
There was, however, a general commitment to incorporating gender perspectives into 
projects in all fields of peace, security and development, to promoting UNSCR 1325 
and its implementation and monitoring and a specific commitment to developing a 
checklist to help peacekeepers apply UNSCR 1325 in the field. Who was to be 
responsible to develop this checklist was not made explicit. There was an emphasis 
on continuing pressure for participation of women in positions as officials in 
international organisations, as heads and members of peacekeeping operations and as 
local employees during peacekeeping operations. There was a commitment to 
considering UNSCR 1325 when deciding in which peacekeeping operations Iceland 
would participate. There was an emphasis on civilian peacekeeping and women’s 
access to post-conflict reconstruction. Importantly, too, there was direct mention of 
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the importance of working towards increasing the economic independence and 
security of women – with this being a clear priority action.109 While it did not 
elucidate how this would be achieved, it was a positive step to have such a 
commitment. 
As in the Netherlands Plan, there was reference to education and training for Foreign 
Service personnel and peacekeepers. However, the Foreign Service personnel were 
seen as being ‘briefed’ while peacekeepers were to be ‘educated’.110 It is an 
interesting distinction and, hopefully, did not indicate a different level of importance 
and choice versus mandated informing. There were clear and definite statements that 
misconduct of peacekeepers and other posted personnel would not be tolerated. This 
included buying sexual services or otherwise procuring them from anyone dependent 
on the peacekeepers. Specific codes of conduct were set and it was made clear that 
criminal laws apply to all deployed personnel.111 Where the Dutch Plan referred to 
‘finding’ new funds, the Icelandic Plan stated it would support research and would 
allocate appropriate funds to projects related to UNSCR 1325. 112 
The Finnish Action Plan was released September 19, 2008.113 As in the Netherlands 
and Iceland it was the result of a consultative process: in this case between named 
government ministries, the ‘1325 NGO Network’ and research institutions. A 
working group was established in 2007 to ensure the drafting process was open and 
participatory. The action plan was divided into three sections with specific ministries 
named as responsible for implementation. The first section considered conflict 
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prevention, peace negotiations and peacebuilding, with three specific objectives. The 
first objective was to advocate implementation of UNSCR 1325 in conflict 
prevention, peace negotiation and peacebuilding, which included: recognising 
UNSCR 1325 as a cross cutting theme in the UN strategy of Finland; urging 
attention to equal participation of women and mainstreaming 1325 into all UNSC 
activities; recognising the needs of women and children in disarmament and 
repatriation programmes and monitoring international organisations for gender 
aspects of governing boards, evaluation and research.114 Finland would contribute to 
improvement of women’s position in political decision-making in developing 
countries and to local activities which enhance participation of women in conflict 
prevention and reconstruction such as drafting constitutions and formation of 
electoral and law commissions. It mainstreamed gender issues into humanitarian aid, 
granting men and women equal opportunities in related decision-making. This was 
much more specific than other plans when Finland included a requirement for 
compliance with the principle of non-discrimination as a pre-condition for all re-
construction projects and supported the improvement of women’s financial situation.  
The second objective of the first section was to produce and publish information on 
women’s role in crisis management, on the impact of gender-related aspects of 
conflict and gender roles in peace processes and conflict resolution.115 As well as 
public information and awareness-raising it supported the accumulation and analysis 
of gender-aggregated data on conflicts and violence, with the use of comparable 
gender-related indicators when reporting on programmes and operations. The third 
objective of this same first section stated that ‘special attention is paid to women’s 
role in the management of natural resources, land ownership and use and the creation 
of sources of livelihood’.116 As with UNSCR 1325 generally, this reflected 
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recognition that the vulnerability of women in conflict can at least be alleviated by 
changing some of the constructed attitudes of women as mere dependents or property 
of males.  
The second section concerned actions in crisis management, with specific mention of 
the need to confront human trafficking and sexual exploitation among human rights 
abuses, stressing that all forms of sexual exploitation are criminal offences, with a 
clear resolve that offences will be investigated under Finnish legislation.117 The third 
section dealt with strengthening, protecting and safeguarding the human rights of 
women and girls by encouraging all countries to ratify international agreements and 
monitoring.118 There was stated commitment to fighting impunity, requiring 
prosecutions and supporting the ICC, ICTR, ICTY and the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone as well as continuing support for prosecution of international crimes. 
Importantly, Finland, too, emphasised that countries receiving development 
assistance must ensure that national legislation complied with international 
standards. It was, however, disappointing that when referring to training for 
prosecutors, judges, police and other public authorities, the wording was that they 
would ‘be offered’ training, rather than insisting on such training.119 
Some states reacted quickly, with what were seen as rapid but less than satisfactory 
plans. The United Kingdom (UK) was one state which later re-formulated a more 
comprehensive and more soundly based plan but the early UK outline of its 
implementation appeared cursory at best, with no indication of real community 
consultation or involvement.120 This provided an interesting comparison between a 
brief ‘high level’ paper and more detailed and thoughtful National Action Plans such 
                                                                
117 Finnish National Action Plan, pp. 20-25. 
118 Finnish National Action Plan, pp. 26-32. 
119 Finnish National Action Plan, p. 20. 
120 UK High Level Plan, retrieved 12 June 2007, 
<www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/taskforces/wps/nap/NAP_UK_2006.pdf>. 
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as those above and a full plan, which was released at a later date by the UK.121 Some 
time after the launch of the paper, (March 8 2006), the UK human rights 
representative to OSCE said it was a cross-departmental government process which 
encountered difficulties and developed into a series of inter-departmental working 
groups and other working groups including civil society and experts from other 
governments.122 This paper referred to ‘gender elements’ and ‘gender perspectives’, 
assuming these were understood, without any real attempt to elucidate.123 Activities 
were followed by examples but with no clear allocation of responsibility or time 
frames, other than Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) and in one instance the UK 
Ministry of Defence. There was no mention of evaluation, revision, monitoring or 
updating the plan. There was mention of activities regarding training and policy 
within the Government. However, the language was not strong. Officials were to ‘be 
offered desk top training’ but not required to undertake it and rather than establishing 
such training as mandatory it was only ‘where necessary’ that there would be 
awareness-raising on gender and the UN Code of Conduct on personal behaviour.124 
It stated that ‘where appropriate’ gender perspective training would be incorporated 
into other military and conflict related personnel doctrines.125 Possibilities for 
personnel to avoid training seem clear. This did not indicate any real sense of 
urgency or need for such training. There was encouragement to international 
institutions, civil society and UN member states to identify suitable women 
candidates for posts – but the only mention within the UK was to ‘encourage’ UK 
                                                                
121 United Kingdom Government National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325, Women, Peace and Security, 
Department for International Development 2010, retrieved 11 August 2011, 
<www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/NationalActionPlans/uk_nationalactionplan_november2010.pdf> 
122 Alistair Long, Human Rights Representative to OSCE, UK, Presentation on UNSCR 1325, 4 
October 2007. 
123 UK High Level Plan, paras. 1, 2. 
124 UK High Level Plan, para. 5. 
125 UK High Level Plan, para. 6. 
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military and police forces to make known all vacancies as a means of continuing to 
deploy appropriate female personnel on operations. 126 
The lukewarm tone continued with ‘advocating’ inclusion of gender-based violations 
in mandates of transitional justice mechanisms as the example of how it will promote 
justice for women and tackle post-conflict gender violence.127 When agreeing to 
address gender issues in UK-supported disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration there was a commitment to provide guidelines to UK officials – but no 
indication of the varying nature of combatants or of women in different situations.128 
The only mention of the role that NGOs could play came in the final action point 
when the Government would liaise with them and with civil society and 
parliamentarians on implementation of UNSCR 1325 and would continue dialogue 
on gender-related issues.129 Overall, this first UK plan did not demonstrate any real 
reflection or new initiatives. Rather, the impression was of a paper drawn up to meet 
the minimum demands of the resolution. A more detailed NAP was later released in 
2008 and reflected a more committed approach to implementing the key aspects of 
UNSCR 1325. 
As at April 2012, there were still omissions from the list of states which have 
complied with UNSC 1325 and formulated national plans but thirty-six states had 
complied. Those with plans included: Australia NAP (2012); Austria NAP (2007); 
Belgium NAP (2009); Bosnia-Herzogovina NAP (2010); Canada NAP (2010); Chile 
NAP (2009); Cote d’Ivoire NAP (2007); Croatia NAP (2011); Denmark NAP 
(2005); Denmark Revised NAP (2008-2013); DRC NAP (2010); Netherlands NAP 
(2000); Estonia NAP (2010); Finland NAP (2008); France NAP (2010); Georgia 
                                                                
126 UK High Level Plan, para. 7. 
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128 UK High Level Plan, para. 11. 
129 UK High Level Plan, para. 12. 
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NAP (2011); Guinea NAP (2011); Guinea-Bissau NAP(2011); Iceland NAP (2008); 
Ireland NAP (2011); Italy NAP (2010); Liberia NAP (2009); Nepal NAP (2010); 
Netherlands second NAP (2011); Norway NAP (2006); Philippines NAP (2010); 
Portugal NAP (2009); Rwanda NAP (2010); Sierra Leone NAP (2010); Slovenia 
(2011); Spain NAP (2007); Sweden NAP (2006); Sweden revised NAP (2009); 
Switzerland NAP (2007); Switzerland revised NAP (2010); Uganda NAP (2008); 
UK NAP (2010); USA NAP (2011).130 There were, admittedly, other states which 
were in the drafting phase – eleven years after formally accepting responsibility and 
acknowledging the need for action. While this may be a limited list, given that 
UNSCR 1325 was passed unanimously by all member states of the UNSC, it is 
nevertheless significant that NAPs have in fact been formulated..  
Each of the NAPs considered (Dutch, Icelandic, Finnish) reflected the degree of 
commitment of states to implement the broad strategies inherent in UNSCR 1325 to 
decrease women’s vulnerability in conflict. They are strategies which strengthen 
women’s access to decision-making, to a greater degree of independence and to an 
increased hope of countering social attitudes which expose them to particular 
violence such as tactical rape during conflict. The plans are the practical measure of 
commitment at national level to implement policies and principles which form the 
basis of normative expectations regarding treatment of women in conflict. As such 
they indicate a varied and generally limited degree of commitment. Most National 
Action Plans have lacked adequate indicators to evaluate their implementation. Of 
course, NAPs are not the only way to develop policy on women, peace and security 
and offer no guarantee that states are seriously committed to implementation of 
stated strategies. It is possible that a state may claim to be mainstreaming the 
concerns of UNSCR 1325 into other policy frameworks. However, they can be 
viewed as a statement of intent to meet agreed responsibilities and to comply with 
                                                                
130 Peace Women, retrieved April 4 2012   <www.peacewomen.org/naps/list-of-naps>.  
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what is becoming a normative expectation that strategies will be formulated and 
implemented to meet needs as outlined in UNSCR 1325. 
Conclusion 
Changes in attitudes towards humanitarianism during the 1990s set a context in 
which there was progress in discourse leading to normative rejection of tactical rape 
and sexual violence in war. At the UNSC, initially in reaction to the public 
awareness of tactical rape and cries for action there began movements towards 
confronting sexual violence. This eventually led to UNSCR 1325, where there was 
recognition that confronting tactical rape and sexual violence in war would require 
multi-faceted actions. All member states of the UNSC passed UNSCR 1325. In 
doing this, they effectively committed to policies and practices outlined in that 
resolution. When reminded of these obligations states were asked to formulate NAPs. 
Twenty six had done so by 2011. The quality of those NAPs varies. However, when 
compared with an example such as the high level paper of the UK – which might 
have been the norm but for pressure from the UN and other states – some of those 
NAPs are indicative of some serious consideration. 
Despite the slow pace of this aspect of commitment to UNSC 1325 there has 
continued to be further development at the UNSC in additional resolutions. Gaps and 
omissions of UNSCR 1325 became clear as the international community, while 
recognising the developments UNSCR 1325 represented, became stronger in 
requiring that more needed to be done. The next chapter will look at how far the 
principal elements of UNSCR 1325 had developed and been integrated into 
attitudinal and normative change within a decade of the resolution being hailed as 
such a milestone for women. It will consider the recognition that UNSCR 1325 did 
not provide all the answers to confronting tactical rape and sexual violence in war. It 
will also look at the additional resolutions which attempted to increase the efficacy of 
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UNSC 1325 and their implications for the international commitments and the 
developing discourse rejecting tactical rape. The pace of these additional 
commitments has increased since 2008 and they reflect some further normative 
progress.
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Chapter 6 
 
Women, Peace and Security: After 1325 at the UNSC and the International 
Criminal Court 
UNSCR 1325 was an important step in the development of recognition by the 
international community of states that tactical rape and sexual violence in war were 
realities as targeted attacks and deliberate strategies used in many conflicts. It was an 
important step in stated commitment to confronting tactical rape and sexual violence. 
UNSCR 1325 had demonstrated preparedness to confront women’s generalised 
vulnerability. These are vulnerabilities which often arise from generalised 
community attitudes to women evident in patriarchal societies and societies failing to 
recognise women’s right to human rights and to equality in political, economic and 
cultural aspects of life. It was a development in the discourse which, increasingly, 
was recognising that vulnerability in peacetime is highly likely to result in 
exacerbated vulnerability in times of conflict. Consideration of UNSCR 1325 has 
partially begun to answer the question about the degree of commitment to rejecting 
tactical rape which was really reflected in United Nations Security Council 
resolutions since the early 1990s. Consideration of the National Action Plans 
translating UNSCR 1325 into national settings provided an important measure of the 
degree of serious commitment of states to the elements of the resolution.  
This chapter will consider the developments in discourse which followed UNSCR 
1325 in the UNSC. This included debate on the relevance of tactical rape and sexual 
violence in war to issues of security. There were additional resolutions to strengthen, 
expand and reaffirm the importance of confronting tactical rape and sexual violence 
in war. Importantly, there was debate by member states, which concluded that sexual 
violence (and tactical rape which was usually a part of that sexual violence) did fall 
within the mandate of the UNSC because these violations did have an impact on 
security. But, the precise type of security was not always clear.  
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This chapter will, first, analyse developments between the passing of UNSCR 1325 
(2000) and the next key resolution regarding women, peace and security, UNSCR 
1820 (2008).1 This will include consideration of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC). It will, secondly, analyse developments in discourse reflected in the 
significant debate between member states of the UNSC prior to passing UNSCR 
1820. Thirdly, this chapter will analyse the developments reflected in UNSCR 1820. 
Fourthly, it will analyse UNSCR 1888 (2009)2 and UNSCR 1889 (2009).3 Finally, it 
will analyse developments in 2010 and into 2011 as the discourse continued with 
UNSCR 1960 (2010).4 It will analyse the content and the import of these resolutions 
and the degree of commitment to the developing discourse reflecting international 
rejection of sexual violence in war, which they demonstrate. It will set the context for 
understanding the increased links made between tactical rape and security as even 
the terms ‘tactic’ and ‘security’ began to appear frequently in the discourse around 
the named resolutions. 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) 
The international tribunals (ICTY and ICTR) were ad hoc courts, limited in time 
frame and geographic focus. Because they were established to try crimes committed 
only within a specific time-frame and during a specific conflict, and because there 
was considerable lobbying and advocacy by some states and by international NGOs, 
there was eventually general agreement among states that an independent, 
permanent, criminal court was needed.5 In 1998, the Rome Statute was adopted by 
120 states, as the legal basis for the establishment of the International Criminal 
                                                                
1 S/Res/1820 (2008). 
2 S/Res/1888 (2009). 
3 S/Res/1889 (2009). 
4 S/Res/1960 (2010). 
5 International Criminal Court, retrieved April 4 2012, <www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court>. 
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Court.6 By 2011, 116 states were parties and a further 34 had signed but not ratified 
the Statute.7  
The ICC is ‘an independent judicial institution, charged with carrying out 
investigations into and trials of individuals allegedly responsible for the most serious 
crimes of international concern, namely genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes’.8 It is an independent international organisation and is not part of the UN 
system, although it is funded primarily ‘by states parties as well as by governments, 
international organisations, individuals, corporations and other entities’.9 The ICC 
entered into force July 2002 and has built on the work of the tribunals and concerns 
regarding tactical rape and sexual violence reflected in UNSCR 1325. The ICC 
report to the General Assembly, 2011, indicated that the UN continued to provide 
support and assistance to the Court’ and the Court, engaged closely with States, the 
UN and regional and intergovernmental organisations to enhance cooperation in the 
fight against impunity for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.10 The 
same report noted meetings between the Court and the Special Representative of the 
Secretary General on Sexual Violence in Conflict (a post which will be detailed later 
in this dissertation). 11  
The ICC has a particular mandate to consider sexual violence in conflict. In 2009, the 
ICC prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, outlined the approaches to gender crimes, 
                                                                
6 International Criminal Court,  retrieved April 4 2012,  <www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court> retrieved 7 August 2011. 
7 Report of the International Criminal Court to the General Assembly, 19/8/2011 A/66/309, 
Introduction.para. 2. 
8 Report of the International Criminal Court to the General Assembly, 19/8/2011 A/66/309, 
Introduction para. 1. 
9 International Criminal Court, retrieved 7 August 2011, <www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court>. 
10 A/66/309. 
11 A/66/309, para. 101 
 237 
 
particularly as they are committed in conflict.12 He highlighted that the Rome Statute 
specifically included a mandate to deal with crimes of gender, specifically in Articles 
42 (9) and 54 (1) (b).13 He made the connection with the former Yugoslavia: 
The efforts since the mid-1990s to obtain accountability for atrocities committed 
against women in Bosnia helped establish how rape and other sexual violence could 
be instrumentalised in a campaign of genocide. This equally contributed to the 
expanding understanding of gender or sexual violence as war crimes or crimes 
against humanity.14 
This direct reference to the ICTY was accompanied by reference to the work of the 
ICTR, in particular the Akayesu case, described as, ‘the most groundbreaking 
decision advancing gender jurisprudence world wide’ noting that ‘for the first time in 
history, rape was explicitly recognised as an instrument of genocide’.15 By 
recognising the foundational work of the ICTY and ICTR, the ICC was providing 
permanent codification of the progress in normative rejection of tactical rape and 
sexual violence. It was an important development in the fight against sexual violence 
in conflict which was the focus of UNSCR 1325. 
Moreno-Ocampo provided examples from ICC cases. From the Central Africa 
Republic (CAR) he referred to one case where one party to the conflict had, ‘used 
rape as a primary weapon of war to terrorise and punish the civilian population…and 
to create a politically pliable situation.’16 This is a clear indicator that, as Moreno-
Ocampo himself recognised, there has been an ‘evolution’ regarding gender crimes.17 
                                                                
12 L Moreno-Ocampo, Sexual Violence as International Crime: Interdisciplinary Approaches to 
Evidence, International Criminal Court, The Hague, 16 June 2009. 
13 Moreno-Ocampo, p. 3. 
14 Moreno-Ocampo, pp. 4, 5. 
15 Moreno-Ocampo, p. 5. 
16 Moreno-Ocampo, p. 5. 
17 Moreno-Ocampo, p. 4. 
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With reference to the Application for Arrest Warrant for Al Bashir, President of 
Sudan, he noted that, ‘crimes of rape and sexual violence committed in the Darfur 
area are an ‘integral part’ of his attempt to destroy’ certain groups and ‘should be 
charged as genocide’.18 The connection with findings of the ICTY and ICTR are 
clear. He concluded, that his office ‘is part of a new system to end impunity’. 
The Years between UNSCR 1325 (2000) and UNSCR 1820 (2008)  
As has been shown, the translation of UNSCR 1325 into national policy and 
procedure was slow and varied in quality. Much of the initial excitement that 
accompanied UNSCR 1325 continued as there was wide recognition of its value as a 
basis for confronting sexual violence in war. But gaps in the resolution became clear 
and the reality of the limited degree of commitment really being demonstrated by 
states began to become evident. The reality of tactical rape and sexual violence in 
war continued to be reported and recognised. The ICTY and ICTR acted to provide 
new understanding that these were violations of existing international law. 
Increasingly there was rejection of such violations. It had been established with the 
two tribunals that there had been widespread rape in Rwanda and the former 
Yugoslavia. Further reports had emerged from Kosovo of mass rapes. One article, in 
2000, referred to more than 20,000 women raped in Kosovo.19 Reports that rape had 
occurred in Kosovo also emerged from NGO reports such as that by World Vision.20 
After the conflict in Sierra Leone and reports of mass rapes in that country, the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) was established in 2002 by agreement 
between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone ‘pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 1315’.21 The statute of this Special Court allowed 
‘prosecution of rape as a crime against humanity and as a violation of common 
                                                                
18 Moreno-Ocampo, p. 7. 
19 The Guardian, <www.guardian.co.uk/world/2000/apr/16/balkans>. 
20 Fitzpatrick, Kosovo.  
21 Statute for Special Court for Sierra Leone, art.2-3, retrieved 6 October 2011, <www.sc-sl.org>.  
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Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for Protection of War 
Victims and of additional protocol II thereto of 8 June 1977’.22 In 2007, the SCSL 
convicted three accused for rape as a crime against humanity and for sexual slavery 
and forced marriage.23  
The conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) also received wide media 
attention. In 2004, it was reported that hundreds of thousands of Congolese women 
had been subjected to sexual violence. It was reported, in 2004, that ‘an estimated 40 
rapes occur every day in one province alone’.24 By 2007, reports were being made of 
mass rape being carried out by all sides to the conflict in DRC. A UN expert on 
violence against women wrote that because of the seriousness and urgency of the 
situation in the DRC, his visit ‘focused mainly on sexual violence, which is rampant 
and committed by non-state armed groups, the Armed Forces of the DRC, the 
National Congolese Police and increasingly also by civilians’.25 His report, in 2007, 
continued that in one province alone, records indicated, ‘4500 sexual violence cases 
in the first six months of this year alone. The real number of cases is certainly many 
times higher as most victims live in inaccessible areas, are afraid to report or did not 
survive the violence’.26 What is interesting is that in light of the strategic approaches 
outlined in UNSCR 1325 this same UN expert also cautioned against: 
singling out sexual violence from the continuum of violence that Congolese women 
experience, which manifests itself in various forms in their homes and communities. 
                                                                
22 Statute for Special Court for Sierra Leone, art.2-3, retrieved 6 October 2011 <www.sc-sl.org>,  
23 The Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone v Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara, 
Santigie Borbor Kanu (the Africa accused) (judgement) SCSL-2004-16-T at 691 Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, 19 July 2007, available at <unhcr.org/refworld/docid46a46d262.html>. 
24 J Goodwin, ‘Silence=Rape’ The Nation, retrieved 10 October 2011, 
<www.thenation.com/doc/20040308/Goodwin> 19/4/2004 
25 UNHCR UN Expert on violence against women expresses serious concerns following visit to 
Democratic Republic of Congo 30 July 2007, retrieved 30 August 2007, <www.unhchr.ch>. 
26 UNHCR UN Expert on violence against women. 
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Violence against women seems to be perceived by large sectors of society to be 
normal.27  
This was reaffirming the growing understanding that confronting sexual violence in 
conflict must be approached in the context of confronting violence against women in 
peacetime. This UN expert report recommended that: 
empowerment and equality of women, socio-economic development and change of 
mentalities on gender must be prioritized as integral components of the 
reconstruction process if sustainable and just peace is to be achieved in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo.28  
This UN expert report reflected the contents and statements expressed in UNSCR 
1325 but there was a growing sense that UNSCR 1325 alone was insufficient to deal 
with tactical rape and sexual violence in war. A further resolution was needed and 
was achieved - this time more as a result of state advocacy rather than pressure from 
NGOs. 
The Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the UN has been credited with 
being the first mission to begin, in 2005, advocating for another resolution which was 
‘more actionable’, which would ‘specifically address the types of gross human rights 
violations that were increasingly being reported in conflict-related areas’ and which 
would ‘advance the women, peace and security agenda’.29 Whereas NGOs had been 
key players in advocating and formulating UNSCR 1325, this time some women’s 
groups initially resisted advocacy for a new resolution. They were reportedly 
concerned about reversion to an attitude of women as victims rather than participants 
                                                                
27 UN Expert on Violence, retrieved 30 July 2007. <www.unhcr.ch>. 
28 UN Expert on Violence, retrieved 30 July 2007. <www.unhcr.ch>. 
29 M Achuthan & R Black, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1820: A Preliminary 
Assessment of Challenges and Opportunities International Women’s Tribune Centre New York, 
September 2009, p. 7. 
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– an attitude which had begun to change after UNSCR 1325.30 They were also 
reportedly concerned that a new resolution would distract from the pressure to have 
UNSCR 1325 fully implemented.31  
In May 2008, the UK and UNIFEM hosted a conference at Wilton Park in the UK, 
attended by representatives from permanent missions to the UN, country level 
ministers, military personnel, policy-makers, NGO experts from conflict zones and 
practitioners and experts with insight to tackling sexual violence. Shortly after this 
conference, the USA expressed interest in advancing a resolution during its 
presidency of the Security Council.32 While NGOs had little input to the actual 
wording of this new resolution – certainly much less that with UNSCR 1325 – the 
NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security (NGOWG) eventually agreed 
minimum requirements for the text of the proposed resolution as the value of 
sustaining momentum and attention to the women, peace and security agenda. This 
set the scene for a day-long ministerial level debate on ‘Women, Peace and Security’ 
and the passing of UNSCR 1820 on June 19, 2008. 
Women, Peace and Security at the Security Council: The Debate Before UNSCR 
1820 
The day-long debate which preceded the passing of UNSCR 1820, in 2008, included 
representatives of member states, of Pacific Small Island Developing States, the 
African Union and the European Union and was a debate on ‘Women, Peace and 
Security’.33 It is worth looking closely at contributions to the discourse in this debate. 
It was noteworthy because it presaged the acceptance of sexual violence as an issue 
of concern and relevance to the Security Council. The language of ‘women, peace 
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33 Security Council SC/9364, 19 June 2008. 
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and security’ had begun to take hold, reflected as an issue where concerns of women 
intersected with security concerns. As the following analysis indicates, comments of 
speakers reflected the specific interest in the interconnectedness of violence against 
women and security. In some cases, it will be seen that input from states’ 
representatives could be interpreted as apportioning blame, deflecting attention 
towards other players or of furthering issues not immediately perceived as related to 
rape and sexual violence as instruments of war. Overall, the input from the UN, 
regional bodies and individual states all indicate a major shift in perception of 
tactical rape.  
The term most frequently used was sexual violence but statements frequently 
referred directly to rape as a weapon and a tactic of war. Representatives of some 
member states articulated clearer understandings of tactical rape. The representative 
of Austria used the term tactic in its statement. It highlighted sexual violence as ‘not 
only a manifestation of war, but a deliberate wartime tactic’ as well as a security 
threat.34 The representative of Argentina recognised ‘an increasing use of sexual 
violence as a political or military tool’ and noted that ‘rape and other heinous forms 
of sexual violence can be used by agents of the State as a tool to spread terror, to 
torture and degrade those it considers its ‘enemies’’.35 The representative of Benin 
recognised that such violence on women ‘was in full contradiction to international 
standards’.36 The Philippines’ representative stated that sexual violence was ‘deeply 
rooted in a pervasive culture of discrimination’, highlighted by the unequal power 
equation that denied equal status to women, ‘which was manifested during conflict 
through the social, political and cultural norms identifying women and girls as 
property of men as well as sexual objects’.37 The representative of Liberia noted that 
                                                                
34 SC/9364, p. 24. 
35 SC/9364, p. 24. 
36 SC/9364, p. 29. 
37 SC/9364, p. 26. 
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such acts of sexual violence against women during conflict were embedded in 
cultural beliefs and practices ‘that will have to go’.38 Taken together these statements 
indicate that understanding of the nature, causes and impact of sexual violence were 
being clarified. While this is a long way from actually reducing the incidence of 
sexual violence in war, it does at least provide a base for understanding and 
recognising the issue. 
The key outcome of the debate was the acceptance of tactical rape as a Security 
Council concern. This was expressed by Condoleezza Rice, then Secretary of State 
of the USA, holding the Council Presidency, when she noted that there had long been 
debate about whether the use of rape and sexual violence as instruments of warfare 
was an issue that should be debated by the Security Council and which the Council 
was authorised to address.39 She declared that the broad and high-level participation 
in the debate that day meant a strong agreement that this was indeed an issue for the 
SC and the SC would ‘affirm that sexual violence against women not only affected 
the safety of women, but the economic situation and security of their nations’.40 She 
added that member states were responsible for holding their troops accountable for 
any abuse of this recognised expectation that states ‘protect and provide justice for its 
most vulnerable’.41 Many other speakers reiterated these sentiments with reference to 
security of states as well as security of women. However, as an analysis of other 
inputs indicates, there was often a lack of clarity regarding the precise type of 
security being highlighted and there was no definition of women’s security, human 
security, state security or even international security. The terms frequently appear to 
have been used interchangeably.  
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Various representatives and office-holders of the UN referred to security issues. Ban 
Ki Moon, the UN Secretary General, spoke of sexual violence as posing ‘a grave 
threat to women’s security in fragile post-conflict countries’ and undermining 
‘efforts to cement peace’.42 The President of the UN General Assembly referred to 
the Assembly’s thematic debate on ‘Human Security’ which had resulted in 
demonstrating the importance that member states ascribed to the integration of 
‘human security perspectives into the Organisation’s peace and security work’.43 The 
President continued that ‘people-centred solutions at the crossroads of security, 
development and human rights must be at the heart of efforts to fight gender-based 
crimes in conflict situations because such violence against women was an inherent 
and grave threat to human security’.44 The UN Deputy Secretary General referred 
back to UNSCR 1325, which she said demonstrated that sexual violence was not just 
a gender issue but a fundamental security concern.45  
Major General Cammart, former Division Commander of the UN’s Organisation 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) who had served for thirty-
nine years, referred to what he had seen of the violence against women and girls in 
conflict and said that ‘even when conflict formally ended and UN peacekeepers had 
been deployed, women and girls continued to be targeted’.46 He continued: ‘the 
current climate of impunity in most post-conflict contexts allows the many forms of 
violence, including sexual violence to flourish’ and added that often the political will 
to end the vicious cycle of impunity did not exist. He added: ‘sexual violence must 
be seen as a threat to international peace and security’.47 The representative of 
Panama stated that systematic acts of gender-based violence threatened international 
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peace and security.48 So, within just these contributions to the debate there was 
reference to women’s security, human security, security linked with development 
and human rights and security as a threat to international peace and stability. 
Progress in recognising the links between women’s security and the need to protect 
them from tactical rape had been made. The links between women’s security and the 
security of states and international stability was implied but still not clearly defined.  
Member states also contributed to the discourse with diverse references to security. 
The representative from Croatia referred to the need for ‘social norms’ to ensure 
‘women’s physical and economic security’ and informed the gathering that Croatia 
was integrating a gender perspective into its national security policy.49 In this and 
some other statements there was recognition emerging of the links between women’s 
security and economic security of states, but still the focus was on security in some 
form or another. The UK said that the international community now better 
understood how sexual violence damaged prospects for post-conflict recovery and 
that the Security Council should show leadership by recognising that widespread and 
systematic sexual violence could pose a threat to international peace and security.50 
Belgium believed that sexual violence against women and children was an issue of 
international peace and security and the international community should mobilise all 
efforts to end sexual violence as a weapon of war.51 Costa Rica said that systematic 
sexual violence exacerbated conflicts and was an enormous obstacle to resolving 
them.52 Similar statements were made (inter alia) by representatives of Ireland, the 
Republic of Korea, Tonga and Bosnia Herzegovina. These all reflected progress in 
seeing sexual violence and its aftermath as an issue demanding attention – not 
because it is an issue for women but because it is an issue for communities, for states 
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and for the international community of states. The representative of Japan said 
clearly: ‘the matter should not be treated as only a women’s issue’.53 This evidenced 
real change from attitudes early in the 1990s. The representative of Ghana was clear 
that rape ranked highly among the core security challenges of the time and should 
not be viewed as only a human rights or women’s issue.54 Ghana’s representative 
also called for security institutions to be encouraged to work more closely with 
women’s organisations and this was just one of the calls for specific action including 
intergovernmental oversight of UNSCR 1325 because responses of states had been 
‘woefully inadequate’.55 
A number of member states placed emphasis on how to respond to the issue. France 
referred to doubts which had been raised as to whether or not a debate on sexual 
violence in armed conflict should be included in the Security Council which debated 
peace and war. France believed that peace could not be re-established while 
remaining silent about the violence done to women and with a realisation that ‘law 
must be supported by action’, it promised that the EU would make the issue a 
priority ‘on both political and financial levels’.56 By making specific reference to 
financial priorities for action France was sending a strong message of commitment. 
Rhetorical commitment must be accompanied by practical commitment, especially 
by enabling practical action, which means providing funds. In contrast, Vietnam 
urged that any action guard against unnecessary administrative and financial burdens 
for member states – a message that calling for financial commitment could impact on 
all states and therefore was not to be taken lightly.57 This might be interpreted as a 
difference between the relative strengths of states’ economies but it did highlight that 
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actually financing steps to achieve the goals set out in resolutions could not be taken 
for granted.  
The debate highlighted a range of diverse issues in this important discourse of 
confronting sexual violence. References to security were common. The 
representative of Israel referred to the Wilton Park Conference and recommendations 
made there that sexual violence be viewed as a security issue and that the 
international community should identify the circumstances under which sexual 
violence threatened national and international peace and security.58 The 
representative of Israel also stated that a there was need for ‘change in societal 
attitudes and norms on sexual violence’.59 The act of states actively calling for such 
normative change is an important step in achieving it. This statement also referenced 
the need to confront societal attitudes – patriarchy has been shown to be a factor in 
the efficiency of tactical rape and sexual violence in war. The representative of 
Germany, stating that sexual violence was a security problem requiring a systematic 
security response, supported ‘a stronger normative and operative framework on 
gender equality and empowerment’ and asked that the ‘topic should be mainstreamed 
into the Council’s work programme, including in its discussions of conflict and post-
conflict situations’.60 This was another indicator that the issue demanded ongoing 
attention as part of the work of the UNSC, mainstreaming it into core security 
considerations. The representative of Canada referred specifically to Sudan, DRC 
and the wider Great Lakes region where sexual violence was a clear threat to 
international peace and security and where the problem required a ‘security-based 
response’.61 These calls for inclusion in mainstream work of the UNSC were echoed 
in the contribution from the representative of Ecuador, which stated that ‘sexual 
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violence, including violence perpetrated during times of armed conflict, should be 
systematically and permanently examined by the Council’.62  
The two states which had been most resistant to acknowledging that sexual violence 
was an issue for the Security Council were China and Russia. However, even these 
two states, so often reluctant to be involved in issues of humanitarianism and human 
rights at the UNSC, had been persuaded to agree and eventually to pass a further 
resolution, UNSCR 1820, which followed this debate. A letter from seventy-one 
women’s organisations in the DRC, calling for help, has been credited with 
contributing to persuading them to support the trend evident in the attitudes of the 
majority of states.63 The Russian spokesperson did eventually condemn rape and 
sexual violence and stated that the international community must address the issue of 
women, peace and security broadly ‘not just as a matter of sexual violence’.64 This 
representative of Russia was more guarded regarding the UNSC role. While he said 
that responding to widespread and systematic violence against women should be a 
priority for the UN, he cautioned against ‘duplication of efforts in the field’ as the 
draft resolution being considered appeared to be a repetition of work being done by 
the Assembly which also requested the General Secretary to report on sexual 
violence.65 However, the statement did include, along with a call for condemnation, a 
call for ‘strict sanctions, especially in situations where the practice was widespread 
and systematic’.66 Admittedly, the nature of such sanctions was not spelled out but it 
was an inclusion which could be read as a serious concern. When the resolution was 
eventually put to the UNSC, Russia agreed to it. China also agreed to the resolution. 
In its statement it had urged that the UNSC should focus on prevention of conflicts, 
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peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction.67 These were, of course, already 
established as the ongoing work of the UNSC. He condemned sexual violence, called 
on all governments to investigate and punish those who perpetrated such violence, 
while urging that ‘sexual violence should not be treated as a stand-alone issue’.68 
There was not a clear commitment to the UNSC undertaking to act on sexual 
violence in war per se, but it was close enough to ensure the resolution would 
eventually pass. China and Russia were also among the states which focussed on the 
role of the UN itself in confronting rape by its own troops of peacekeepers. The 
Secretary General had already noted a policy of zero tolerance for abuses by its 
peacekeepers.69 This policy certainly needed affirmation but one cannot help but feel 
that a focus on this element of action might be construed as a way of shifting focus 
away from specific states and ensuring that the UN took its share of responsibility. 
Many states acknowledged the shortcomings of UNSCR 1325 and the shortcomings 
in its implementation. This was the basis for recognising that any new resolution 
needed accountability, benchmarks and focal points in the UN system to ensure 
follow up on implementation at national levels. The representative of Italy said that 
the time had come to ‘shift gears’ in implementing 1325 because the link between 
sexual violence and the maintenance of peace and security demanded immediate 
action.70 The representative of Indonesia referred to UNSCR 1325 as a guidepost but 
recognised that more work needed to be done.71 The representative of Tanzania 
supported UNSCR but called for ‘stern measures’ to end impunity.72 It commented 
that despite the number of calls in various Security Council documents to protect 
women and girls, there was an ‘escalation of systematic and brutal acts as calculated 
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tools of war against civilians’.73 This was one of the states which reminded the 
gathering that such attacks were in clear violation of existing international law and as 
such, brought a responsibility on the UNSC to take real action. Concerned for a more 
effective follow up to UNSCR 1325, the representative of Netherlands referred to 
national action plans and noted that at last more states were formulating them.74 
Some states called for help in progressing actions with Spain identifying a need to 
study ‘how to structure and institutionalise an efficient response’.75 The 
representative of Bangladesh noted that there was still inadequate understanding of 
the gender dimensions of conflict, a lack of understanding which led to gaps in 
institutional capacity to address’.76 These contributions are indicative of a narrowing 
of focus to specific actions needed to ensure specific effective action. It is true that 
they still did not really detail with whom or where precisely responsibility for these 
actions should be placed, but these states were at least prepared to engage in the 
debate and generally accept the need for action. At some level, these were positive 
calls for specific action. 
While the final resolution, which was the result of this debate, is a key step further in 
the development of normative rejection of tactical rape, it is the debate itself which 
indicates the progress made in the understanding of states and their preparedness to 
accept responsibility for confronting it. It demonstrated a preparedness to shoulder 
responsibility for sexual violence in war. It demonstrated an understanding that 
sexual violence was an issue of security and whether it was security for women, for 
humanity, for states or for the international community, it fell under the 
responsibility of the Security Council to deal with it. At the end of the day-long 
debate UNSCR 1820 was passed and led then to further commitments and later 
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resolutions – all under the rubric of ‘women, peace and security’. These resolutions 
are the formal expressions of attitudes and commitment which comprised important 
discourse in the development of normative rejection of tactical rape.  
Women, Peace and Security: UNSCR 1820 (2008) 
The first operative paragraph of UNSCR 1820 was a strong statement about the 
reality of tactical rape where the UNSC ‘stresses’ that sexual violence, ‘can be used 
or commissioned as a tactic of war’ and recognised that it ‘can exacerbate situations 
of armed conflict and may impede restoration of international peace and security’.77 
The verbs italicised, as in any resolution, may indicate the level of seriousness. 
Having acknowledged this reality the text continued that the UNSC:  
affirms in this regard that effective steps to prevent and respond to such acts…can 
significantly contribute to international peace and security, and expresses its 
readiness when considering situations on the agenda of the Council, to, where 
necessary, adopt appropriate steps to address widespread or systematic sexual 
abuse.78 
So, the existence and the potential for impact on international peace and security 
were beginning points for the resolution. The links between women, peace and 
security had been explicitly recognised.  
Although the resolution stated that such acts (of sexual violence) ‘can contribute to 
international peace and security’ it fell just short of saying they did represent a threat. 
While the resolution then expresses readiness to confront sexual violence, it failed to 
be explicit about it coming under the authority and duty of the UNSC to confront it 
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under Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN.79 However, it then aligned sexual 
violence with situations where the UNSC would be considering items on its agenda, 
accepting that dealing with such sexual violence was within the scope of responses 
and concerns of the UNSC. There have been concerns expressed by some women’s 
groups that the resolution applied only to sexual violence and not to other forms of 
gender-based violence.80 While this is a legitimate concern, the resolution did 
maintain momentum on UNSCR 1325 and did continue to reflect a strategic 
approach to women’s vulnerability generally in peacetime as well as in conflict. For 
these reasons the more specific focus on detailing responses to sexual violence 
should be seen as progress within the broader context of women’s vulnerability to 
violence. 
In paragraph 5 of UNSCR 1820, there is what could be seen as a major development 
reflecting the seriousness with which the issue was being taken – the resolution 
‘Affirms its intention’ when ‘establishing and renewing state-specific sanctions’ to 
consider the issue and ‘take into consideration the appropriateness of targeted and 
graduated measures’.81 The application of sanctions is a key tool in the armament of 
the UNSC and by referring to sanctions in the same paragraph as referencing 
graduated and targeted measures, it may be taken that the UNSC would consider 
using this tool when confronting sexual violence in war. This is another strong 
measure of the seriousness with which the issue was being viewed. There can be 
criticism of this wording as being too weak but the inclusion of the paragraph was an 
important sign of progress. It is, of course, acknowledged that the likelihood of such 
sanctions being applied without a veto from China and Russia is slight. However, 
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this analysis of progress on the issue of women, peace and security has demonstrated 
that change happens slowly and incrementally rather than in great leaps forward. 
This overall acceptance of responsibility did clear the way for practical responses 
and reactions such as that expressed in the previous paragraph where it ‘demands the 
immediate and complete cessation by all parties to armed conflict of acts of sexual 
violence against civilians with immediate effect’.82 This is strong language for a 
resolution and reflects a degree of seriousness on the part of member states to 
confront the issue. The next paragraph continued in a similarly strong vein with a 
demand that all parties protect civilians, including women and girls, from all forms 
of sexual violence.83 Throughout the resolution, responsible agents such as parties to 
conflict, states in conflict, states, regions and sub-regions were identified as 
requested to take action.  
Specific action was urged on the Secretary General of the UN and UN agencies. 
Countries contributing forces, civil society and NGOs and police forces were 
identified for specific action. The role of the Peacebuilding Commission was 
stressed. The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was established in 2006 as an 
intergovernmental advisory body to support peace efforts in countries emerging from 
conflict, and as a key addition to the capacity of the International Community in the 
broad peace agenda. It has a unique role in bringing together all of the relevant 
actors, including international donors, the international financial institutions, national 
governments, troop contributing countries. Its role includes marshalling resources 
and advising on and proposing integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding 
and recovery and, where appropriate, highlighting any gaps that threaten to 
undermine peace.84 The resolution called upon the PBC for provision of advice and 
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recommendations regarding particularly post-conflict strategies for ways to address 
sexual violence committed during and in the aftermath of conflict.85 There was direct 
reference to regional bodies in reconstruction and rehabilitation processes, which 
proved to be an astute move as it will have contributed to the formulation of the 
African Union gender policy of 2009 which called on its members and states to use 
UNSCR 1325 and UNSCR 1820 as points of reference in working to protect women 
and girls.86 
There were strong indications in UNSCR that the rejection of sexual violence in war 
was becoming institutionalised at international level. This specifying of particular 
actors and agencies was an improvement on UNSCR 1325 where implementation of 
strategies was largely left to states as a general body, with a few directions to the 
Secretary General and the UN agencies. In this resolution the Secretary General is 
requested to ‘systematically include in his written reports to the Council on conflict 
situations his observations concerning the protection of women and girls and his 
recommendations in this regard’.87 This meant that all considerations of conflict in 
any country would include consideration of the protection of women and girls – a 
major change in procedures. A detailed report on implementing UNSCR 1820 was 
also requested but this seemed to be a one-off request for focussed follow up, and 
concerns about this continuing were clarified and confronted in later resolutions to be 
discussed in this chapter.  
The resolution was clear about the subject of its concerns. The main body of UNSCR 
1820 dealt with sexual violence when it is used as a tactic of war to deliberately 
target civilian populations in order to achieve political and military objectives. It 
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referred to sexual violence when it constitutes a widespread or systematic attack on 
civilian populations, including opportunistic attacks as a consequence of 
environments of impunity.88 It noted that ‘rape and other forms of sexual violence 
can constitute a war crime, a crime against humanity or a constitutive act with 
respect to genocide’.89 The work of the international tribunals was reflected in this 
wording as these judiciaries had established that tactical rape and sexual violence in 
war were clear violations of existing international law. The resolution highlighted 
specific related issues such as sexual exploitation and abuse; command 
responsibility; issues of abuse which may arise in UN camps for refugees and 
internally displaced persons.  
Importantly the resolution approached the issue of sexual violence in conflict as 
something which must be confronted. It was not treated as inevitable. It was treated 
as a violation of existing laws and something to be rejected and opposed and for 
which there must be accountability. By affirming that sexual violence of this nature 
is against international laws and standards, the resolution presented a tool for 
advocates, civil society and NGOs to use in work to make governments act and in 
reforming national laws and ensuring appropriate, effective, relevant national 
legislation. This affirmation of sexual violence as a deliberate tactic rather than as an 
unavoidable aspect of conflict provided a basis for excluding amnesty and for 
disallowing impunity for those who perpetrate such violence. 
What was missing in the resolution was any direction to specific overall leadership 
for ensuring implementation by the various actors and there were no monitoring 
mechanisms included. While the Secretary General was requested to include the 
issue in reports and to provide at least one report on UNSCR 1820 itself, there was 
no mention of any specific focal point for ensuring implementation and monitoring 
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states’ or even the UN agencies’ actions. The IWTC assessment of the challenges 
and opportunities of UNSCR 1820 outlined a number of possible avenues for 
strengthening the impact of the resolution.90 There was advocacy for formation of a 
UNSC Working Group on women, peace and security, similar to the existing 
working group on Children and Armed Conflict. Other recommendations included 
setting time frames for certain actions, more explicit monitoring and measurements 
of progress, with overall goals of preventing widespread violence from leading to 
cultures of impunity and strengthening effective accountability mechanisms to 
prosecute perpetrators.91 These recommendations recognised that while there will 
likely be similarities between conflicts the situation of women and girls needed to be 
considered individually for each community or group involved or impacted by 
conflicts. These were valuable insights to areas where further work was needed to 
build on UNSCR 1820 and UNSCR 1888 (2009)92 filled some of these gaps. 
UNSCR 1888 (2009) 
UNSCR 1888 was passed in September 2009 and it built on UNSCR 1820, to 
address lack of specificity in that resolution which had, in its turn, tried to address 
lack of specificity in UNSCR 1325. The resolution in 2009 reaffirmed SC concerns 
expressed in UNSCR 1820 about sexual violence as a tactic of war and reiterated its 
understanding of the nature, extent and impact of such violence against women. 
However, it went further than UNSCR 1820 had done and listed twenty-nine 
operative paragraphs, most of which were considerably more specific than in 
previous resolutions.  
UNSCR 1820 had included a demand that all parties immediately take measures for 
the protection of women and children. UNSCR 1888 included in those measures a 
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demand that those measures include, ‘vetting candidates for national armies and 
security forces to ensure the exclusion of those associated with serious violations of 
international humanitarian and human rights law, including sexual violence’.93 This 
was approaching the concern to articulate practical steps for states to take as they met 
their responsibilities under previous resolutions. There were also further steps in 
institutionalising rejection of sexual violence in war. UNSCR 1888 called on the 
Secretary General to identify and appoint a Special Representative to provide 
‘coherent and strategic leadership’ in coordination and collaboration with other 
entities primarily through the inter-agency initiative ‘United Nations Action Against 
Sexual Violence in Conflict’ in situations of particular concern regarding sexual 
violence.94 The Special Representative was to work with UN personnel on the ground 
and national governments to strengthen the rule of law. The Special Representative 
was to include information about the prevalence of sexual violence in reports to the 
Security Council by UN peacekeeping missions. Teams of experts were to be 
immediately deployed to situations of particular concern with respect to sexual 
violence in armed conflict, working through the United Nations’ presence on the 
ground and with the consent of the host government, to assist national authorities to 
strengthen the rule of law.95 These were specific steps to be taken to provide the 
leadership and focal points missing in UNSCR 1820. Responsibilities and responses 
for practical confrontation of sexual violence were to be placed clearly within UN 
structures. 
Concerns which had been voiced about reporting in UNSCR 1820 were also 
addressed. UNSCR 1888 registered specific steps regarding both monitoring and 
reporting with calls for the Secretary General to devise specific proposals to ensure 
more effective monitoring and reporting within the UN system on the protection of 
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women and children from rape and other sexual violence – setting a time frame of 
three months for him to comply with these requests.96 In line with the vetting 
requirements of applicants to security posts as noted in paragraph 3, UNSCR also 
asked for annual reports to provide details on the perpetrators of any sexual violence. 
There was a request for the Secretary General to include, where appropriate, in his 
regular reports on individual peacekeeping operations, information on steps taken 
within those operations, to implement measures to protect civilians, particularly 
women and children, against sexual violence.97 There were other paragraphs 
regarding peacekeeping and encouragement for states, ‘to increase access to health 
care, psychosocial support, legal assistance and socio-economic reintegration 
services for victims of sexual violence, in particular in rural areas’.98 These 
paragraphs reflected the growing awareness that confronting sexual violence in war 
required multi-faceted responses to meet the needs of survivors. They went a long 
way to meet concerns regarding perceived gaps in UNSCR 1820. In addition there 
was a specific request for regular reports from the Secretary General to the UNSC on 
the implementation of UNSCR 1888 and these were to include information regarding 
‘parties to armed conflict that are credibly suspected of committing patterns of rape 
or other forms of sexual violence, in situations that are on the Council’s agenda’.99 
This certainly seemed to send a message that violations of international law 
regarding sexual violence were to be taken seriously.  
An important addition to the lists of actors which had been a feature of UNSCR 1820 
was the mention of leaders at the national and local level, ‘including traditional 
leaders where they exist and religious leaders’ with encouragement for them ‘to play 
a more active role in sensitising communities on sexual violence to avoid 
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marginalisation and stigmatisation of victims, to assist with their social reintegration, 
and to combat a culture of impunity for these crimes’.100 This was a recognition that 
the issue of sexual violence in conflict had some roots in cultural and societal 
attitudes and that there would be no international acceptance of cultural or religious 
differences as excuses for such use of tactical rape or other sexual violence. It was 
also a recognition that international norms needed to be substantiated and 
institutionalised at local levels. 
While UNSCR 1888 was clearly an improvement on previous resolutions regarding 
reporting and regarding spelling out more precisely a serious commitment to 
confronting tactical rape, it did still omit some areas. It did not include specific 
accountability and implementation mechanisms. There was a focal point in the 
recommended appointment of a Special Representative and there were calls for 
agencies to report. But the mechanisms and methods for the UNSC to ensure and 
monitor implementation of its agreed actions were still missing. What is pertinent is 
that this resolution followed so quickly on UNSCR 1820. The pace of action seemed 
to be increasing. There was also little doubt that even if resolutions did not yet fulfill 
all requirements to ensure comprehensive confrontation of sexual violence in war, 
there had been major and important steps towards achieving agreement that such 
action was not normatively acceptable. 
UNSCR 1889: Building on UNSCR 1325 
In October of 2009, the same year as UNSCR 1888 was passed, a further resolution, 
UNSCR 1889, was also unanimously passed by the UNSC.101 While UNSCR 1888 
had built on UNSCR 1820, this resolution emphasised specific elements more 
directly enunciated in UNSCR 1325. It emphasised elements of that earlier resolution 
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which called for women to be recognised as participants and agents in creating 
sustainable peace and security. This was an affirmation that confronting tactical rape 
required broad strategies to ensure women’s capacity and potential to be part of 
creating the communities in which they lived and in contributing positively to the 
way those communities dealt with issues of peace and security. 
The second paragraph in the preamble of UNSCR 1889 was an important re-
statement of the connection between women, peace and security and the role of the 
UNSC itself. The resolution is set in the context of the UNSC being ‘guided by the 
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and bearing in mind the 
primary responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter for the maintenance 
of international peace and security’.102 The debate about whether or not this issue of 
women, peace and security is one for the UNSC has been concluded. The preamble 
referred to the report of the Secretary General of 16 September 2009 in which it was 
noted that obstacles to implementation of UNSCR 1325 related to the breadth of that 
resolution.103 That report of the Secretary General had noted that the breadth of 
UNSCR 1325 often meant that ‘novelty and creativity’ were required in 
implementation of the resolution and the difficulties which arose from a ‘weak 
implementation framework and absence of clear targets and reliable data’.104 It had 
become clear that more work was needed to make UNSCR 1325 achievable. 
The preamble to UNSCR 1889 also enumerated a diverse range of concerns and 
obstacles to women’s involvement in ‘the prevention and resolution of conflicts and 
participation in post-conflict public life’, and recognised that obstacles arose from a 
more diverse set of causes than those recognised in UNSCR 1325.105 These causes 
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were noted as being the result of ‘violence and intimidation, lack of security and lack 
of rule of law, cultural discrimination and stigmatisation, including the rise of 
extremist or fanatical views on women, and socio-economic factors including the 
lack of access to education’.106 This builds on the inclusion noted above about the 
references to community and religious leaders in UNSCR 1888. Overall the 
preamble recognised that the marginalisation of women could delay or undermine the 
achievement of durable peace, security and reconciliation. It noted that women in 
situations of armed conflict and post-conflict situations still continued to be ‘often 
considered as victims and not as actors in addressing and resolving situations of 
armed conflict’ and it stressed ‘the need to focus not only on protection of women 
but also on their empowerment in peacebuilding’.107 This answered to some degree 
any possible concerns that UNSCR 1888 would reverse progress made regarding 
women as participants and not merely victims in issues of peace and security. As the 
preamble also expressed concern that women’s capacity to engage in public decision-
making and economic recovery often did not receive adequate recognition or 
financing in post-conflict situations, it could be expected that the operative 
paragraphs would include some specific actions.108 The mention of finance often 
reflects seriousness in approach to issues. 
Consequently major developments in UNSCR 1889 had a practical focus on the 
participation of women in peace processes, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding. It called for increased participation of women at all levels of the 
peace process, particularly as high-level mediators and on mediation teams as well as 
in peacekeeping as special representatives and special envoys.109 It reiterated that 
women had a vital place as participants in preventing and resolving conflicts with 
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frequent reference to the need to ensure such participation.110 It requested the 
Secretary General to include gender advisors on relevant missions.111 As part of 
advancing the concerns regarding women’s development donors were ‘urged’ to 
address women’s empowerment and insist on transparency in the tracking of 
funds.112 All of these actions represented advances in taking seriously the recognition 
that confronting tactical rape and sexual violence in conflict required broad-ranging 
strategies to confront societal status, attitudes and inequalities which contributed to 
women’s vulnerability in peace – and vulnerability in conflict. They were steps 
which recognised that women have capacity to be involved in processes relating to 
their own security. 
UNSCR 1889 had a general direction of strengthening and making more specific the 
elements in UNSCR 1325. There were calls for states to continue developing 
National Action Plans for the translation of UNSCR 1325 strategies into national 
policy and practice and to collect relevant and, where appropriate, gender-aggregated 
data for the development of national strategies to help understand women’s needs.113 
UNSCR 1889 did not omit reference to UNSCR 1888, requesting that the Secretary 
General ‘ensure full transparency, cooperation and coordination of efforts between 
the Special Representative of the Secretary General on Children and Armed Conflict 
and the Special Representative of the Secretary General on sexual violence and 
armed conflict whose appointment has been requested by its resolution 1888 
(2009)’.114 
A key development in working for more practical application of the principles set out 
in UNSCR 1325 was a call for recommendations in 2010 on how the Security 
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Council should receive, analyse, and act on information of violations of UNSCR 
1325. This was a direct request for the Secretary-General to submit to the Security 
Council within six months, ‘a set of indicators for use at the global level to track 
implementation of its resolution 1325 (2000), which could serve as a common basis 
for reporting by relevant United Nations entities, other international and regional 
organisations, and Member States, on the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) 
in 2010 and beyond’.115 There was also a request for the Secretary General to provide 
a review of progress on UNSCR 1325 which was to include an assessment of the 
processes by which the Security Council received, analysed and took action on 
information pertinent to UNSCR 1325 and recommendations on further measures to 
improve coordination across the UN and with member states and civil society.116 
Taken together these actions represent developments towards working to put into 
practice and policy, issues recognised in UNSCR 1325 and informing states so that 
they were better equipped to confront the reality of the impact on women of sexual 
violence in conflict. The request that all country reports include information on the 
situation of women and girls again reinforced the acceptance that this was an issue of 
work for the UNSC.117  
While again this resolution was an advance in the commitment of the UNSC to 
confront the issues around women, peace and security there remained some 
shortfalls. The resolution still failed to identify or refer to specific sanctions for 
violations of relevant international law and violations of the norm rejecting tactical 
rape. There were still no strong enforcement measures but more detailed reporting 
was a useful step. The sad reality was that tactical rape and sexual violence in war 
continued even though efforts to confront, prevent and bring perpetrators to account 
were becoming more prevalent at the international level. 
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Women, Peace and Security: Developments at the Security Council in 2010 
Late in 2010, there were further significant developments at the Security Council on 
the issue of women, peace and security. The first was the report of the Secretary 
General to the UNSC on September 28, 2010.118 This was recognition that a decade 
had passed since UNSCR 1325 and while the role of women and peace was ‘now 
more clearly integrated into the Council’s deliberations’, there remained much more 
to do before sexual violence was fully confronted.119 Some specific developments 
were identified in the work of the UN, some states and civil society but, importantly, 
this report was a response to calls made in UNSCR 1889 for indicators relating to 
monitoring progress because despite increased commitment to confronting issues 
such as tactical rape, ‘significant achievements are difficult to identify and 
quantify’.120  
There was a list of the number of resolutions and recommendations which had 
included reference to women, peace and security in the first half of 2010 and these 
included: seven out of fifteen Presidential Statements and thirteen out of twenty-eight 
resolutions.121 It was understandable that with such a degree of inclusion in the 
relevant aspects of UNSC work, there was a need for some way to monitor the 
impact of the resolutions. The report noted that this would need commitment from 
the Council and efficient and effective approaches in processing the information 
which came to the table from diverse sources such as UN agencies, states, civil 
society and NGOs.122 There was a list of tools such as reports from experts and 
specific missions, assessments commissions of enquiry, which the UNSC could use 
for information and a related suggestion that the UNSC could issue regular 
statements to media to stimulate national and international discussion and 
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momentum.123 Section IV of the report was a detailed review of the first UN system-
wide Action Plan 2008-2009 on the implementation of UNSCR 1325. 
In direct response to calls from UNSCR 1889, as noted above, this report included a 
detailed list of indicators to be used to monitor, analyse and review progress. The 
process towards developing these indicators had begun earlier with an Open Debate 
in April 2010 after which the Secretary General had been requested to carry out 
further consultations with SC members and other stakeholders.124 The indicators as 
attached to the report included some which were qualitative, some quantitative, and 
included some financial tracking.125 On October 26, 2010, the Security Council also 
held an Open Debate on Women, Peace and Security which considered the twenty-
six indicators contained in the annex of the report. The Council adopted a 
Presidential Statement.126 This was a non-binding political statement which 
expressed support for taking forward the indicators but did not specifically endorse 
them, as had been hoped for by the report itself. However, at least by supporting 
them, the adopted statement allowed for the UN and relevant actors to begin 
operationalising them. 
The next significant development was that on November 24, 2010, the Secretary 
General presented a report to the UNSC in which he referred to the mass rapes being 
carried out by all sides in the ongoing conflict in the DRC late in July and in August 
of that year, which had ‘provoked unprecedented public outrage’.127 Such outrage at 
the ongoing practice of rape as a tactic in the attacks on civilians was sustained by 
public reports of such abuses and the UNSC recognised that it could not be ignored. 
In this report, the Secretary General noted that sexual violence ‘is not specific to any 
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era, culture or continent’.128 He continued to comment that rape is not synonymous 
with sexual violence which covers a wider range of acts under international law and 
he highlighted the fact that disaggregating sexual violence into more specific actions 
‘permits a more focused approach’.129 This was a recognition that there are diverse 
types of rape in war and one of those types is tactical rape, not just opportunistic 
rape. Rejection of tactical rape such as that evident in the DRC was contributing to 
rejection of other abuses which fell under the general definition of sexual violence. 
Importantly, the report continued that while sexual violence had for long been 
approached as a matter of reproductive health or development, ‘the international 
community has begun to embrace the concept of conflict-related sexual violence so 
as to address the security-related social drivers of such violence’.130 This was 
reinforcement of the strategic approach to confronting tactical rape: recognising that 
tactical rape is one element of sexual violence and recognising that preventing it 
requires a broad base of strategies targeting root causes as well as outcomes.  
In the report there was reference to questions remaining in some circles even after 
UNSCR 1820 as to how dealing with sexual violence ‘corresponds with the 
fundamental purpose of security institutions’.131 The answer to such questions was 
made clear in that while some people still see ‘bullets, bombs and blades as war’ and 
rape as a ‘random disciplinary infraction or private aspect of culture-based gender 
relations’, sexual violence in war must be confronted under definitions found in 
international law.132 The understanding of tactical rape as a purposeful and political 
act, while still not completely accepted in some circles, had certainly developed. The 
report notes that in the DRC, the numbers of military casualties were ‘dwarfed’ by 
the numbers of rape, killing and destruction experienced by civilians so that sexual 
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violence has become a ‘front line consideration’, that the collapse of the rule of law 
often enables new and more brutal forms of rape and that rape of boys and men was 
being included in the ‘repertoire of armed and political violence’ as a method of 
attacking ‘community norms and structures’.133 
Despite this growing awareness and a developing discourse rejecting tactical rape, 
the report noted that it was remarkable that two days after UNSCR 1820 was passed 
and in a conflict where the ICC was investigating a case which alleged the number of 
rapes far outweighed the number of killings in the Central Republic of Africa, a 
peace accord between the Government and three armed groups was signed that made 
no mention of sexual violence.134 There followed a detailed report of initiatives and 
progress aimed at implementing UNSCR 1820 and 1888, a list which demonstrates 
serious attempts to respond to those resolutions. However, before making further 
recommendations the report noted, ‘tragically, laudable progress at the level of 
policy has been overshadowed by the surge of sexual violence’ in the DRC and its 
continuing prevalence elsewhere.135 It was, indeed, tragic that the attention and 
growing commitment at international level did nothing to prevent the suffering of the 
women in the DRC. But, the increased awareness, the increased recognition that such 
suffering is a reality and the increased – even if not yet thorough – rejection of such 
suffering does provide a basis for future confrontation of the causes, impact and 
perpetration of tactical rape and sexual violence in conflict. 
Recommendations in this report of the Secretary General included some very specific 
actions. The system of monitoring, analysing and reporting on incidents of sexual 
violence was proposed in response to a ‘gaps analysis’ identified in paragraph 26 of 
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UNSCR 1888.136 The UNSC was requested to support the development and 
application of this monitoring system. The Secretary General also proposed applying 
increased pressure on perpetrators through sanctions and by listing in annual reports 
the names of those parties engaged in sexual violence in situations of armed 
violence.137 This was a further step forward in that such listing had the potential to 
publicise and shame those who violated what had become a norm rejecting sexual 
violence. These recommendations were taken up for discussion in the formulation of 
UNSCR 1960 which followed within weeks. 
Further significant developments came on December 16 and 17, 2010. On December 
16, 2010, UNSCR 1960 (2010) was passed and this was followed by a Security 
Council Open Debate on Sexual Violence in Conflict.138 This resolution followed the 
trend of previous reports, attempting to create institutional structures and processes 
to confront sexual violence in conflict and to act more deliberately for protection of 
women and rejection of impunity for those who perpetrated such violence. It built on 
the Secretary General’s report S/2010/604 discussed above. Specifically, this 
resolution encouraged the Secretary General to include in his annual reports to the 
UNSC, detailed information on ‘parties to armed conflict that are credibly suspected 
of committing or being responsible for acts of rape or other forms of sexual violence’ 
and to provide an annexed list of the parties ‘that are credibly suspected of 
committing or being responsible for patterns of rape and other forms of sexual 
violence in situations of armed conflict on the Security Council agenda’.139 This was 
a clear decision to apply public pressure and condemnation of those who perpetrated 
sexual violence (which would include tactical rape) and indicative of the growing 
import of the discourse rejecting such abuses and violations of international law. The 
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same paragraph set out the use to be made of these lists as the SC expressed, ‘its 
intention to use this list as a basis for more focused United Nations engagement with 
those parties, including, as appropriate, measures in accordance with the procedures 
of the relevant sanctions committees’.140 This listing mechanism is similar to that 
relating to offenders against Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC), although CAAC 
has a specific working group and the CAAC mechanism and Resolution 1882 
already require the UN System to gather information on and publish a list of 
perpetrators of sexual violence where the victims are children.141 This is a significant 
step in institutionalisation and bringing offenders to account. UNSCR 1960, by 
endorsing a similar system for sexual violence perpetrated against adult women, 
obviates the divide between victims according to their age so that lists of perpetrators 
include those who offend against women and girls without the cut off at age eighteen 
years for victims. 
There has been some concern by women’s advocates that this mechanism was 
limited to situations on the Security Council’s agenda.142 However, it certainly did 
send a strong message that impunity, for these violations of international law, was 
being challenged with specific strategies to deal with it. With referrals to the UN 
Sanctions Committee and to the ICC, there was a clear political message. Serious 
action was being proposed with the resolve that ‘when adopting or renewing targeted 
sanctions in situations of armed conflict, to consider including, where appropriate, 
designation criteria pertaining to acts of rape and other forms of sexual violence’ and 
a quite detailed list of those who would be expected to share relevant information 
with the UN Sanctions Committee when this consideration was being undertaken.143 
The extent to which member states would eventually accede to such referrals in 
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practice was still to be determined but the resolve to do so was a major step towards 
ending impunity. 
A similarly strong message was sent by the resolution to states and others involved in 
conflict. They were called upon ‘to make and implement specific and time-bound 
commitments to combat sexual violence’.144 Some specific strategies were outlined 
for them including: ‘issuance of clear orders through chains of command prohibiting 
sexual violence and the prohibition of sexual violence in Codes of Conduct, military 
field manuals, or equivalent’.145 They were further called upon ‘to make and 
implement specific commitments on timely investigation of alleged abuses in order 
to hold perpetrators accountable’.146 As well as calling on these parties the Secretary 
General was also asked to track and monitor the implementation ‘of these 
commitments by parties to armed conflict on the Security Council’s agenda that 
engage in patterns of rape and other sexual violence, and regularly update the 
Council in relevant reports and briefings’.147 There was certainly a sense that, this 
time, the SC was more serious about expectations that all parties act responsibly. As 
with any crime or violation of international law, the ending of impunity for offenders 
– or at least serious efforts to end it – aims to have some deterrent effect. 
The previous work on developing indicators for monitoring and analysis as well as 
efficient data collation was also resolved when the Secretary General was requested 
to establish ‘monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements on conflict-related 
sexual violence, including rape in situations of armed conflict and post-conflict’.148 
The resolution requested that these arrangements take into account ‘the specificity of 
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each country’ in order to ensure a coherent and coordinated approach at the field 
level’.149 The paragraph encouraged the Secretary-General: 
to engage with United Nations actors, national institutions, civil society 
organizations, health-care service providers, and women’s groups to enhance data 
collection and analysis of incidents, trends, and patterns of rape and other forms of 
sexual violence to assist the Council’s consideration of appropriate actions, 
including targeted and graduated measures.150  
There was a request for annual follow up reports on the resolution, with the first due 
within twelve months of the resolution being passed, which meant by December 
2011. 
The final significant development in 2010 regarding women, peace and security at 
the Security Council was the open debate which followed the passing of UNSCR 
1960.151 There were forty-three speakers and general accord that impunity must be 
tackled and ended for violators of international law, in perpetrating sexual violence 
in conflict. The debate was based largely on the report of the Secretary General 
which had outlined specific steps to be taken, including the recommended sets of 
indicators for monitoring and the listing of offenders for consideration in application 
of sanctions.152  
The Secretary General reported on a range of developments including the 
appointment of the Special Representative to the Secretary General on Sexual 
Violence in Conflict. This was a new post within the UN structure designed to bring 
together the widening focus on the issue. The post’s mandate included: addressing 
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impunity including by supporting national entities to prosecute; empowering women 
to seek redress; mobilising political leadership; increasing recognition of rape as a 
tactic and consequence of conflict; ensuring more coherence in UN response.153 This 
is a wide-ranging mandate. The Special Representative’s priorities include 
facilitating a rapid response mechanism based on a matrix of indicators; identifying 
and promoting exemplary responses; urging media attention when there is 
insufficient attention and under-resourcing for situations of sexual violence in 
conflict; supporting national institutions and the development of appropriate 
government strategies to combat sexual violence.154 Upon appointment the Special 
Representative, Margot Wallstrom of Sweden, urged member states to seek 
accountability for mass rapes committed in the Eastern DRC telling the UN Security 
Council it should ‘turn the tide against impunity’.155 She said it was crucial that all 
means be used to put pressure on all armed groups in that country, and elsewhere, to 
turn over to authorities perpetrators of sexual violence and to prevent further such 
violence. She highlighted her authority to inform the UNSC on matters such as 
sanctions saying: ‘In this regard, the leverage that we gain from the credible threat of 
Council sanctions against perpetrators of sexual violence cannot be overestimated’.156  
The Special Representative demonstrated her understanding of the long-lasting 
impact of sexual violence in conflict as she warned that the atrocities committed 
daily against women and children would leave a devastating imprint on the country 
for years to come. She said: ‘Where sexual violence has been a way of war, it can 
destroy a way of life’ and children accustomed to rape and violence could grow into 
adults who accepted such behaviour as the norm.157 She reminded the forum that 
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‘international peace and security is indivisible from women’s peace and security’.158 
Continuing, she referred to her own mandate in the new position of Special 
Representative and stated that ending impunity was her first priority as she believed 
that prosecution of perpetrators equalled protection for victims, noting that, ‘rape 
victims are the only casualties of war that a nation dishonours, rather than 
honours’.159 The role of states in ending impunity was also reiterated with references 
to the need for effective rule of law and strong legal structures.160 
The Secretary General also reported on the preparation of a conceptual framework 
for a Team of Experts which would be multi-disciplinary and available for rapid 
deployment to assist governments to reinforce judicial systems weakened by 
conflict.161 He reported other developments which included arrangements for 
improved reporting, defining the roles of women’s protection advisors and work on 
approaches to dealing with sexual violence in peace and mediation processes.162 The 
report continued to outline work on developing strategies for governments to combat 
sexual violence in conflict, improving services for victims of sexual violence in 
conflict and generally strengthening protection from and prevention of sexual 
violence in conflict. These were strong indicators of institutionalisation of the 
recommendations from the resolutions. It was a significant move from the early 
decades as the Secretary General concluded, ‘there can be no security without 
women’s security’.163 The days of failing to recognise the interconnectedness of 
women’s human security and international security would seem to have passed. 
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Speakers in the debate affirmed the importance of these steps. The representative of 
Mexico called for strengthening of the ICC to enable effective prosecutions and 
representatives of France, Austria, Uganda and the Russian Federation were among 
those who expressed alarm at the continuing use of tactical rape and sexual violence 
in conflict. There was no dissent from the resolve to list and publish the list of 
perpetrators, no question of the relevance of the issue to the UNSC and no question 
that sexual violence in conflict related to security. 
Conclusion 
The progress made during the period between UNSCR1325 in 2000 and UNSCR 
1820 in 2008 may have been slow but there was an acceleration of attention and 
institutionalisation from 2008 to the end of 2010. The discourse indicated that 
understanding of the issues of tactical rape and sexual violence in conflict generally 
progressed substantially as evidenced in debates, reports and resolutions. Early 
outrage to reports of tactical rape had developed into rejection of sexual violence in 
war. There continued to be some gaps and some reservations but acceptance of these 
issues as issues for the attention of the Security Council was notable. The level of 
commitment to confront this issue grew and, importantly, the level of 
institutionalisation within the UNSC system was significant. This was clearly 
indicated in the report of the Secretary General which preceded the open debate.164 
The appointment of the Special Representative to the Secretary General on Sexual 
Violence in Conflict and changes to institutional practice and policies were all 
positive steps. There remained, however, several areas which required greater 
attention and clarification and these will be considered further in the next chapter 
which looks at the way forward. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Women and Security 
This dissertation has established that events in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia in 
the 1990s brought international attention to tactical rape and sexual violence in 
conflict. It has acknowledged that, as Shirley V. Scott, Anthony John Billingsley and 
Christopher Michaelson highlighted, western publics were shocked into demanding 
that these practices should not be allowed to continue.1 The ICTY and the ICTR 
made clear that tactical rape and sexual violence in conflict are breaches of 
International Humanitarian Law. It was an important development to state clearly 
that tactical rape and sexual violence in conflict were violations of IHL.  
Feminists, activists and many NGOs have been calling for many years for 
acknowledgement that such breaches of IHL are security concerns. Previous chapters 
of the dissertation have demonstrated that the UNSC finally began to address and 
confront these violations of IHL and has begun taking practical steps to 
institutionalise action to prevent and to prosecute those responsible for these crimes. 
Importantly, the UNSC recognised such actions as a security threat, falling within the 
UNSC mandate. This was a significant recognition regarding tactical rape and sexual 
violence in conflict and the nature of that threat needs to be fully understood because 
tactical rape and sexual violence in war continue to present security threats. It is a 
threat which forms the basis for member states – not only the UNSC - to be required 
to recognise and accept their responsibility to confront tactical rape and sexual 
violence in conflict.  
This chapter first looks at the continuing use of tactical rape and sexual violence in 
conflict. Next is an analysis of the nature of the security threat from tactical rape and 
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sexual violence in conflict. Thirdly, this chapter will analyse the interaction between 
women’s security, human security and state security. The development from the 
limited perception of tactical rape and sexual violence in conflict as a security threat 
only for women to perceiving such acts as a human security threat and finally to full 
understanding that tactical rape and sexual violence in conflict constitute security 
threats to women, to communities and to international stability of states is a 
significant move and must be understood. It must be understood because this 
recognition impacts on the responsibilities of member states as well as on the UNSC. 
The fourth focus of this chapter will be on how states need to institutionalise security 
from sexual violence in conflict. It will be argued in the fifth area of focus in the 
chapter that states need to ensure security sector reform and transitional justice in the 
aftermath of conflict. Finally, because states need to accept responsibility for 
confronting tactical rape and sexual violence in conflict, the sixth section of this 
chapter will consider states’ responsibilities for transitioning from the ICTY and 
ICTR to national judiciaries. 
Continuing Use of Tactical Rape and Sexual Violence in Conflicts  
While there has been an increase in international attention to and rejection of tactical 
rape and sexual violence in war, these abuses continue, with Oxfam reporting in 
2011, that ‘sexual violence is increasingly being used as a tool of conflict itself’’.2 
The Oxfam report highlighted the geographic spread of the abuse across continents, 
noting the claims of the UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, 
in 2010, that rape was used in Côte d’Ivoire for political ends. On 3 October 2011, 
the Pre-Trial Chamber III of the International Criminal Court (ICC) granted the 
Prosecutor’s request to commence an investigation in Côte d’Ivoire with respect to 
alleged crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, committed since 28 November 
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2010, as well as with regard to crimes that may be committed in the future in the 
context of this situation.3 These are likely to include charges relating to tactical rape 
and sexual violence in the conflict. Oxfam named other arenas where sexual violence 
has been prevalent: rape used in Myanmar as a tool in the long-running conflict; in 
Kyrgyzstan where at least six hundred people suffered from sexual violence in 
clashes during the period June to December 2010; and in the Central Africa Republic 
(CAR) where one third of women were victims of sexual violence in conflicts in 
Bambouti and Mboki.4 Darfur and Colombia also remained a focus of UNSC 
concern regarding sexual violence in conflicts though it was noted that UNSC 
response had been uneven, with some conflicts attracting attention and others seen as 
not being on the UNSC agenda.5 This is indicative of concerns that will be 
considered later in this chapter. 
Other countries where sexual violence has been reported as a significant feature of 
conflict include Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia and Chad.6 In Chad, rape has been used 
as ‘a deliberate conflict tactic’.7 For Chad, Randi Solhjell, John Karlsrud and Jon 
Harald Sande Lie noted that dealing with sexual and gender-based violence ‘involves 
improving security and is an important element in the imperative to protect civilians 
under the auspices of international humanitarian law and human rights law’.8 
However, there is also a fear that protection of civilians in line with international law 
will not be a primary priority of the Government of Chad.9 The list of conflicts where 
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tactical rape and sexual violence are reported is long. It includes the conflict in 
Conakry, Guinea, where soldiers particularly targeted women when suppressing a 
political demonstration at a stadium in Conakry and where rapes and attacks ‘appear 
to have traumatized the citizenry’.10 Early reports in June 2011 were that the chief 
prosecutor of the ICC was likely to add rape to the war crime charges against 
Muammar Gaddafi following mounting evidence that sexual attacks on women were 
being used as a weapon in the Libyan conflict.11 There are, sadly, too many ongoing 
cases of conflict where sexual violence may be being used to consider in depth, 
which is in no way an indicator of lack of importance. As ‘new wars’ continue so too 
does the use of tactical rape and sexual violence. 
However, the arena which must be mentioned further and which has attracted much 
attention for the ongoing use of tactical rape and sexual violence is the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC). This conflict has earned for DRC the ignominious title of 
‘the rape capital of the world’.12 This has been an intractable conflict involving seven 
nations and many rebel groups of armed combatants, all with varying agendas and 
motives, beginning in 1996, with a short break between 1997-1998 before it 
resumed.13 There are aspects of this conflict which are an extension of Rwanda’s 
civil war between Hutu and Tutsi which has continued onto DRC territory. Major 
causes of the wars are seen to be long-term, ongoing disputes over land and resources 
overlaid with significant elements of ethnic conflict. Whatever the causes, DRC has 
been unable to make any sustainable peace as conflicts still continue over access to 
economic and political power. In 2001, tensions were described by the UN as 
‘perpetuating the conflict in the country, impeding economic development, and 
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exacerbating the suffering of the Congolese people’.14 There were renewed outbreaks 
of fighting again in 2009, despite continued attempts at peace-making. In March 
2009, it was reported that a peace accord had been signed between the DRC 
Government and the National Congress for People’s Defence (CNDP), which it was 
hoped would ‘foresee the end of all hostilities, the transformation of armed groups 
into political parties and the return of refugees and displaced persons’.15 However, in 
April 2009, it was reported that renewed waves of fighting between splintered rebel 
factions had forced more than 30,000 civilians to flee their homes.16  
Sexual violence against women and girls continued in the conflict and may even 
have increased with reports that in South Kivu in the east of the country, some 463 
women were raped in the first quarter of 2009 – more than half the total number of 
violations registered for the whole of 2008.17 At the national level, the UN reported 
that 1100 rapes per month were registered from 21 November, 2008 to 24 March, 
2009, with an average of thirty-six per day.18 Analysis of the age of victims indicated 
that between thirty-five and fifty percent of victims were aged between ten and 
seventeen years, while more than ten percent were younger than ten years of age.19 A 
disturbing factor in the use of tactical rape and sexual violence in DRC is that in this 
conflict use was not restricted to one of the warring parties. As noted above there are 
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many opposing groups in DRC and reports have indicated that all sides are using 
these abuses as strategies of attack: members of all armed groups, rebel groups, the 
police force and opportunistic criminals have been perpetrators of rape and sexual 
violence against women and girls in the DRC.20 There were at least 15,000 cases of 
sexual violence in DRC in 2009 and by mid-2010, 7685 cases had been reported.21  
By 2011 there had been no lasting resolution, with the conflict in DRC described as 
‘Africa’s world war’, with an estimated 5.4 million deaths and widespread use of 
rape to strategically shame, demoralise and humiliate ‘the enemy’.22 A Harvard 
Humanitarian Initiative report insists that this use of rape must not be seen as 
‘collateral damage’ but as a deliberate strategy.23 Many cases have featured either the 
rapes of mothers and daughters in front of their families, mass rapes, rapes in public, 
or forcing victims to have sex with family members.24 There have been clear 
indications of ethnic elements to the use of rape, with combatants purposefully 
singling out their victims from among an ‘opposing’ ethnic group.25 Analysis also 
clearly indicates a spill-over into what are termed civilian rapes (rapes committed by 
non-military personnel), which. between 2004 and 2008 increased seventeen-fold 
while military rapes decreased.26 These findings imply a normalisation of rape among 
the civilian population suggesting the erosion of all constructive social mechanisms 
which ought to protect civilians from sexual violence.27 If this extended use of 
tactical rape and sexual violence as part of conflict is ever to end then ‘the 
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environment of impunity must end’.28 This will require ongoing attention and 
appropriate programme responses from international funders and effective judicial 
systems to confront and bring perpetrators to account. 
It must be noted, too, that in DRC there are reports of the rape of men and boys and 
some analysts have expressed concern that there is too much focus on such violence 
against women to the detriment of concern for men and boys as victims of gender-
based sexual violence.29 As has been discussed earlier in this dissertation, in many 
situations, the rape of women is an attack on men and communities, but in the DRC 
now there is direct sexual attack on males.30 This, too, must be condemned. It must 
not be allowed to develop into an either/or choice for attention and response. Tactical 
rape, whether of men or of women, must always be decried and confronted. It has 
been reported that within the DRC Government, an official was heard to say that 
‘rape was a women’s issue that women needed to deal with on their own’.31 There 
needs to be change social attitudes which render women and men vulnerable, either 
by direct attack or because social attitudes render one gender particularly vulnerable. 
Sadly, men and boys are suffering but sadly women are still disproportionately the 
victims. All victims deserve response and protection and the protection of men and 
boys will require different responses and recognition of different needs.  
While the reports noted above are indicative of the widespread and deliberate use of 
tactical rape and sexual violence it is recognised that many victims do not or cannot 
report attacks. Resources to document these reports are likely to be limited. The 
                                                                
28 HHI, p. 9. 
29 ME Baaz & M Stern, ‘The Complexity of Violence: A Critical Analysis of Sexual Violence in 
Democratic Republic of Congo’, The Nordic Africa Institute, May 2010. 
30 Baaz & Stern, p 43. 
31 M Pratt & L Werchick, ‘Sexual Terrorism: Rape as a Weapon of War in Eastern Democratic 
Republic of Congo – An assessment of programmatic responses to sexual violence in North Kivu, 
South Kivu, Maniema, and Oriental Provinces’, USAID/DCHA Assessment Report, 9-16 January 
2004, p. 30. 
 282 
 
result is that there is often very little timely or reliable consolidated information on 
rape and sexual violence despite these being persistent and severe threats faced by 
women as well as children and men in conflicts.32 Work is needed to estimate and 
effectively document the numbers and types of rapes in war. Catrien Bijleveld, Aafke 
Morssinkhofe and Alette Smeulers have argued the case for improved 
documentation.33 They have listed some of the reasons often given for arguing that 
such documentation is not essential: some say it is not important, because the number 
differentials are trivial in the sense that it does not matter if the final figure is two 
million victims or two point one million victims. They note that some commentators 
fear the numbers may overshadow a focus on the causes and nature of a conflict and 
others feel the precise number bears little legal relevance.34 However, as they 
concluded, it is important to collect data. Figures are important when each figure 
represents an individual. For planning and delivering post-conflict strategies and 
resources there is a need to know how many victims there were and their locations. 
Such data is essential to provide for consequences such as pregnancies and health 
issues, including HIV/AIDS. To meet the needs of victims and survivors of tactical 
rape and sexual violence it is necessary to understand if they are able still to bear 
children and whether or not they are likely to be able to care for children – 
emotionally and economically. For recovery and rebuilding, truth commissions have 
been shown to be effective. Such commissions proceed from an acknowledgement of 
victims and the damage done to them. The aim is to ‘deconstruct the social reality in 
which the crimes were committed’ so knowing the extent and the nature of suffering 
matters.35 It is important to have reliable data regarding current and future conflicts in 
which sexual violence may be used as a tactic if there is to be adequate and 
appropriate response to protection of civilians and accountability of perpetrators.  
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From a legal perspective, there is a need to know figures and patterns of the use of 
tactical rape and sexual violence in order to establish if such use was widespread 
and/or systematic. This is an element of judging if the abuse could be deemed a 
crime against humanity or a war crime. The extent and nature of the crimes is also 
important in deciding whether such attacks were deliberate, aimed at a specific group 
– whether they constituted genocide.36 There is recognition of the difficulties in 
gathering such data but it must be recognised as a need to be solved. One option 
proposed is that a self-report for rape victims might be worth considering.37 There are 
immediate difficulties in such a plan – the literacy level of victims will vary greatly, 
resources would be needed to support, design and collate findings. However, what is 
clear is that this must become a priority and it is encouraging to see the moves being 
made at the UNSC, analysed in the previous chapter, to tackle this issue. These will 
be considered in more detail later in this chapter. What is clear is that in 2011 tactical 
rape and sexual violence in war remain a persistent and pernicious practice.  
What Sort of Security Threat?  
As stated earlier in this chapter, it is significant that the UNSC has recognised 
tactical rape and sexual violence in conflict as falling within its mandate because 
they are issues of security concern. This was significant progress but early steps 
could not be viewed without reservations. Referring to the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia and writing in 2001, Judith G. Gardam and Michelle J. Jarvis noted that: 
for the first time, sexual violence against women during armed conflict as a distinct 
issue within the UN system. In particular, the sexual abuse of women during armed 
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conflict was linked with the maintenance of international peace and security and the 
United Nations system as a whole was prompted to respond.38  
Gardam and Jarvis did however, highlight some limitations to this progress noting 
that the woman who benefitted most from this developing concern had to be white 
and Western and needed to ‘be perceived by Western media to be the victim of 
sexual violence as part of a deliberate war strategy’.39 While previous chapters have 
shown that there has indeed been progress on tactical rape and sexual violence since 
2001, it is recognised that Gardam and Jarvis sounded a clear warning against 
assuming that this is the only form of sexual violence which warrants attention by the 
international community.40 They also sounded warnings regarding the efficacy of 
trials as the only form of delivering justice for women victims of sexual violence in 
war. These concerns warrant ongoing recognition if there is to be effective 
implementation to the UNSC resolutions previously analysed and if there are to be 
coherent responses to the security threats posed to women. However, there has been 
significant progress in discourse regarding the need to reject tactical rape and sexual 
violence, seen as security threats. 
Clarity is needed regarding the nature of those security concerns. Katrina Lee-Koo 
pointed out that security is not just about the absence of threat and not just about 
uncovering and addressing sources of insecurity.41 It is also about providing the 
values which make a person feel secure. For women survivors of tactical rape and 
sexual violence this must mean enabling them to feel secure as part of their 
communities, even though those communities have often rejected them. Lee-Koo 
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averred that the key was to reconstruct concepts such as ‘international politics’ and 
‘security’.42 She noted that realists define security in political and military terms as 
the protection of the boundaries and integrity of the state against the dangers of an 
anarchical international environment. She concluded that within this discourse, 
women as a gendered grouping cannot be seen or heard, and are placed outside the 
realm of the ‘international’, which threatens lives and engenders gross insecurity in 
‘silenced and unseen space’.43 This is an important insight. It is significant that the 
official discourse rejecting tactical rape and sexual violence in war has belatedly 
acknowledged the gendered dynamics of security. Women must be enabled to be part 
of developing their own security. They must be given space to participate and their 
capacity to do so must be part of any rehabilitation and reconstruction programme.  
This progress of the gendered dynamics of security is also due to the growing impact 
of the understanding of human security. It is essential to appreciate the growing 
discourse of the interconnectedness of human and international security. In 1998, 
Canada and Norway formed a partnership in human security which subsequently 
became the Human Security Network, ‘an informal coalition of states that is 
committed to human security’.44 Eventually, the Commission on Human Security 
was established and released a seminal report in 2003.45 The Report of the 
Commission on Human Security defined human security as protecting vital 
freedoms.46 It continued that human security means protecting people from critical 
and pervasive threats and situations, building on their strengths and aspirations. It 
also means creating systems that give people ‘the building blocks of survival, dignity 
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and livelihood’.47 Human security connects different types of freedoms – freedom 
from want, freedom from fear and freedom to take action on one’s own behalf.48 
When considering how human security can be delivered the Report offered two 
general strategies: protection and empowerment.49 Protection shields people from 
dangers. It requires concerted effort to develop norms, processes and institutions that 
systematically address insecurities. Empowerment enables people to develop their 
potential and become full participants in decision-making. Reasonably, there is 
recognition that protection and empowerment are mutually reinforcing and that both 
strategies are required in most situations for people to be secure. Commentary in 
2006 noted that human security offered a way of ‘identifying and prioritizing issues 
to be addressed in respect of international law and conflict’.50 Recognition by policy 
makers of the interdependence of women’s security and international security meant 
recognition of the interdependence of human security and state security. This was an 
important step as it was a recognition long espoused and promoted by feminists, 
activists and some NGOs but largely ignored by power brokers.  
In March 2010, the Secretary General presented a summary report on Human 
Security to the UN General Assembly.51 He referred to (inter alia) the Human 
Security Network, the report of the Commission on Human Security and the 2005 
World Summit which had considered human security and stated that the concept ‘is 
gaining wide support in the United Nations and other forums’.52 One action had been 
a debate in the General Assembly in May 2008 and during the course of those 
deliberations: 
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broad consensus was reached by Member States on the need for a new culture of 
international relations that goes beyond fragmented responses and calls for 
comprehensive, integrated and people-centred approaches.53 
As part of this new awareness it was noted that: 
human security draws attention to a wide range of threats faced by individuals and 
communities and focuses on the root causes of such insecurities. In addition, by 
understanding how particular constellations of threats to individuals and 
communities translate into broader intra- and inter-State security breaches, human 
security seeks to prevent and mitigate the occurrence of future threats, and in this 
regard can be a critical element in achieving national security and international 
stability.54 
By the time this debate took place, the UNSC had recognised that tactical rape and 
sexual violence in conflict, as breaches of IHL, were threats to international stability. 
The concurrent discourse on human security and discourse on sexual violence in 
conflict could be seen to have been mutually strengthening.  
By 2011 there has developed further understanding of the inter-relatedness of human 
security and international security in ways which must be taken into account in 
effective rejection of sexual violence in war. Human security is vital if there is to be 
any security but it does not replace state security. A report from the Commission on 
Human Security stated that human security complements state security.55 Over the 
past decades there has been a growing understanding and broadening of state 
security, from securing borders, institutions and values to greater recognition of 
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individuals and communities in ensuring their own security.56 Human security 
broadens the focus from the security of borders to the lives of people and 
communities inside and across those borders.57 Working to achieve human security 
does not take the place of working for protection of states. It complements state 
security by being people-centered and addressing insecurities that have not always 
been considered as state security threats. Human security puts people at the centre of 
focus with a requirement for freedom from fear, from want, to live in dignity.58 In 
line with this concept of securing people, but with a somewhat different focus, the 
World Development Report used the term ‘citizen security’ because it is claimed that 
this sharpened focus on freedom from physical violence and freedom from fear of 
violence.59  
For women, there may be some hesitation in adopting this term, citizen security, as 
women are often excluded from real citizenship with allied political and economic 
access. As early as 1997, Ann Tickner had pointed out that terms such as citizen, 
head of household, bread-winner are not neutral terms and are problematic for 
women especially, given that in many parts of the world women are still struggling 
for equality and may not have the right to vote.60 She reminded that previously 
security had been defined in the realist paradigm, in political/military terms, as the 
protection of the boundaries and integrity of the state and its values against the 
dangers of a hostile international environment. Then, Tickner noted, in the 1980s 
there began a trend towards defining security in economic and environmental terms 
as well as political and military terms.61 This broadening of definitions led to the 
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concept of human security and, eventually, to recognition that tactical rape and 
sexual violence were security concerns for the UNSC. Where early considerations of 
security focused on understanding and analysing the causes and consequences of 
wars from a top-down perspective, feminists have been more concerned with 
considerations at community or individual levels and aiming at a analysis of the 
impact of conflict and related violence at these levels to understand the extent to 
which unjust social relations contribute to insecurity.62  
Women’s security, human security and state security 
While recognising the importance of women’s security and human security 
generally, there must be recognition of their impact on the security of states, which 
do not operate in isolation from each other or the global system. There has been 
recent focus on understanding that a lack of human security can cause insecurity for 
states. This has contributed to recognition of the links between women’s security, 
state security and sexual violence in war. The World Development Report (WDR) 
2011 was notable for its insights to this interdependence.63 The WDR of 2011 
reiterated that states are part of an international system that confers certain benefits 
and requires certain behaviours.64 The required behaviours include: helping to 
maintain interstate security by not threatening each other and by observing ‘rules of 
warfare’; upholding international law and treaty obligations; and behaviour at home 
consistent with international norms such as upholding human rights.65 Importantly, 
now these expectations include rejection of tactical rape and sexual violence in war. 
Previous chapters of this dissertation have considered the nature of tactical rape and 
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sexual violence in conflict and have demonstrated that such violations are against the 
rules of warfare, they breach international law and treaty obligations and they 
contravene international norms regarding human rights. States which do not meet 
these expectations can create stresses between states.  
The WDR reported that major stresses which are likely to result in violence between 
or within states are often a combination of security, economic and political stresses. 
Insights into the links with tactical rape and sexual violence have been made more 
explicit in 2011 with understanding the regional and international impact of these 
violations on the states in which they occur and the impact on other states. The WDR 
highlighted that interstate wars have decreased in number since the two world wars 
of the first half of the 20th century. But civil wars (those with more than 1000 battle 
deaths a year) have increased, peaking late in the 1980s and early 1990s when there 
were twenty-one active major civil wars. This number of civil wars has decreased to 
less than ten each year since 2002.66 These figures were reinforced by the Human 
Security Report 2009-2010 which also stated that since the period of 1992-2003, 
state-based conflicts decreased.67 These are the conflicts involving a government as 
one of the warring parties. However, since 2003, the global incidence of non-state 
armed conflicts (those with no government as a warring party) increased by 25%. 
This figure rose between 2007 and 2008 when conflicts including non-state actors 
increased by 119 percent. These involved actors such as rebel groups, war lords and 
factional militias.68 There are also conflicts termed campaigns of ‘one-sided 
violence’: campaigns of organised violence by a government or non-state armed 
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group directed against unarmed civilians who cannot fight back and which results in 
twenty-five or more codable deaths in a calendar year.69  
This analysis of conflicts up to 2011 helped to understand the implications of specific 
conflicts such as those which have been the focus of this dissertation. The Rwandan 
genocide by government and Hutu militias was the worst example of one-sided 
violence and the attacks by the Serbian Government on Bosnia and Herzogovina was 
second worst in the 1990s.70 The WDR highlighted that conflicts in the 1990s in 
those two specific countries had impact beyond the time of the conflicts and beyond 
the borders in which the conflicts took place.71  
It was important to note that a conflict in one state can affect the security of its 
neighbouring states. Violence has economic impact and disrupts development. The 
effects of violence are community-wide and long-lasting. The WDR estimated that it 
takes an average of fourteen years of peace before resumption of economic growth 
paths.72 The violence in Rwanda spread over into DRC and it is recognised that 
development consequences of violence, like its origins, spill across borders with 
implications for the neighbours, the region and globally.73 Estimates suggest that 
countries lose 0.7 per cent of their annual GDP for each neighbour engaged in a civil 
war.74 This indicates that there is a shared interest in global, regional and state peace 
and prosperity and a shared interest in ensuring security for populations even if those 
populations are within an individual state’s own borders. The violence in Rwanda 
with widespread sexual violence has had implications beyond Rwanda’s borders.  
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Political and economic issues can be triggers for violence and conflict within states. 
Injustice and exclusion, too, can act as stresses on security and there has been found 
to be strong correlation between past human rights abuses and current risks of 
conflict.75 This would certainly appear to have applied to the conflict in Rwanda and 
raises the issue of the interconnectedness of human and state security. Most 
contemporary armed conflicts are ‘low intensity’ civil wars that avoid major military 
engagements but frequently target civilians with great brutality and with the threat 
and perpetration of sexual and physical violence against women and children a 
systematic weapon of war.76 As has been seen from the analysis of the impact of 
tactical rape and sexual violence in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, such 
violence compromises human security and dignity.  
It was increasingly clear by 2011 that for political, economic and humanitarian 
reasons, no country or region could afford to ignore areas where repeated cycles of 
violence flourished or men or women were disengaged from protection and 
participation in the workings of the state. Human security is a pre-eminent goal 
underpinned by justice and economic independence and there is a need for states as 
well as the international community to act pre-emptively before violence recurs or 
escalates.77 Survivors of tactical rape and sexual violence frequently suffer from 
discrimination and exclusion which renders them economically and socially isolated. 
Many women rear children of rape in poverty. Many women also wait for some 
acknowledgement of their suffering and for justice. States must be active participants 
in ensuring social protection for their citizens. International humanitarian agencies 
will often be involved in post-conflict provision of justice and economic 
development. If social protection is delivered only through international 
humanitarian aid, then governments and communities have few incentives to take 
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responsibility for violence prevention and neither do national institutions have 
incentives to take on responsibility for protecting all vulnerable citizens.78 
What is of particular relevance to dealing appropriately with tactical rape and sexual 
violence is the recognition that emerged by 2011 that it is incorrect to think of the 
progression from violence to sustained security as linear. Almost every civil war that 
had begun after 2003 was a resumption of a previous civil war.79 The analysis in 
previous chapters has demonstrated that the impact of tactical rape and sexual 
violence is long-lasting. If action is not taken to deal effectively with the aftermath of 
these abuses and with the needs of survivors, the potential for recurring violence 
increases. As was seen in both Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, perpetrators of 
violence were often convinced they were avenging previous injustices. Failure to 
offer support, failure to challenge societal attitudes such as rejection of victims of 
rape, failure to achieve some sort of accountability and disallow impunity – all of 
these failures have the potential to be the foundation for the next wave of violence. 
Transitional justice is essential and will be considered later in this chapter. 
The children born of tactical rape in the conflicts in Rwanda and the former 
Yugoslavia were, in 2011, in their late teens – young adults in their communities. 
They have grown up in societies dealing with the trauma of those conflicts. They will 
have been, for the most part, reared by mothers who are likely to be suffering 
extreme physical and/or emotional damage. It is possible that many of these children 
and their mothers will have also suffered from social stigma, discrimination and 
ostracisation. The economic effects for the women victims and their children may 
well have been significant. It is possible that some mothers would have difficulties 
relating appropriately to offspring who might be perceived to have caused such 
negative community reactions. Certainly, these children will have grown up with a 
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sense of being the children of criminal acts by men perceived as ‘the enemy’. This is 
not only the case in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. A doctor from DRC 
reported the words of a twenty-two year old woman made pregnant by being raped 
by ten combatants who also killed her husband in front of her, and which provide 
further representation of the impact that rape has in Congolese communities: 
Today, when I walk with my baby, the people in the community say that I am the 
enemy’s woman, and that the child belongs to the enemy…I am alone. What I find 
upsetting is that nobody will come near my baby; everybody says he is cursed. And 
the baby is frightened because the neighbours are always shouting at him.80 
The challenge is that for human security to be achieved, this attitude and its 
consequent suffering for women and children victims of tactical rape and sexual 
violence must be confronted and states have a consequent responsibility..  
Given that by 2011 there was increased recognition that most civil wars are in fact 
continuations of previous conflicts which were unresolved, there must also be 
recognition that generations beyond the immediate victims continue to feel the 
impact of abuses. These generations could still be confronting what happened before, 
at and after their conception. Attitudes which contributed to those events are likely to 
persist. This means that there must be due attention to this newly-emerging group of 
adults, attention to their emotional and economic welfare, if the cycles of violence 
are to be broken. Support must be offered to all survivors of rape in conflict, the 
women who suffered directly, the children born of those rapes and their 
communities. The approach to survivor care must assist all those who are survivors 
of the general trauma of the conflicts as well as involving men where possible.81 
Previous chapters have shown that the international community has made significant 
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progress in confronting challenges such as these and now has the legal foundation for 
doing so. States must be part of confronting these challenges.  
However, response by the international community has varied in the extent to which 
it has demonstrated specific responses of certain states. Scott, Billingsley and 
Michaelson highlighted that the west ‘ultimately acted decisively to address 
problems of the disintegrating Yugoslavia, but ignored the Rwandan genocide, a 
human rights tragedy on an even larger scale.’82 The relationship between the UNSC 
and sovereign states is in ongoing tension. These writers identified the challenge: 
‘the task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority but 
to make the Security Council work better than it has’.83 Closely related is the ongoing 
discourse regarding any intervention in the affairs of sovereign states and the concept 
of the responsibility of states to protect populations in other states. The outcome 
document of the 2005 World Summit considering this issue stated that each 
individual state has the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Where a state does not provide 
such protection other states have a responsibility to intervene – and the UNSC has 
established grounds for doing so when sexual violence is used against populations. 
Gareth Evans has noted that the debated ‘Responsibility to Protect’ is relevant in 
specific and narrowly focused problem areas.84 These are situations where mass 
atrocity crimes are clearly being committed or where such crimes are imminent 
according to warning signs.  
These are difficulties and Evans acknowledged that it is more difficult to pin down 
countries where such crimes are likely in the future, perhaps because of history of 
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such crimes, continuation or re-emergence of relevant internal tensions and 
incapacity to control potentially explosive situations.85 Rwanda and the former 
Yugoslavia  are among countries which could be assessed as likely for re-emergence 
of tensions and renewed violence. It is essential to recognise this potential for 
renewed violence in states where there is no accountability, where there is impunity, 
where there is no redress or reparation, no attention to children of tactical rape and 
no change in societal attitudes and status of women. But intervention will be a 
political step and it would appear that, ‘the approach whereby policy considerations 
will override legal considerations in cases of emergencies is likely to dominate’.86 It 
is at least now established that tactical rape and sexual violence in conflict are 
contraventions of IHL and they present a threat to security. It is in states’ interest to 
confront those crimes but it remains to be seen how often such state intervention 
follows such abuses and threats.  
The approach for states concerned about security must be to ensure accountability for 
those who fail to respect agreed international law and treaties. Such accountability 
must be evident as soon as possible after cessation of hostilities and, as will be seen 
below, the period of transitional justice is a key factor in moves to security within 
societies which have suffered – including victims of tactical rape and sexual violence 
There is a need to ensure adequate and appropriate security structures at state levels. 
Prioritisation of basic security and justice reforms programmes has been part of 
successful core tools to develop resilience to violence.87 This priority should be 
enacted wherever there has been ongoing violence – particularly where there has 
been tactical rape and sexual violence – if the cycles of violence are to be broken. 
Promoting democratic principles is a step towards attaining human security and 
development. It enables people to participate in governance and make their voices 
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heard. This requires building strong institutions, establishing the rule of law and 
empowering people.88 
State level Institutionalisation of Security from Sexual Violence in War 
Legitimate institutions and governance serve as an immune system and defence 
against ongoing conflict for states.89 In this context, the legitimacy of institutions 
refers to their capacity, inclusiveness and accountability.90 Where institutions and 
governance are not capable, inclusive and accountable, a state can be fragile in terms 
of development and political security. States where institutions are weak are more 
vulnerable to civil war. Of seventeen fragile states (as measured by the World Bank) 
between 1990 and 2008, fourteen experienced major civil wars.91 There are a number 
of recognised institutional indices relevant to reduction of violence and these can be 
usefully applied to reduction of the impact of sexual violence in war. These include 
‘rule of law; levels of corruption; respect for human rights; democratic governance; 
bureaucratic quality; oversight of security sectors and equity for the disadvantaged’.92 
From arenas such as Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia it is apparent that many of 
these indices could have indicated the need for prevention of conflict.  
Rape and sexual violence against women can also be seen as indicative of rising 
tensions and incipient conflict. It has been recognised that continuation of sexual 
violence indicates that peace has not been achieved in a state. Rosan Smits and 
Serena Cruz noted that ‘rape is seen as strategy for undermining efforts to achieve 
and maintain stability in areas torn by conflict but striving to achieve peace’.93 Such 
                                                                
88 Human Security Now, CHS, Outline.  
89 World Bank WDR, p. 50. 
90 World Bank WDR, p. 84. 
91 World Bank WDR p.87. 
92 World Bank WDR p.108. 
93 R Smits and S Cruz, ‘Increasing Security in DR Congo: Gender Responsive Strategies for 
Combating Sexual Violence’, CRU Policy Brief, June 2011, p. 2. 
 298 
 
recognition has serious implications for states. There are security implications of 
ongoing rape and sexual violence after cessation of hostilities and these constitute 
part of the long-lasting effect of such violations and will spread into peacetime 
practice when norms are broken down and when there has been perceived impunity 
for perpetrators. The cyclical nature of many conflicts means that attention must be 
paid to indicators of potential conflict even as peace seems to be established. Paul D. 
Church noted, when writing about protection of civilians in peace operations, that 
when deterrence of events such as massacres is the objective there is a need to 
strengthen global norms, reinforcing certain values to the point where it is well 
understood they must not be violated.94 This is a principle which must be applied to 
deterrence of renewed tactical rape and sexual violence in conflicts because, as can 
be seen in the Democratic Republic of Congo, when ‘norms of war are internalised 
into everyday male behaviour’, sexual violence continues after conflict ceases.95 The 
challenge is to support states to internalise normative rejection of tactical rape and 
sexual violence in war as an integral part of their planning and responses to protect 
their populations. 
Even when rape and sexual violence are not tactical or part of a systematic use as a 
weapon, they are indicative of tensions. They should be used as warning signs of 
armed conflict and indicate the need for prevention strategies.96  Within a state, 
underlying weaknesses that increase risks of repeated cycles of violence have been 
identified as: deficits in security, deficits in justice and inadequate job creation.97 As 
rejection of tactical rape and sexual violence in conflict moves from international to 
national levels to confront these risks, there continues to be a need to be alert to the 
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justifiable concerns of feminist analysts regarding the nature of political and 
institutional structures. Jacqui True has presented an insightful review of such 
concerns and concluded that ‘malestream’ visions of international relations distort 
knowledge of both ‘relations’ and ‘international’ transformation and concluded: 
if one wants to gain fresh insights into the processes of transformation of world 
order, averting one’s gaze from the processes of state formation…has its limits as a 
research strategy.98  
These are concerns regarding the international structure within which this 
dissertation has tracked progress in rejecting tactical rape and sexual violence. They 
also apply when considering national transformation. True has provided a reminder 
that throughout modern history: 
women have been told that they will receive equal human rights, equality with men, 
after the war, after liberation, after the national economy has been rebuilt, and so on: 
but after all these ‘outside’ forces have been conquered, the commonplace demand is 
for things to go back to normal and women to a subordinate place.99 
If the rejection of tactical rape and sexual violence in conflict is to be reflected in 
state institutions, it is imperative that the tendency to delay women’s security, justice 
and strengthening their positions in societies be strenuously avoided. Eric Blanchard 
highlighted that ‘feminist security theory articulates an alternative vision’ which 
entails ‘revealing gendered hierarchies, eradicating patriarchal structural violence 
and working towards the eventual achievement of common security’.100 There is at 
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least – and at last – some progress in recognising the need for women’s security but 
Blanchard continued: 
Ironically, the policy world of nation states has recently begun to outpace the 
academic discipline of International Relations in its acceptance of feminist issues, as 
evidenced by the rapid diffusion of ‘gender mainstreaming’ bureaucracies and 
gender sensitive policies across states from a diverse range of cultures and levels of 
gender equality’.101  
It would be reasonable but probably optimistic to assume that security reform will 
follow the inclusive and restructured approach of feminist security theory. Much 
further research, analysis and comment to support advocacy for women’s security 
will be needed. As the policy world of states and the international community 
continues to evolve, some tasks are not yet completed. 
However, there has been useful work done regarding how strengthening women’s 
security, justice and equality at state level has impact on international stability. Work 
by Mary Caprioli and Mark Boyer has indicated that states exhibiting high levels of 
gender equality also exhibit lower levels of violence in international crises and 
disputes.102 Caprioli is reported to have extended this analysis to militarised interstate 
disputes and to have found a similar relationship where ‘states with the highest levels 
of gender equality display lower levels of aggression in these disputes and were less 
likely to use force first’.103 Working with Peter Trumbore, Caprioli found that this 
applied to intra-state conflicts as well as international ones:  
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states characterized by norms of gender and ethnic inequality as well as human 
rights abuses are more likely to become involved in militarized interstate disputes 
and in violent interstate disputes, to be the aggressors during international disputes, 
and to rely on force when involved in an international dispute.104 
This benefit to states of ensuring gender equity and justice has been recognised to 
some degree. As understanding of the full impact of tactical rape and sexual violence 
has grown, so too has the understanding of its implications for states’ development 
and security. In 2006, Secretary-General of the United Nations Koffi Annan was of 
the opinion that: 
the world is starting to grasp that there is no policy more effective [in promoting 
development, health, and education] than the empowerment of women and girls. 
And I would venture that no policy is more important in preventing conflict, or in 
achieving reconciliation after a conflict has ended.105 
Recognising such interdependence between women’s equal, justice and security with 
state security has been an important step. 
According to the World Development Report, there have also been identified basic 
principles for sustained violence prevention and recovery: inclusive enough 
coalitions for change; some early results to build confidence and create momentum 
for longer-term institutional transformation; pragmatic best-fit options to address 
immediate challenges.106 Where lack of accountability has been a source of tension, 
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strategies need to focus on responsiveness to citizens and to act against abuses 
perpetrated during a conflict.107 In confronting the impact of tactical rape and sexual 
violence, early results in justice and accountability for these violations as well as 
broader democratic accountability would be particularly essential as women, their 
children and their communities struggle to see that crimes were committed and to 
help end impunity of perpetrators. It has been noted that the inclusion of populations 
affected and targeted by violence has been productive and that ‘including women 
leaders and women’s groups has a good track record in creating continued pressure 
for change’.108 This may seem self-evident to those who are aware of structural 
discrimination against women but at least it is now being officially, more widely 
recognised as an effective approach to rehabilitation and reconstruction activities as 
they pertain to building and reforming security institutions after periods of extreme 
sexual violence in conflict. 
Security sector reform and transitional justice 
In periods following conflict the security sector of states involved usually requires 
reform – particularly in arenas such as Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia and the DRC 
where security forces have been implicated in tactical rape and sexual violence in the 
conflicts. In broad terms, security sector reform operations need to cover a range of 
strategies and actions which include demilitarisation and peacebuilding; establishing 
civilian control and oversight of the security sector; professionalising the security 
forces and strengthening the rule of law.109 Such reform typically involves defining a 
country’s long-term security needs and vision; conducting an audit of existing 
security sector institutions, laws, policies and capacities; identifying structural issues, 
discriminatory practices and other barriers to meeting state security requirements; 
                                                                
107 World Bank WDR, p. 249. 
108 World Bank WDR, p. 250. 
109 UN Women ‘Women and Security Sector reform’, retrieved 2 June 2010, 
<www.womenwarpeace.org>. 
 303 
 
and developing a plan to bridge the gap between what exists and what is needed to 
provide effective security.110 Particularly if these actions and processes are inclusive, 
as noted above, they can be productive in strengthening local ownership of 
peacebuilding processes, by enabling those affected to have a role in change which is 
likely to build their confidence in state security agencies.  
Without being enabled to participate, women particularly, are unlikely to see reason 
to trust these agencies. It is also imperative that women have a role in designing and 
implementing processes and systems which recognise their trauma and which 
provide appropriately for survivors to testify and require official accountability for 
the wrongs they have suffered. Women who have experienced tactical rape and 
sexual violence in conflict have particular security concerns which must be 
recognised. Addressing this issue and institutionalising security provision involves a 
broad set of reforms, such as excluding ex-combatants who are known to have 
committed sexual violence from security sector positions; establishing specialised 
police units for investigating crimes of tactical rape and sexual violence in war; 
recruiting more women into the security sector; strengthening the capacity of health 
services to collect forensic evidence and providing legal services to victims.111 In 
Rwanda, for example, the UN agency, UN Women, has provided support to 
strengthening female parliamentarians’ oversight role, to improving women’s access 
to justice through the National Police Gender Desk, to developing protocols and 
policies on sexual and gender-based violence, to improving services for victims, and 
partnering on gender-sensitive reform with other security sector institutions.112 
Security sector reform is intended to transform security sectors and systems, ‘which 
includes all the actors, their roles and responsibilities – working together to manage 
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and operate the system in a manner which is more consistent with democratic 
norms’.113 This cannot be achieved when women survivors of tactical rape and sexual 
violence are excluded. A UNIFEM Workshop on Gender and Security Sector 
Reform, in 2003, concluded that gender-responsive security sector reform requires 
normative, institutional and procedural reform of security institutions that includes a 
commitment to protect women, to advance their rights and practical access to 
services, to ensure policies are translated into instructions and incentives for 
implementers.114 This must apply to women who have suffered tactical rape and 
sexual violence and a particular point of focus must be on their first contact with 
security and justice systems. It is also essential to work with traditional authorities to 
raise awareness of women’s security needs.115 In addition to such specific measures, 
the needs of women must also be recognised in general policy-making processes 
which follow cessation of hostilities. These would include the development of 
national security policies, peace agreements, codes of conduct, and the strategies of 
donors and international organisations.116  
A major area of concern for survivors of tactical rape and sexual violence in conflict 
is to ensure recognition of the need to provide transitional justice and ensuring their 
access to this justice during conflict and when conflict ceases. An important aspect of 
tactical rape and sexual violence is that impact does not necessarily cease after 
cessation of hostilities. The motivation may be less clear with war no longer the 
context, but the damage to social behaviours, to norms of expected behaviours, to 
standards of behaviour – all these can have been seriously damaged. Sexual violence 
as a tool of war can become a way of life: once entrenched in the fabric of civilian 
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society, it lingers long after ‘the guns have fallen silent’.117 During conflict the 
priority is to protect civilians and halt sexual violence by armed elements. After 
conflict the priority is to avoid a repetition of patterns of violence and exclusion thus 
preventing the ‘normalisation’ of brutal and widespread sexual violence committed 
by security forces, combatants and non-combatants alike.118  
In 2007, Médecins Sans Frontières commented that the extent of sexual violence 
against women in DRC was significant as an indicator of the breakdown of social 
relationships after so many years of conflict.119 They argued that ‘social norms’ had 
been considerably weakened, allowing individuals to engage in acts of extreme 
violence with almost absolute impunity.120 This perception of impunity was linked 
with the justice system in the DRC, described by the UN as being in a ‘deplorable 
state’, and with widespread reports of corruption and political interference.121 This 
was recognition of the impact of tactical rape and sexual violence with the 
breakdown of the security sector and highlighted the need for strategies to confront 
and reform a seriously flawed security sector. MSF continued:  
In rare cases where women brave all obstacles and dare to report sexual violence, it 
has been widely reported that senior officers shield the men under their command 
from prosecution and deliberately obstruct investigations. Intrinsically linked to 
addressing the widespread impunity within the DRC will be the task of changing 
society’s attitude towards victims of rape and sexual violence. Changing such 
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attitudes represents an enormously difficult and complex task as they are embedded 
within societal values and customary law.122  
Changing such attitudes will be a difficult task but it must be accompanied by 
ensuring effective transitional justice for victims of tactical rape and sexual violence 
in conflict. 
Transitional justice refers to the set of judicial and non-judicial measures that have 
been implemented by different countries in order to redress the legacies of massive 
human rights abuses. It has been recognised that: 
transitional justice mechanisms can be critical in helping societies cope with the 
legacies of conflict, including widespread human rights violations. Through both 
judicial and non-judicial means, transitional justice aims to rebuild social trust, 
reform justice systems and law enforcement institutions, strengthen accountability 
for war crimes, promote national reconciliation, support those affected by conflict, 
and advance democratic governance.123 
Given the possibility of renewed conflict when issues are unresolved and the 
generational impact of tactical rape there is a definite need for justice which can be 
delivered during the recovery period for communities and victims. 
The International Center for Transitional Justice has identified certain measures to be 
put in place when delivering transitional justice and these include criminal 
prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations programs, and various kinds of 
institutional reforms.124 According to the ICTJ, there are four core elements of 
transitional justice. The first is criminal prosecutions, particularly those that address 
                                                                
122 Médecins Sans Frontières, p. 20. 
123 UN Women, ‘Transitional Justice’, retrieved 11 November 2011, <www.womenwarpeace.org>. 
124 International Center for Transitional Justice(ICTJ), retrieved 11 November 2011, 
<ictj.org/about/transitional-justice >. 
 307 
 
perpetrators considered to be the most responsible.125 The second is reparations, 
through which governments recognise and take steps to address the harms suffered 
(such initiatives often have material elements such as cash payments or health 
services as well as symbolic aspects such as public apologies or day of 
remembrance.126 The third core element is institutional reform of abusive state 
institutions such as armed forces, police and courts, to dismantle—by appropriate 
means—the structural machinery of abuses and prevent recurrence of serious human 
rights abuses and impunity.127 The final core element identified is truth commissions 
or other means to investigate and report on systematic patterns of abuse, recommend 
changes and help understand the underlying causes of serious human rights 
violations.128  
There may be instances, such as truth commissions, where a degree of immunity may 
be negotiated in exchange for testimony but these do offer a form of accountability 
agreed by victims and survivors as part of a process of reconciliation. This is not to 
ignore or fail to bring perpetrators to account. It is, rather, an agreed process with at 
least some form of enabling communities to acknowledge crimes and injustices and 
to effect some basis for collective healing. There may be a perceived need for 
granting collective amnesties – often a compromise between justice and peace. There 
may be tensions arising from each of these approaches and some may be selected 
according to local practices. However, as analysis later in this chapter of the use of 
traditional courts in Rwanda will show, they may have a mixed degree of success. 
This reinforces the need to complement use of community-based justice systems with 
building formal justice systems.129  
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Transitional societies emerging from serious conflict, ‘often adopt amnesty laws to 
consolidate fragile peace or fledgling democracy’.130 For women and communities 
recovering from tactical rape and sexual violence which has constituted such crimes, 
amnesty must not be seen as a viable alternative to accountability – even when 
governments might want to further other goals relating to recovery. The warnings of 
Jaqui True regarding promises made to women by recovering governments but which 
are not eventually delivered must be noted.131 The institutions to support these 
elements of transitional justice, often requiring security sector reform, must be in 
place for recognisable accountability and an end to impunity. It is possible that 
transitional justice may not be given high priority by governments which see other 
priorities for recovery after conflicts. These may reflect more concern for economic 
aspects of recovery and there may be a lack of understanding that transitional justice 
is a basic need of effective, long-lasting recovery. There are sound reasons to 
challenge such resistance to the provision of justice for survivors. As highlighted 
above, the possibility of recurrence, of the spread of violence and of ongoing lack of 
development all have implications beyond the immediate and convincing needs of 
specific communities. The end of conflict and the recovery and rehabilitation phases 
provide important opportunities to call for legal and judicial reforms, which in turn 
can be factors in developing compliance with international standards and law. For 
women in some post-conflict countries, such reforms can be critical in abolishing 
discriminatory laws and practices that keep them dependent on male family members 
and prevent them from participating fully in peacebuilding and reconstruction.132 
The international community, as well as state governments, has responsibilities 
relating to transitional justice. During recovery periods international donors play a 
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significant role in setting priorities for change and development. Many development 
agencies have focused on building national capacity but little on building capacity in 
security and criminal justice, but there is a need to reinforce the sense of needing to 
act for prevention.133 Greater understanding of the inter-relatedness of human 
security and state security, with the consequent understanding of the need for 
security reform and transitional justice to prevent renewed wars, may be more 
compelling than the recognition of the needs of survivors of tactical rape and sexual 
violence. Whatever the motivation, security and justice are essential at both state and 
international levels. 
The Need to Transition from International to National Justice and Security For 
Victims of Sexual Violence in War. 
The UNSC has recognised that ‘when states are unwilling or unable to protect their 
civilians then international actors…may become engaged to remind parties of their 
obligations to protect civilians and may take measures to prevent abuses and protect 
people from harm’ and has progressively identified the protection of civilians as part 
of the business of the UNSC.134 The establishment of the ICTY and ICTR 
represented action by international actors stepping in to provide justice for civilians 
where states were not providing it. Given the analysis and focus in this dissertation 
on the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda these provide useful examples for analyzing 
how justice and security concerns need to transfer from international to state levels.  
The ICTY and ICTR are both nearing conclusion. Each has made contributions to the 
application and interpretation of international law to crimes of tactical rape and 
sexual violence. Each has held accountable at least some perpetrators of these 
crimes. They have defined rape and have defined when tactical rape and sexual 
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violence can be war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. In doing so, each 
has provided valuable grounds and bases for requiring that tactical rape and sexual 
violence in conflict are rejected. The issue of concern now is how justice will be 
delivered to those victims who have not received justice from the tribunals and for 
whom it may seem that their suffering goes unacknowledged and perpetrators go 
unpunished. For these victims and for their communities there must be justice if they 
are to be enabled to move on and if the possibility of renewed violence from a sense 
of unresolved issues is to be prevented. If there is to be security for them within their 
states the security institutions must be legitimate and must be seen to be legitimate. 
Authority to deal with unheard cases must be passed over to legitimate courts. Any 
future tribunals need to function better and lessons must be learned from the 
successes and failures of these two judiciaries. 
In both the ICTY and ICTR the work of investigating sexual crimes has been found 
to be difficult. There must be further attention to training personnel and to setting in 
place systems which respond to the realities of victims within their own cultural 
contexts. John Cencich has acted as an investigator of sexual violence for the ICTY 
and outlined ten specific difficulties he encountered when investigating.135 He 
included in these difficulties the need to recognise and work with differences 
between civil and common law; issues around who is in charge of investigations; 
differences in methods of interrogation; differences regarding admissibility of 
hearsay and circumstantial evidence; differences in ways of using intelligence and 
counter-intelligence; differences in perceived need for personal security and attitudes 
to individual criminal responsibility and joint criminal enterprises.136 While these 
difficulties were put forward from his personal experience as an investigator for the 
ICTY, rather than tested theories, they should be recognised for further enquiry and 
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for developing guidelines for future court investigations. Cencich concluded that it is 
imperative that investigators be properly trained in international criminal law and in 
dealing with inherently different personal and legal needs of accused and accusers 
associated with charges before the courts.137. This is relevant for all crimes being 
investigated including those involving sexual violence if there is to be appropriate 
accountability. 
The work of the two tribunals was carried out with some serious deficits. By the 
tenth anniversary of its establishment, the ICTR had handed down twenty-one 
sentences, with eighteen convictions and three acquittals.138 Ninety percent of those 
cases included no rape convictions and no rape cases were even brought by the 
prosecutor’s office in seventy percent of those cases.139 The report from the UN 
Research Institute for Social Development which provided these statistics claimed 
that the past decade has revealed a lack of political will at senior management level 
to integrate sexual violence crimes into a consistently followed prosecution 
strategy.140 This report was titled, ‘Your Justice is Too Slow’, reflecting the sense of 
frustration of many women in Rwanda. It concluded that prosecutions have been 
hampered by inadequate investigations, by inappropriate investigating methodology 
and a lack of training for staff. Some cases have moved forward without the 
inclusion of rape charges even when the prosecutor had strong evidence of such 
crimes.141. Despite statements about the need for justice for rape victims, the UN ‘has 
managed to transpose some of the crushing limitations and biases that rape victims 
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encounter in their national jurisdictions to the international legal system it 
administers’ and there is concern to ensure the same does not happen at the ICC. 142  
The specific strategy adopted in Rwanda to move accountability and provision of 
justice from the international tribunal to local courts provides some insights to how 
difficult such a process can be in a post-conflict situation. With the ICTR proceeding 
slowly and tens of thousands of cases awaiting trial, Rwanda attempted transition to 
local justice, ‘blending local conflict-resolution traditions with modern punitive legal 
system to deliver justice’.143 This was a transfer of cases to the community-based 
courts known as ‘gacaca’ in the hope that this justice system would have community 
support and would be able to deliver justice to survivors of the genocide, including 
women who had suffered from tactical rape and sexual violence. Human Rights 
Watch reported in 2011 that since 2005, 12,000 courts had tried 1.2 million cases.144 
It needs to be recognised that within a few months after the genocide, jails were 
bursting. By 1998, there were an estimated 130,000 prisoners in jails built for 12,000 
prisoners and conventional courts had tried approximately 1,292 suspects between 
December 1996 and 1998.145 There have been some achievements from this move to 
involve traditional justice systems but there are many concerns. Concerns relate to 
lack of fair trials due to untrained or corrupt judges, lack of rights to legal 
representation and failure of community members to denounce false testimonies 
because they feared reprisal.146 Related to this fear of reprisal is the reality that rape 
has been used as a tactic of war, to humiliate, intimidate and traumatise whole 
communities. Reprisals fuel further violence, and, as the climate descends into 
                                                                
142 Nowrojee, Your Justice is Too Slow, p. 26. 
143Human Rights Watch  Justice Compromised: The Legacy of Rwanda’s Community-based Gacaca 
Courts, Human Rights Watch, 2011, p. 8. 
144 HRW, Justice Compromised, p. 8. 
145 HRW, Justice Compromised, p. 9. 
146 HRW, Justice Compromised, p. 11. 
 313 
 
general lawlessness, opportunistic rape by civilians becomes a normal part of life.147 
Perceived impunity for perpetrators can contribute to the generalised breakdown of 
security within the society. If gacaca courts were to be offering resolution and 
accountability they had to be seen to be just. Security for women testifying also 
needed to be effective. 
Genocide related rape cases, originally deemed to be under the jurisdiction of 
conventional courts, were transferred to gacaca in 2008. Women had preferred 
conventional courts believing they would have a better chance of confidentiality and 
many were surprised and felt betrayed when suddenly cases were transferred to 
gacaca. However, Human Rights Watch reported the government as saying that some 
women had requested a more speedy response and that many victims who had 
contracted HIV/AIDS were dying before courts could hear cases.148 Rape victims 
uniformly expressed disappointment at having to appear in gacaca rather than 
conventional courts, as gacaca proceedings – even behind closed doors – failed to 
protect their privacy. The government had changed relevant laws so gacaca could be 
held behind closed doors – but the nature of the process meant that the whole 
community knew of cases and there were some cases in which there was no witness 
as to whether or not trials were fair.149 Many women, as well as voicing fears 
regarding privacy noted the bias of judges where, for example, in some cases, judges 
were related to the accused and in one case the judge was the brother of a man 
accused of rape during the genocide.150 There were also allegations of women being 
bribed to drop cases and of judges demanding bribes.151 Rape victims were offered 
support counselors but these were limited in number. There were some attempts to 
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respond appropriately with some women being accompanied to gacaca when they 
feared attacks from relatives of the accused. However, complaints were rife. Often 
witnesses failed to appear and gacaca sometimes tried cases with just accused and 
accuser present. Some women found judges asked ‘bad’ or ‘insensitive’ questions 
although there were cases where some women were satisfied with the process and 
outcome.152 There were many complaints that compensation was only awarded in 
cases regarding property, with no compensation being offered to those who had been 
raped.153  
Community-based gacaca courts and national conventional courts continued to try 
individuals for crimes committed during the 1994 genocide. Reporting in 2009, 
Human Rights Watch noted that while some Rwandans felt the gacaca process had 
helped reconciliation, others pointed to corruption and argued that the accused 
received sentences that were too lenient, or were convicted on flimsy evidence154. 
There were also concerns that the government had increasingly but unsuccessfully 
called for foreign jurisdictions, including the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) in Tanzania, and several European countries, to return genocide 
suspects to Rwanda. The government vehemently rejected calls for the ICTR to 
prosecute crimes committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front in 1994. According to 
Human Rights Watch, gacaca courts tried thousands of sexual violence and other 
particularly serious cases, and imposed mandatory lifetime solitary confinement for 
convicted persons. But, in the absence of legislation setting out the implementation 
of this punishment, prison authorities did not isolate prisoners.155 
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Gacaca trials started in 2005 and were initially due to end late in 2007. The closing 
date was then extended to June 2009, but the National Service of Gacaca 
Jurisdictions (SNJG) unexpectedly began gathering new allegations in parts of the 
country and extended the deadline to December.156 This time-frame was extended 
once more until, in July 2010, the government announced that the last cases had been 
finalised. Then two months later, the government announced gacaca would continue 
to review cases considered miscarriages of justice but would hear no new cases.157 
There is concern, of course, that if reviews are again carried out in gacaca, there is 
the same vulnerability to corruption and miscarriages. Human Rights Watch 
recommended that such reviews be carried out by a special unit attached to the 
Supreme Court.158 They also recommended that there be provision of trauma 
counseling and support for victims of sexual abuse.159 In all, there are reasons for 
concern that as the ICTR closes, there will be little application of the findings that 
emerged from its work to ensure justice and appropriate security for victims of 
tactical rape and sexual violence. Failure to effectively resolve their issues does not 
auger well for future stability.  
The situation in the former Yugoslavia also gives reason for concern as the ICTY 
draws to a close and responsibility for ongoing work passes to the national courts and 
judicial systems. Already there are strong grounds for urging better practice in these 
national courts. There are concerns that many perpetrators of tactical rape and sexual 
violence are enjoying impunity for those crimes. Amnesty International has 
concluded that the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has failed to ensure 
justice and reparation for thousands of women who were raped during the 1992-1995 
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war.160 As in Rwanda, there is a perceived failure to comprehensively investigate and 
prosecute before international and national courts. In many cases, women face 
stigmatisation, post-traumatic stress disorder and other psychological and physical 
problems. They often live in poverty and cannot afford medicines. As in Rwanda, 
too, no reparation for victims of sexual violence is required by international law and 
this absence of reparation creates additional difficulties for victims to deal with the 
past and move on with their lives.161 In BiH this situation is exacerbated by women 
survivors of war crimes of sexual violence knowing they are discriminated against 
even at the level of social benefits available to them in comparison with what is 
available to war veterans.162 It seems that recognition of these women as casualties of 
war, victims of rape which was a tactic of war, is not yet achieved. It is in such 
practical ways that governments and communities express attitudes to these abuses.  
The list of obstacles still to be overcome before the justice system functions 
appropriately in cases of sexual violence is long and varied. Legal frameworks are 
often inadequate, which means cases which are prosecuted are adjudicated based on 
legal frameworks not in line with international standards for prosecuting war crimes. 
There is failure to provide adequate protection and support for survivors and 
witnesses and many women are re-traumatised during legal proceedings.163 One call 
from Amnesty International is for amendment of the BiH Criminal Code to include a 
definition of sexual violence in line with international standards and jurisprudence 
related to prosecution of war crimes of sexual violence – by removing the condition 
of ‘force or threat of immediate attack’ from the present definition of sexual 
violence.164 In 2009, Amnesty International also called on the international 
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community to continue support for the State Court of BiH and to provide adequate 
funding for witness support and protection, while BiH authorities were urged to 
develop a state strategy on reparation for victims of war crimes of sexual violence.165 
All of these changes are needed if the justice system is to meet the needs of the 
women of BiH. International donors and agencies need to be prepared to continue 
with such reforms if they are committed to rejecting tactical rape and sexual violence 
in conflicts, which again have the potential to recur when issues are insufficiently or 
inadequately resolved. Transitional justice is an essential element of providing 
security and responses are essential at both state and international levels. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the nature of the security threat posed by tactical rape and 
sexual violence in conflict. It has analysed the security threats inherent in acts which 
are now officially acknowledged as violations of international law: the threat of the 
spread of political and sexual violence across borders; the threat to economic 
development; the threat to societal norms when conflict ceases; the threat of 
recurrence of violence when there is insufficient accountability and justice. The 
chapter has considered the links between women’s security, human security and state 
security with international stability. The role of states has been shown to be crucial in 
the provision of security for its population and this must include providing security 
for women who may become victims of tactical rape and sexual violence in conflict. 
In the immediate aftermath of conflict it is imperative to ensure a viable and 
functioning security sector. Transitional justice provides a basis for recovery, 
rehabilitation and recovery of the state. International initiatives such as the ICTY and 
ICTR represent action taken by the international community – but ensuring the work 
of those judiciaries is taken into state systems is a responsibility which states cannot 
ignore.  
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Recognition that tactical rape and sexual violence in conflict constitute a security 
threat and come within the responsibilities of the UNSC to confront has been a 
significant development. This chapter has argued that there is an ongoing need to 
confront tactical rape and sexual violence in conflict because security threats 
continue. It argues that states have a responsibility to confront tactical rape and 
sexual violence in conflict. States, as well as the UNSC, need to institutionalise 
policies and practices and ensure appropriate security sectors and transitional justice. 
States must eventually accept responsibility for the working and outcomes of 
internationally established ad hoc tribunals.  
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Conclusion: significant progress; ongoing challenges  
This dissertation set out to question the nature and extent of a commitment by the 
international community to confront tactical rape and sexual violence in war since 
the early 1990s. In doing so it considered the conflicts and ad hoc International 
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR). The 
dissertation analysed their contributions to the international community’s eventual 
move to actively reject tactical rape and to articulate and reject the broader practice 
of sexual violence in war. It analysed United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
resolutions, particularly since 2000, to understand the progress of official 
institutionalisation of efforts to confront tactical rape and sexual violence in conflict. 
The dissertation considered how the interests of human security and international 
stability intersect and how the security of women, human security and state security 
interplay.  
The central argument of the dissertation is that despite ongoing use of tactical rape 
and sexual violence in conflict, there has been significant progress in the 
international recognition of sexual violence as a tactic of war. This has led to a 
broader international response to gender-based violence in conflict as these acts have 
been increasingly perceived as a threat to international and human security. There 
certainly remain serious ongoing challenges before women, girls and their 
communities in situations and arenas of conflict are duly protected from these 
violations of international law.  However, the fact that the UNSC recognised sexual 
violence in conflict as a security issue and consequently promoted various forms of 
institutionalisation to confront this threat has been a major achievement. Importantly, 
the dissertation finds evidence of official international recognition that women’s 
vulnerability in peace is exacerbated in times of conflict. This reflects work by 
feminists, activists and certain NGOs over a long period of time and there is, now, an 
official approach to strategising to confront sexual violence in conflict.  
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The dissertation also argues that a number of factors contributed to this development 
in rejecting sexual violence in conflict. The examination of events in the conflicts of 
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia and the related work of the ICTY and ICTR 
established that sexual violence in war violates international humanitarian and 
human rights law. The dissertation finds that a significant development has been 
UNSC realisation of the intersection of the interests of human security and 
international stability which, in turn, has been a major contribution to a normative 
rejection of tactical rape and sexual violence in war. UNSC acknowledgement of the 
threat to international and human security posed by tactical rape and sexual violence 
in war has led to consequent responses to this threat. The dissertation also finds that 
there has been significant contribution made to these developments by a diverse 
range of actors including NGOs, feminist analysts and some states.  
While recognising these significant indicators of progress in rejecting sexual 
violence in conflict, the dissertation does also acknowledge that there remain 
significant challenges to ongoing rejection of sexual violence in war. These 
challenges are particularly in the transfer from international to state-level policies 
and practices. However, the fact that this has been identified and states have been 
required to take action in National Action Plans is itself a major achievement, even 
though there is much still to be done to integrate action to confront sexual violence in 
conflict into state policies and practice. There remains a need for ongoing action at 
international and state levels to prevent these abuses, to protect women and 
communities and to bring to account perpetrators of what are now recognised as 
violations of international law and threats to security. In concluding the argument 
that there has been progress in the international response to gender-based violence in 
conflict, there are five important features that need to be emphasised. 
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Recognition of tactical rape 
First and central to progress since the 1990s in rejecting sexual violence in conflict 
has been the major achievement of the recognition by states and in the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) that rape and sexual violence can be tactics of 
war, employed for political and military gain. Tactical rape was defined for the 
purpose of this analysis in the introduction, because it is a term which the author 
argues encapsulates concerns about the use of widespread rape as a tactic and a 
deliberate strategy in wars since the 1990s. Although rape has been used for 
generations, it was in the changing context of international attitudes to 
humanitarianism that attitudes to this particular violation of civilians began to change 
in the early 1990s. There was public outrage at reports of widespread tactical rape. 
The wars being waged towards the end of the twentieth century were described as 
‘new wars’. These were wars in which attacks on civilians were employed 
deliberately. Attacks on civilians included attacks on women and rape was an 
effective tactic. There were media and public calls for international action to stop the 
rapes which were being reported from the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In the 
early reports regarding rape in the former Yugoslavia, the term ‘rape as a weapon of 
war’ began to circulate.1 It took many years before even this term, which did not 
carry a full understanding of tactical rape, was accepted in general use by NGOs and 
states, as discussed in earlier chapters of this dissertation. The awareness of rape 
being used deliberately for military and political purposes grew and pressure to act 
reached to the United Nations, which demonstrated a concern about tactical rape – a 
concern which broadened to include a wider concern for various forms of sexual 
violence in conflict.  
This dissertation argues that an integral achievement of this significant discourse was 
the recognition that action to confront tactical rape and sexual violence in war meant 
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understanding and confronting the reality that women’s vulnerability in peace is 
exacerbated in war. The concerns of feminist analysts and many NGOs which had 
been articulated for many years were eventually – even if not entirely – officially 
registered in the UNSC as demanding attention. Underlying causes of the total 
impact of tactical rape and sexual violence in conflict were registered as needing to 
be confronted.  
Feminists have argued convincingly that inequalities between men and women which 
contribute to all forms of insecurity can only be understood and explained within the 
framework of patriarchal structures that extend from the household to the global 
economy.2 This is integral to providing protection for women in conflict and for 
ensuring justice for them after wars. Largely because of patriarchal attitudes reflected 
in social relationships and cultural values, rape has long-lasting effects on 
communities who see ‘their’ women raped. Patriarchy, while variously exhibited and 
defined in earlier chapters, is evident in communities and as such an influential 
social, cultural and legal element affecting women and men. In many of these 
patriarchal communities, women are valued as ‘belonging’ to men. Gendered values 
of women include chastity and fertility. Women as well as men often share these 
values so women may estimate their own value through the lens of the communal 
values. This is what makes tactical rape and sexual violence horrifyingly effective. 
Women victims of tactical rape suffer physically, emotionally, economically and 
socially. The effects can continue for generations as children born of tactical rape can 
continue to be ostracised, rejected and impoverished with – and perhaps by – their 
mothers.  
It is concluded therefore that it is significant that there has been formal, international 
recognition at the UNSC that confronting policies and practices which discriminate 
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against women in peace time is an element confronting the use of tactical rape and 
sexual violence in conflict. It is also significant that there has been recognition of the 
responsibility of the international community and states, locally, to respond. This 
responsibility means meeting the need for attention to those social attitudes and 
values inherent in some communities which contribute to tactical rape and sexual 
violence being such perniciously effective strategies to achieve military, territorial 
and political gains. It is a responsibility which includes formulating and 
implementing policies which enhance women’s education, economic independence 
and participation in government.  
Confirming that sexual violence in conflict contravenes IHL 
Second, this dissertation has concluded that establishing tactical rape and sexual 
violence in conflict as contraventions of international humanitarian law has been 
essential to the moral condemnation of tactical rape and sexual violence in war. The 
outcomes of the ICTY and ICTR as they investigated breaches of international 
humanitarian law examined cases of rape and sexual violence in those conflicts, 
provided the legal basis for international concern. The two ad hoc tribunals were 
enabled to investigate and to bring to account perpetrators of violence in the two 
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The tribunals were mandated to 
apply existing international law, not to establish new law. However, it proved 
possible to prosecute tactical rape within the existing legal framework. This was an 
important development as the tribunals demonstrated that application and 
interpretation of existing law was sufficient to recognise and confront the reality of 
tactical rape and sexual violence in war as breaches of established law. With 
indictments and judgements came a broadening of concern about rape into concern 
for all forms of sexual violence in war, encapsulating what was tactical rape and 
other forms of sexual violence. The term ‘rape’ was finally defined comprehensively 
and international law was found to be applicable in various ways.  
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At the ICTY, there were judgements regarding rape as a crime against humanity, a 
war crime, slavery and torture. Chapter 3 of this dissertation showed that there were 
specific clarifications and definitions which were extremely valuable in setting legal 
precedence and in ensuring recognition that tactical rape and sexual violence in war 
contravene international law. There was clarification of terms within international 
law such as ‘protected persons’ and of when international law applied to conflicts 
within as well as across borders. At the ICTR, the subject of Chapter 4, it was 
established that rape and sexual violence could be methods of genocide. Following 
initial resistance to calling rape in certain circumstances a means of contributing to 
genocide, the work of the Tribunals contributed to the eventual (albeit limited) 
acknowledgement of it as such under the terms of the International Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Part of this 
acknowledgment was that rape had become increasingly not only a weapon of war 
but also a policy-determined, tactical weapon of genocide. The term ‘sexual violence 
in war’ was used frequently as an extension of the initial abhorrence for rape which 
was used as a tactic. These were important developments in a discourse leading to 
rejection of sexual violence in war. The international community of states has 
formally rejected genocide and accepted the responsibility to prevent and respond to 
genocide. There is now a consequent responsibility to respond to tactical rape and 
sexual violence where these are used to perpetrate genocide. It is, however, 
recognised that the reluctance sometimes demonstrated by states to respond to events 
which could be deemed genocide may also apply to tactical rape and sexual violence 
in war. 
The testimonies of many women in the tribunals exposed underlying social attitudes. 
This included attitudes demonstrated in the operation of the tribunals themselves, 
with judges and prosecutors reflecting at times levels of insensitivity and a lack of 
care that must shock any observer. The extent and intrinsic cruelty of the rapes and 
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sexual violence documented in survivor and witness accounts in both conflict arenas 
demonstrated the deliberate, planned and authorised nature of attacks on women. 
They also demonstrated the multi-facetted and long-term suffering of victims. 
Discourse leading to rejection of tactical rape and sexual violence in war accelerated 
as the work of the tribunals was disseminated. At the international level, at least, 
grounds for rejection of these abuses grew with recognition that they were 
established violations of international law. Given these achievements, which 
provided legal grounds for rejecting tactical rape and sexual violence in war, the 
conclusion, therefore, is that the conflicts and the ICTY and ICTR did make 
significant contributions to the international community’s eventual rejection of such 
abuses.  
The analysis of testimonies and court proceedings at the ICTY and ICTR has resulted 
in the conclusion that the serious reservations, especially on the part of feminist 
analysts as discussed in Chapter 1 are indeed justified. The potential for negative 
impact on women who had suffered from tactical rape and sexual violence being 
required to testify in these tribunals is clear. These reservations were shown to be 
credible, especially as accounts of women’s experiences in the tribunals began to 
emerge. The testimonies referenced in Chapters 3 and 4 regarding the insensitivity of 
courts and of judges and investigators, the risks and indignities encountered by 
witnesses and the limited attention paid to tactical rape and sexual violence – all 
these demonstrated the need for greater understanding and more effective responses 
when responding to the crimes of tactical rape and sexual violence in war. There 
were lessons learned about the operation of courts and judiciaries dealing with 
witnesses and with the requirement to pay due attention to tactical rape and sexual 
violence as violations of accepted international humanitarian law. On balance, the 
outcome of these two judiciaries contributed positively to case law, legal definitions, 
recognition of the need for accountability of perpetrators and in so doing did support 
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rejection of tactical rape and sexual violence at international level. Despite some 
reservations and ongoing challenges discussed below, it is concluded that the work of 
the ICTY and ICTR in establishing sexual violence in war as a contravention of 
international humanitarian law has under-pinned progress in understanding and 
acceptance by the UNSC that sexual violence in war constitutes a threat to both 
human security and to the security of states.  
Establishing sexual violence in conflict as a security issue 
Third, this dissertation has also argued that the acceptance that the issue of sexual 
violence against women in conflict falls within the mandate of the UNSC has been 
another momentous achievement. The nature of the security threat posed by sexual 
violence in war is increasingly being officially recognised. It is the conclusion of this 
dissertation that the question regarding the extent to which interests of human 
security and international stability intersect and contribute to a normative rejection of 
tactical rape and sexual violence has begun to be answered. Chapter 7 considered the 
significant work undertaken on human security and the inter-relatedness of human 
security and security of states. It was established that unresolved sexual violence in 
war, where there was insufficient or unsatisfactory accountability and justice, leads 
to recurring conflict. As was noted earlier, it was common in both Rwanda and the 
former Yugoslavia to hear participants in violence say they were avenging earlier 
events. When perpetrators of sexual violence escape accountability and are granted 
impunity, the cycles of enmity can continue. It was also established that conflict in 
one state can spill over into neighbouring states. There is evidence from the World 
Bank, noted in Chapter 7 that economic development is impeded when neighbouring 
states are in conflict. There is evidence also noted earlier that tactical rape can erode 
social norms to the point that, without accountability for perpetrators, the violations 
which occur in conflict carry over into peace time. There can be a cycle of violence 
against women in peacetime leading to violence against women in war, leading to 
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renewed conflict and more violence against women in war. It has been recognised at 
the UNSC that women’s security as part of human security is closely interlinked with 
the security of states.  
This recognition of sexual violence in war as a security threat has been reflected in 
unanimous passage of UNSC resolutions and particularly in the open debate around 
UNSC 1820 in 2008 which was discussed in detail in Chapter 6. The consideration 
and analysis of UNSC resolutions leads to the conclusion that a considerable degree 
of commitment to rejecting tactical rape and understanding the broader concept of 
sexual violence in war has been evinced in important ways by the UNSC since the 
1990s. Building on specific decisions of the ICTY and ICTR, which made clear that 
these abuses were violations of existing international law, the United Nations began 
to take steps towards confronting what was increasingly perceived to be a security 
threat falling within the mandate of the Security Council. 
As seen in Chapter 5 of this dissertation, the UNSC demonstrated its involvement 
when in 2000 it passed a landmark resolution, UNSCR 1325. It was this resolution, 
passed unanimously by all member states of the UNSC, that demanded action be 
taken to confront sexual violence in all its forms (including tactical rape) and steps 
taken for the prevention of this abuse and for prosecution of perpetrators. The 
resolution was remarkable for the breadth of understanding of the nature, sources and 
effect of sexual violence in war and for the recognition of it as a violation of 
international law. Perhaps even more remarkable was the explicit acknowledgement 
that if women are vulnerable in peacetime, their vulnerability is exacerbated in times 
of conflict. Confronting sexual violence in war, therefore, required confronting social 
attitudes, community structures and value systems which render women vulnerable 
to violence in peacetime. There was recognition of the particular needs of women in 
conflict and in peace, whether that peace preceded or followed conflict. There was 
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also recognition of the potential for women to play constructive roles in peacemaking 
and reconciliation. This resolution was a major step in international efforts to 
prohibit tactical rape and sexual violence in war.  
UNSCR 1325 was passed unanimously and all member states had a responsibility to 
act on issues included in the resolution. However, states were slow to take practical 
steps to incorporate the resolution into national policies and practice so all states 
were asked to formulate National Action Plans (NAPs) to ensure such state level 
policy and practice. It is concluded that the resolution was a significant step in the 
discourse rejecting sexual violence in war because it was an overt attempt by the 
UNSC to strengthen state capabilities in addressing sexual violence. It is also argued 
that the UNSC requiring states to formulate National Action Plans was a significant 
step even if there is still a long way to go before commitment to rejecting sexual 
violence in war is effectively institutionalised at the national level of many member 
states.  
While UNSCR 1325 was widely acclaimed, there was some continuing debate about 
whether or not tactical rape and sexual violence were issues for the UNSC. Were 
these acts security threats for states? At one level, there was acceptance that 
deliberate, policy-based, widespread violation of international law contributed to 
international instability. But, until 2008, questions were still raised about the 
alignment of rejection of sexual violence in war and the mandate of the UNSC. In 
2008, as discussed in Chapter 6, in an open debate preceding the passage of another 
key resolution, UNSCR 1820, member states formally acknowledged the links 
between tactical rape, sexual violence in war and security. This resolution and 
UNSCR 1888 (2009), UNSCR 1889 (2009) and UNSCR 1960 (2010) which 
followed represented further steps in institutionalising the focus and confrontation of 
sexual violence in the structure and practice of the UNSC. Once it had been 
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recognised – as indicated in UNSC 1325 – that approaches to prevention and 
protection require a range of diverse strategies then appropriate implementation of 
UNSC resolutions was more likely to be effected. The effects of UNSC 1325 and 
other UNSC resolutions look promising and there has been significant progress in 
institutionalising UN responses to tackling sexual violence in conflict. There are 
however, ongoing challenges to be considered later in this conclusion. 
Contributors to progress in the discourse rejecting sexual violence in conflict 
Fourth, this dissertation has concluded that various stakeholders have played 
significant roles in achieving this recognition of UNSC responsibility to recognise 
and confront tactical rape and sexual violence in war. The role of feminist analysts 
such as those who have informed this dissertation is acknowledged. Other 
stakeholders have included NGOs, activists and governments. In particular, it is a 
conclusion of this dissertation that the ongoing role of NGOs and civil society groups 
should be acknowledged in the development of the international rejection of tactical 
rape and sexual violence in war. Analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 showed that even the 
UN Special Rapporteurs, appointed to investigate human rights abuses in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda did not acknowledge the wide spread use of tactical rape 
and sexual violence in those two arenas of conflict and genocide. Those chapters 
demonstrate that early reports from these investigators failed to record what was 
glaringly apparent to humanitarian aid workers, peacekeepers and NGO observers – 
that there was widespread use of tactical rape and sexual violence in those conflicts 
and genocide. As shown in Chapter 5, the sustained pressure exerted by those NGOs 
and civil society groups eventually resulted in UNSC 1325. 
The role of NGOs in investigating and recording early reports of mass rapes 
demonstrates the contributions of these groups to sustaining pressure on the UN to 
respond. An important strategy included in the operation of NGOs at the time of 
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reporting about tactical rape and sexual violence was the collation of personal 
testimonies and data about the number, type, targets and extent of the violations. 
These records, as demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 4, provided grounds for 
recognising the reality of tactical rape and sexual violence and a basis for 
acknowledging that such practices constituted a threat to the international community 
as well as a threat to women. As noted, a representative of the World Council of 
Churches (WCC) provided a briefing for the European Council’s investigative team 
into the former Yugoslavia and its own report.3 Reports from the WCC and other 
NGOs also helped apply pressure for the UN Special Rapporteurs to take note of the 
rapes and sexual violence and for the establishment of the two tribunals, ICTY and 
ICTR.4 The role of NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and writers such as Binaifer 
Nowrojee indicate the power of advocacy groups when they alert the international 
community to violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.5  
Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink recognised the role of trans-
national advocacy networks.6 So, too, did Jacqui True who wrote of trans-national 
networks of women’s NGOs as being conduits of information and best practice 
models but also of their ‘knowledge concerning alternative political strategies and 
how they may be applied to further promote gender policy change’.7 Analysis of the 
development of normative rejection of tactical rape and sexual violence in war 
confirms the value of such networks in sharing information as a method of bringing 
pressure for change.  
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7 J True, ‘Mainstreaming gender in global public policy’ International Feminist Journal of Politics 5-
3 November 2003, p. 377.  
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Whereas pressure from NGOs sharing information and demanding responses had 
been key in the adoption of UNSC 1325, the next major step, UNSCR 1820, came as 
a result of pressure from specific states. Chapter 6 includes detail of the role of states 
in advocating for a further resolution which provided for monitoring and 
implementing specific actions to confront the concerns raised in and by UNSCR 
1325. The chapter noted that in this instance some NGOs were hesitant to raise 
perceived weaknesses in UNSCR 1325, fearing to undermine the positive impact of 
that resolution but states such as the United Kingdom took the lead in calling for 
another resolution which would take further the progress inherent in UNSCR 1325.  
Member states of the UN were also active in a number of areas related to confronting 
sexual violence in war. In 2000, the same year as UNSCR 1325 was passed, the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) came into operation. The mandate of the ICC, as 
has been discussed earlier in this dissertation, included dealing with crimes such as 
tactical rape and sexual violence. This was a development which went beyond the 
time limited, specific conflict related, ad hoc tribunals. In effect, states had agreed 
that accountability was essential for breaches such as those being identified by the 
ICTY and ICTR. It is concluded that normative change can be instigated and 
sustained by productive partnerships between states and NGOs, particularly when 
states perceive it is in their own interest to promote such change.  
Chapter 1 noted the three types of socialisation processes necessary for enduring 
change identified by Risse, Ropp and Sikkink: first, the processes of adaptation and 
strategic bargaining; second, the processes of moral consciousness-raising, 
‘shaming’, argumentation, dialogue and persuasion and thirdly the processes of 
institutionalisation and habitualisation.8 In the case of normative rejection and 
condemnation of tactical rape and sexual violence these stages have overlapped and 
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occurred in parallel. It was a significant development when states at the UNSC, after 
considerable debate, endorsed this normative rejection unanimously. Given the 
reservations outlined in Chapter 6 it could be surmised that at least some of those 
states did so for strategic motives in a desire to win approval from other states – and 
possibly, political and economic benefits in so doing. However, as Risse, Ropp and 
Sikkink noted, to ‘endorse a norm not only expresses a belief, but also creates an 
impetus for behaviour consistent with the belief’.9  
Whatever their motives may be when responding, it is notable that states have found 
themselves required to formulate national action plans and to support changes in 
policy and practice at global levels. Not all states have yet complied, but the fact of 
the requirement on states to enact national policies and practices could result in 
moves to the second stage, accompanying or eventual moral consciousness raising. 
This could have the positive result that the normative rejection, which may have been 
adopted at global level but given only rhetorical support by some leaders, may 
eventually become internalised as new leaders, used to hearing the rhetoric come to 
believe and accept what has become collective expectations. Consequently, ‘the goal 
of socialisation is for the actors to internalise norms, so that external pressure is no 
longer needed to ensure compliance’.10 It can be concluded that international actors 
and organisations such as those at the UNSC and Assembly have begun to state the 
rejection of tactical rape and sexual violence in war in specific resolutions – and 
those resolutions are increasingly accompanied by specific institutionalised policies 
and practices.  
Effecting substantive change requires serious work in institutionalising and 
resourcing policies and practices and there has been member state support for such 
institutionalisation at the UN. Resolutions at UNSC have been valuable in moving 
                                                                
9 Risse, Ropp & Sikkink, p. 7. 
10 Risse, Ropp & Sikkink,  p. 11. 
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forward understanding of how to confront sexual violence in war, but practical action 
has been needed to see many elements of those resolutions implemented. The 
analysis of UNSCRs 1820 and 1888 in Chapter 6 detailed that senior appointments 
were made, teams of experts were established, on-going procedures for regular 
reporting were set in train and budget allocations agreed by states at the UNSC. The 
UNSC agreed a policy of zero tolerance for sexual violation and exploitation by 
peacekeepers was to be instituted. UNSCR1888 included a requirement regarding 
peacekeeping and encouragement for states, ‘to increase access to health care, 
psychological support, legal assistance and socio-economic reintegration services for 
victims of sexual violence in particular in rural areas’.11 Training programmes for all 
personnel involved in the aftermath of conflicts were to include gender-related issues 
and women were to be actively recruited and involved in all UN activities relating to 
peacekeeping, peacemaking and reconstruction and recovery initiatives. UNSCR 
1888 reinforced the decisions that teams of experts were to be immediately deployed 
to situations of particular concern with respect to sexual violence in armed conflict, 
working through the UN presence on the ground with the consent of the host 
government to assist national authorities to strengthen the rule of law.12 Data 
collection by a range of stakeholders including UN agencies, governments and 
development funders, continues to be imperative if the issue of tactical rape and 
sexual violence in conflict is to receive due attention. UNSC reports being required 
to include information regarding sexual violence and support for the work of the 
Special Representative are positive developments.  
It is, therefore, a further conclusion of this dissertation that, as a result of the work by 
diverse stakeholders, there has been significant institutionalising at the UN to ensure 
resources are available for the ongoing work of confronting sexual violence in 
conflict. These resources include staffing, training and documentation and recording 
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of incidence and extent of tactical rape and sexual violence in conflict. These are all 
important steps to ensure effective planning and post-conflict strategies for recovery, 
reconstruction and rehabilitation of individuals and communities. By 2011, it was 
clear that at international level, as evidenced by these resolutions and accompanying 
implementation of a range of policies, that there was considerable institutionalised 
commitment to confronting sexual violence in war. In March 2012, a statement from 
the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) demonstrated 
ongoing and regional institutionalisation, noting that it would, ‘continue to examine 
ways to integrate into the activities of the Organisation, the relevant parts of 
UNSCR1325 and related resolutions’ and its decision to appoint an OSCE Special 
Representative on Gender Issues.13 
Ongoing challenges 
Fifth, there have been significant developments in confronting tactical rape and 
sexual violence in conflict but there remain ongoing challenges. This dissertation 
argues there have been major developments in discourse regarding normative 
rejection and condemnation of tactical rape and sexual violence in war. It argues also 
that a challenge is to build on this discourse and to ensure that this rejection is 
sustained, strengthened and translated more seriously from global to state levels. The 
developing normative rejection of sexual violence in war must be mainstreamed in 
all states and in all aspects of humanitarian response.  
The challenge, therefore, is to build on the achievement of requiring states to develop 
and support sustained, extended actions to confront sexual violence in war 
effectively. States must continue to work with the UN to develop further legal and 
normative frameworks which have been set in train with the developments charted in 
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this dissertation. States must recognise their responsibilities to cooperate for effective 
data collection and documentation of the incidence of tactical rape and sexual 
violence in war, essential for planning post-conflict strategies. International and 
national stakeholders, government and non-government, must prioritise 
strengthening state level institutions such as the security sector and judiciaries. 
International assistance needs to be sustained and to focus on security sector reform 
as well as strengthening national justice systems and courts. Together, they must 
ensure that demobilisation and rehabilitation strategies are designed to take women’s 
roles and experiences into account. Approaches which are inclusive of women in 
recovery and development are essential.  
Closely related is the conclusion that a further challenge will be to ensure state 
policies and practices in the aftermath of conflict recognise that while men and 
women civilians share some of the same needs, women also suffer gender-related 
violence in war, often linked to and exacerbated by their pre-conflict status. For 
effective peacebuilding, there must be attention to the pre-conflict status of women. 
As has been noted, women vulnerable to violence in peacetime are even more 
vulnerable in conflict when attacks on them are deemed to be attacks on their 
communities. This becomes part of a cycle as civil wars recur: peacetime 
vulnerability leads to wartime vulnerability which leads to post-conflict 
vulnerability. Confronting and dealing with the issue of women’s status has been 
recognised as essential for peacebuilding. William Durch and Alison Giffen found 
that the pre-conflict status of women significantly affects the probability of 
successful peacebuilding when a peacekeeping operation is present:  
The higher the pre-conflict status of women, the greater was the probability of peace 
building within five years of the end of conflict. In other words protecting and 
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empowering women in post war settings, often cast as a moral imperative, can also 
be seen as an operational necessity for building sustainable peace.14 
This finding is indicative of the growing realisation that an ongoing challenge in 
building security in states post-conflict is building security for women.  
This dissertation also concludes that serious challenges have emerged alongside the 
achievements of the ICTY and ICTR. Continued and sustained action at a number of 
levels and by a number of stakeholders is needed to cement progress achieved in 
those judiciaries. National and international monitors of the tribunals must watch 
how these tribunals pass over responsibilities to national and domestic judiciaries. 
They need to observe and evaluate how the gacaca community courts of Rwanda as 
discussed earlier, deal with all the remaining cases. It will be necessary to see how 
communities deal with considerable backlogs of cases and to see if impunity is in 
any way dented. Importantly, it will be necessary to observe how or if the continuing 
tensions between competing calls for attention in the courts in both Rwanda and the 
former Yugoslavia are lessened or exacerbated when international steps for 
accountability appear to be lessening. Lessons can be learned about the need for 
witness protection, training for court personnel dealing with survivors of tactical rape 
and sexual violence and programmes to confront existing communal and social 
attitudes to survivors and their children. All these need to be the foundation for state 
and international actions relating to the aftermath of conflicts. The challenge is to 
ensure that in transitions from conflict to peace, tactical rape and sexual violence are 
dealt with to the same extent as other breaches of international humanitarian law.  
                                                                
14 WJ Durch and AC Giffen, Challenges of Strengthening the Protection of Civilians in Multi-
Dimensional Peace Operations, Background paper prepared for the 3rd International Forum for the 
Challenges of Peace-Keeping Operations, Australia, 27-29 April 2010. 
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There are other ongoing challenges at international level. Member states of the UN 
must ensure and sustain an ongoing, well-funded and resourced focus on the 
prevention of tactical rape and sexual violence in war and ensure appropriate steps 
and strategies for prosecution of perpetrators. As indicated in resolutions to date, this 
must include strategies of peacekeeping, peacemaking and transitional justice in 
recovery, reconstruction and rehabilitation phases post conflict. These include 
continuing to tackle issues of concern regarding peace support operations, efforts to 
integrate gender perspectives across the work of the UN and its agencies and 
preventing sexual exploitation. All these require ongoing budget allocations for 
staffing, funding and meeting enforcement deficiencies. An ongoing challenge comes 
from the fact that to support this work, further field research and active scholarly 
debate on UN policies are still urgently needed.15  
Closely allied is the need to ensure data collation and to provide resources for 
research into the extent, impact and confrontation of tactical rape and sexual violence 
in conflict. Research and academic analysis of causes and strategies to prevent sexual 
violence in conflict, to bring perpetrators to account and to meeting the needs of 
survivors – this must be encouraged and enabled. The UN, through its agencies, 
which are now required to mainstream women’s issues, must include resources to 
ensure women’s concerns are researched, analysed, incorporated into policy and are 
monitored in all areas relating to post-conflict activity and crises which involve 
women likely to have been victims of tactical rape and sexual violence. This must be 
an ongoing concern and challenge for the Special Representative appointed by the 
Secretary General, as noted earlier, to provide, ‘coherent and strategic leadership’ in 
coordination and collaboration with other entities primarily through the inter-agency 
                                                                
15 A Nduka-Agwu, ‘Doing Gender After the War: Dealing with Gender Mainstreaming and Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse in Peace Support Operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone’, Civil Wars, vol. 11, 
no. 2, June 2009, pp. 179-199. 
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initiative, ‘United Nations Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict’ in situations 
of particular concern regarding sexual violence.16  
Many other challenges have emerged in the course of this dissertation and will 
require specific attention from states and international organisations. It will be 
important that responses to prevent and confront sexual violence is coordinated so 
that concerns for women, children, men and boys are not competing for funds and 
practical institutional support and there must be further attention to the staffing, 
training and resourcing of ad hoc tribunals – the Tribunal for Sierra Leone will 
continue after the ICTY and ICTR conclude. Despite the significant development of 
discourse regarding tactical rape and sexual violence in conflict, changes are needed 
in societal attitudes to these abuses.  
Guidance and direction is needed as to how to implement many of the decisions 
regarding women’s role in peacebuilding. These strategies may include setting up 
advisory groups, appointing gender focal points in government departments and 
generally ensuring that civil society organisations and women’s groups are supported 
practically to participate in policy and practice decisions. These are very practical 
strategies and often it is such practicalities which either facilitate or prevent women’s 
participation in building their own security and peace in their own communities. 
Issues of funding must underlie all practical efforts at protection and security at state 
and international levels if tactical rape and sexual violence are to be confronted. 
Conclusion 
Sadly, as Chapter 7 highlighted, tactical rape and sexual violence in war continued 
into 2011 and will probably continue into the future. In the conflicts of the DRC, 
involving multiple warring factions, all sides are employing these tactics. Women 
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and girls suffer disproportionately. Men and boys are being increasingly targeted. 
The children of tactical rapes perpetrated in the 1990s are now teenagers or young 
adults. It can be concluded that if this generation does not see practical policies and 
practices to end impunity for perpetrators of sexual violence in war and to strengthen 
protection of women in peacetime, then there are grounds to fear recurring violence.  
However, this dissertation argues that there has been significant progress in the 
discourse regarding tactical rape and sexual violence in conflict. There has been at 
last recognition by the UNSC that tactical rape and sexual violence can be used for 
military or political goals. Establishing that tactical rape and sexual violence in war 
contravene international law has been another important step in providing official 
and legal grounds for rejecting such violations. There has been recognition that 
women’s vulnerability in peace time exacerbates their vulnerability in conflict and 
that underlying causes of such vulnerability must be confronted. The recognition by 
the UNSC that tactical rape and sexual violence in conflict constitute a security threat 
- bringing responsibility to confront them into the UNSC responsibilities – has been a 
major step. Resolutions reflecting an international normative rejection of tactical rape 
and sexual violence are strongly indicative that the international community and 
states will not accept such practices on the part of states or warring factions. Specific 
resolutions and allied responses such as establishing courts to investigate and 
prosecute perpetrators do represent a significant commitment by the international 
community to reject tactical rape and sexual violence in war. There have also been 
practical steps taken to institutionalise UN capacity and the capacity of states and 
regions to respond to the threats of tactical rape and sexual violence in war.  
This dissertation also argues that there are ongoing challenges in confronting the 
continued use of tactical rape and sexual violence in conflict. But, with all these 
challenges, it is concluded that in the ways highlighted in this dissertation, there has 
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been progress - in many ways remarkable progress - in recognising the reality and 
the implications of tactical rape and sexual violence in war. After centuries of states 
and the international community appearing to ignore, accept, condone or exploit the 
prevalence of rape and sexual violence in war, an international discourse involving 
these states and international policy makers has emerged. This discourse incorporates 
a rejection of tactical rape and sexual violence in war by considering such practices 
and violations of international for humanitarian law and articulating specific 
measures to institutionalise this rejection. 
~  §  ~ 
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